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Public space is defined as a place ordained by law or custom
to be the point of public assembly at which the political decisions
taken by the governing authority are made. Such decisions are politi-
cal because they are a necessary part of the general responsibility
for the welfare of the whole society which has been consistently
regarded as the special function of the political order. The
assembled group represents the generality of society, speaks in its
name and is concerned with society's attempt to articulate what is
common or general to its life. The decisions taken in the public
space are "public" when those who are to be affected by them have phy-
sical access to the place where they are made, and the privilege of
either directly participating in or at least of observing the debates
and political processes through which the decisions are taken.
The theory of the public space was outlined in its "pure"
classical form in the Politics of Aristotle. This work lay behind the
v i i i
actual practices of men and informed the state structures they
designed at several points in subsequent European history. Both the
theory and practice of state constitution based on a public space
politics can be seen to constitute an Atlantic Republican tradition.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore ancient and modern
articulations of Republican ideas, as theories and as practices, in
order to develop a model through which the political processes of the
contemporary United States Congress can be explored and evaluated.
The rules and procedures of Congress were drastically altered
during the 1950s and 1970s. These changes profoundly affect the
nature of the politics that takes place there. Professional students
generally agree that the fundamental basis and range of Congressional
power is subject to periodic shifts and that these can be better
understood by analyzing the body di achronical ly. Further, they assert
that while Congress serves special interests well, its national
constituency is being ignored. Given our classical model and a sum-
mary of the history of Congress, can we determine whether it functions
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CHAPTER I
THE FAILURE OF CONGRESS: CRISIS IN PUBLIC SPACE POLITICS
We lived in a time of troubles, when the very torpor of
our momentum let us see what monsters and what heroes we
could make of ourselves in imagination--the monsters of our
behaviour newly seen, and the heroes of our struggle with
that conduct newly construed. Newly seen and newly
construed: for not only did we live in a time of troubles, we
lived also in a time when we were learning a whole set of
techniques for finding--even creating--trouble : new ways of
undermining personality and conviction and belief and human
rel ation.
R.P. Blackmur
The Concept of Public Space
The following dissertation is an attempt to explore some of
the philosophical and historical dimensions of what I call "public
space" politics. Public space is defined as a place ordained by law
or custom to be the point of assembly at which the political deci-
sions taken by a governing authority are made. Such decisions are
political because, in the words of Sheldon Wolin, "they are a
necessary part of the general responsibility for the welfare of the
whole society which has been consistently regarded as the special
function of the political order. "^ The assembled group represents
the generality of society, speaks in its name and is "concerned with
society's attempt to articulate what is common or general to its
life." The decisions taken in the public space are "public" when
1
2those who are to be affected by them have physical access to the
place where they are made, and the privilege of either directly par-
ticipating in or at least of observing the debates and political pro-
cesses through whicb the political decisions are taken. Hence this
"space" of meeting often comes to have great symbolic significance,
for it sets apart that association which is directed to the welfare
of the whole from any lesser association, and so represents general
or common, rather than particular goods. The activity which public
space makes possible is an integrating activity, above and beyond the
heterogeneity of the private sphere, in which a living reality of
active collaboration for individuals comes into being precisely
because the issues raised there affect everyone.
What "happens" in a public space is political action: an
integration of diverse elements and interests through a dialogue
between uncoerced participants about common issues or concerns such
that a general consensus is created and its decisions enacted into
policy. The concrete opportunity for political action saves the
people from lethargy and inattention to public business, i.e.,
from lapsing into letting others take care of that business for
them. No multiplication of fragmentary constituencies or partial
interests will provide a substitute for a common public space open to
all.
Theories of direct democracy stress that the relationship
between the individual citizen and the public realm be unmediated.
3Democracy means government literally by the social estate of the
people, that is, not simply a government electively derived from the
people, but a government actually consisting of all of the citizens.
Nearly all business is conducted by the assembled multitude of citi-
zens, and such theories thus describe a government of all over all.
The public space at the heart of such a government must be large
enough, then, to physically accommodate everyone who lives in the
society and who has been granted the right to participate in deli-
beration and action.
Republic theories of government, on the other hand, are a
logical consequence of the growth of large polities: once the city
reaches a certain size it becomes impratical to frequently assemble
all of the citizens to deliberate upon every matter of public impor-
tance. Hence arises the theory of the elective derivation of
government from the people to representatives chosen by them. The
public space persists as a constant element here; still seen as a
necessary condition for the determination of the common good; still
the central element in a political theory which associates the con-
cepts of justice, participation and public life. But now, everyone
in the society does not have equal access to the public space. Those
who have access to its debates and political processes are generally
accorded the label "representative" and receive the power to act
politically for others through some kind of election or selection
process. Historical constructions of the concepts "citizen" and
4"representative" have been characterized by considerable fluidity as
the following study will show, but one constant element seems to be
this: although a person need not always be a representative to have
citizen rights, representatives are drawn exclusively from the body
of citizens. Debates in the republican tradition, then, center first
on what criteria legitimately admit one to the represented group,
second, on the proper nature of the relationship between represen-
tative and represented, and third, on the qualities that must be pre-
sent in each of the participating individuals if the process is to
work as intended. Behind all such discussions lies the common view
that citizenship itself is not a right but a privilege restricted to
qualified individuals on the basis of criteria established by the
community.
Both democratic and republican versions of the public space
politics are, ultimately derived from Greek conceptions and practices.
At various times, each was brought into being by some of the ancient
city-states that dotted the Hellenic sea coasts and countryside. Fran
their practical experiments with such forms of government we have
inherited many of our traditions and much of our vocabulary about
pol i tics.
For what has come to be known as the republican political tra-
dition, the earliest and most important theory of politics is the
pol itika of Aristotle,^ which has come down to us in the fonn of two
separate texts, the Nichomachean Ethics and the Politics . The former
5deals wi.th ethical questions involving individual arete and the ends
of individual life; it is primarily concerned with the problems of
living a "good life" insofar as that life is private and personal.
The latter takes up similar questions but in the context of the poli-
tical society and the role of the citizen; it inquires into the nature
of the "good life" insofar as that life is lived and shared with
others in the public realm, and insofar as its attainment can be
established as an object of common action.
Though the influence of both of these texts on subsequent
generations of scholars and political actors has been immeasurable,
we shall concentrate primarily on the doctrine of "polity" or "mixed
government" which is presented for the most part in the third and
fourth books of the Pol i tics . Here, more than anywhere else, we
find the notions of a free citizenry actively participating in the
power of government, and a doctrine of citizen equality and political
ethics that merges private and common goods through the activity of
collective participation in public affairs. This is not Aristotle's
ideal form of government, nor is it by any means the only possible
form of government that he considers, but it is the form that he
claims to have the greatest practical efficacy for the organization
of the majority of states and the majority of men. For Aristotle,
the Polity is not the "ideal best" but the "practical best" form of
government. The reading of Aristotle which follows emphasizes the
theory of the polity at the expense of other possible schemes of
6government, and while some may feel that I am in danger of making
him a theorist of the pol i ty--which he is not--it is this concept
of the mixed government design which has served as the basic
blueprint for countless succeeding political theories and revolu-
tions.
In formulating the mixed government theory, Aristotle's
question seems to have been as follows: "given the nature of men as
they are--i.e., as history and our contemporary societies show them
to be--what is the most effective formula for ordering the polis that
we can find which will allow them to express the social diversity of
human experience and interests, yet contain them in a political unity
based upon common values, friendship and a shared public life?" This
gives rise to ancillary questions: What is the role that values must
play in the evolution and maintenance of a common way of life; how
can the frictions of social inequality be minimized and the stability
and daily functions of a shared way of life be maintained? Can we
assure stability and the long continuance of our city in such a way
that the end result will be of demonstrable positive benefit to every
citizen in the pol i
s
? Can we arrange our affairs in such a way that
not only will our material needs be taken care of, but also that
decadence and luxury for the few at the expense of the many become
impossible, and the highest potentialities of mankind thus nurtured
and flourish here?
Aristotle's answer to the last questions seems to be a
7qualified "yes" provided that some set of institutional arrangements
be discovered which provides for broad participation in the daily
search for answers. For Aristotle, such arrangements will evolve
around a public assembly of legislating citizens who gather together
in a public space. These citizens are the ones who make the law and
change the law, and it is through a combination of education and the
concrete experience of participation in politics that their emotional
and intellectual support of the constitution and the public life of
the pol is are established and maintained. When citizens so gather at
this center, important consequences follow. First, the public space
provides a symbolic point of entry for the individual citizen into a
common, public realm of shared experiences. This is set off absolu-
tely from private, personal realms of human life, for the factors
which impel the assemblage involve common concerns and common needs.
Second, the gathering together of heterogeneous citizens, qua members
of different and even opposed social classes makes it possible for
them to mediate their differences through public discourse, to
establish consensus through that dialogue, and hence to act collec-
tively. Thus the public space provides individuals the opportunity
for political action, and society the possibility of collective
action. For a society must act, despite its internal conflicts,
without breaking apart, and the only way it can do so without systema-
tically overriding some interests is to incorporate them into the
decisionmaking process--i .e.
,
by making political actors out of every
8citizen and insuring that his interests shall be articulated in the
public dialogue.
In what follows, then, I hope it will become clear that the
public space itself is the defining characteristic of any system of
politics based upon collective participation of unlike citizens, and
that having or not having access to it is what distinguishes citizens
of polities from other members of society. We shall see that it is
the citizens who emerge from tbe privatized background of social life
to create and use the public space and to participate in public life.
We shall also see that having access to the public space is what
determines a citizen in fact and distinguishes him from a citizen in
name. Such a citizen, of course, has power; and such a mode of poli-
tical life offsets the centrifugal forces of social diversity by pro-
viding access to political power among them severally: as long as the
various social forces are physically present within the public realm,
political power is truly divided and shared. None can come to syste-
matic and constant dominance over the others, and the public realm
can become the crucible for whatever is common to all of those citi-
zens.
We are trying to walk a fine line here. We are trying to
emphasize the notion that political communities exist first as genera-
lities and second as complex entities characterized by clashes of com-
peting interests. As we shall see later, Aristotle's "polity" is a
society riven by class conflict of such severity that unless some kind
9of recognition and power are extended to each of the varying interests,
civil strife and the breakdown of the whole will ensue. Since, for
Aristotle, it is impossible for men to attain eudaimonia or happiness
in a context of social breakdown, the causes of such breakdown must be
anticipated in the structure of political institutions. Hence the
central ity of the public space and the emphasis placed upon its
integrative functions. This assumption is crucial to the establish-
ment of even a working definition of what a public space may be, and
it is logically prior to any examination of the kinds of politics that
take place there, or of the nature of the issues to be considered
there. Throughout the following dissertation, then, we will accept
the following as an adequate definition of the fundamental problem in
political life:
If one of the main functions of the political association is
to render "public" judgments in those situations where the
plans, aspirations, and claims of its members are in
conflict; and if, at the same time, it is an association that
desires to retain a sense of community among its members--if,
in other words, it is to be not only a community of well-
being but of bel onging--then there must of necessity be some
clearly defined procedures whereby the "opinions" of the mem-
bership may be incorporated into the decisions affecting that
community.^
For Sheldon Wolin, opinion ceases to be exclusive and private
and begins to become politically relevant at the moment it transcends
the merely private concerns of the individual and can be related to a
common problem. This in turn indicates that there is a special kind
of rationality demanded of judgments whenever such judgments are to
apply to the whole community. Such rationality should possess a
10
general character while not ignoring the actual tendencies of par-
ticular political forces "such as the attitudes and strategies of
active social groups." This, of course, shifts our fundamental
understanding of the political situation away from a mode of thought
based upon abstract principles, for what we have to deal with is a
multiplicity of perspectives upon a particular problem in a concrete
historical moment. Hence, should we wish to base our policies upon
the axiom that it is desirable to seek integrated and consensual solu-
tions, we must persuade the participating citizenry to abandon as far
as possible alternative principles or theories of politics that pro-
mote the interests of one segment of the social order at the expense
of others. This is a kind of triumph of the particular moment over
the general assessment in political life, and it is based on the
realization that while philosophical elegance is unattainable in lived
solutions, expediency and compromise are necessary if a genuinely com-
mon viewpoint is to emerge:
The reason is not simply that it is a good thing to formulate
policies that will reflect a sensitivity to variations and
differences throughout the society, but rather that a politi-
cal society is simultaneously trying to act and to remain a
community.^
These considerations permit us to see more clearly the
connection between political decisions and political participation or
citizenship. The political actions of diverse citizens contribute to
the generality of decisions and simultaneously constitute methods for
expressing the resident differences of the society. But this does
11
no
not solve the problem of action on the collective level, because
political decision can affect everyone who lives in the society in
the same way, indeed, agreement about the inclusion or exclusion of
particular items on a political agenda itself may be a bone of con-
tention. Further, it is frequently the case that politics is con-
cerned with both benefits and burdens and these, of necessity, must
be based on some discriminatory scheme of classification. Thus,
general agreements are often but necessary preludes to discrimina-
tion, and participation can be seen as the basic method for
establishing agreements and political consensus about such distinc-
tions .
In its political aspect, then, a community is not held
together by truth but by consensus, and this carries with it a
necessity that often causes modifications in both means and ends which
differ from what an "objective" or purely technical judgment might
dictate. Therefore,
This gives to political judgments a character different from
that of a "true" philosophical or theological proposition.
In large measure, a political judgment is usually "judicial"
in quality; that is, for the inost part it involves a judgment
concerning conflicting claims, all of which possess a certain
validity. As Aristotle shrewdly pointed out, there is no
problem of political judgment when one claim alone is ad-
mitted to be valid and enthroned above all the rest. The re-
sult of this condition, however, is that the political
association is replaced by the state of seige. But once the
political association is defined as a compound of many
diverse parts, and once it is allowed that these "parts" will
have different opinions, interests, and claims, the politi-
calness of the judgment will depend on a sensitivity to
diversities. A political judgment, in other words, is "true"
when it is public, not public when it accords to some stan-
dard external to politics.^
12
What this does is to elevate procedure over substance and
compromise over principle. It assumes that justice, if there be any
such thing, is predicated of public rather than private affairs, and
it entails that the outcome of public political processes cannot be
prescribed in advance. If, after all, we knew what "justice" was,
that is, if we could define justice as a particular distribution of
resources, or as a set of institutional arrangements, or as something
predicated of the individual psychologies of the members of the com-
munity, then we might be willing to beg the question of how it might
be attained in order to be able to get there. Our starting position
here will be, however, that not only are competing theoretical views
of justice possible, but that a number of such competing theories will
doubtless be scattered among the individual citizens of a given com-
munity. One takes a diversity of inters ts and views as given, then,
and the problem of acting for the good of the whole as the desidera-
tum . It is precisely because the concrete situation is constantly
changing, and the interests of the parties involved varied and hetero-
geneous that we give priority to a kind of collective epistemology
with respect to collective problems. We do not try to stipulate out-
comes in advance--only to provide a "space" in which consensus can
emerge.
Given these assumptions and our definition of the nature of a
political judgment, it is clear that we are speaking of a political
realm of collective decisionmaking that is secular and limited in its
13
scope. The matters to be considered in the public space are all and
only those which involve the generality of society; they are taken up
and considered by those whom the political community has decided are
qualified to participate; the activities that take place in this
public space therefore have a peculiar quality and a peculiar focus
because only here is that business which affects the common interest
considered, and only here are the compromises worked out that allow
its carrying forward. Given these restrictions, it is not difficult
to support the claim that political activity is an autonotnous realm of
action, that "political action" concerns something quite specific, and
that the private beliefs and concerns of the various individuals who
gather in the public space will not be proper items on its agenda.
What we want to do here then, is to work our way through some of the
philosophical and historical treatments of a conception of political
life that explicitly denies the contemporary notion that "everything
is political." At stake in this argument is the problem of
participation: if everything is political, then we can point to no
specific realm of collective life which has responsibility for
ordering and regulating the others, and we shall find no kind of human
activity or art peculiar or appropriate to such responsibility. If
everything is political, then it is impossible to discover a realm of
action from which anyone might be or has been excluded. Such a con-
ception of the political threatens to homogenize the specifically
political out of existence and sink it permanently beneath the waves
14
of "social" life.^
We shall return to some of these themes later. For now it is
sufficient to let these general remarks stand for the basic notion of
the public space, the kind of politics that takes place there, and the
aims of purposes of that politics. Given this much, let us see if it
is possible to outline the primary characteristics of a public space
in general so that one might take up any given political arrangement
and see whether it is organized around a public space or not.
Following is a list of considerations, baldly and simply stated in
full recognition that each requires a thesis of its own if all of its
implications are to be spelled out.
1) The assembled body will be sovereign with respect to the
common affairs of the polity, i.e., it will have the
power to ensure that its decisions become policy.
2) The methods of its conduct will be collegial, i.e., power
and authority will be vested equally in each of a number
of colleagues.
3) The individuals assembled will engage in debate and
dialogue, using language comprehensible to the general
body. Any restrictions upon debate will be unifomily
imposed.
4) The assembly will dispose of various items of business by
majority vote, unless it agrees to different stipulations
for special cases.
5) Exclusion or inclusion of items of business on the agenda
will be determined by the members of the assembly at
large, or through the agency of its own appointed
magistrates or officers.
One feels something of a fool. These general stipulations
open up a Pandora's box of political and philosophical problems. It
15
is absolutely impossible that the simple notion of a public space
will not erupt into byzantine complexities as soon as it is set dov<n
either in a full-blown theory of political life or applied in a
historical situation. The philospher will seek to satisfy his
curiosity about whether a public space exists or not by carefully
delineating its formal characteristics and then matching them up with
their possible treatments in various treatises on the subject. The
historian will see the rough outlines of concepts battered beyond
recognition by political accident and misconception as they are
pushed and hauled by a body of desperate and excited men who,
someplace, try somehow to get a larger society to see things their
way with respect to institutional arrangements. If we would really
explore what a public space might be, and make a realistic appraisal
of its strengths and weaknesses, we need to combine the methods of
the philospher and the historian.
First, if the Aristotelian polity serves as the earliest
example of the notion we wish to explore, it is by no means the only
one. The idea of a publicly accessible political space in which the
major decisions that affect the community at large are taken is at the
heart of all republican forms of government. It was the spirit of
this idea which animated the Roman Republic, the Florentine Republic
of 1494, the Whig doctrines of Parliamentary supremacy of seventeenth
century England and, finally, the Congress of the United States itself
as it was conceived at Annapolis in 1787. Each of these, obviously.
16
presents us with a distinct cultaral context and unique historical
tradi tion.
Second, there is a sense in which we might say that the
bodies of writing which formulated and explained this kind of govern-
ment are simply theories, and that the notion of a public space is
nothing more than an elaborate rationalist daydream unless it can
somehow be brought to birth politically and given a life in the
world. Hence, the plausibility of the notion of public space with •
respect to the actual practices of men is something that can only be
studied and tested historically. What have men done with this
theoretical notion in specific historical contexts? Here, I think,
we shall see that the notion can mean little by itself no matter how
thoroughly its theoretical underpinnings might be explored. What
matters is that political theories, like great religions, are depen-
dent upon specific contexts and the daily practices of the ways of
life of the people who adopt and institutionalize them for their
ultimate form and political issue. One could look, for example, at
the various treatments Christianity has received in Madrid, in Rome,
in Sao Paolo, in Kiev, or in Seol , to see that the actual working out
of a single set of doctrines is subject to considerable local
variation. Therefore, if we really want to know what the notion of a
public space entails, we need to look not only at such theoretical
formulations as have been provided by Aristotle and Machiavelli among
others, but also at the practices to which these and other theories
17
have given birth. Once having done so, we can then raise the
question whether this notion of an open space at the heart of things
might find critical application with respect to the present conduct
of the United States Congress.
Now there are a number of obvious logical and theoretical
difficulties which arise almost in constant conjuction with the
notion of a public space politics. All I can do here is allude to
them briefly, and wait until the appropriate moment to develop them
further.
The Distinction Between The Public and the Private
First we must confront the implications which our central
notion has for the perennial clash between particular and general
interests. What is being emphasized above all is that the primary
function of the assembled group is to articulate what is common or
general to the life of the community as a whole. Hence the group as
a whole must be capable of making "political" judgments. Note that
it is this integrative aspect of public space politics that sets
political action apart from other kinds of human activity, and the
realm of politics apart from the particularistic and heterogeneous
array of concerns which the participants in the process bear with
them as they enter the public space. Here we can see that any par-
ticipant in such a political process must find himself in something
of a bind: he must articulate his particular interests or lose the
18
game of power; he must defend and promote his separate, individual
views or they will not emerge from the shadows of the private realm
to enlighten the public realm; he must urge his particular interests
forward as forcefully as possible in order to ensure that they will
not go ignored or be systematically overriden. Such activity is
necessary in order that the product of the deliberations be truly
integrative. At the same time, however, he must know when to compro-
mise or even to abandon his personal interests in order that the
strength and vitality of the community be promoted. He must be
genuinely capable of listening to others and of modifying his own
views because he recognizes that no-one ever attains complete grati-
fication if the consensus to be established is truly genuine. Much
attention has been devoted to the problem of developing the kind of
individual who will abandon particular interests at the right moment,
and for many writers in the republican tradition, this capacity to
find the balance between the particular and the general within them-
selves is an essential characteristic of the ideal political actor,
and the one element which ensures that the public realm will always
be that place where the art of politics is practiced and can
flourish.
Aristotle presents us with the phronimos as the person who
best combines the attributes needed by the political actor in the
pol ity . Machiavelli discourses on the subject of virtu ; the
English of 1688 saw the problem of personal characteristics pri-
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marily in terms of a "patriotism" that bowed neither to the king nor
to popular opinion.'^ The Americans upheld the notions of genius,
ability and virtue.^ In all of these cases, it was recognized that
the vitality and longevity of political institutions would be partly
a function of the moral and psychological qualities of the indivi-
duals who vivified them. Why were such concerns so important? Why
could it even be said, to take the language of modern social science
for just a moment, that it might be the case that political institu-
tions were the dependent variable and human psychology the primary
thing? The answer lies in the word "corruption" in its old-
fashioned sense. Political institutions, like all artifacts, are
subject to the forces of time and decay. Republics are particularly
fragile because they embody a genuine balance between the
conflicting forces within society. If the participating individual
were to fail to seek the common good, his logical alternative would
be to promote his particular goods instead. Under these conditions,
either one faction having private goods in common v/ould cane to
dominate in the assembly, or the body would fail to arrive at the
consensus necessary for action. Readers of the French press, for
example, have known for six generations now that to read, "The
disorder was at its height" as a description of the activities in
the Chamber of Deputies is but a succinct rendering of the problem
of legislative immobilisme . Therefore, whether the assembly came to
be dominated by faction or paralyzed by self-interested heteroge-
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neity, the integrative functions of the public space would be lost
and the way opened for a transfer of power to political arrangements
that would systematically favor one viewpoint or interest over the
9
rest.
Thus the institutional integrity of the public space qua
institution rests upon the personal integrity of the citizens and
their several capacities to abandon personal interest at the right
moment in order to work together in the common interest. This bond
between the public space and the citizen is so strong that they
might be thought of as two sides of the same coin: the common
interest will emerge only insofar as the participants genuinely work
toward it.
At the same time, it may be possible to distinguish between
issues which involve the common interest and those which do not. We
could, for example, introduce
the sort of distinction C. Wright Mills draws in The
Sociological Imagination
, between "the personal troubles of
milieu" and "the public issues of social structure."
Personal troubles. Mills says, "occur within the character of
the individual and . . . his immediate relations with
others." So their "statement and resolution" properly lie
with "the individual as a biographical entity and within the
scope of his immediate milieu--the social setting that is
directly open to his personal experience and to some extent
his wilfull activity. A trouble is a private matter."
Public issues of social structure, however, transcend "these
local environments of the individual," and concern "the orga-
nization of many such milieux into the institutions of an
historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various
milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger struc-
ture of social and historical life. An issue is a public
matter. ^0
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Perhaps we can best express the essence of the public-private
distinction as follows: particular interests are predicated either of
indi duals or segments of the social order; general interests are those
of the society as a whole. Particular interests are, for the most
part, adequately dealt with in the private sphere, or among those
groups or associations whose immediate concern they are. The public
realm, again is that place where issues involving the whole are raised
and dealt with. The political tension between the particular and the
general, then, lies in the potential capacity that importunate citi-
zens always have to claim that their "troubles" are really "issues"
and then to trammel them into the public space and make them matters
of public deliberation and policy. Where the line between them ought
to be drawn, however, has historically been treated as a public issue
and this has played havoc with the distinction. The twentieth century
at least is showing us that it is possible that the citizens can use
the public space for logrolling and tradeoffs with the result that
public deliberations have come to be increasingly occupied with the
consideration of "troubles" which are handled as though they were
issues, in a constant round-robin of mutual gratification of par-
ticular needs. This development was nowhere anticipated by the
ancients, so far as I can tell, and it seems that modern experience
may be in the process of teaching us a brand new lesson about poli-
tics.
In any case, it was the awareness that the private and per-
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sonal could eruct within the public space and displace consideration
of public and common goods that drove Hannah Arendt to try to
distinguish between the two realms so forcefully. She has much of
importance to say about the basic concept of a public space and it is
through her writings primarily that the notion has emerged in American
political theory since the second world war. In Arendt' s writings,
the distinction between public and private, i.e., the distinction bet-
ween public issues and private troubles, is complex, varied and
subtle. A comprehensive treatment of these notions would take many
pages, but her basic idea seems to be drawn from the simple fact that
the public assembly itself is a unique form of association in human
experience. If none of the concerns appropriate to private or lesser
associations are brought before the public assembly, the line between
issues and troubles can then be mapped out with relative ease. This
at least is my understanding of her fundamental position though she
nowhere explains it in these terms.
For Arendt the distinction between public and private
corresponds to that between the household and the political realm that
12first emerged in ancient Greece. The household was a pre-poli tical
realm, a necessary condition for citizenship, but always a means to a
higher end. It was, by contrast, the public realm, i.e., the polis
way of life, that set off the Greek from the barbarian and made a free
13
and truly human way of life possible. In Arendt' s reconstruction of
Greek life, pol i
s
citizenship was a relationship of equality among
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individuals who might be unequal with respect to either wealth or abi-
lity in the private sphere. This "equality" was a special artifi-
cially created equality of status as citizens. The polls guaranteed
equal i ty
not because all men were born or created equal, but on the
contrary, because men were by nature ... not equal ....
Equality existed only in this specifically political realm,
where men met one another as citizens and not as private
persons .l**
For Arendt, then, it is in the public space and there alone
that men can encounter one another as equals and coexist in the realm
of free speech and political action.
The Problem of Representation
If the distinction between the public and the private is one
of the fundamental theoretical questions bound up with the notion of
a public space, the problem of representation is the second.
Representation in general has been justified on a host of theoreti-
cal grounds, and emerged historically in many times and many places.
It presents us with something of a vexed question, however, because
while it attempts to preserve the attributes of a genuine public
space, it puts that space at one remove from the people themselves.
Thus, theories of representation first try to justify the removal of
the public space from direct access by all of the citizens, and
second supply rationales for whatever particular form of represen-
tation is advocated, in order to show that the relationship between
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the people and their representatives preserves a kind of mapping of
the one upon the other.
Hannah Pitkin has provided one analysis of the proble.Ti in
her Concept of Representation.^^ Pitkin distinguishes between four
elements which, in some way or other, have been combined in most
theories of representation. First, formal representation is the
transfer of authority to act in one's behalf, brought about through
an institutional arrangement such as an election process. Second,
descriptive representation takes as primary the question of the
extent to which representatives reflect the characteristics of
those they formally represent. Such characteristics as ethnic
background, social class, age, place of residence, and occupation
are considered important. According to this measure, a represen-
tative legislature should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the
people at large. Third, symbolic representation is less concerned
with either the transfer of authority or a possible mapping of
social characteristics than it is with the belief systems of the
individuals involved: how is the representative perceived by his
constituents? The crucial question here is, "do the represented
believe in or have faith in their representative?" The fourth kind
of representation taken up by Pitkin revolves around the now-ancient
debate over the behavior of the representative once he reaches
office: is he to act as a trustee or a delegate? When the
representative enters the realm of political action, he carries
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with him a complex set of relationships with those for whom he
acts:
Representing here means acting in the interest of the
represented, in a manner responsive to them. The represen-
tative must act independently; his action must involve
discretion and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The
represented must also be (conceived as) capable of indepen-
dent action and judgment, not merely being taken care of.
And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between
representative and represented about what is to be done, that
conflict must not normally take place. The representative
must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it
occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found
persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented
without good reason in terms of their interest, and without a
good explanatioOgOf why their wishes are not in accord with
their interest.
Other considerations flood in from other sources. The
American colonists took up the delegate/trustee question in terns of
the general relationship between the people as a whole and their
legislature. While preserving the form of the basic question, they
saw it as a matter of choice between "virtual" and "actual" represen-
tation. The English were in the habit of telling the colonists that,
as British subjects, they were "virtually" represented in
Pari iament--i .e. , that a man didn't have to be one's neighbor in order
to represent one there. The Americans, finding themselves separated
from England by a variety of geographical, political and social fac-
tors demanded that their representatives "actually" represent them,
that is that they be able to hold them individually responsible for
their actions. According to Gordon Wood, neither the debates which
then took place throughout the colonies nor their ultimate resolution
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in the institutions they founded at both state and national levels
ever completely resolved the basic tension between the two approaches.
Republicanism
with its emphasis on devotion to the transcendant public good
logically presumed a legislature in which the various groups
in the society would realize "the necessary dependence and
connection" each had upon the others. "Our situation
requires their being firmly united in the same common cause"
with "no schism in the body politic." And this kind of
legislature presumed a particular sort of representation--"a
house of disinterested men" who "would employ their whole
time for the public good."!^
At the same time, the colonists frequently put it forward that
such a scheme of representation left rather more distance between the
people and their agents in the legislature than their desires for
"actual" representation would permit. Bernard Bailyn holds that they
ultimately evolved a uniquely American theory of representation which
attempted to ensure that "equal interest among the people should have
equal interest in [the assembly]."
The result would be, if not a wholly original contribution
to advanced thought, at least a reversion to a radical con-
cept that had long since disappeared from the mainstream of
English political theory. For such arguments led to a
recovery and elaboration of conceptions of government by
the active and continuous consent of the governed that had
flourished briefly a century earlier, during the
Commonwealth period, and had then faded during the
Restoration . . . Where government was such an accurate
mirror of the people, sensitively reflecting their desires
and feelings, consent was a continuous, everyday process.
In effect, the people were present through their represen-
tatives, and were themselves, step by step and point by
point, acting in the conduct of public affairs. Mo longer
merely an ultimate check on government, they were in some
sense the government. Government had no separate existence
apart from them; it was by the people as well as for the
people; it gained its authority from their continuous con-
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less thln sfunhJl "'l.Tf ' P^o^l^inied by Blackstone noa by Hobbes, that law was a command "prescribed bvsource superior and which the inferior is bouSd t^ ^
obey
--such a sense of law as the declaration of a personor body existing independently above the subjects of lawand imposing its will upon them, was brought into questionby the developing notion of representation. Already inthese years there were adumbrations of the sweeping
diation James Wilson and others would make of
Blackstone's definition of law, and of the view they wouldput in Its place: the view that the binding power of lawflowed from the continuous assent of the subjects of law
the view that the only reason why a free and independent
man was bound by human laws was this--that he bound
himsel f ."^o
Unfortunately, the foregoing considerations do not even
begin to exhaust the difficulties inherent in the concept of repre-
sentation or the related issue of consent. How can we tell when the
people "consent" to institutions let alone to their specific acts?
When the citizens of Massachusetts Bay Colony began to debate the
form of representation that would hold between themselves and their
central government in Boston in 1774 and 1775, the question they
wished to raise was one of apportionment: how were the commercial
interests of the Boston merchants to be meshed with the agricultural
interests of the farmers in the western part of the state?
Convinced that representation must be "equal" and grounded in
something more permanent than mere population, the citizens of
western Massachusetts had held, since 1691, that every town, no
matter how small, could send one representative to the legislature.
Hence the question: were towns to be represented, or individuals?
Some may see this as an illustration of the sort of question that
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arises with respect to the problem of formal representation which we
noted as the first of Pitkin's four elements. The point here is
that once a general body of citizens moves to constitute an assembly
that will act in its name, the question of the formal relations bet-
ween the two will turn out to be political
,
and its disposition may
result in the emergence of a particular interest within a represen-
19
tative system.
To exhaustively treat of these and other questions would
take us far afield. What counts here is that there is nothing
simple about making the jump from direct democracy to representative
government; that whenever this apparently elegant idea is inter-
jected into the real world of politics, a host of very particular
and specific complexities emerges, and that behind all theories of
representative government, no matter how elegant or how publicly
arrived at, the discerning student can discover a maze of pipes and
wires and Rube Goldberg devices designed to confer upon the whole
the illusion of harmonious function. Gordon Wood at one point
refers to the whole representational process as a "fiction" which
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the Americans of the 1770s nearly exposed for themselves. Whether
this is true or false is not something we shall try to settle here.
But the Massachusetts example shows that if the tension between the
common and the particular is seen from the standpoint of geography,
the fundamental dilemma can be stated, not in terms of a heteroge-
neity of diverse interests arranged against a common one, but of
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centralism vs. localism. Unable to discover a formula for the ulti-
mate resolution of the problem, the writings and speeches of
Americans throughout the revolutionary period frequently show them
reaching out to grasp both horns at once:
Submerge all particular and partial interests into the
general good was still the common cry. James Winthrop was
very daring and unusual indeed but very honest in 1737 when
he impatiently retorted that "it is vain to tell us that we
ought to overlook local interests," for no free government
could disregard them. "No man when he enters into society
does it from a view to promote the good of others, but he
does it for his own good. "21
Intellectual Origins of the Republican Tradition
At this point, let us return to the basic notion behind the
concept of a public space: society is comprised of a heterogeneity
of interests and views and it is the function of the political
order, as representative in some sense of the whole, to integrate
whatever centrifugal forces may be present into a consensus and so
make political action possible. If such political action can corne
into being in the world, it will not habitually or regularly occur
at the expense of one particular minority or class interest among
the citizens. The writings of Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides all
display, in various forms, the horrors and injustices that followed
the utter domination of a pol is by either its oligarchic or its
democratic element. Plato sought to design a set of political
arrangements that could make such political one-sidedness
impossible, first in his Republic and later in The Laws . Similarly,
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Aristotle, as suggested earlier proposed his theory of the polity or
mixed form of government as a design for the state which would pro-
mote an end to civil strife by permanently embodying a compromise
between the constantly warring class interests present there. We
will review Aristotle's theory in detail below. What is important
to note here is that the Greek experience taught the lesson that
neither oligarchy nor democracy would result in the kind of vivere
^ivi^g which would be the practically best possible for most men.
The one suppressed political liberties and individual diversity,
while the other made excellence impossible and encouraged the
ignorant to pretend to an art of which they knew nothing. Asked for
advice on how the demos might never lose power, Hesiod is said to
have replied, "Cut off the tops of all the corn that grows above
average height." The polity of Aristotle, then, is a "middle
constitution" in which the middle class rules by serving as a
balance of power between the two extremes. The political
organization of the polity is simple compared to some of the mixed
government designs that were to come later: the assembly is open
to citizens drawn from all classes of society. From it, officers
the state are elected and serve terms of relatively short
duration. Everything revolves around the assembly or gathering of
citizens in the public space. The mix of diverse interests is
established not by designating separate executive, judicial and
legislative branches, but in the admissions criteria for the
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assembly. In general, Aristotle's intention is to mix diverse
social forces so that they may balance. Now it is co.nmon knowledge,
or should be, that large assemblies of Athenian citizens exercised
judicial functions outside of the assembly, and that the boule or
council of four hundred carried out administrative and executive
functions--but these institutions are not expressly treated in those
books of the Politics which are directly concerned with the polity
itself. Instead, what Aristotle does explicitly stress is that the
polity is a mix or balance of virtue, wealth, and numbers, and then
goes on to offer a variety of fonnulas through which it might be
23institutionally composed. The constant element in any of these
possible sets of institutional arrangements, however, is the mixture
of social elements. To claims of different social classes, then, a
mixed constitution either distributes political power or awards it
entirely to the middle class, which in itself is a combination of
rich and poor. In this recognition of a diversity of claims,
political authority is divided and shared. Insofar as that
authority is to be exercised by a sovereign assembly, we find that
the Aristotelian polity is organized around a public space.
Now it is not our primary purpose here to perform an exercise
in intellectual history by tracing the idea of a mixed constitution
throughout the writings of various theorists in the Western tradition
Neither do we intend to exhaustively explore every instance in which
it might be said that some significant variant of a republic or mixed
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constitution came into being. We will ignore the political thought
of Jean Bodin and we will ignore the Republic of Venice. Yet it is
important. I think, to search out the constant elements in the basic
idea as they have appeared in both theory and practice at selected
moments so that we might determine, if possible, to what extent our
present institutions embody the basic assumptions of that tradition of
which they form a part. What we finally want to do is to discover a
standard through which we might understand and evaluate the political
activities and representative functions of the United States Congress.
The reason for this is not difficult to state: the present United
States is, by historical standards, an amazingly heterogeneous
society. The political order, as we have claimed, has the potential
to integrate diversity into political action such that a common
interest can emerge. Our project is to see to what extent the public
space of theory continues to serve as the open point of access for the
diversity of interests and views presently at large here. But the
standard cannot be derived simply from theory alone. Suppose that in
selecting certain past republics for study, we find that in no case
was a "pure" public space ever instituted? In that case it would be
absurd, I think to castigate the present Congress for failing to com-
port itself as one.
The idea of the mixed government with the public space at its
centre has exercised an incalculable influence on the Western
tradition:
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There IS a tradition of thought on these matters of which the
Pol2ti_cs^ formed part, but its role in that tradition is dif-ficult to assess precisely because it is so vast and all-
pervasive. The tradition in question may be referred back toAnstotle in nearly every respect, but (leaving aside the
fact that certain decisive formulations of its doctrines were
made by Plato before him) so many subsequent authors restated
parts of it and were influential in their own ways that,
especially under Renaissance conditions, it is hard to define
with certainty the particular writer exerting authority at a
particular point. We are, in short, confronted by the
problems of interpreting a tradition of thought; but that
tradition (which may almost be termed the tradition of mixed
government) is Aristotelian, and the Politics
, as well as
forming the earliest and greatest full exposition of it,
makes explicit so many of the implications which it might at
one time or another contain that- -apart from the enormous
direct authority which the book exerted--it is worth
rehearsing the theory of citizenship and polity which it con-
tains in order to see what might (and did) result and what
importance the theory might (and did) possess for intellects
in the problem-situation of civic humanism. 24
That rehearsal will come in the next chapter. Meanwhile, Kurt
Von Fritz has traced the influence of Aristotle's theory of the mixed
constitution as it was embodied by Polybius, first to Cicero and later
to St. Thomas. While Cicero was an important influence, widely and
frequently acknowledged by the founders of the American republic,
these two writers do not immediately concern us here. What does con-
cern us, however, is Von Fritz' assertion about the influence of this
theory upon Machiavelli:
Machiavelli, who, according to a very widely accepted opi-
nion, stands on the threshold of modern political philosophy,
in his Discorsi (Chapter VI) repeates several pages of
Polybius' sixth book in a paraphrase sometimes approaching a
literal translation without mentioning Polybius' name. From
then on the theory in its Polybian form , . . remained an
important thread in modern European political thought, a
34
development which in a way culminated in Montesquieu's De
L' esprit des Lois . 25 h
^
Mow in aiming ourselves at the Congress, it would be a
pointless and fruitless exercise to trace out the various national and
legal traditions which influenced the Founders of the American
Republic. Pocock sees the dominant line running through Aristotle and
26Machiavelli. Von Fritz, as we have just seen, holds that Polybius is
a central figure. Felix Raab discovers Machiavelli exerting a strong
but unfocused influence on the metaphysical and moral assumptions that
underlay Tudor and later English conceptions of political authority
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and power. Charles Mcllwain worked his way laboriously through the
lex publicam of Roman law and its spreading influence over the ius
gentium of English common law, citing cases as he went, and found
little modern authority for the English version of the mixed
constitution outside that of Jean Bodin, and little ancient authority
before the Roman period. Polybius is not mentioned. Corrine Weston
also holds that the theory of the mixed government was central to the
entire Anglo-American political tradition, but traces its genealogy
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through yet a different route. The contemporary student, seeking
to understand the fundamental issues bound up in the theory is reluc-
tant to enter the controversies of intellectual and legal historians
about who was responsible for precisely which lines of influence and
which lines of influence exerted the greater force. For the purposes
of the following, however, it has been necessary to adopt a design,
and that has been taken more or less intact from the more recent
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scholarship of J.G.A. Pocock. It is Pocock who is most responsible
for placing the U.S. Constitution in the mainstream of a political
tradition which he traces back first to England, then to Machiavelli
and ultimately to Aristotle. In looking for a plan about which to
organize not only theories about the public space but historical
attempts to implement one, Pocock 's genealogy has its advantages: if
one takes Aristotle, Machiavelli, the men who brought about the
English Revolution of 1642 and, finally, the founders of the American
Republic themselves, one will be able to read directly the thoughts of
men who have actually lived during times when a public space was a
known thing. Since part of the attempt to shed light on the modern
Congress involves understanding the intellectual and political issues
incorporated in its design, this seems to be a reasonable path to
follow.
The Contemporary Congress
When we turn to the Congress, however, and start examining
what the contemporary scholarship has to say about it, we discover
that it is widely held to be failing in its duties. Again, the scho-
larship is voluminous and we must be content with a few sample com-
ments here and more detailed analysis later. At bottom, most of the
criticisms can be traced back to the assumption that Congress is some-
how failing to make use of the public space which was its original
raison d'etre . For many, the fact that the Congress has divided
itself again and again into a set of competing internal institutions
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means—whether they acknowledge this consciously or not--that it has
made itself institutionally incapable of performing those acts of
synthesis which are the essence of political judgments and the basis
of consensus. Congress, it is held repeatedly, upholds special
interests at the expense of investigating and acting upon questions of
broad policy. This criticism appears someplace in the writings of
nearly every one of its professional students.
What the bulk of the following more specific criticisms points
out is that many of the problems which we have been discussing with
reference to a public space and the conflict of social forces in
general have in fact come to light over the course of the history and
development of the United States Congress. In short, the Congress
embodies the realm of human politics writ small, and he who finds him-
self curious about nearly any aspect of political life would do well
to study it.
... In large part, the history of the House of
Representatives has been a struggle to mold a coherent poli-
cymaking instrument out of a large disparate collectivity.
It has been, one might say, a struggle of the general versus
the particular, in which the particular seems the more power-
ful force.
The role of the particular in Congress has been institutiona-
lized and strengthened through the emergence of an elaborate system of
committees and subcommittees. As long as a hundred years ago, Woodrow
Wilson decried these developments, claiming that the theatre of debate
has permanently shifted from the floor of Congress to the comparative
privacy of its committee rooms. Here, the representatives of the
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American people concerned themselves primarily with private rather
than public business. The House, when it finally did gather together
as it occasionally did, for the most part simply ratified substantive
decisions taken in its committee rooms. Both Wilson and James
Sterling Young, by the way, have gone out of their ways to note that
the accoustics in the House chamber are atrocious--hardly what one
would expect of the architectural meeting place of an assembly the
essential purpose of which is to engage in speech and dialogue.^^
J. Mclver Weatherford claims that the enactment of public ritual has
replaced the substance of legislative work thoughout most of the daily
round of the average member of Congress. David Mayhew finds that the
"entrepreneurial member" has emerged with particular prominence since
the reforms of the 1970s. This individual is primarily concerned with
his own reputation and the activities of getting re-elected. Such
individuals, of course, can be expected to uphold neither the institu-
tion of Congress nor the public business of which it was instituted to
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take charge.
Other critics find that the House is decentralized to the
point of paralysis; that the party system, which once focused member
energies on selected problems and promoted consensus when the time
came to vote, has declined in power and been replaced by an
endlessly shifting set of ad hoc caucuses comprised of entrepre-
neurial members, which promote no consistent program in the broad
public interest. Others point out that leadership in the chamber is
attainable only after years and years of service--thereby denying
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the public the positive benefits of the insights of those in the
prime of life and skewing the scheme of representation to favor the
results of elections held long ago by an older generation. Finally,
David Vogler points out the sheer range of particular issues upon
which the contemporary member of Congress is called to exercise
judgment:
The scope of these decisions is mind boggling. During the
course of one day in June, 1969, the House discussed the
following subjects: financing of airport facilities, disposal
of surplus lead, the use of Defense Department facilities
in making movies, aid to the arts, treatment of laboratory
animals, creation of a national wildlife refuge, textile
imports. Post Office salaries, chemical and biological war-
fare research, and patents and copy rights. 35
Vogler goes on to make the obvious point that such a number
and variety of "issues" frequently puts legislators in the position of
having to decide about questions of which they know little or nothing.
He quotes two members:
"I have to vote on 150 different kinds of things every
year--foreign aid, science, space, technical problems, and
the Merchant Marine, and Lord knows what else. I can't
possibly become an expert in all these fields."
"It's not uncommon for me to go [to] the floor with bells
ringing, votes being taken, and it's on a bill or issue that
I have never heard of before. I haven't the remotest idea of
the issues involved. You've got to make up your mind; you
can't vote "maybe" and you can't vote "present"--you don't
want to. So you have to make a decision on the best basis
you can. "36
Among the most important cricisms, however, is that in its
inability to address the broad problems of public policy. Congress has
repeatedly made unwarranted grants of power to the presidency. If
this allegation turns out to be true, it should come as no surprise to
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students of the republican tradition of government. The Americans of
the revolutionary period in particular, advocated the Whig thesis that
executive power would grow unchecked in the absence of a strong
parliamentary counterforce.
Here, then, seems to be the problem. Congress specializes.
It divides itself up into subunits for the purpose of coining to
grips with specialized issues— "troubles" if you will. Its indivi-
dual members are encouraged to be self-interested by both the struc-
ture of their daily occupations and the nature of their electoral
ties to local constituencies. The influence of particular interests
upon Congressional deliberations is enhanced by both these factors.
Meanwhile, the growing independence of individual members makes it
increasingly difficult for the leadership to facilitate the kinds of
compromise and bargaining that are precursory to political consen-
sus. Professional students of the body are nearly unaminous in
holding that while able to serve particular issues extremely ably.
Congress is unable to address the broad general issues which it
ought to confront in its role as representative of a national
constituency.
If this makes sense, then I think we will be able to use the
classical traditions of public space politics to support the following
claim: Congress has abandoned the use of its public space. Virtually
nothing of importance takes place on the floor, and no political
scientist in his right mind would expect to learn anything about the
body by sitting in the gallery and following the debates there.
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Everything of importance takes place in the caucuses and the
committee and subcommittee rooms. The result is that Congress is
institutionally incapable of making political judgments in the sense
outlined earlier. What dominates its attention is private business;
what rules the roost are special interests. And the institutional
consequence of all this is that, especially since the 1930s, Congress
has steadily allowed its power to ebb away to the executive, thus
altering the balance of power in a mixed constitution. Mow on the
classical view, on Aristotle's view, the fundamental attribute of
a morally bad state is that one section or interest of the social
order comes to dominate the rest and orchestrate public affairs
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according to its own preferences. The mixed constitution sought
to make the emergence of such interests impossible by granting a role
in the formation of general policy to each of the several interests
actually present in society. When approaching matters of common con-
cern, then, the many particular interests converged through a general
public dialogue.
Now suppose a system in which matters concerning the common
interest are not raised, but matters concerning special interests are
handled with dispatch. In such a case, not one but a multiplicity of
special interests constantly comes to the top of things one by one as
it were and exerts dominant influence over its particular sphere of
concerns. Once its interests are taken care of, it recedes to be
replaced by another. Where we generally think of despotism as
unshared power over the whole by a part, that power is usually con-
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ceived as persisting over time. Suppose, instead, a temporarily
unshared power, or an endless succession of moments of unshared power,
in which the agent continually changes bu the form persists. In such
a case, the general interest is pushed out of the picture as surely as
if it had been displaced by a single abiding interest. But now the
general body discovers no dissatisfaction or pain because the consti-
tuent interests severally find that their most urgent requirements
have been satisfied. All that goes begging is the national consti-
tuency. If this is, in fact, a fair representation of contemporary
events, it makes sense to raise questions about the long term fate of
the general order itself.
To explore the implications of these and other developments
and the present state of the Congress, then, we will take a public
space model of politics, briefly trace selected moments in its history
in thought and action, inquire into the attributes of the citizens who
were deemed necessary to sustain it and ask the following questions:
First, is Congress organized around a public space in the traditional
sense? Is it a legislative assembly as defined in the republican
tradition? Second, does the contemporary member of Congress exercise
the prerogatives and display the attributes of the traditional citizen
of a republic? Does he have the personal and institutional powers
that republics traditionally conferred upon their citizens? If the
answers to these questions turn out to be "no," then we might make a
brief foray into yet another question: what form of government now
prevails in the United States?
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CHAPTER II
THE REPUBLICAN POLITICAL TRADITION
I. Philosophical Background: Aristotle's Corpus
In laying bare the fundamental differences that separated
Plato and Aristotle, Whitney Oates holds that that which ultimately
distinguished them could have no rational basis, and uses a remark
from Origen to illustrate his point:




"Don't examine or investigate, but believe."
Origen admits the reproach in a way, by observing that few
men have the time or the inclination for investigation. But,
Origen goes on to say that the gentiles really do the same
thing: "For it is not by waiting to hear the arguments of
all the philosophers and of the different sects, and by
learning how some may be upset and others established, that a
man chooses to be a Stoic, or a follower of Plato or a
Peripatetic, or an Epicurean . . . ; but it is by a certain
unreasoning impulse ( alogoi tini phora ) though they will not
admit the fact." One way to express the difference between
Plato and Aristotle may be this: Whereas the alogos phora of
Plato led him to feel the reality of the other-world and the
illusion of phenomena, the alogos phora of Aristotle led him
in the opposite direction.
^
Divergence is strikingly evident in their respective treat-
ments of the political realm. The Republ ic envisioned a political and
social unity conferred by the authority of the philosopher-king and
derived in its turn from a vision of the Forms themselves. But the
Pol itics occupied itself with the variety of existing modes of politi-
cal life and explored not one but several possible solutions to the
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fundamental problems of politics-solutions that found their genesis
in history as well as metaphysics. The bond that finally unites the
men of the Republic is that of knowledge; the common element in the
life of Aristotelian political actors is that of citizenship. The
former is true and unchanging, but there are many ways in which a per-
son can be a citizen.
If we take the notions of unity and diversity as the fundamen-
tal motifs of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, we will have
made a large step toward understanding the basic ethos of the politi-
cal philosophy of the Stagirite: the emphasis is on diversity--
diversity of political forms and diversity of individual experiences
of political life.
There are two elements which, together with the political phi-
losophy of Plato, form the necessary background for a reading of the
Pol itics
. First is Aristotle's emphasis on the multiplicity of being
and heterogeneity of methods for studying it which clearly emerge as
fundamental results of the multitude of studies that comprise his
corpus as a whole. Second is the Greek city-state itself: the pol is
which in somewhat idealized form is the subject of his political
theory. If Aristotle's metaphysical and logical treatises reflect a
predisposition to discover multiplicity in all areas of formal study,
this was undoubtedly reinforced for him by his political subject
matter. When he turned to examine the variety of existing fourth-
century city-state forms--each with its ruling divinity, peculiar
customs and way of life, he also found an equal diversity of political
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orders--each with its roots in historical and sociological factors
that lay outside the political realm proper. Constitutions, unlike
birds and syllogisms, could not be studied separate from their
background conditions:
In tracing the constitution to social conditions, Aristotle
gives explicit recognition to an important truth, which Plato
had certainly not recognized with equal clearness, though the
facts which pointed to it were familiar enough. The genesis
of the constitution of a State was perhaps studied by
Aristotle more closely and more successfully than it has been
studied till recent times, for the "social contract" theory,
so long dominant in political science, tended to disguise the
circumstances under which a State comes by its constitution.
The pictures drawn under its influence of a people meeting
together and selecting its government, as a man might select
a house or an article of furniture, were of course
consciously ideal, but they obscure our recognition of the
fact which Aristotle had long ago pointed out, that the
constitution of a State has its roots in what moderns term
its social system.
2
It was ultimately political variety which was to become the
subject of Aristotle's vast empirical studies of politics. The mixed-
government theory of the polity, with its class structure, balance of
institutions, active participating citizen and system of distributive
justice based on property and merit reflect an attempt to unify and
balance within a single political order all of the diverse forces and
interests that characterize a city. As such, these forces can be seen
as expressions of phenomena in the human world for which parallels can
be found in logic and in nature. As but one of several alternative
models of the "wel 1 -governed" state, the mixed government theory is
simultaneously Aristotle's acknowledgment that political theory can
only recommend, never prescribe, and that the plausibility of its
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prescriptions rests on the extent to which it incorporates an
understanding of the dilemmas of its era and of its audience.
Though one may regard Aristotle's works or their parts as
stages in the unfolding chronology of his thought, written at dif-
ferent times and evincing a gradual but uninterrupted movement away
3from Plato or as constantly-revised notebooks which served him as
lecture notes for students on different levels of understanding,^ the
themes of equivocality and multiplicity constantly recur throughout
them in ways that Plato could never have intended or permitted. A few
examples should serve to illustrate this.
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, for Aristotle "being"
( to 0£) is a manyness rather than a oneness.^ Further, even the stu-
dent of being in its concrete particularity ( ousia ) eventually must
face up to the equivocal nature of the essence of a particular
substance^--nei ther immanent nor transcendent; always a combination of
matter and form. Thus the basic "stuff" of things is multiple and,
furthermore, the words we use to speak of them have multiple implica-
tions and uses. Second, then, is a claim about the language we use
when we talk about the world. This is summed up by the observation he
repeatedly makes that "'being', or 'is', or 'to be' is said in many
ways." To say that a word has many uses is to say that it is used
homonymously
,
and in Categories lal, Aristotle explains:
Things are said to be homonymous that have in common only a
name; the definitions corresponding to the name are dif-
ferent. Thus, for example, both a dance and a sphere are
balls. So the name of these two things is common to them
both, but the definition that corresponds to the name is dif-
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ferent. For if one gives an account of what it is for each
of them to be a ball, one will give a separate definition for
each.
'
One can reasonably regard the homonymy of terms as a problem
of language, or of perception or of ontology, but for our purposes
what counts is that if, for Aristotle, "is" ( einai ) can signify
o
existence, identity or predication we should beware of misun-
derstanding him by oversimplifying the implications of his terms or
seeking out consistency where none is to be found. At many important
points in Aristotle's philosophy, denying universality seems to be
equivalent to asserting a multiplici ty of senses, and it is important
to bear this in mind, not only with reference to his efforts to deve-
lop a technical vocabulary of terms for a science of politics, but
also as one attempts to make sense of his theory of political morality
and justice. Failure to take homonymy into account is also a promi-
g
nent feature at times in his criticisms of others.
Professor Owen, for one, has explored Aristotle's use of terms
as well as the techniques of investigation he developed to separate
and distinguish them.''"^ For example, einai is not the only word with
many uses: "one" and "good" are also members of a rootless family,
11
ready to marry subjects from any category. "Good" is a primary
example of homonymy in Topics A(107a4-17). For Owen, Aristotle's com-
ments on homonymy reveal basic patterns in his analysis of existence.
For that purpose it is enough to say that his later theories
do not in the least entail the discarding of these patterns.
His disclaimer in Metaphysics r is politic: he is announcing
his own "general science of being qua being," and it was on
the homonymy of "being" that he had earlier built his objec-
50
tion to any such enterprise. But . . . more important thanthese labels is the fact that his own theories were worked
out wholly within the framework of those techniques on which
the analysis that we have been reviewing here relies. 12
A good example of the application of such basic techniques to
politics is Aristotle's study of the different kinds of "democracy" in
Book VI, Ch. 1-5 (1330bff) of the Politics
. But language begins to
slide into ontology as we go further. Mot only is "being" multiple
and "einai " said in many ways, but such diversity must be reflected
back into our formal methods of study and theories of knowledge.
Hence "being" must be studied in many ways if we are to understand it.
To oil must be broken up still further--beyond matter and form; beyond
substance and attribute: we find that "it" becomes "they" and they,
qua objects of knowledge, cannot be the subject-matter of a single,
unified science of knowledge. Instead, for Aristotle our knowledge of
"being" will be neither singular nor uniform but based on principles
1 o
given through experience and peculiar to each subject. "Science"
can and must be divided up, and the various sciences ( epistemai )
having different subject-matters, will necessarily differ from one-
another in terms of both the methods to be followed and the possible
precision or clarity of their results. In Topics 1,4, for example,
Aristotle divides propositions into ethical, physical, and logical and
thus suggests the standard Hellenistic division of philosophy into
14 15
logic, physics, and ethics; elsewhere he introduces distinctions
about the purposes and ends of knowledge itself, further complicating
the study of being with a diversity of possible human reasons for
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undertaking it. Hence, knowledge may be pursued for its own sake
(theoria: theoretical knowledge), for the sake of actions ( praxis :
practical knowledge), or for the sake of making or producing something
( poesis : productive knowledge) .'"^
It is thus possible to follow Aristotle through several major
distinctions: first, between the ends of knowledge; second among the
various sciences; third, between kinds of propositions; fourth, among
the multiple senses of terms such as einai
, and last--though the
significance of this does not emerge until we get to pol i tics--between
the realms of the necessary and the contingent. Given such distinc-
tions as a background framework of techniques, it should come as no
surprise to find that he has very firm convictions about the nature of
political theory and its limits as a branch of knowledge. First, the
study of politics and ethics ( pol itika ) can be located qua science,
with some precision: it is a practical as distinguished from a
theoretical or productive science. Its aim is to indicate what fine
and just actions may be and to instruct us on the nature of virtue in
general and to show us how to live well. Ultimately, its subject-
matter is action, something that takes place in the realm of the con-
tingent. Second, in its technical aspects, political science will
have to account for a diversity of actual constitutions, explaining
their appropriateness to different kinds of societies, their origins,
and their place on scales as diverse as their degrees of conformity to
a moral ideal on the one hand and their plausibility qua programs for
17
actual cities on the other.
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How then are practical and theoretical sciences distinguished?
Professor Newman pointed out four ways: in subject-matter; in aim or
end; in the subjective faculty employed; and in scientific method or
procedure. The subject-matter of Theoretic Science is either "things
self-existent, unchangeable, and separable from matter" (i.e., the
subject-matter of first philosophy), or "things unchangeable and
separable from matter only in logical conception" (the subject-matter
of Mathematics), or "things inseparable from matter and subject to
change" (the subject-matter of Physics ).^^ What these things have in
common, qua objects of knowledge for science, is that we make disco-
veries about what they, in fact, may be--we play no role in making
them what they are. Newman shows that Aristotle draws a very firm
line between these and the objects of a practical science
. . .
both things done, which are the subject of pol i tika
,
and "things produced" ( ta prakta ) have their originating
principle (arche) outside themselves in an agent or producer.
It is thus that "things done" lie as it were passively at the
disposition of the agent, just as "things produced" do at the
disposition of the producer. They are therefore said to be
in our power ( eph hamin ) , (Nic. Eth. 1112a31), and we are
said to deliberate about things which "come to pass by our
agency, but not always uniformly" (1112b3). The defective
exactness of practical science is perhaps due to this subjec-
tion of "things done" to human arbitrium but it is still more
due to the fact that practical science, being concerned with
action, is concerned with particulars. ... 20
If both the subject-matter of action and the agent himself can
be changed, the purpose of practical science becomes that of promoting
right action, i.e., not understanding in simple but bringing something
into being. This makes a neat archetectonic fit with the Aristotelian
doctrine that the soul (psyche) is divided into a rational and irra-
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tional part, and that the rational part can be further separated into
scientific and calculative aspects. Both tecna, the faculty which
operates in productive science, and phronesis
, the chief virtue of
practical reason, belong to the calculative part. Different sciences,
then, call for the exercise of different faculties of the soul, and
the faculty that is concerned with moral action is the same as that
which deals with the science of moral action.
Thus what we would call the subject or agent comes to have a
central place in practical science, and through him ( phronesis ) , or
virtuous political action, comes into being. In order to act at all,
phronesis must have a conception of moral virtue which it wishes to
bring into being. That is, it has to adjust its choice of means to
the end suggested by moral virtue. Thus phronesis needs to be
completed by moral virtue, just as moral virtue is incomplete (because
merely potential) without phronesis . In actual operation, phronesis
conducts a whole process of deliberation, until it lights on the
actual step which must be taken in order to attain the end it forsees.
This is the last point reached in deliberation, the point at which
23
action begins.
The crux of the methodological distinctions between practical
and theoretical sciences, then, lies in the difference between their
respective ends, i.e., between analysis and the bringing of something
into being. Theoretic science takes a given fact or thing and
inquires into its cause. Practical science, however, starts from an
end to be attained, an artifact or a policy, and asks after the means
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of attaining it-until it arrives at one which lies within the power
of the inquirer to set into motion. This means that practical
sciences are always teleological and must, in a sense, borrow their
modes of explanation and knowledge from the intentional structures of
the activities of agents and producers. One important implication of
this is that the student of pol i tics--unl ike the student of physics--
will participate directly in the subject-matter of which he is a stu-
dent. He cannot sit back and contemplate the forms of politics, or
seek to inquire abstractly into the causes of political events-
-
indeed, he cannot: if he is to develop the faculty through which he
would learn about the political, he must do so in the context of poli-
tical experience itself, and in active dialogue with the various
agents who follow its pursuits. Aristotle's method of traveling around
Hellas and gathering up 158 constitutions is a reflection of this.
This in turn gives rise to two additional factors which
further distinguish theoretical from practical sciences. First, the
degree of precision with which one can claim to know or understand the
subject-matter of practical science is far less rigorous than is the
case for Theoretical science. Second is the matter of experience:
the life-experiences of the student of pol i tika are crucial for both
his knowledge of his subject-matter and the moral ends of action he
envisions. First let us take up the matter of precision.
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness
as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be
sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the
products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which
political science investigates, admit of much variety and
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fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to existonly by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give
rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to manypeople; for before now men have been undone by reason oftheir wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We mustbe content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with suchpremises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in
speaking about things which are only for the most part true
and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that
are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each
type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an edu-
cated man to look for precision in each class of things just
so far as the nature of the subject admits;^^
The final subject-matter of political science is reached
through the exercise and development of phronesis
,
rather than through
the theoretical reason we find in the logical works or the empirical
observation which underlies Aristotle's studies of the natural world.
But if the subject-matter of political science is the realm of free
and just actions for individuals, and the search for practical solu-
tions to the problem of finding the best life for most people in the
polis, the issue of such enterprises for knowledge is immedaitely
clouded by the reappearance of diversity within the audience to whom
the student of politics addresses himself. First he encounters a
diversity of opinion about which actions are truly fine and just; and
then he discovers that no action can have consequences which will
affect all people the same way. Since we have given up both Plato's
metaphysics and epistemology, we have al so had to relinquish our faith
that political ends are knowable in any universal sense, i.e., that
they are truly "objects" of knowledge. It is upon this that Aristotle
rests his claim that the activities of moral and practical judgment
( phronesis ) are inescapably conventional in character and not handed
down by either nature or the gods. The only truths at which we can
arrive are those "true for the most part," and he cautions, or rather
begs the indulgence of, his reader to recognize the tentative nature
of his arguments and receive them in the spirit with which they are
offered.
As students of politics we will find that the precision of
scientific simplicity characteristic of the more exact sciences will
be unattainable for us given the nature of our subject-matter and the
peculiar rel ationship--part paticipant, part observer--that we have to
it. In the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle notes that
"the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate
to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or
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navigation." The political theorist may advise, then, but he must
do so in collaboration with those who may seek him out; he cannot
prescribe absolutely in the manner that an engineer, for example,
might determine for a city exactly where a wall should be placed and
how it should be constructed. The theorist simply lacks this kind of
knowledge, and politics is simply not something like walls, to be
constructed according to specifiable rules. As a participant in the
affairs of his time, the theorist can recommend and give reasons, but
he lacks the authority to command which even the technical "expert,"
on occasion, can muster. The major reason for this lies in the
problem of the political consequences that follow for the inexact
nature of political knowledge.
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Aristotle s reason for saying that precision beyond a certaindegree is not to be expected in ethics is that (a) any
general account is bound to obscure the variations in obliga-
tion that arise from the varieties of circumstance attending
the performance of any action, while (b) the particular
account will have to be so hedged with qualifications if it
IS to fit the particular case (as the general account does
not), that it will inevitably lack the simplicity which
Aristotle regards as characteristic of precision. ... in a
work which treats generally of ethics the discussion cannot
fully reflect the complexity of the particular cases; and
accordingly, Aristotle says that the account which he will
present in the Nichomacbean Ethics can only be a rough and
outline accountT^°
Ultimately, of course, one studies polities' not in order to
know but to do. It is not knowledge but action that counts. The
problem that confronts both the student of politics and the man of
affairs is that action always unfolds in a concrete particular
situation, and no amount of general or theoretical or a priori
knowlege can guide the agent at the moment he is called upon to
decide. But this means that in speaking of political action,
Aristotle is necessarily addressing a circumscribed audience: those
who have already developed some insight into particulars by prac-
ticing the role of political agent; and we are told that those who are
excessively dominated by emotion or young--ei ther in years or in
character--are not expected to be able to listen to reason in matters
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of conduct. Newman says:
. . .particular judgments need to be correct, and this they
can hardly be without experience: experience, though it arri-
ves at a sort of Universal
,
never wanders far from par-
ticulars. It is evident, then, that the faculty which is
concerned with practical science, is to be developed in life
and in life only. Its beginning lies in habituation, its
growth in experience. The young fall short in both respects.
It is a faculty which cannot be passed from hand to hand.
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Hence, though the sphere of Contingency (and this is the
sphere of Practical and Productive Science) is that which is
most amendable to human influence, the faculty which is con-
cerned with It can only be produced by a circuitous andindirect process beginning in infancy--a slower process than
that by which speculative virtue comes into being though
intellectual virtue generally, which includes speculative
virtue no less than phronesis and tecna
,
is said to "stand in
need of experience and time." (Eth. Nic. 1103al5.)30
At the same time, hovever, politika differs from teckna qua
practical science, precisely because the certainty of the outcomes of
aims and projects undertaken through political action is by no means
guaranteed. Politics is the realm of the uncertain and contingent,
and entire social structures, not to mention individual projects are
subsceptible to the vagaries of accident and the unpredictable: the
state is not a creation of man which man can mold as he likes, and in
this respect whoever seeks to manage state affars has nothing like the
artisan's control over his material.
"The accidental," says Zeller, "arises when a free or unfree
activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of
external circumstances to produce a result other than that
end." Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a
disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and
impeded is that of a being exercising Moral Choice or not;
Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus
modified, is a being exercising Moral Choice. . . .Chance
plays round the ordered process of Nature, careless whether
it mars or aids it or does neither. Its essential charac-
teristic is to be without design and irregular; it is the
negation of Intelligence and Nature ... 31
Thus we have a paradox: contingent (as opposed to necessary)
matters are precisely those about which men can meaningfully deli-
32berate and choose; yet spontaneity, fortune or accident--to say
nothing of necessity and nature--may contribute to the frustration of
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political action, and to the erosion of the confidence with which
either the student of politics or the political actor can safely
.ake
pronouncements about possible future events. Thus the tentative
nature of political theory: neither knowledge (the realm of the
scholor) nor power (the realm of the political actor) can establish or
maintain complete control over its subject-matter. To ask how politi-
cal science is possible at al 1 , then is to ask about the efficacy of
its judgments upon the most appropriate presently apparent means
required to bring about the future moral ends envi sioned .33 gut this
only serves to introduce a further problem-this time in the distinc-
tion between theoretical and practical science. For what emerges here
is that the knowledge of the political theorist becomes contingent
upon his apprehension of actual conditions, and insofar as this is a
precondition of right recommendations to action, the "facts" of poli-
tical life how somehow to be sneaked back into consideration and a
practical dimension into theory. Therefore, the normative and
descriptive elements of political theory are inseparable. Finally, we
come up against the realization that even moral ends in general must
be recommended to some one in particular, and that the possibility of
their articulation in action entails the presence of an audience that
finds the recommendations acceptable; further, that the means to
attain such possible recommended ends can be realized in practice only
through an active process of dialogue between those whose efforts will
be required to bring them about and the theorist himself. Such com-
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munication will depend upon shared values and the persuasive qualities
of rhetoric as necessary conditions. The context for all such activi-
ties, of course, is provided by a space in which a dialogue is
Id
possible.
When all these things are taken together, they do not result
in the clear and methodical exposition that characterizes, say, the
Posterior Analytics: they result in the aporetic method of the
35Politics
. Richard Robinson, a recent translator of Aristotle,
explains:
Aristotle is not writing out elementary principles of poli-
tics to be learned by docile and ignorant beginners. He is
discussing difficulties felt by those who have already
reflected on political matters. His word for such a dif-
ficulty or problem is "aporia." After indicating an aporia
,
he recites the considerations that have made it an aporia
,
including arguments both for and against a certain solution.
These arguments may or may not have true premises, and their
premises may or may not be strong grounds for their conclu-
sion. Aristotle by no means personally recommends all the
premises and inferences to which he draws your attention. He
merely lays them before you as things to be considered in
making up your mind. He believes it worth your while to know
the arguments that have been given, or might be given, for
and against a certain view. He does not write for those who
only want dogmatic conclusions, which they can then adopt on
the authority of Aristotole. Usually he does give his own
conclusion; but sometimes he gives it in such a tentative
form (for instance, as a question) that it is easy not to
recognize it. In his aporetic discussions we are liable to
mistake the beginning for his own view when it is not, and to
mistake the end for a question when it is his own
conclusion|36
What we have here, then, in contrast to Plato's theories, is a
far less idealistic and more trenchant view of human political life
and the craft of the political theorist. Many important consequences
follow upon the Aristotelian emphasis on the particular event and cri-
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tique of the possibility for precise knowledge of political phenomena;
not the least of these is pointed out by Sheldon Wolin:
Plato's distrust of political participation, then rested on adefinite notion of what constituted a relevant source of
political knowledge. If a case is to be made for popular
participation, it would have to be shown that Plato's concep-
tion of political knowledge was unduly narrow and that a (nore
adequate conception, one that would be more in keeping with
the nature of political decisions, is directly connected to a
more inclusive sceme of participation. The first thing to be
noted is that Plato vastly exaggerated the degree of preci-
sion that political knowledge might attain. The belief that
political science was a body of absolute knowledge was clo-
sely conneted with the static character that Plato attributed
to the objects of knowledge; there could be no valid
knowledge where the objects of thought were unchanging and
lacking in proportion. Conversely, because the true objects
of thought were fixed, unchanging, and symmetrical, it was
possible for thought to achieve an absolute precision and
accuracy. But Plato's argument about the absolute character
of political knowledge was not the consequence of a close
examination of politics or of political situations, but was
drawn from other fields.-^'
Evans makes a similar argument, but reasons more closely,
emphasizing the formal elements in the Platonic and Aristotelian
epistemologies respectively. It will be remembered that one function
of the Forms is to resolve difficulties in our understanding of
things, and that reference to the different views that different per-
sons may take of the same thing serves to help Plato distinguish bet-
ween the expert and the inexpert. One way to see the contrast between
Forms and particulars is to represent it as a distinction between
context-free and context-dependent cases of concepts. For Plato,
expert understanding or Knowledge is not something that varies from
person to person and hence is not qualified by reference to its human
subjects: the Forms are pure objects, and knowledge of them is always
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the same regardless of the life-situation or experience of he who con-
templates them. Both the nature of the philosopher-king and the
object of his knowledge are unqualified by context. But Plato grad-
ually became aware of this, and he raised a problem for himself in the
Parmenides which, had he discovered it earlier, might have changed the
form of the Republic
.
In the former work, he applied the principle of
correlatives (that as sets of beliefs vary from person to person so
does the world as it seems to each) to the relation between human
faculties and their objects. For Evans, the arguments
. .
.show that insofar as each person's faculty is subject
to the qualification of being hrs, its object cannot be the
object of the faculty: moreover, if some exercise of the
'
faculty may be counted an unqualified exercise in virtue of
its expertness, its object cannot be something other than the
object of the faculty. In terms of the distinction between
Forms and particulars, this makes it incoherent to assert, as
Plato does in the Republ ic that the expert recognizes the
distinctness of the two, while the inexpert confuses them. 38
The political consequence of this, which Aristotle refused, was to
reduce all political conflicts to conflicts about knowledge.
If we reject Plato's distinction between expert and inexpert
on the grounds that it cannot account for real differences in indi-
vidual understanding and experience, who--if anyone-does Aristotle
select as more likely to be superior in knowledge of political things?
First, in politics we should praise not wise but practically wise men;
for, in speaking of wise men, this is "why we say that they know
things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, divine, but useless;
39
viz., because it is not human goods that they seek."
Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things
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human and things about which it is possible to deliberate-
for we say this is above all the work of the phronimos to'
deliberate well, but no one deliberates about things
invariable, nor about things which have not an end, and that
a good that can be brought about by action. The man who is
without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is
capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best
for man of things attainable by action. ^0
The object of understanding for the phronimos is the city-
state itself, a diverse collection of human aims and interests, of
which he is a member and a citizen. But for much of what he knows he
must rely upon the opinions of those whose lives and interests
directly or indirectly constitute the political situation which is the
context in which he acts. The role of opinion, which Plato had
assigned to the epi stemol ogical nether realm of mere belief, becomes
highly significant for Aristotle, whose phronimos can be seen to
depend upon it as one of the chief means through which he acquires the
experience that makes practical judgment possible. Of the various
human sources of political knowledge, and this includes the many, few
may measure up to Aristotle's standard of the ideal political actor,
but each is indispensable to the buildup of the kind of experience
prefigured in right action. As Wolin noted, Aristotle's theory of
political knowledge, for all of its inherent imprecision, makes the
validity of claims for wider political participation in decisionmaking
for more plausible than Plato would allow, insofar as Aristx)tle too is
offering us a political philosophy based on a concept of knowledge.
Newman says,
. . .neither the end of man, nor the means to its attainment
can be ascertained, at all events in detail, except by an
64
appeal to the judgement of the phronimos and also to the
c^ll^^iTu^^'P^^''^"" sifted and corrected as we have
th?n\ 'r'''^' ^'^^ Pl^to does no?i k that a knowledge of the ideas will suffice to ,nake his
experience!4lM" ^^'^^^"^ ^'^^^^^ ^^^'^ practical
The Politics of Aristotle
The Pol is is a Koinonia
As we turn to Aristotle's Politics
, two preliminaries should
be mentioned. First is Aristotle's teleological mode of explanation
of the subject-matter of political science. This is a mode of expla-
nation in terms of ends which assumes in its very structures that
individuals and states alike have the capacity to move forward on the
basis of consciously formulated aims or intentions about possible
future arrangements and projects. Any existing state can be seen as
the embodiment of a telos of collective aims. The second factor is
his conception of the pol i
s
as a species of human association or
koinonia
.
This notion is prior to his concepts of state and com-
munity.
In politics, as well as in personal life, then, the political
actor manifests arete (excellence) when what he does fulfills the
telos of his community: eudaimonia . This last term should not be
understood in any of the usual modern senses of our English
"happiness," which is often taken to indicate being in a state of
satiated desire; or of physical comfort or spiritual joy; or even as
designating a way of life free of constraints and full of leisure.
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Rather, it indicates a 'state of psychological self-fulfillment and
general well-being brought about through the successful acco.npl i shment
of meaningful activity. It is always associated with arete and with
doing something well.^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ briefly, the true end
of the state is the eudaimonia and highest personal development of the
greatest possible number of its citizens consistent with their
character as a people and the form of its constitution.
Now the polis itself is a species of associ ation.44 Aristotle
says a species of koinonia
. The term has no English equivalent and
this makes it difficult for the Greekless reader to understand what
Aristotle is getting at. Barker translates it variously as
"community," "association," and even "aggregate"--vastly different
words with substantively distinct and important implications for the
political theorist. Robinson usually translates it as "community."
The problem is that it means something different from and more than
any of these: when Aristotle says " koinonia " he does not mean a com-
munity of the sort that Helen and Scott Nearing founded in Vennont
after World War II; neither does he mean an association such as the
American Association of Manufacturers. It implies a little more
distance than is to be found in the one; considerably less utili-
tarianism than characterizes the other. The noun-form cognates of
koinonia include "the political," "the common," "communication,"
"community," and (also) "sexual union. "^^ Verb-form cognates can be
translated "unite" or "unify." In general, it indicates a living
together of men and a form of their common life. Newman says that all
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koinoni^ are held together by friendship^^ and uses the word in its
plural form because, for the Greeks, it signified the household and
the village as well as the polis. When Aristotle speaks of the poli-
tical koinonia, then, he means that this particular koinonia is that
human association which embraces and is superior not only to indivi-
duals but also to all lesser forms of koinoniae .^^ The household and
the village are "like" the polis in the sense that all are charac-
terized by friendship and a common life; but when Aristotle applies
the term to the polis itself he is making a double move: he is first
setting the polis above and beyond the lesser koinoniae as something
which includes them; but he is also trying to express something of the
bonds of warmth and personal connectedness that characterize them.
The political koinonia thus expresses a unity in much the same way
that the household and village express a unity of common experiences.
Note, however, that the political koinonia should not be confused with




. If we recall our earlier arguments about the
heterogeneity of political communities, it should come as no surprise
to find that the political koinonia of Aristotle is "home" for a
diversity of human interests and experiences:
. . the cause of the fallacy into which Plato falls must be
held to be the wrong character of the premise on which he
bases his argument [i.e., that the greatest possible unity of
the whole polis is the supreme good. [1260b37-38.] It is
true that unity is to some extent necessary, alike in a
household and a polis; but total unity is not. There is a
point at which a polis, by advancing in unity, will cease to
be a polis: there is another point, short of that, at which
it may still remain a polis, but will nonetheless come near
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to losing Its essence, and will thus be a worse polls It isas If you were to turn harmony into .nere unison, or to reduce
a theme to a single beat. The truth is that the polis ashas already been said, is an aggregate ([koinon] of many
members; and education [paideia] is therefore the means of
making it a community and giving it unity.^^
Thus a polis
,
as a specific kind of koinonia has neither the
homogeneous unity of the Republic nor the haphazard and accidental
union of human energies that might be conferred by geography, migra-
tions or even common habits. It is a unity in consciousness of
varied and reciprocal parts that become unified through coimnon
language and an education which improves the character of the
• . 50
citizens, and in democracies provides the basis for the decisions
that political agents make together about their common mode of life
itself. Individuals are here "made one by the pursuite of a common
aim in which their nature, their habits, and their training lead them
1 51
all to join." The pol i
s
unifies its parts without reducing them to
uniformity, and when we conceive of it as a "whole"--which it is some-
times possible to do--then Aristotle holds that it exhibits the same
formal relationships that wholes and parts are said to have throughout
52his wider corpus. Ernest Barker summarizes:
The terms "compound" ( syntheton ) and "whole" ( hoi on ) are both
technical terms of Aristotle's philosophy. The "compound" is
the genus: the "whole" is a species of that genus.
"Compounds," as defined by Grote in a Passage quoted in
Newman's note, "are of two sorts--aggregates like a heap
(mechanical) and aggregates like a syllable (organic)."
"Wholes" are aggregates of the second or organic kind: they
have a form which gives them an organic unity, and an End or
Final Cause which gives them a single purpose. The polis is
such a "whole. "53
For Aristotle, "a part is not only a part of something other
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than itself: it also belongs entirely to that other thing. "^^ Given
this primarily metaphysical relationship between parts and wholes, it
is no great leap for Aristotle to assert that the destruction of a
whole deprives the part of ousia or being. Since the specific nature
of any part depends upon its function in relation to the whole, in the
case of the polis the identity of the individual depends upon what he
does within the koinonia
. In no case can the individual be simulta-
neously self-complete ( autarkis ) and separate from the polis
. Thus
the very substance of individuality is conferred by the polis which
stands in relation to him as a beginning or occasion of origin
( archa )
.
Much the same account is given by Aristotle of the archa (et.
1060a)
,
( archa gar to sunanairoun ) or the ousia of a thing
(De An. 412bl8f7D". Severance from the Whole, in fact,
involves the loss of the Form or ouisia
,
and the loss of this
involved "destruction" ... but a hand destroyed is a hand
unfitted to discharge the functions of a hand, or in other
words is not a hand at all. Thus we may almost say that in
Aristotle's view the polis is the ousia or archa of the
i ndi vidual .^^
The point is crucial first because it illuminates Aristotle's
reason for thinking that it is possible for the political association
to become a unity of diverse and heterogeneous elements without sacri-
ficing the integrity of the elements; second, because it is the
background for his later assertions that the interests of individuals
must be subordinated to those of the whole in the event of a clash
between them; third, it forms part of Aristotle's effort to strengthen
the authority of the pol i
s
and promote a revival of civic virtue at a
time when these things were coming under severe pressure. For him,
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the poljs does not come into being in opposition to or as a limitation
upon man's natural rights: for man has no natural rights. Whatever
rights he may have in fact are called into existence by the constitu-
tion, i.e., by men themselves. While this last doctrine may give
rise to disagreement, it is Aristotle's practical solution to the
problem that he can find no transcendental argument for justice that
would be good in all times and places.
Hence the ends of the city cannot be given by a_ priori prin-
ciple, but must come in a general way from the sociological and
historical conditions which are such important elements oP collective
life itself. Following Newman's suggestion, then, if we pay as much
heed to Aristotle's method as we do his doctrine, we will see that the
phronimos
,
or man of practical wisdom, cannot himself be the final
court of appeal about what the collectivity is to do. Instead, he
must converse and engage in dialogue with the other inhabitants of his
city if he is to attain the practical grasp of daily affairs which is
a necessary condition for his exercise of arete. Given the express
role that Aristotle grants the opinions of others in the marshalling
of facts by the phronimos
,
it is difficult to conclude otherwise than
that the ends of the state cannot be given in particular except
through a process of intersubjective examination of available alter-
By
natives by the inhabitants of the city. Therefore the "end" of the
state is not a universal but subject to contingencies rooted in its
historical conditions; and the power of the phronimos , as well as his
personal arete is at least partly a consequence of his ability to
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grasp what they tell him. Under some forms of constitution, such
dialogues must take place in public because large numbers oF people
are expected to exercise the arete of the phronimos
. And this is the
form of constitution that we are specifically interested in. Hence
the following emphasis upon the "pol i ty"--that form of constitution
which places an assembly of citizens at its head and a public space at
its heart.
Aristotle distinguishes between higher, social fuctions and
lower, necessary ones. The higher functions are peculiar to man and
are seen as direct outgrowths of his capacities to reason, to speak
and to choose. The lower functions are usually seen as necessary to
all forms of life and not peculiar to man. The primary distributive
function of any consti tution--and what makes the association which it
governs uniquely political and superior to all others--is to portion
out those higher social activities and thereby to define the civic
body by stipulating the rights of citizenship and rule.^^ According
to Newman, this is the "only problem which the constitution has to
solve.
"^^
Broadly speaking, Aristotle classifies constitutions in two
ways, first, morally, i.e., according to whether the ruling person or
group acts to further its own self interests or to seek the common
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good. The second manner of classification is formal. It is a
function of the economic origin of the ruling group. Constitutions
differ in the ways they allot the right of ruling to different persons
or groups of persons. Where power is held by those who act for the
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common good, Aristotle calls the constitution "normal," or "healthy."
On the other hand, constitutions which reflect or embody the political
dominance of men seeking only personal gain are called "degenerate"
forms, and of this sort he makes strong cri tici sms.^^
Aristotle's scheme for the moral sortition of constitutions is
based upon the principle that political rule, by virtue of its speci-
fic nature, is essentially for the benefit of the ruled. But not
everyone who lives within the social order of the polis counts, and
this is why a polis, qua political koinonia must be understood as
something less than what we moderns would consider an entire city:
strictly speaking, it incorporates the political or ruling element,
but not those social strata that contribute exclusively to its
material functions--i .e.
,
those which are its "necessary conditions."
These parts of the city are regulated by the political part, but the
individuals who carry out such activities are not necessarily admitted
to share political power.
Aristotle's attempt to formally classify pol i teia
(constitutions) is made in terms of the social and economic heteroge-
niety of city life. Here he says that "The real ground of the dif-
ference between oligarchy (the rule of the few) and democracy (the
fid
rule of the many) is poverty and riches. By this he means that the
form of government he calls "democracy" is a government in which "the
freemen and the poor are invested with the power of the state. By
an "oligarchy" he means a government dominated by the rich--whether
fifi
they be a majority or a minority. It is not the numerical value of
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the ruling group that counts then, but its role in the economy of the
city. Newman notes that here Aristotle applies the rule that a defi-
nition of a thing must not be built on a distinguishing feature which
is only an accident and not present in every case:^^ power is econo-
mic, not numerical
.
But something more is involved in these categories than econo-
mic position or status. All of the "poor" and "rich" in question here
are also both "freemen" and "citizens" of the polis
. The Greek polis
had both rich and poor citizens, who had been divided into four
classes more than once-in theory by Plato in the Laws, and in prac-
tice by both Solon and Cleisthenes .^^ Sometimes the access to power
granted to these economic classes varied, but not always. At other
times, equality counted for far more than wealth.^^ What is important
here, however, is that the polis was also the place of residence for
vast numbers of non-citizens. These were concerned with the necessary
functions of collective life and can be divided into three groups:
"metics"--i .e.
,
free foreigners and those natives who neither owned
land nor appeared on the registry of some tribe or deme; slaves; and
women. Of these three, none had any political rights or privileges in
Aristotle's sense of "political," though individual metics often
enjoyed great wealth and social status and carried primary respon-
sibility for the commercial activities of city-states such as Athens.
The point, then, is that it is citizenship and not wealth which con-
fers political privileges on individuals for Aristotle and--under the
best of condi tions- -arete not numbers, which confers moral legitimacy
upon the policy directions which those citizens choose.
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The Mixed Constitution
The "polity" as we saw earlier, stands as a mean between oli-
garchy and democracy and incorporates elements of each.^^ The polity
of Aristotle serves as the prism through which many of the major con-
cepts entailed by any participatory model of politics are refracted.
The issues raised here are to reappear again and again, whenever
assembled groups of men gather together to debate and decide the
central questions of political life; these are also the problems and
concepts which seem to hold the center of attention of any group
trying to decide, at the moment of founding, just how to institutiona-
lize a central and permanent political role for decisionmaking by
groups. I will try to show that all of the essential elements of the
mixed government theory revolve around the central concept of a public
space, that it is the sine qua non of this particular form of govern-
ment. Most of Aristotle's theory of the polity appears in Books III
and IV of the Pol itics .
Our primary interests here will be the citizen, the assembly,
the distinction between public and private, and indirectly, the con-
cepts of civic virtue and common good. It would be wonderful (but
Utopian) could we discuss such notions far from the dust and din of
social stratification and class struggles, but this would be to omit
phenomena essential to the plausibility of the entire discussion.
The practicality of Aristotle's approach to political life has
long vexed those who are unhappy with the world that men have made for
themselves thus far. Our discussion of the role that practical
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experience must play in the search for solutions to the dilemmas of
politics has shown that a real state, a workable state, cannot be
formed, willy-nilly, from the imagination of the political theorist.
Men and their cities are "already there" and their manner of being, as
we come upon them in history, constitutes both the field and the hori-
zon of any possible political action. Actual cities are bound to tra-
ditions and institutional practices that could only be wiped clean
were it possible to simultaneously found a city in a desert and people
it with individuals who had had no experience of existing political
life. But we can never have it this way and Aristotle knows it. So
he turns to the raw materials of history, and his characterization of
Greek cities, while nowhere assembled in a single place runs through
the Politics in a series of background themes that reminds the reader
of Thucydides: the city of man is ridden with class antagonism, wars,
demagogues and often civil strife; its population is diverse in
background, interests and moral attainments, education, wealth and
tastes; it may or may not be wel 1 =governed; its capacity to persist as
an independent, sovereign political unit is often threatened. The
problem is to discover a constitution that could really mold such
centripetal forces into a koinonia held together through human affir-
mation rather than through force or fears--wi thout striving to simply
abolish such forces entirely. The diversity of social and class
distinctions can neither be legislated nor imposed nor wished away in
the long run, and its presence results in a continuous clash of
interests that politics can contain but never absolutely resolve. We
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Shall see below that Aristotle does not think that human attempts to
abolish class distinctions can succeed; that property can ever be
absolutely equalized. That the two are tied together is a continuing
theme throughout the Politics ; but there are limits to the realm of
things human over which man can exercise choice or rational control.
For Aristotle, as I read him, social hierarchy is not a product of
human choice but appears everywhere that men live together in can-
munities. Thus it is a prepolitical phenomenon given by nature.
Further, when either the rich or the poor gain power in a
city, the consequences for its civic virtue and political system are
disasterous. The rich tend to extract vast quantities of wealth from
the poor and push them into military service and other forms of ser-
vitude. The poor, on the other hand, divest the rich of their lands
and funds and turn these over to a state which cannot really redistri-
bute them, itself having been taken over by demagogues who want
"rewards" and lavish public momunents to the memory of their deeds.
Neither form of politics can attain even the practical level of
justice that Aristotle seeks the one uses centralized power to
determine the affairs of the city exclusively from the standpoint of
its own self-interest, while the other takes an extreme of human poli-
tical and social experience and attempts to remake the entire civic
culture over in its own image. Each asserts its own interests
entirely at the expense of those of the other side--creating either an
oligarchy or a democracy as it will --and each is doomed to failure,
precisely because the wants and needs and interests of the other side
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are ineradicable and will assert themselves anew whenever there occurs
a moment of weakness or hesitation among those who dominate.
Accordingly, the "polity" is an attempt to institutionalize a
compromise; it expresses Aristotle's desire to find a mean between the
extremes of domination by either the rich or the poor, for otherwise
"the result is a state, not of freemen but only of slaves and
masters."
The mean he seeks would institutionalize and preserve a
balance of social and economic forces so that all of the citizens
could "share in a common constitution. "''^ The compromise contains two
essential elements: first, power is to be shared by a large number of
equal citizens drawn from all economic classes; second, the powers of
the various classes themselves must be balanced, with none taking a
dominant position over the others and none excluded. This
"solution," then, attempts to preserve the positive and communal ele-
ments implied by the notion of a political koinona without sacrificing
awareness of and respect for the very real centrifugal forces
unleashed by social heterogeneity and economic inequality. The
balance is delicate: the citizen holds power; the rich are permitted
neither to encroach nor to deceive; the power of the state itself is
to be divided into three separate elements, each of which conducts its
business publicly; and a strong middle class will act as a kind of
balance of power and mediate between the other two. The result, it is
claimed, will be a form of government that accurately reflects




tion, establishes a realm of political freedom where the diversity of
citizens can act together under conditions of political equality.
At one point, Aristotle sets up an empirical test by which
anyone can tell whether a mixed polis is "mixed" properly: the various
parts of the city must support their constitution. And he does not
mean tacit consent: he means that if offered the opportunity to change
their constitution they would refuse:
A properly mixed "polity" should look as if it contained bothdemocratic and oligarchical elements--and as if it contained
neither. It should owe its stability to its own intrinsic
strength, and not to external support; and its intrinsic
strength should be derived from the fact, not that a majority
are in favor of its continuance (that might well be the case
with a poor constitution), but rather that there is no single
section in all the state which would favor a change to a dif-
ferent constitution. '3
Suppose we think of the mixed constitution as a design
intended to bring about two aims. First is that of establishing a
political koinonia
. Second is that of establishing a balance of power
among the various forces actually present there. The one emphasizes
the individual or subject of politics as he appears in the political
arena, engages in political action with his friends and acquaintances,
and exercises his liberties in the realm of freedom. The second is
concerned with power and the brokerage role that politics must always
play as it seeks to mediate between conflicting social and economic
interests. If a constitution alone can create a realm of freedom in
which men can truly act politically, the lesson here seems to be that
most men are nonetheless formed outside that realm: they bring with
them to the public space the concerns and interests that necessity
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imposes, and these concerns will inevitably reappear as they exercise
their lawmaking functions. Conceived in tenns of the integrating
function that the public space itself exerts upon its hurnan elements,
each of these two aspects of the "good" polity both defines and is
defined in terms of it: the citizen is whoever has access to the
public space; the subject-matter of the debates unfolded within it
concerns necessity in a number of guises-but always as those citizens
determine it to be. In Aristotle's "Ideal State" freedom and
necessity are separate. Here, in the Practically best state, they
appear together in the balance of social forces present, and are
embodied in the agenda items with which they will deal.
Theory of the Citizen
The citizens of the polity are equal to one another in the
political realm, regardless of what they may be outside it.^^ But
Aristotle does not use the notion of equality in anything like our
modern sense. Equality does not exist in nature; it is only possible
in human affairs where it is always discussed with reference to
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something specific. The primary characteristic with respect to
which men are equal or unequal is, of course, property. Others
include birth, honors, freedom, intelligence, productivity and even
numbers. No such attribute, when present, justifies the elevation of
individual or group to a sovereign position above the other
81
citizens.
This much should be simple and clear, but complexities follow
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as usual. These are revealed to us as we turn to consider the mixed
constitution as a structure or framework of institutions, and the
problems raised by the division of power in government. The "mixed-
constitution is not only mixed with respect to the class origins of
the participants, it is also mixed with respect to divisions of power
and authority. Most important, some citizens are going to hold office
while others do not:
It is a principle which has to be observed among free and
equal citizens. They cannot all rule simultaneously; they
must therefore each have office for a year.
. .or by some
other order of succession for some other priod. In this way
It comes about that all are rulers.
. .because justice
requires the participation of all in office (whether officebe a good thing or a bad). There is yet an imitation of it
or an approximation to it, if equals retire from office in
turn and are all, apart from their period of office, in the
same position.
For Aristotle, there will not necessarily be a contradiction
between equality and of ficehol ding if three conditions are met.
First, officeholders must be drawn from the pool of citizens at large.
No non-citizen may hold power and there is no social distinction or
rank which might automatically confer high office upon a few, or
advance the interests of a subset of society. Second, there must be
rapid turnover in office, for permanent rulers are dangerous. Third,
the general pool of citizens is the body that usually selects the
officeholders and always reviews their performance at the end of their
84tenure in office. For Aristotle, these conditions insure that the
real sovereigns in the polity are the citizens at large, and not the
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officeholders. Thus he prepares the ground for answering the
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question that would naturally occur to any Greek well-educated enough
to plow through a treatise on politics: can the ,nany really decide
important matters as well as the expert few?«^ After some discussion.
Aristotle confers judgment in favor of the many, noting that what
counts-in terms of justice-is the collective participation in
decisions: it is the institutionalized powerholding group of citizens
in general that ultimately holds and controls the office:
. .
.for the officer is not the judge or the councillor orthe assemblyman but the court ( ekklesia ) and the council
lbouj_e) and the demos; each of the persons mentioned is apart of these, I mean the councillor, the assemblyman and thejudge. Hence it is just for the people to control greater
matters since the demos and the boule and the ekklesia con-
sist of many persons, the property qualifications of whom,
taken all together, is greater than that of those who fill
great offices individually or in small groups. Let these
matters be determined in this way. 87
Sovereignty is thus firmly planted in collective assemblies
and by this arrangement the citizen-body distributes office.^^
We may therefore draw the conclusion, which can be defended
on many grounds, that all should share alike in a system of
government under which they rule and are ruled by turns. In
a society of peers equality means that all should have the
same rights: and a constitution can hardly survive if it is
founded on injustice [i.e., if it gives different rights to
men who are of the same quality].^^
Now if all of the citizens have the same rights, and not all
of them have the same duties at the same time, how are the various
rights and duties and citizens to be divided? We know from the defi-
nition of a "citizen proper" given earlier that citizens exercise both
"deliberative and judicial functions"--i .e. , the duties of both
legislators and judges. In addition, some are to hold office or--as
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Barker translates, "magistracy." The fullest treabnent of citi-
zenship, then, must incorporate all of these elements. In Book IV,
Ch. 14, Aristotle takes up the problem:
We may lay it down that there are three elements or powers in
each constitution. ... The first of the three is the deli-berative element concerned with common affairs and its
proper constitution: the second it the element of the
magistracies (and here it has to be settled what these
magistracies are to be, what matters they are to control andhow their occupants are to be appointed). The third is thejudicial element and the proper constitution of that
element .^^
Properly speaking, the title "magistracy" should be reserved
"for those which are charged with the duty of deliberating, deciding
and giving orders. "^^ This power, different in but one respect from
that of the citizen in general, is checked by the right of the
assembly to appoint and to review, and there follows a technical
discourse on the various methods according to which magistrates might
92be selected. These passages are important because they illustrate
the variety of formal possibilities according to which magisterial
power may be allotted and checked. The constant theme throughout it
is this: some kind of executive is necessary, but an unchecked execu-
tive is a threat to popular soveriegnty. How are the people to bring
the executive into being yet not lose control over it, once it begins
to command and they to obey?
For Aristotle, the political agent proper is not the faction
or group but the citizen ( pol i tikos ) . He is the subject of both
history and political life, and in the final analysis it is the unity
of citizens that counts. Though citizens may be "partisans" of either
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democratic or oligarchical parties, it is individuals and not groups
who act within the public space, and individuals and not groups who
finally experience the positive affections and bonds of loyalty which
are essential to the political koinonia
. Thus the concept of citizen
occupies the central place in his theory of political action and is to
his political theory what knowledge was for Plato and classes are for
Marx. There is no such thing as citizen qua univeral for Aristotle.
At the most abstract level, citizens are the elements or parts of
which the political koinonia is formally composed. As constitutions
differ, so do definitions of ci tizenship .^^ What he is trying to
determine at the beginning of Book III, however, is the concept of the
citizen in a democracy, i.e., "a citizen proper. "^^ He starts by
sharply distinguishing those who are not to be included in the cate-
gory from those who are: naturalized citizens, metics, those whose
only civic entitlement is suing and being sued in the courts,
children, and also the old (whose presence as a nuisance in the
assembly was sometimes proverbial). Each of these carries burdens of
one sort or another which justifies barring them from unqualified con-
sideration for citizenship. Any of these might be included in the
category "ci tizen"--i .e.
, a child of Greek citizen parents would grow
up to exercise his privileges and duties as a citizen--but what counts
is that none of these is totally free of some personal or legal hin-
derance to the exercise of the citizenship function.
What we have to define is the citizen in the strict and
unqualified sense, who has no defect that has to be made good
before he can bear the name. ... The citizen in this strict
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?n . criterian, "A man who sharesin the administration of justice and the holding of o?fice "
. . .
we have no one word to denote the factor common to thejudge and the member of the assembly, or to describe the
interest of a clearanalysis, call it indeterminate office." On that basis we
hold \)
^^'^ '^"'^'""^ are those who share in theing of office as so defined. 96
There are a number of important things to note about this
passage. First. Aristotle's notion of a citizen in the "unqualified"
sense has it roots in some of the more basic categories of his logic.
An object can be a "universal" in the sense that it is the co-nmon
characteristic of a number of instances, and it is well to take note
of the "universal" possibilities inherent in essentially complex con-
cepts such as Friendship. Soul, Shape, Being, or Philosophy ... or
"Citizen." What ARistotle is seeking here, then, is to find a defini-
tion of citizenship consistent with the formal requirements of
"definitions" he has offered elsewhere.^^ The concept he comes up
with is one that will, under most normal constitutions, indicate that
part of the population which actively participates in the political
life of the city. The definition presented here, however, is that of
the primary form of citizenship only, and it would be a misun-
derstanding to think that Aristotle holds that this is the only way a
constitution can define a citizen.
Second, the citizen in this strict sense--hereaf ter to be
called the "Aristotelian citizen"--is defined in terms for which
empirical validation is possible: the student of any polis, wishing to
know who actually plays the role of citizen, has merely to discover
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who actually holds indeterminate office at a given time. The equation
of officeholding and citizenship isolates that set of people who wield
formally defined political power in a given society at a particular
time and reveals much about the nature of what power and of the kind
of individuals who hold it. Applied to the contemporary United
States, for example, the notion could quickly point out for us who the
"actual" citizen are.
Now, for the student of politics, the question, "Who actually
•does hold office?" may be sufficient to settle the question of citi-
zenship. But the legislator faces a different sort of problem alto-
gether. The question, "Who should be admitted to office, and why?"
involves him suddenly in the immense area of individual attributes and
capabilities. "Should office be open to just anybody?" The question
is of utmost importance because the "good" of the entire city and the
preservation of its health and way of life are at stake. Obviously,
those who have not developed the moral and intellectual capabilities
to serve the common good should be excluded and those who have deve-
loped these capacities should be admitted. But this does not move us
forward very far: how are we to know and who is to decide?
What strikes the modern mind about the excluded categories of
individuals is that neither birth nor residence per se are said to
admit an individual to the status of citizen, and that citizenship
turns out to be a privilege and not necessarily a birthright: mem-
bership in the ongoing life of the society does not automatically
qualify the individual for citizenship in the political order.
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Aristotle wants to admit those with "no defect that has to be made
good
. .
and I suppose we could take the categories of lunatics and
children as starting points from which to see what such defects anight
be in general. The citizen, after all, takes responsibility for the
affairs of the city, and clearly must be able to assume responsibility
for himself before being empowered to take responsibility for others.
This means that he must be both economically and psychologically
(i.e., morally) independent. He should be neither a minor nor a
pauper; neither weak and subject to bribes, nor impressionable and
subject to influence. Hence it appears that anyone who either cannot
be held responsible for his own acts, or is in a position of servitude
or retainership would be barred from the status and privileges of
citizen. But "responsibility" so used casts a very wide conceptual
net indeed. What does taking care of oneself mean? Is this actual or
potential? Aristotle doesn't tell us. What he does tell us is that
an individual can make claims to exercise the mandates of citizenship
if and only if he fulfills the criteria stipulated by the constitution
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under which he lives. This ultimately makes the concept "citizen" a
matter of law in the sense that a constitution defines not only who
the citizen may be, but also the basic institutions of political power
and its distribution. Citizenship falls within the category of res
adjudicata
. But the obvious political consequence of this lies in the
possible responses that those omitted might make to such formal, and
necessarily exclusive definitions, either at the moment a constitution
is being adopted or later. Formal or legal exclusivity of privilege
86
entails considerable control over the agenda of politics In any city.
Indeed, one «ay to look at the history of class conflict Is to see It
as revolving around the admissions criteria for Aristotelian citi-
zenship.
At this point, Aristotle passes from these questions of
defining the citizen to examine the nature of his virtue. Suppose we
put the question in the institutional form first: "Who should be
admitted to the exercise of the privileges of the citizen?" and
recognize that the "should" in this instance refers to something about
the moral quality of an individual's performance rather than his
suitability to perform certain necessary functions. In making such a
shift, Aristotle broadens and deepens his inquiry considerably. He
shows us that in human affairs functional and empirical definitions
are insufficient to determine whether something is really what it
appears to be. The dimensions of citizenship implied in its having an
^^^^^ are necessary because in politics the right performance of
duties cannot be determined separate from considerations of subjective
intention and personal character, i.e., we have to know something
about the reasons and attitudes that underlie the apparent activities
of the individual. We know who the citizens are in the normal state
because we can point out the officeholders. We know something about
the attributes they need to fulfill their functions of participation
in office. But there is a teleological dimension to political action
and to the life of the city. The aim of both is not mere life but
good life. Therefore, it is necessary to seriously raise questions
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that surpass functional capabilities because these presuppose a cer-
tain kind of moral and intellectual individual background. To sum up
the whole business, we can ask one kind of question about the external
appearances of power and those who have access to it. This is empiri-
cal
.
We can ask another kind of question about the practical duties
and difficulties that anyone exercising citizenship privileges must
master. This is functional
. And we can ask yet another kind of
question about the motives for action, and this is psychological and
moral. The question of motivation increases in importance as emphasis
grows on the necessity of ruling for the common good. So, therefore,
does the far more vexatious dilemma of personal attributes. Aristotle
does not try to take Plato's escape route here and give power only to
those who are absolutely good. This, as we have seen, imposes far too
much unity on the city. Instead, he tries for a more open yet still
restrictive definition of the citizen.
Hence the citizen of the polity is not the spoudaios^ ^
-i.e.,
the man who is good without qual i fication--though he does need some of
his attributes. In addition, however, he needs the attributes of the
phronimos and this means that he has to be practically effective in
working with others to achieve jointly determined ends. The latter
qualities are necessary if he is to embody practical wisdom, engage in
political action and work for the common good.''"^^
Now the problem is that if the constitution is of a degenerate
fonn, constructed for the satisfaction of private rather than common
goods, there is no way that a person formally admissable to office can
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both exercise the arete of phronesis and simul taneously be a "good"
citizen. This is a celebrated dilemma in the politics and a direct
result of Atistotle's refusal to lay down a priori principles of right
action. A free people chooses its own constitution and in the process
decides which among them are fit for citizenship. In the absence of a
universal (or metaphysical) principle of justice, they are left with
whatever wisdom they may embody at the time they choose a political
order (i.e., a principle derived from historical experience). Thus
the relationship that Aristotle finds between existing constitutions
and their sociological background conditions.
The active citizen, then, must hold office; he must not just
be eligible for it, he must be able to hold it and exercise it. Thus
we start with the definition of citizen as officeholder, move to the
question of practical capacities and moral attributes, decide that we
can't know too much about them in advance, and finally return to at
least a general level of understanding of those practical things that
he must be able to accomplish and manage: this expands upon what we
can say positively about his individual capabilities;
. . .men hold in esteem the double capacity which consists in
knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and they regard the
excellence of a worthy citizen as consisting in a good exer-
cise of this double capacity.
More discussion follows: there are different kinds of ruling
and being ruled. The citizen need not learn how to be ruled insofar
as this means the kind of being ruled associated with the performance
of menial duties or manual labor or soldering. 103 ^ 4.u 4.u u a
^ On the other hand,
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there is rule of the sort which is exercised over persons who are
similar in birth to the ruler-i.e., by a person over his political
equals. This latter the citizen should know, because "rule of this
sort is what we call political rule/'^^^ Finally Aristotle concludes
. . .
ruler and ruled have indeed different excellences- buttne fact remains that the good citizen must possess theknowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well asfor being ruled, and the arete of a citizen may be defined as
a knowledge of rule over Tri^men from both points of
VI ew.
What is important here is the emphasis upon the kind of rule
In question: the adjective "political" is specifically attached to
this kind of rule, and it indicates something important about
Aristotle's concept of the "political" life proper: it is a life where
equals rule equals and are ruled in turn;^^^ where power is shared;
where no-one who holds power has not first learned to obey; where the
sharing of power necessitates the taking of decisions in public. The
exclusion of soldiers and manual laborers from citizenship here is
done more with an eye to shedding light of> the kinds of individual
experience necessary to the personal development of political arete
than it is to permanently exclude a particular group or social
class. '^^ The point under consideration here is positive, not
negative: the nature of the realm of freedom and political action is
such that it would be counterproductive for the individual citizen to
spend much time learning how to perform technical operations involving
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objects and things. Citizens work with equals and with ideas, and
thre is no a priori standard available to evaluate the outcome of
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their actions as there is in the case of .anual labor or technical or
military operation. Hence, the fonnative experiences of those who are
to live up to a citizen ar:ete must take place in the midst of politi-
cal activities and the realm of freedom; and this is the kind of rule
which the ruler ought to learn while being ruled.
These considerations must not be allowed to obscure the fact
that one of the fundamental attributes of the Aristotelian citizen is
power, and that the granting of real power to large numbers of the
lower classes is the cutting edge of the "compromise" that is the
polity. Each side must give up something. There will be rulers, but
they will not be the sort that have sovereign and ultimate authority.
This is reserved for the assembly to which all the citizens have
access and in which each has the potential to exercise a power far in
excess of that implied by our contemporary voting rights. And note:
if this power is not shared equally among the citizens, regardless of
their class background, the demos is excluded and the polity is not
mixed.
Public Space
The single most important difference between the social and
economic realm on the one hand and the political realm on the other,
is that the former is private for Aristotle, but the latter is public
and shared. Economic decisions are made by and between individuals as
they seek to promote their subjective ends. Political decisions
involve common things and are taken by citizens who gather together in
91
public. What concerns individuals is private; what concerns the
collective is public. The public space of the asse,.bly, then, is the
one institution that most requires equality for its practical efficacy
as the forum in which the disparate elements of the polity are mixed
and the public persona of the individual first given birth and nur-
tured. Thus, it serves as both the point of integration of diverse
social forces and as the school for the citizens where the arts of
ruling and being ruled are first practiced. More important, it makes
equality possible by providing a common situation to all citizens,
regardless of what they may be to one-another outside it in the pri-
vate sphere.
Despite the division of government into three distinct ele-
ments, ekklesia, boule
,
and assembly, it is important to note that the
citizens who assemble to deliberate and decide the most important
issues for the polity^^^ exercise sovereign power over the city.
Furthermore, in Greek politics, the ekklesia often had 5000 people in
attendance and the executive power or boule numbered 400 citizens
during the 300 years of its greatest influence. But the most impor-
tant thing to note is pointed out by Barker. The assembly could
always override the other bodies:
The characteristic of ancient democracy was omnipotent
sovereignty of that assembly. Primarily deliberative, it
turned itself into an executive, at the expense of the coun-
cil and magistrates; and it acted as a court of justice in
great cases, while the Hel iaea (which was only the assembly
transformed) did the great bulk of judicial work. There was
no supreme^judicature ... to check the action of the
assembly.
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Again recall that Aristotle frequently praises the advantages
in judgment and wisdom which the many have over the few.^^^ Not only
is a body of persons more likely to be free of corruption than a small
112group but each member of the assembly participates in the process
of deliberation and is equal to any other member. We saw earlier that
P^'^Q"^^^'^
^
virtue peculiar to the ruler, and that insofar as the
member of the assembly has access to power and office, he must be said
to embody it whenever he acts for the common good.^^^ The equality
that holds among these individuals is an attribute of their membership
in the political koinonia
,
and specifically a consequence of their
admission to the status of citizen by the constitution of the city.
They assemble together in a free place ( eleutheria agora) "clear of
all merchandise" and this will be a special area of the city set
aside for this and for no other purpose.
Here is the public space which it is the central aim of the
dissertation to explore: it is the heart of the free realm; a per-
manent embodiment of the commitment by the polis to government by
assembled citizens. It is a "free place," not the market place, and
thus set aside from other human activities either necessary or gain-
ful. It symbolizes the freedom of the political thing.
We have seen that the form of constitution known as "polity"
is Aristotle's attempt to outline the "practically best" scheme for
organizing the polis. The assembly is the center of this scheme, and
the equality of the citizens within it indicates something about the
necessity for establishing equality among men in that area of collec-
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t1ve life Where Us absence would likely result in an absolute break-
down of civic relations. That, and to leave the rest alone.
Aristotle generally thinks that the sources of econ^ic inequality lie
beyond our reach. They are given by £husis and not by no^. But we
are able to exercise a measure of influence upon the political ine-
qualities that follow economic inequalities; not only is it possible
to redress the,., it is necessary if the stability essential to politi-
cal life is to endure.
This, then, is the only place where the vivid inequalities of
human life are left behind, and a rough and practical equality of par-
ticipation brought into being. Such a notion of equality, of course,
fails to square with the more modern conceptions of equality as some
kind of universal principle, discoverable by reason and grounded in a
natural law doctrine of fundamental human rights. In Aristotle's
theory, equality emerges as a wholly conventional and somewhat fragile
construct, something not given to men by nature at al 1
,
yet something
nonetheless made possible through the concerted actions and decisions
of men themselves. In a sense, then, the de facto inequality of
history serves as the experiential background for the de jure equality
of the public space. This is not the place to attempt thorough and
complete studies of the difficulties involved in these questions.
Suffice it to say that Aristotle proposes a remedy for the question of
participation by the rich and the poor: both are required to cotne and
participate. The poor should be paid for attending the assembly and
the rich should be fined for non-attendance. As for the other.
94
deeper problem of how we might guarantee that individuals could be
equal within the public space. Aristotle offers no real solution.
When we finally push the question of equality beyond equality of
access to decisionmaking, we draw a blank. Aristotle implies that to
the question. "Equal with respect to what?" there can be but one
possible answer: "Equal with respect to citizenship." Perhaps this is
all that a polis or a political theorist can offer in the way of
equality: the individual citizen is anyone who has legitimate standing
to claim active membership in an association entailing formally stipu-
lated privileges and duties. Within that association, however, all of
the variety of human attitudes, interests and abilities can be
expected to re-emerge.
What, exactly do citizen do in the public space and over what
matters will they have jusjurisdiction? Aristotle gives us relati-
vely little to go on here. Twice he tells us that they will
"deliberate,"^^^ i.e.,
. .
.the people in their gatherings have both a judicial and
a deliberative capacity, and in both capacities they make
decisions which are all concerned with particular matters,
[i.e., the matters that cannot be decided, or properly
decided by law.]il/
The job of the people who assemble in the public space is
twofold: first, they need to come to some agreement about ends, and
then they need a second kind of agreement about the means they will
undertake to realize those ends. But this does not exhaust the moment
of deliberation. Action is necessary as well. Phronesis is a virtue
conflated with action, and the phronimos is not a phronimos at all
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unless he engages in political action. Therefore, his acts can beco.e
the "truths" of practical justice-that is, the justice that is sought
and attainable in the polity, if and only if they serve the kinds of
ends in question and are concretized qua acts. G.E.M. Anscomb
explains the nature of the moral syllogism that connects subjective
reason, intersubjective dialogue and political action:
. .
what does Aristotle mean by "practical truth?" He calls
n^..^.^?'"''
working, or the work, of practical judgment; andpractical judgment is judgment of the kind described ter-
minating in action. It is practical truth when the judgmentsinvolved in the formation of the "choice" leading to the
action are all true; but the practical truth is not the truth
of those judgments
. For it is clearly that "truth in
agreement with right desire ( orexei )"[Ethics. 1139a30], which
IS spoken of as the good working or the work of practical
intelligence. This is brought about--i.e., made true--by
action (since the description of what [the citizen] does is
made true by his doing it), provided that a man forms and
executes a good "choice. "118
Alisdair Mclntyre argues the same point more succintly, but in
the language of syllogisms:
The form of the deliberation involved Aristotle characterizes
as that of the practical syllogism. The major premise of
such a syllogism is a principle of action to the effect that
a certain sort of thing is good form, befits, satisfies a
certain class of person. The minor premise is a statement,
warranted by perception, that here is some of whatever it is;
and the conclusion is the action.
These analyses are helpful for our understanding of delibera-
tion on the level of the subject. Newman takes it from the standpoint
of the assembly as a whole and the succession of issues with which it
must deal
:
All may be said to share in deliberative authority, (1) if
all do so successively (i.e., by relays) on almost all sub-
jects, and the subjects on which all deliberate collectively
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of^n'"^hI^^^'° ^'"^ °f collective gatherina
zne rest, (3) if all deliberate collectively on a con
?he'';1%a\t^^°L"?r'^'i?;? -gistratL^l1b:?ate on
nature ^f th! j^- ^^^'°'" ^^^^^ ^11 cases in which theo the office does not make it essential that it*:
sha
1 be filed by election (from all?); (4) if a l deliberateCO lectively about all subjects and th^ magistrates nerelymake preliminary inquiries. But if to pan?as Boulesthaf kai£en apanton is democratic (1298a9f fTT Wrle^l^l^d—
tliTFd modes really democratic?120
Such at least are the approaches of philosophers and Greek
scholars to the problem of deliberation: they delve into the Ethica
^^'^""^^^^^^ attempt to discover the connections between right
reason, deliberation, and other-regarding actions which Aristotle
discusses there. While I think such approaches are useful, and shed
great light upon what Aristotle would like to see happening in the
public space, the historian and the reader of Thucydides cannot help
but note that rhetoric plays a considerable role in helping the
assembled multitude make up its mind.
Therefore, while most of our contemporarires in either philo-
sophy or political theory would say that one should not study the
Po^^'^ics of Aristotle without taking the Nichomachaean Ethics into
account, I am convinced that this approach overemphasizes the role of
reason and underplays that of the emotions in political life. I can-
not take the time to develop this viewpoint in full, but consider the
following. First, we know something about crowd psychology. '''^^
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second. „e
.now so.ethin, about G.ee. psychology In panicuU.
we have a mt,e han.boo. that A.stotle M.seH
.ote . a,M
those «.o ^oun. themselves havln, to spea. In p„.„,.
^
a textboo. Of devices, d.a.atlc. psychological and linguist;^;:;"".
in the assembly, then, rhetoric
,s not sLply an art for the dilet-
tante to study and practice at his leisure: it is the essential tool
for gaining and wielding effective power in the assembly, one cannot
use it Without a knowledge of his audience, that is, without a pro-
found knowledge of his fellow citizens. Therefore, I submit that rhe-
tone and not syllogism comprises the speech of the phronij^
Further, given the absence of a set of abstract principles or stan-
dards external to politics which
.ight serve as universals to guide
the assembly, I think it reasonable to expect that the argument which
carries the day will be. as often as not. the most persuasive rather
than the ,„ost true. Here is Versenyi's summary of the argument for
rhetoric that so shocked Plato:
w;^e^: T^:^-^;^-: of opmion,
(philosophic,
"scientific," legal or other) is a result ofthe force of eloquence rather than of rational insight
loHn "?ruth'"LTt^' ' ''''' ^^'^^--^^ bet:^en'-dec;p:
su^cP.^fMi ^ distinguish between
arguments 1^3^
unconvincing, persuasive and fruitless
Whether rhetoric makes integrative political judgments
possible is open to doubt; whether it has had demonstrable historical
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consequences Is certain. The demagogue was an archetypal figure in
the Greek polis and the consequences of his actions for the welfare of
the society were widely known. Basically, the problem was this:
assembled bodies of men are often carried away by rhetoric, passion,
and the beguilements of the outstandingly brilliant, devious or gla-
morous. Though the assembly is the center of debate and deliberation,
the institutional structure of responsibility is threatened when non-
officeholding citizens rise on the assembly floor and recommend or
urge policies that the assembly adopts. Any citizen could stand and
speak his mind; any citizen's proposals could be enacted into policy.
The difference was that such citizens, unlike the magistrate proper,
were not subject to the audit and not formally accountable for the
consequences which followed the enactment of their proposals. That
this could be a severe problem can be drawn from the career of
Alcibiades. That the Greeks recognized it as such can be seen from
certain changes that they enacted into law:
For if a decision which had been taken turned out to have bad
consequences those who had voted for it could always claimthat they had been misled or decieved by the orators who had
spoken in favor of the measure, while the orators could claim
that they had no responsibility because they had no
authority. They had merely expressed their opinion, and
nobody had been compelled to follow it. There can be no
doubt that this government of irresponsible advisers and
chance majorities contributed largely to the crushing defeat
which Athens suffered at the end of the Pel oponnesian War
although at the end of the first part of that war the advan-
tages had been all on the Athenian side in spite of the
terrible and unforseeable losses that Athens had suffered
through the plague of the years 439, 429, and 426. In the
fourth century, the absolute sovereignty of the people was
somewhat restricted through the introduction of a more ela-
borate law code and the prescription of a very strict and
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ornew'laws.fer'"'' the creation
Let me just add in closing here that I do not find a prejudice
against rhetoric in the Aristotle scholorship so much as I find a ten-
dency to ignore it completely. This, in turn, I think reflects
something more about our current institutions and mode of life than it
does either about Greek practices or a public space politics in
general. Were we familiar with political participation ourselves, it
seems, we would not so easily ignore the role that rhetoric plays or
can play. But we don't have this experience. Instead, we read books,
diagram arguments and think about whether statements and proposals are
"reasonable" or not. We don't go out and participate; we don't enter
the public space with our point of view firmly grasped only to have it
swept away by someone's stupendously moving presentation of the other
point of view; we don't ourselves abandon tightly reasoned precepts
for the "good of the whole" in the moment that that good sweeps over
us in a wave of collectively high spirited affirmation. And since we
have so little experience of such things, and since we would most like
to be able to protect ourselves by maintaining our ability to "think"
through the social and political relations posited by Aristotle's
theories of government and of participation, we ignore the human ele-
ment, the irrational, the emotional, the vainglorious and egotistical
sense of possession and power that can sweep over large gatherings and
make this sort of government erratic and dangerous. It is, in the
words of Winston Churchill, ". . . absolutely the worst form of
government imaginable--except for all the others."
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Machiavelli: a Republic of Divided Sovereignty
To attack and inflict lasting damage on a central assumptionof an entire civilization is an achievement of the first
order. 'niu
I si ah Berlin
But to return to the dangers you run if affairs remain asthey are, I wish to make a prediction. I say that if an
emergency comes when the city is not at all reorganized one
of two things will be done, or both of them at once: eitherin not and haste a head will be set up who with arms and
violence will defend the government; or one party will run to
open the Hall of the Council and plunder the other party
And whichever of these two things comes about (which God
forbid), Your Holiness can imagine how many deaths, how many
exiles, how many acts of extortion will result, enough to
make the cruel est man--much more Your Holiness, who is most
merciful
--die of sorrow. There is no other way for escaping
these Ills than to give the city institutions that can by
themselves stand firm. And they will always stand firm when
everybody has a hand in them, and when everybody knows what
he needs to do and in whom he can trust, and no class of
citizen, either through fear for itself or through ambition,
will need to desire revolution.
Machiavel 1
i
A Discourse on Remodeling The
Government of Florence. 1520.
Conceptual Background: Ambition Plus Fortuna Plus H i s to ry
Equals Politics ~ ~
"The accidental," says Zeller, "arises when a free or unfree
activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of
external circumstances to produce a result other than that
end." Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a
disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and
impeded is that of a being exercising Moral Choice or not;
Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus modified,
is a being exercising Moral Choice. . . .Chance plays round
the ordered process of Nature, careless whether it mars or
aids it or does neither. Its essential characteristic is to
be without design and irregular; it is the negation of
Intelligence and Nature.
Of all the human characteristics that might be noted by a
101
political theorist, the one that comes up most often for Machiavelli
is that of ambition. It drives men forward; it leads to the destruc-
tion of both respublics and principalities; it contributes to the ani-
mosity that usually holds between the nobles and the people; it makes
for outstanding careers and, as often, destroys them. We do not find
the well
-modulated world of the virtuous here, or the reasoned dialo-
gues of truth-seekers in the agora. Instead, the life of men in
cities is chaotic, constantly changing, colorful, violent, faction-
ridden, frequently orchestrated by cabals and conspiracies, and
peopled with skilled practitioners of intrigue. One reads the false
message bourne in a leather pouch by the faithful courier, hears the
clanging of hooves on pavement, sees the quick flash of sun on steel,
senses the tension and power in the body of the other across the nego-
tiating table, fears the poison in the wine glass, ignores the blood
on the walls of public buildings. Men are dupl ici tious, venial,
hungry for power and riches, eager to curry favor with those who would
advance them, and motivated by the desire for gain for themselves and
their families, and a sense of honor that tolerates no insult. The
problem is to contain them; to channel their energies, to satisfy the
urges that will not be denied, and somehow to orchestrate the com-
peting interests of the various classes that they not destroy one
another--civic life along with them--in plotting to seize the city by
the throat and break her to serve their selfish ends. Machiavelli
comes, picking his way among the corpses, seeking to found a republic.
In the political thought of Machiavelli, the concept that
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embraces this mordant chaos is that of Fortuna.
I compare Fortune with one of our destructive rivers which
when n IS angry, turns the plains into lakes, throws downthe trees and the buildings, takes earth from one spot putsIt in anotner; everyone flees before the flood; everyoneyields to Its fury and nowhere can repel it. Yet though suchIt IS, we need not therefore conclude tht when the weather isquiet, men cannot take precautions with both embankments anddykes, so that when the waters rise, either they go off by a
canal or their fury is neither so wild nor so damaging. The
same things happen about Fortune. She shows her power where
strength and wisdom do not prepare to resist her, and directsher fury where she knows that no dykes or embankments are
ready to hold her. •25
fQ*"^""^ is the accidental in history and the unpredictable in
men. For Machiavelli, it controls but half our lives while we control
1 26the other half. Always a force to be reckoned with, it thwarts
reason and planning and confounds those who would carefully anticipate
either the structure of events or the timing of actions. It suddenly
elevates the incompetent or utterly shatters the empire. It may
strike the triumphant, like Alexander the Great, or the crafty, like
Alexander VI. While we can prepare for it through awareness and
caution, our acceptance of it as a force beyond our control, but
likely to interfere with our claims means that we should always expect
that political action will have unintended consequences, and that
nothing planned or executed by men can ever turn out precisely as they
127thought it would. Machiavelli has here compared Fortuna with a
1 ?ft
river. At other places he speaks of "fortune's wheel" and draws
upon the old medieval image and trope of the wheel of fortune from
which kings are seen to fall with their crowns and their
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sceptres. Thus conceived, it is Fortuna which contributes to the
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rise and fall of individuals, republics and principalities. But, as
we have indicated, this force must not be construed as that which
determines the course of a career or the final outcome of a chain of
events. Fortuna can be anticipated and dealt with, for she is "a
woman and it is necessary, in order to keep her under, to cuff and
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maul her." The political actor confronts an interdetemiinate realm
in which Fortuna acts as a constraint which he may nonetheless
understand and harness to his own purposes. This means that men are
free to act and to choose, yet are constantly confronted by a sort of
exigency that is utterly foreign to the accounts that either Aristotle
or Arendt has provided of political life. Mishap or opportunity
constantly lurk and the political actor must be poised like a cat--
ready to pounce or to run.
This concept, this notion of Fortuna
, which Machiavelli sees
as something like a natural force appears in his thought, I think,
because of certain specific characteristics of the Italian city life
of his time--factors which set the Italian city-state apart from the
poll's
.
The violence which sweeps through the Italian city is not
rooted in a simple opposition of democratic and oligarchical classes
of citizens, as it was in Greece during the fifth century, but comes
from a different kind of struggle that took place between princes and
nobility, and the mass of people at the bottom. This last included
workers and artisans who would never have been admitted to the
franchise at Athens, but who had long enjoyed intermittent access to
power in the Ital ian communes . Under such conditions, the divergent
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claims to power and the self-assertion of newly emergent commercial
interests during the quottrocento
, and the theories of justice with
which each of these rationalized its claims to power, were far more
radically opposed to one another than had been the case in Greece.
Hence, I think it is possible to say that if one compares the ancient
pom with the Italian Renaissance city, one sees a breakdown in the
moral unity of the latter under the strain of a highly intensified
class conflict. I will not explore this material difference here, but
I think that it could be made out and demonstrated. In any case, it
is the sudden eruption of strife and violance which frequently
overwhelms a city and radically changes its constitution that serves
as a frequently cited example of the power of Fortuna .-^^^
In general, Machiavelli holds that without an overall direc-
tion, men will find to their sorrow that Fortuna has pitched them and
their cities into chaos and squalor. To found a republic in Italy
meant that first of all the men of his time needed a model of a well-
governed city which could serve as an example which they could emu-
late. He finds such a model or telos in the Roman republic. If that
ancient republic could somehow be made known to modern men, it could
serve as a source of examples of effective and noble political action
for individuals, and provide a collective goal for entire cities.
This, in turn, might make it possible for the cities of Italy to free
themselves from interminable civil strife and, ultimately, from
foreign occupation. This is the central message of the Discorsi .
In turning to Machiavel 1 i ' s conception of the well-ordered
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city, then, it is necessary to turn to ancient Rome-not as it
actually may have been, but as Machiavelli presents it to us in the
Discorsi, based on the writings of Titus Livy. In both Machiavel li ' s
general orientation to politics and this particular connection with
Livy, we find several threads which lead back to Aristotle. First,
men are moved to action through their desires and intentions which can
be channeled like Fortuna and drawn forth and elevated either through
personal example or by the desire to instantiate a collective aim.
Hence a teleological mode of explanation is appropriate to the politi-
cal realm. Second, Marchavel 1 i ' s method of presenting what he knows
about politics, while not based on the authority of Aristotle, echoes
what we found in the Politics. There is no "system" here, only a
series of aporiae
,
which often explore a particular problem from ser-
veral points of view. Third, R.M. Ogilvie, in his introduction to
Livy, finds that this historian himself worked within the framework of
a philosophy of history and a theory of unchanging human character
that were derived from Thucydides and Aristotle:
The difference between Livy and the others (i.e., Roman
historians) is that his philosophical detachment enabled him
to see history in terms of human characters and represen-
tative individuals rather than of partisan politics. Livy
accepted a tradition going back to Aristotle (especially in
the Rhetoric: 1367b) and to Thucydides which explained
historical events by the characters of the persons involved.
As Aristotle said, "actions are signs of character." Because
people are the sort of people they are, they do the sort of
things that they do, and the job of the historian is to
relate what happens to the appropriate character. Equally,
however, it follows that if similar characters occur in 500
B.C. and 20 B.C. their possessors will tend to act in a
similar way, so that one can infer from what a nan of a cer-
tain character did in 20 B.C. what a similar character must
106
have done in 500 B.C. Human Nature, Thucydides argued is
constant and hence predictable. [1.22.4]. This philosoohy
helps to account for the readiness with which historians
transferred events from the recent to the remote oast but
Livy usea it as the framework of his history. 133
'
What we may think of such a philosophy of history has nothing
to do with its influence upon Machiavelli and the Renaissance. He
tells us often enough that the world has always gone on in the same
way, and that historical situations have a tendency to repeat them-
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selves. The reader of Machiavelli must always beware that he writes
to the political actor and not to the academic student of politics,
and that it is this audience with its immediate needs that he seeks to
serve. Hence we find that all of his writings are concerned with the
particular and the concrete, rather than with the general and the
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abstract. While not a philosopher then, and completely unconcerned
with the nicities of thought which have concerned philosophy since
Plato's time, I find that Machiavel 1 i
' s general approach to politics
and his aporistic method are entirely consistent with Aristotle's con-
ceptions of what students of any practical science can hope to obtain.
For both Machiavelli and Aristotle, then, a "practical" science is
concerned first, with things said to be in our power; second, with
things which come to pass by our agency but not always
uniformly--i .e.
,
subject to the unanticipated consequence; third, with
seeking discoveries the exactness of which is defective when compared
to those of the physical sciences; and fourth, with particulars and
not with generalities or universal s.
Within this constricted yet problematic realm of
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understanding, I think we can show that Machiavel 1 i
' s writings rest or
the following general assumptions about what politics is. I think
that he holds that political action is context-dependent; that effec-
tive political action therefore depends upon a clearheaded
understanding of one's context, including the nature of the times and
the ambitions of those who surround one and with or against whom one
must act. Hence, if the present context can be shown to be "like" a
past one, then the political actor can learn effective lessons by
studying what was done in the precedent case. Can we make a sloppy
distinction? His philosophy of history could be used to provide
explanations for why he proceeds with something like the jus gentium
of English Common Law, rather than following the more precisely laid
out and clipped pathways of the lex publicam of political philosophy.
In other words, he stands with Aristotle, and not with Hobbes or John
Rawl s.
In addition to the disproportionate weight of classical
influence--which includes Aristotle, Livy and Polybius--upon the
Discorsi and other works, there are a number of other general factors
about Machiavel li 's thought that might be mentioned, though they will
not be explored here to any extent. First, Machiavel li is not a
Christian, and, indeed, presents an ethics of civic life and political
action that are contrary to the tenets of Christianity
. Since the
republican tradition in general denies the possibility of discovering
external or "transcendental" standards according to which politics
might be judged, this amounts to saying little more than that politics
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is a secular activity and that if political actors are not guided by
Christian precepts, students of politics may freely ignore them.
Second, and closely related to this fall from Christian metaphysics,
is a factor that completely distinguished Machiavelli from both his
medieval predecessors and scholarly contemporaries: he entirely
disregards any attempt to found a philosophy of right, and no trace of
Natural Law theory is evident anywhere in his works. With this
disappear both most of the traditional criteria for submitting politi-
cal action to moral judgment, and some check on the rule of pure expe-
diency in politics. What criteria remain are to be found in his
republicanism, to which we will turn shortly. Third, it is important
to note that Machiavel 1 i ' s republicanism lies square in the midst of
an ongoing stream of Florentine political thought and values. It is
hardly his own invention. This tradition surged during the crisis in
republican self-awareness that accompanied Florentine defiance of the
Milanese imperialism of 1390-1402, and afterwards went on to sweep the
political thought of that city during the next generation--beginning
with the writings of Bruni and continuing throughout the general revi-
val of classicism during the early quattrocento
. Fourth, The
Prince and the Discorsi are two completely separate works, written to
different audiences and directed to diverse political ends. The
Discorsi, with which we are primarily concerned, are addressed to
those who would establish a republic, or who, finding themselves
living in one, would like to know what to do to keep it.
Like the Roman writers whose ideals were constantly before
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wi^t"'!"'^'
^1^^ L^'^^' Machiavelli believed thatwhat men-at any rate superior men-sought was thefulfillment and the glory that come from the creation andmaintenance by a common endeavor of a strong and well-governed social whole. Only those will accomplish this whoknow the re evant facts. If you make mistakes and live in astate of delusion, you will fail in whatever you undertakefor reality mi sunders tood-or worse still, ignored or
scorned-will always defeat you in the end. We can achieve
thPn tL^n^i understand firstly ourselves, ande the nature of the material with which we work. 1^0
We have already alluded to the nature of such "material:"
violent, ambitious and al 1
-but-ungovernable men who will pursue self-
interest at nearly any cost to others. Machiavelli seeks to work on
this human material by imposing a new "form" upon it,^^^ and he sets
about this task in two ways. Knowing that he must establish goals for
both individuals and cities to aim at, he provides the first a
doctrine of virtu
,
which is really a psychology of subjective politi-
cal action based on the ethics of pagan antiquity, and the second with
a theory of republican government--i .e. , the mixed constitution of
142Aristotle and Polybius. The fomi-matter relation, then, appears in
two important dimensions of his thought. First, virtu
, the mix of
attributes which Machiavelli holds that the citizens of a republic
must have if their city is to survive in liberty, has as its function
to impose form upon fortuna ."*-^^ At the same time, the republican
constitution is the form which must be impressed upon the matter of
the men who live in the city.'^'^^ He thus suggests parallel solutions
for the problem of politics, one for the particular and the other for
the general aspect of the polity. It is important to note here that
the political aspects of this theme appeared earlier in Aristotle's
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Politics: citizen and republic are mutually dependent. The man of
virtu upholds his city and it, in turn, educates him and makes him
strong in the way of virtu
.
if the individual is not virtuous, the
population cannot be. A virtuous population will uphold good laws and
act to preserve its own liberty; the laws they sustain will press them
into virtu :
*
'a' i^lu ^? morals, if they are to be maintained, haveneed of the laws, so the laws, if they are to be observed
have need of good morals. 1^5
The antithesis of virtu for Machiafelli is corruption. A
corrupt populace is one which pursues selfish or short-term interests
at the expense of the framework of institutions which preserves and
guards its liberties. A people that allows itself to become corrupt
can easily be taken advantage of by the wily political manipulator and
bent to serve his own ends. Hence failure to exercise virtu will, in
the long run, lead first to corruption among the people or rulers and
ultimately to the degeneration of the form of the polity.^^^
Machiavelli discusses specific attributes of virtu at several
places in the Discorsi
. In general, it does not mean wisdom or good-
ness or power. In all cases it seems to connote efficiency in action
with respect to attaining the ends the actor has in view. First of
all, for the citizen of a republic, it entails a willingness to put
aside self interest and work for the common good.'^'*^ Hence, by the
argument we first saw in the Aristotle section, the concept is fun-
damentally related to political life: "politics" is a public thing in
the sense that it is concerned with those things that affect the
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generality of the citizens, and the goods with which they are
severally concerned. Further, if virtu is predicated of politics and
politics of public life in the double sense that it takes place in
full view of the populace and concerns common goods, then the exercise
of virtu improves the general quality of life and acts to check ambi-
tion. Overweening ambition arouses animosity in the people whenever
it appears:
. . .
in D.I. 30. 3, where Machiavelli is discussing the same
subject, he writes: "In time of war Rome availed itself of
everybody in the city, whether they were nobles or not and
in consequence there were always to be found in Rome at any
given epoch so many virtuous men with victories to their name
that the people had no cause to be dubious in regard to them,
since there were so many that one looked after the other."
Hence candidates for office were careful, he adds, "to main-
tain their integrity and studious to avoid the least sign of
ambition, lest it should cause the populace to attack them as
ambitious persons." By " virtus " the Romans meant any charac-
teristic that is appropriate and becoming in a man (vir).
The word connoted not only a man's personal characte'FTnd his
ability, but also devotion to the state, and again efficiency
at his job, which was of special importance in the statesman
and the general. But man, as the Romans conceived him, was
first and foremost a citizen with duties to the commonwealth
in which he lived, and unless he fulfilled these duties to
the best of his ability he was not, from the standpoint of
the Romans, or of Livy or Machiavelli, a virtuous man.
(Cp.D.111.8.3.)148
When Machiavelli moves from the "is" to the "ought" of things,
he nonetheless maintains that the latter be defined in terms of what
is practicable and not in terms of what is imaginary . '^'^^ This ultima-
tely means that it is not to principle to which the political actor
must appeal, but to the characters and desires of those around him,
i.e., to the material that he has to work with and the structure of
competing interests and passions in which he finds himself.
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Merleau-Ponty noted that virtu ,s a
.eans of living „Uh others a
Of affirming oneself by acting In consultation and exchange with the.n^
and even the Prince gives way to the opinions of others In the procesi
Of determining his course of actlon.^^O „
^^^^ ^.^^
^^^^^
that virtu and co«un1cat1on with others are placed at the service of
the needs of power, and 1n the final analysis no one can be called
"virtuous" in Machiavel 11
s sense who lets hl.sel f be daunted by
fortuna or otherwise acts imprudently. Soderini, for example, was a
virtuous man who transfon^ed opportunity into failure by not striking
down his enemies when they were still disorganized and he had the
opportunity to defeat them. Instead, he sought to win them over by
kindness. Unreconciled, they successfully plotted against him. His
little exercise in Christian virtue caused not only his own ruin but
that of the Florentine Republic-in other words, personal scruples mr-
tally wounded the cmmn good. gut at the same time-and here we
see the utter futility of trying to generalize about such matters-
neither is it virtuous to successfully acquire or retain power through
excessive or prolonged cruelty because actions of this sort alienate
those against 'whom they are directed and sow seeds of hot hatred




Machiavelli's republicanism, his impassioned advocacy of
institutions open to participation by a broad range of citizens, and
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his reiteration of arguments in favor of a goN^ largo are not
couched in anything like the moral terms which the twentieth century
has seen fit to bring to bear on such questions. What is at stake has
nothing to do with justice or fairness for its own sake, or with the
notion that there is anything reprehensible in formally or systemati-
cally excluding some group from power. Yet, within the--to us-
relatively limited diameter of his spotlight of liberty, we
nonetheless find a range of social and economic classes which were not
to see power in other parts of Europe for hundreds of years.
Machiavelli wants them in that spotlight, visible in the glare of
liberty, because he knows that once admitted to political action they
will both strengthen the city and check the ambitions of the nobility
or signori who would otherwise corrupt it and bring it down.
. .
.in Rome the evil of establishing
. . . tyranny came from
the same causes as most tyrannies in cities, namely, the too
great desire of the people to be free and the too great
desire of the nobles to command. And when they do not agree
to make a law in freedom's behalf, but one of the parties
rushes to support a single person, then tyranny quickly
appears.
. . .
When a people thus brings itself to make this
mistake of giving one man authority in order that he may
attack those it hates, and that one is shrewd, he always
becomes tyrant of that city, because with the aid of the
people he undertakes to get rid of the nobility, and he never
turns to the oppression of the people until he has got rid of
the nobles. By that time, when the people realizes it is in
slavery, it has no one with whom to take refuge. This has
been the method used by all who have founded tyrannies in
republ ics . ^^^
We have seen this kind of argument before in Aristotle: a
balance of power between the different classes in the city prevents
the rise of tyrants. The one-sidedness of tyranny will lead to
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further domestic strife in the long run. Further, Machiavelli adds a
dimension that did not appear in Aristotle. He is not arguing here
from a moral basis so much as he is making it clear that there are
efficient means by which a city may remain strong in relation to its
neighbors. A city divided by class conflict is a weak city. A united
city will maintain her strength-led by the talented and virtuous who
are sown at random by Fortuna
, scattered like the seek of the
paleolithic farmer upon both the hills and valleys of the social
order.
I say, then, about that fault of which writers accuse the
multitude, that all men individually can be accused of it
and chiefly princes; for he who is not regulated by the laws
will commit the same errors as the ungoverned multitude. AndIt is easy to make sure of this, because there are and havebeen many princes, and the good and wise ones have been few
. .
.Hence it is necessary to consider each man's naturefor Itself and to see if he is like the multitude, because
the comparison ought to be made with a multitude regulated bythe laws in the same way as those princes are, and it will befound to have the same goodness as we see in them, and it
serve^f^^^*^
"^^itSier arrogantly to domineer nor humbly to
The laws of which Machiavelli speaks here are those of a
republic. A republic is a mixed body of the sort Aristotle and
Polybius had described. At the beginning of the Discorsi
,
he notes
that states may be governed by the one, the few or the many, and that
each has both a healthy and a degenerate forni.-^^^ He then unfolds an
endless cycle of the emergence and decay of each of these, borrowing
shamelessly from Polybius, working from historical examples in Livy,
and says that "a state might circle about for an infinite time in
these forms of government." Hence,
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bad 156
^ood and the viciousness of the three.
The solution to the dilemma raised by this endless cycle of
growth, decay and collapse is to abandon all hope of sustaining a
state organized along any of these lines, and instead to combine the
three into a single plan, because "in that case one [part] keeps watch
over the other." Thus, early Rome at first combined the powers of a
monarch in the Consuls, and oligarchical power in the Senate. It
remained for the popular element to attempt to wrest power fr™ the
nobles in the senate
people rose up against it; thence, in order notto lose the whole, the nobility was obliged to grant thepeople their share, and on the other side the Senate and theConsu s continued to hold so much power that in such a
republic they were able to keep their rank. 157
What is this but a balance of power in a mixed government? On
the basis of such institutional arrangements, the Roman Republic was
able to establish internal stability, and ward off the encroachments
of corruption and the prediations of Fortuna. Over the centuries she
then gradually wrote that history which Machiavelli finds so redolent
with good examples.
But let us become more specific. Since we are primarily
interested in the notion of a public space as it might be embodied in
a popular assembly, what did Machiavelli propose when he turned to
consider the institutional structures of his own time? What can we
infer about what he might have done had he actually been able to play
the role of innovator in an Italian city, and what arguments did he
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put forth to Justify his views? Is the assembly that Machiavelli pro-
poses "sovereign" in the way that Aristotle's is?
Machiavelli's most specific published statements on the
possible nature of a republican government in his own city are to be
found in his "A Discorse on Remodeling the Government of Florence,"
which was written to Giovanni de'Medici, then Pope Leo X
,
about
1520. Note that the suggestions embodied here are based upon
notions first advanced by Savonorola and subsequently incorporated in
the Florentine constitution of 1494. That document, nullified by coup
d:etat in 1510, had established sovereignty and legal rights,
prescribed the composition of ruling councils, detennined the qualifi-
cations for individual service and outlined the duties of the various
magistracies instituted to oversee public affairs. We will see that
the assembly proposed by Machiavelli to Leo is a body weaker and more
constrained than the ekklesia of Aristotle's polity, and that it would
be inaccurate to characterise the Grand Council as the sovereign ele-
ment in a mixed government. At the same time, what he proposes fits
the formal definition of a republic and can be seen as the institu-
tionalization of a treaty of peace between conflicting class interests
in the Florence of his time.
Here is a sketch of what Machiavelli proposed in his letter to
Leo.
There are three sorts of men who exist in all cities: the most
important, those in the middle, and the lowest. Hence there must be
three ranks in a republic and not more. At the top, then, he sees a
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council Of sixty.flve citizens of forty-five years and ™ore, fifty-
three for the major guilds and twelve for the ,ninor guilds. These
Shall serve for life. Fro. the. an executive or Galfonier of Justice
Is Chosen. The rewlning sixty-four are divided into groups of
thirty-two. Which rule with hi. for alternating one-year periods. All
together are to be called the Signoria.^S^ The Signoria are the first
rank in the city.
The second rank is to be arranged in this way. A council of
Two Hundred, composed of men at least forty years old, forty of them
chosen from the minor guilds, and sixty from the major guilds. None
of them would be permitted to belong to the sixty-five. They also
should hold office for life and be called the Council of the Selected.
These two ranks, the Signoria and the Council, would hold all execu-
tive and most administrative power in the city and have primary
responsibilty for decisions of broad policy. The weakness of this
constitution, so far, lies first in Machiavel li ' s failure to stipulate
short office tenure and second that both of these ranks shall be
appointed by Leo himself, rather than chosen by the assembly from
among its own ranks as would be the case with Aristotelian
citizens. -^^^ Leaving these considerations aside momentarily, we come
to the popular element itself:
It is now left to satisfy the third and final class of men
which IS the whole general body of citizens, who will never
be satisfied ... if their power is not restored or if they
do not have a promise that will be restored. ... And there-
fore I judge that you are under the necessity of reopening
the Hall of the Council of One Thousand, or at least of the
Six Hundred Citizens, who would allot, just as they fonnerly
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This is clearly not a program for an Aristotelian polity.
Neither the English of the seventeenth century nor the taericans of
the eighteenth would have stood for such a thing. But we need to look
first at the context, and second at the arguments Machiavelli puts
forth in defense of this scheme before deciding whether its tripartate
structure is sufficient ground for calling it a republic or mixed
government.
The context is as follows: the House of MedTcT had succeeded
in bringing about the collapse of the Republic of Florence, and for
ten years had held control of the city. Leo was, for all intents and
purposes, now in charge. Machiavelli, who had held the position of
Secretary to the deposed Galfonier Soderini, therefore finds himself
writing to an opponent to propose institutional arrangements which his
reader will suppose
-correctly or not-to be directly contrary to his
own interests. Seeking preferment and favor, the writer nonetheless
fervently and cleverly advocates a republic to one who, we can be
sure, has never felt the sightest need of one. Machiavelli. no doubt,
weaves a tangled web which we cannot here take time to completely
unravel, but the thought does occur: should he gain preferment and
official position under the rule of this Pope by proposing a plan that
would defuse tensions in the city, how better could he contrive to get
along with his fellow citizens as well, than to take some of the ere-
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dit for helping to have established arrangements that gave to the,«
some power and which, in that century at any rate, canprised grants of
a sort that Princes were not wont to give?
Here are some of the propositions with which Machiavelli seeks
to persude Giovanni de'Medici. The first one is directly concerned
with the public space:
Without satisfying the generality of the citizens, to set upa stab e government is always impossible. Never iill the
Hal?'?I\'^t°^
Florentine citizens be satisfied I Z
th^P lace ofThp\1' ^^1-' Vl' ''''' ine Pa f the Signory]. Therefore, if one is to set ud arepublic in Florence, this Hall must be reopened and this
'
allotment made to the generality of the citizens. 162
Following this, further measures are proposed which will serve
to continue both the republican form and to satisfy the generality of
the citizens once death shall have forever removed this Pope from the
temporal scene. These measures involve an elaborate system of checks
and balances which are to hold among the bodies previously proposed,
and in addition he now introduces the office of Provost. Four people
are to be appointed to this office, drawn from among the people by the
Council, and these officers shall reside in the Signory, in an ordered
succession, and have veto power over the acts of the Signoria. These
measures are put forth for two reasons:
One is that if the Signoria or one of the councils does not
decide a matter as the result of discord, or does things
opposed to the common good through wickedness, somebody may
be at hand to take from them that power and appeal their
decision to another body, because it is not good that one
kind of magistrate or council should be able to retard public
business without someone's being there who can arrange for
action. It is also not good that officeholders should not
have somebody to observe them and make them abstain from
greater,
.orlZslfJ to he r public' iTA''' r^''''''^the earlier office. 163 "^epubli , and more honorable than
Machiavelli characterizes these arrangements as a monarchy
during the lifetime of his Holiness because of the appointive power
rested in that individual, but as a republic thereafter. He closes
with a plea that this plan of his be instituted, giving as final
grounds that the city is, at present, internally divided among sim-
mering and confused factions, and predicts the outbreak of civil
strife in the event of an emergency. The only way of escaping the
ills of faction is to provide the city with institutions that
'^f'.nA ^^T^^^^^ stand firm. And they will alwaysstand firm when everybody has a hand in them, and when every-body knows what he needs to do and in whom he can trust andno class of citizen, either through fear for itself orthrough ambition, will need to desire revol ution .164
This final sentence is a direct echo of the Aristotelian
prescription that, in a properly mixed constitution, no class or
segment of the citizens would desire a revolution-even if given the
opportunity to change their constitution. As Sheldon Wolin has
pointed out, one reason for the superiority of the republican system
consisted in its being maintained by force of the populace, rather
than by force over the populace . '^^^
At the same time, as we have said, the popular element is far
from sovereign here. For Machiavelli, what is most important about
the people is not that they have "rights" (a modern prejudice at best)
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but that they have ambitions (which is a somewhat more ancient
teaching). Furthermore, they not only serve to check the counter-
vailing ambitions of those who look down in the city, they also embody
Characteristics of political judgment and wisdom which must be incor-
porated into the political process if matters of general concern are
to be prudently arranged. Hence Machiavel li says,
i-nfWnce^'^hp'' to impropernfluence, the people always make fewer mistakes 'than Princes
In general, the people judge well of public officials and par-
ticulars, but do not judge well of general i ties .^^^ Thus, though they
provide an all important source of virtuous or great men, without
whose leadership no city can long maintain itself in strength or reach
for greatness, their judgment is neither constant nor reliable enough
for them to be entrusted with plenipotentiary power. But they must
share, they must participate, for even the gran signori cannot long
make adequate domestic or foreign policy without both their coopera-
tion and their wisdom. Furthermore, and this factor is important for
Machiavel li, their active participation is essential to any city that
would rise above the ordinary.
..
.
A City ... that does not make use of her populace for
anything glorious can treat them as she likes . . but if
she hopes to do what Rome did, she cannot make a distinction
against the people. loo
It is ultimately the common good which is at stake here, and
the common good which makes cities great. -^^^ Neither the health nor
the potential greatness of a city can be maintained at its expense.
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and the co™«n good cannot energe without the active participation and
assent of the common people. The common good is most likely to be
preserved and maintained through republican institutions, and espe-
cially through the institution of the G^and^ouncn. Through its
agency, the cycle of decay and corruption, which we saw at the
beginning of the Discorsi. "-ay be circumvented by periodic renewal of
the Form or constitution of the city.
It is most certain that there is a limit for the
^h'^ouah^thP^'J^-
'''''' thef en rally movet rough e entire course ordained for them by Heaven without
lly lZZY- keeping the^irth^wd oraained, ... I am speaking of m xed bodies such fl<;
republics and religions. I say 'that those cha ge^ re toteir advantage that take them back toward their beg nning.
Jh.t Jr'^T.J^^'" ^^'^ organized and have longest ^i e
^hat bv ?nL^
often renew themselve or
rTnL.^
some accident outside their organization come to suche ewal. And it is clearer than light that if these bodies
I'''
''''' t° renew them s
Lrl ^^^""^ ^^^"^ ^^^^ to their beginnings;because all the beginnings of religions and of republics and
of kingdoms must possess some goodness by means of which theygain their first reputation and their first growth. Since inthe process of time that goodness is corrupted, if somethingdoes not happen that takes it back to the right position
such corruption necessarily kills that body. The doctors of
medicine say, speaking of the bodies of men, that 'daily
something is added that now and then needs cure. '170
Sheldon Wolin sums up not only Machi avel 1 i
' s project, but its
historical context:
... To create a political theory for a world of random
movements, a task which had never been seriously undertaken
before, meant surrendering certain kinds of inquiry because
they no longer presented meaningful problems. In a world
pulsating with change, there seemed to be little point in
continuing the old quest for a motionless polity. Likewise,
there was a marked shift away from questions of legitimate
authority, with their connotations of a stable political
world, to questions of power, or the ability to exert mastery
by controlling an unstable complex of movinq forr^.
trell^d^^; tt 1^ sc^l^-e^Iofe ^' ^ were
were .ore often'^L^^L^rthan'?
g c7:^::r^ne°c'ess1t;^^^^
To return to the problem of the political judgment, then, we
recall that such a judgment, properly speaking, concerns matters of
import to the general order of society. Such matters must be
addressed through public procedures which themsleves serve to
integrate the diversity of points of view involved. Machiavelli and
Aristotle both posed this problem squarely against the backdrop of
class conflict and civil strife and-while failing to cast the net of
citizenship as widely as we might have wished-held that both an
integration and a balance of opposing forces were needed to animate
the procedure and prevent systematically unequal distribution of poli-
tical power and goods. Each proposes a mixed government. Each rests
his defense of human liberty on a set of institutions which channels
the desires of the moment, outlives individual political actors, and
itself acts as a school in the open-ended politics and mutual check
and compromise necessary to sustain it. Each presents a politics in
which conflict and compromise take place with respect to concrete par-
ticular interests, rather than over abstract principles or moral
systems.
In Machiavelli 's design, qualitatively different points of
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View are separated and given institutional life in a republic which
prepares for their reintegration by balancing the forces they repre-
sent before requiring that all concur in any forward moves. In other
words, the integration which we have previously associated with the
kinds of political judgment that are rendered in the public space is
here not carried by the assembly alone, nor by the assembly acting in
concert with magistrates drawn from its ranks. Instead, sovereignty
is divided among separate institutions of government, each drawn from
and having the basis of its power in a particular segment of the
social order. In order to move forward, the various parts of the
state must cooperate. Compromise, then, is something that takes place
between branches of the government, and is not a synthesis attained
through assembly debate and deliberation. The public space of the
assembly is not the forum in which all forces come together to
struggle and contend, but rather that place in which the popular ele-
ment gets a sense of its own desires and purposes, before checking and
being checked by the opposed interests which themselves control other
organs of the state.
What we see here, then, is the application of the Aristotelian
philosophy in a different context, and from this we draw the implica-
tion that the instantiation of a philosophically or formally stipu-
lated set of political arrangements will always be subject to the
specific vagaries of a given historical context. At bottom, on both
views, lies the struggle for power between classes. The self-
attitudes of such classes, their aims, their respective psychologies
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and the history of their Interrelations constitute the bounds of the
theoretically plausible and the politically permissible. Politics Is
after all, a practical science, and the desire for popular par-
ticipation in government Is subject to constraints advanced by opposed
interests. Therefore, while the public space (s an Integral part of
the process of forming political judgments in the polity of
Machlavelli, it is not alone at the heart of the affair.
The Wh1<i Science of Politics
^Englishmen are no more to be Slaves to Parliaments, than to
Posterity will be ashamed to own,
The actions we their ancestors have doneWhen they for ancient precedents enquire'
And to the Journals of this age retire
'
To see one tyrant banish' d from his home
To set five hundred traitors in him room.'
?!^?r P^ss^9e of the Septennial Act of 1716[Mcllwain. 50.]
Early English Background
At this point we make another leap in time and geography, away
from the mediterranean basin to England, where the theory of the mixed
constitution with its provision for public space appears to have gone
next
.
The final full English version of this theory would not be
drawn up and set forth until the founders of the American republic sat
in deliberation and wrote the Constitution of 1787. Hence we take the
view that this document was the culmination of over one hundred fifty
years of intense intellectual argument and slow theoretical develop-
ment in two countrires. This means that we have no central thinker or
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text to Which we
.1ght turn to study either the construction or appli-
cation of republican Ideas by the English. There is no English
Machlavelli. For these reasons it is necessary to turn to the synthe-
tic compilations of Pocock, Ballyn, Wood and others who have studied
the vast quantity and range of the primary sources and summarized the
views they contain.
According to J.G.A. Pocock, historians of seventeenth century
English political and intellectual history have profoundly altered
their understanding of this period-and of the American Revolution
that followed-since the 1970s. Pocock indicates that there now
seems to be emerging a new way of looking at the Puritan Revolution
the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, one which takes
them in chronological order and sees them as successive stages in the
decline of an old order and the emergence of a new.
Prior to the emergence of this view, it was the practice among
historians to see the Puritan Revolution of 1641 as the climax or
final catastrophe of the Tudor political religious and social order.
In 1640 this world comes shatteringly to an end, and then after a
revolutionary hiatus, is restored in 1660. This restored aristocratic
world, however, is so unlike the old one that historians found them-
selves having to interpret it anew. A 1976 conference of historians
made it obvious that such reinterpretations were converging, and that
a "new paradigm" was at hand:
The structure of the Folger conference obliged the par-
ticipants to locate the Puritan Revolution at the beginning
rather than the end of a historical series, and this was in
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presen*?lna'"?J
°^ perspective they found themselves
CHS?:
'o'f
dnoLner, the Whig; we see the Revolutinn nf i^ftQ
G:orgTn?!l7]"^"^^"" ^^-'"^^ that order 1n the'r^^gT of
Our project here will be to very quickly sketch the outlines
of the Whig Science of politics and the theory of the mixed constitu-
tion upon which it was based, through a series of writings by various
parties in a long political struggle. Their thoughts and polemics
were published in England and America over a long period of time, and
have been synthesized and analyzed by Pocock and Wood, both of whom
base much of their efforts and nearly all of their approach upon the
work of Bernard Bailyn. Over the course of these debates, the attri-
butes of the basic concepts in the protagonists, their practical
experiences and their expectations of themselves and of the world came
under a variety of pressures. By the time we cover the theoretical
ground that lies between 1558 and 1786, we will see that the ultimate
issue of this movement was an entirely novel concept of representative
government. The study is important first because this long period of
intellectual ferment in England provided both education and justifica-
tion for the American revolutionaries. Second, English Whig politics
of the 1640s provided intellectual sustenance for the American attacks
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on the conservative English Whiggery of the 1760s. The Americans
having become Whigs of the former sort, failed to evolve in step with
their counterparts in England, whereupon the English found the.nselves
attacked by others who held to an antiquated form of their own views.
Such background information is essential for any student of the
American Congress who would attempt to evaluate its historical perfor-
mance and present problems in terms of the Constitutional design.
One way of looking at the revolution of 1641, then, is to see
it as a dispute over the correct form of the English Constitution,
waged between advocates of the mixed constitution, on the one hand,
and the defenders of a divinely-placed and sovereign monarch on the
other. Attempts to untangle the welter of theoretical and historical
sources which may have cast the mixed government theory on English
soil, and nurtured it where it fell, seem futile. Weston sees the
writings of Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, and later continental
thfnkers in this tradition as crucial. Early in Elizabeth's reign, a
number of important men at Cambridge University traveled to the con-
tinent and returned, bearing ancient texts, to teach them at this cru-
cial center of inf 1 uence
. In the next generation, John Aylmer went
so far, in his disquisition on mixed government, as to point a finger
at Parliament and say that here was the mixture of monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy that the ancients had described. This
contravened the prevailing and less radical versions of the doctrine,
held by the Monarch and the Peerage, that sovereignty was divided be-
tween King, Lords and Commons, and that altogether, sovereign agency
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rested with the K1„g-l„.Pa.„-a.ent. Ayl.e.'s
.evisionU™ got h1. mto
trouble at court. Following this. Sir Tho.as S.ith published a
treatise on mixed government, with explicit references to Aristotle,
in 1584. These were by no means the only statements of the theory."
Mixed government was "in the air" and gaining influence. Even
Protestantism itself had become a factor in the spread of the new
doctrine by 1550. and the mixed government theory was held tight in
the grim embrace of the Presbyterian Church throughout the sixteenth
century as a representation of its own scheme of organization, only to
be applied to the English government itself during the seventeenth
century.
But the signal event that moved the Aristotelian conception
from the realm of academic and theological disputation to the center
of political action was brought about by the monarchy, and the arena
in which this actually took place was Parliament.
rh;.i*.?"T^""!i^^n^' ^^"'^'^ "^"^hs before war began,
with ^P"?l^^^^
associated the theory of mixed government
the English constitution and thus gave the classical
other^way''^^'^^
^l^^t it could have acquired so rapidly in no
^
The remarks of Charles I on the mixed nature of thetnglish government were contained in his Answer to the
Nineteen Propositions
,
the cardinal document in the history
of the classical theory of the English constitution and a
pronouncement that proved to be one of the most influential
ever made on the nature of the English government
.
The King based his rejection of the Nineteen Propositions
on the ground that the two Houses, because of the constiti-
tuional reforms that had been completed by August 1641,
possessed sufficient power to prevent the growth of royal
tyranny and that further concessions would upset the balance
among king, lords, and commons and eventually encompass the
destruction of the mixed and balanced government that he was
con1::po?a'n•es^:Ta^•se^'^ effect upo,
tary mixture of the simple forms of nn
^o^^^^'nent as a salu-
been classified by Aris?o?le L ?I 9°'^^"'I^ent as these had
philosophers 175 ^




Not for the first t1.e do „e see a theory of government that
gives a Share of sovereignty to the public space c„e to light and
gain strength In the context of a public space. The crux of the
matter is sl.ply stated, if the English government «s. Indeed
"-xed" then all sovereignty did not reside In the Monarch, and'he
therefore shared power with organs of the state which derived
their legitimacy from sources other than that upon which his
own rested. This concession, forced upon Charles by necessity
amounted to a very large hole placed squarely at the waterline of that
Old tub, the Divine Right of Kings. She would not remain afloat in
troubled waters. Thereafter, the struggle between King and Parliament
would not be over whether Parliament had a share of sovereignty, but
would revolve. Instead, about the question of its dimensions. The
Answer to the Nineteen Propositions provided the point of departure
for subsequent debates between Royalists and Parliamentarians alike,
and the theory of mixed government took a firm hold on the national
'
imagination that was to last for the next two centuries.!'^
But this is not the whole tale. If Charles' Answers served to
instantiate a new conception of Enlish government and diversify Its
sources of legitimacy, only half the task has been completed. What
has been thus far accomplished for the English polity on the general
level remains to be set in motion for the particular, i.e., for the
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individual Citizen. We have seen in the doctrines of both Aristotle
and Machiavelli that citizen and polity are mutually dependent, and
that if the polity is to institutionalize a public space for the pur-
pose of making truly synthetic political judgments, a diversity of
independent and self-interested citizens must arrive at the central
point and participate in making those decisions. To borrow
r^achiavelli's language here, Charles' Answers had the historical con-
sequence of providing the form needed for a republic. It remained,
somehow, to impress that form upon the human material of England.
Hence we raise the question how the political life, the forms of poli-
tical action assumed by this theory, could come into being among
English freeholders long accustomed to being told that political
authority and power flowed from the top down and were embodied by
agents of the Divine will. Pocock put the question thus:
It is not surprising, then, that for some time scholars havesought to raise not only the question of how the values and
concepts of civic humanism could become established in a
territorial-jurisdictional monarchy such as England, but thelarger question of how and when, in what terms and under what
conditions, the Englishman could develop a civic
consciousness, an awareness of himself as a political actorin a public realm. l''
Pocock, therefore, emphasizes a strain of English political
thought which he sees as having been primarily influenced by the
P^'^^Q'^si of Machiavelli. His approach is a departure from the tradi-
tional textbook account of Augustan political thought as Locke et
praeterea nihil
,
and proceeds to center instead on the figure of James
Harrington,
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his time the descent of cprt^ n ITJ ' ^^^^^ ^^^"^
At issue here was something like Machiavel 1 i
' s doctrine of the
popolo armato. Since all cities have enemies and live in the domain
of fortuna. there exists some relationship between military and poli-
tical virtu. In the Discorsi, Machiavel li raised the question whether
Republics lasted longer when military power remained exclusively in
the hands of the nobility or whether the arming of the populace could
be beneficial, despite the internal threat that they might then
constitute for those in power.
. . .
Rome resolved upon empire, upon a daring attemot todominate the environment, and consequently upon a vir^u whichwou d enable her to control the disorder which her^
actions had helped to cause. She had therefore to arm the
powe ''an'd l^'lll
''''''
''^'^ demands for'^mo rer, an to make concessions to those demands. The armingof the plebians contributed to Rome's military greatness- thestruggle between the orders to the consolidation of a mLdgovernment; but some continuing disequilibrium, yet to be
analyzed, to shortening the life of Roman liberty. 179
Pocock finds in Machiavel li an intrinsic connection between
military expansion, the arming of the plebians and the vivere popo-
lare. From this he inquires after the relation between the capacities
of the solder and those of the citizen. Should the individual be a
citizen first and a soldier second, or should some citizens become
professional soldiers? Under the Aristotelian theory of citizenship,
the man who devotes all of his energies to the practice of any par-
ticular art and none to participation in public affairs is less than a
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Citizen: he is a source of weakness to his fellows. The .an who devo-
tes all his energies to war is worse than a weakness. He is an
outright danger. The banausic artisan is pursuing a limited good to
the neglect of the co.n.on good, but the solder is even
.ore likely to
do this because his art is to exercise the .eans of coercion and
destruction, rather than those of dialogue and deliberation. Hence it
is important to restrict the art of war to the commonwealth in general
rather than to a subset of its citizens. A citizen called to arms has
his own place in the body politic and will fight to preserve that, but
once the fighting has ceased, he will return to his private concerns
and his civic life.^^^ Hence,
Military virtu necessitates political virtue because both canbe presenti^n terms of the same end. The republic is thecommon good; the citizen, directing all his ac? o to thatgood, may be said to dedicate his life to the republic- Jhe
nlTflrl"""":'''
''''''''' the two' alike in
Sniversal^Pnr'^iJ'^i;''
^^^^^^icing particular goods to
i? n ff. 1 .1^ '^'t"^' t^^" the warrior displays
dn<;r?nlinl\h% ^ '1^'"""' ^' ^ "^^^ through militaryiscipline that one learns to be a citizen and to display
civic virtue. In the anatomy of the early Roman virtue givenin the Discorsi Machiavelli seems to depict it as built on
twl ^
discipline and civic religion, as if these were thetwo socializing processes through which men learned to bepolitical animals.
In Pocock's reconstruction of these matters, it was James
Harrington (1611-1677) who incorporated Machiavel li
' s notion of the
armed citizen into his own mixed government theory, and who emerges as
a central figure in seventeenth century English Whig political theory.
Following the collapse of Tudor power in 1641 and the execution of
Charles I in 1649, English pol i tics--stil 1
,
primarily, an upper class
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POlU,cs-.egan to
.evolve around a clash of Interests between count.,
gentry and court arUtocrac. 1n London. The country Interests tended
to see themselves as Independent their liberty sustained by lan-
retainers who depended upon the crown for authority and position
Wh,le the executive branch of English government was centered at
court, it was Parliament which represented-through its electoral
syste.-the rival interests of the country gentry. Tempers flared and
debates grew heated as the attention of these two groups became fixed
upon the question of the role that a standing army might play on
English soil .^^^
:i^:ff'^l^ ^M^ir:ai^:n"d?rnotrem^?''^
aw" „' he":il?t?r?h°" armed r^d'icali m.s in t imlitia their ultimate guarantee of the nowpr tn
ner^nn^K'/'" '''^ ''^^ ^^^^ ^''' -''^ able to 5raw ^he con-ctio between proprietorship and the control of the swo^dprobably did more than anything else to preserve
Harringtonian doctrine. But the alternative to the militia
bfiZss^ble'^"' ''V' expressly 'S^cUr d Le impossible: a professinal army maintained in time of oeace
land" ZtT"'. f'^'V '''''' '"'^'^ it u on thT", but found fiscal means of paying it regularly.
.
.The guarDs are mercenary, and therefore dangerous'' was theexclamation in the Commons of Giles Strangways .183
What is clear from Pocock's account is that this clash of
political interests quickly turned into a struggle over the balance of
power in the English government. The squires feared the influence
which the crown could come to exercise upon Parliament in its search
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for funds to sustain the a™. 1t controUed. Individual
.e*e.s could
be pressured or bribed or otherwise curried to vote for funds To
such a development they opposed all of their political skills and
added the rhetoric of
.achlavelll and of Harrington and the civic
humanist Ideology which Insisted that the Individual's political capa-
City depended upon his ability to bpar ;,nH"i 1:0 De , and to possess, the arms to be
exercised in the public cause. ^^"^
What is important for our purposes, is to note that the
attacks upon court power were first launched in terms of protecting
Parliament from the corrupt influences of the monarchy, should respon-
sibility for defense come to rest in the executive branch. As the
century wore on, the emphasis shifted, the question of the military
receded, and attention focused on fear of Court corruption of the
Parliament as a general phenomenon. At stake for the Whigs of this
period, was their right to representation in the English government
and the strength of the institution that embodied that representation:
JrL^^'K'^ property in this vision comes not
sa?nt^ tTV^ oligarchy, nor from a revolutionary army of
0 reduce L ^ir ''''''''' ^'^'^^ which\e dto the independent and arms-bearing proprietors todependence upon government. What may now be termed
neo-Harnngtonian doctrine is directed not against aCO lapsing feudal order, but against a bureaucratic and
n?tf^"Ch^'"^u'^'''^'
^^ainst the past, but against moder-
oarli- Jnt'L r!"^^°\^'^ ^^°"9ht the traditional king andp rliament obsolete in face of the revolution of theproprietors, his heirs and successors sought to mobilizeParliament against king and ministers by invoking the inde-pendence of property against threats too modern for him tohave considered. 185
For Pocock, the next phase of the neo-Harrington revival had
the count.,
.eactlon against Wn,1a™ ,„
«^'-ch fined the
.1,,,e and





.e„n oMueen Anne. The nse o. a second Count./







and commercial turn at Cnnrt .nnuou and an increasingly conserv,;,ti>,o
on old-fashioned virtue by the To .
""3 vat,ve emphasis
P-^ -d become staunch advocates of participation lin.ed
„i th ci ti-;--e. While those at court found themselves standing for indivi-dual freedom from central government intrusion.
But this was a reversal. If the ten„s of the debates had
^e9.n to shift away from the questions of the virtue of the armed
cuizen and the corruptive influence of court on Parliament, the rela-
tive positions Of the two parties began to shift as well. The older
'deology of participation was beginning to give way to a new one that
centered upon the notion of individual liberty.
,n insti^tional
ten.s. Parliament began to represent not so much the ancient demand
for participation as it did, through its laws and its struggles
against the crown, the propertied interests of an individualistic mer-
cantilism, empire and bureaucracy. ^^S By Defoe's time^S'
,-„,eed the
court apologists had begun advocating parliamentary supremacy in








sta.e ,n the co.nt.y
was used 1„ t.e elg.teent. centu.. todefend the «,„opoly of political power
,y the landed an'stccac.
According to PococK and Wood, these developments are not yet clearl.
understood and there exists nothing comparable to the wor. done on the
American politics of this period for British political thought and
history after 1688.
For students of American history and Institutions, however
let us see what has been acomplished between the publication of
Charles' Answers and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. First, the
theory of mixed government, traceable back to Aristotle and Polyblus
has emerged on English soil as the basic paradlg. of politics and
government about which debates over the legitimate distribution of
political power come to center. Second, the doctrine of Divine Right
has been so modified that political struggles, within the new mixed
government context, themselves revolve about the particular question
of the extent and nature of Parliamentary sovereignty. Third,
Harrington's Influence, with Its emphasis upon virtue as opposed to
corruption, and the powers of the assembly as opposed to those of the
monarchy, constitute an Injection of Machiavellian republicanism at a
time when Opposition politics was able to embrace such views in order
to further its own intersts. Fourth, it was the emphasis upon the in-
dependence of the individual citizen, his freedom from retainership at
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t'ons Of the doctnne of Parliamentary supremacy and was later
«^ined to suit the needs of Individual. I.e., co»erc1al liberties.
I^^^-^!!l£!l£irLixp^ to 1776
The reversal of Court and Country positions and the shift of
Whig theories fro,„ the Country Opposition to the Court Establishment
Which too. place at the very end of the seventeenth century need not
concern us here. ,n ter. of British history, they are the place to
start looking for reasons why the Aristocracy managed to regain its
position in British government and society after the revolution of
1641 appeared to have swept it away forever. From this it is possible
to see why a conservative mixed government, with an extremely powerful
House of Lords, was able to persist in Britain Into the nineteenth
century, and up to the passage of the Reform Bill of 1830.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to stop wUh the radical
Whig Opposition, the Country Opposition which owed so much to
Machiavelli and Harrington. As the new emerging paradigm now sketched
by Anglo-American historians has it. it was the political theory of
the radical Country Whigs which had the greatest influence upon the
Americans of later generations as they moved into their own political
crisis of the 1760s, finally coming to oppose Parliament in England 1n
order that they might elect a Parliament of their own In America:
As that century went on its way. Harringtonian and
neo-Harnngtonian ideas were absorbed into the opposition
lhr..llr"^ "'^2?




of the for. of government 5ep,cted ^ mVr''"".'" l°57-62
Tran'TTigt^H^SrNiVTm
c asslcal republic might be de Lne^
^^ow convincingly that a
place of the balanced constitut on of h. ^'"'' ^ "-^^Neville and the other neo-Harrina?onL„^^' ^'"""^
emphasizing the elements of ?enubl?can Li " oftionship and asserting them again t tJ» t '"'!. **'^t rela-executive patronage and finance L . ^^'^^^"^"9 Power oftion of powers, insofar as i? was Iver °^ ^P^^^-rested on a Dunn1ng-1 ike assertion ^L. !!""^^ articulated,legislature was in danger of hl-^ representative
reduced to dependence uDon th„ ?,' ^ ^e,
the independence Of parT amen?' Ill'"" 't was
"lore than the del ineation of ' mattered, evendoctrine became an oppositional nn^tf'-. ^'^'^ the
parliamentary constit,i?inn nterpretation of the
stressed the sovere g t kinn"""",'"" *° "^^'^^
of the executive therein "L "^"' ""Parliament and the role
American Revolution and ihe ConsJff,!."''^
precondition of the
States. 192 titution of the United
Gordon Wood begins his review of the years immediately pro-
ceeding the Americam Revolution by asking why the ;^erican colonists
revolted against such a wonderfully constituted government that all of
Europe in the Age of Enlightenment praised it. The English
constitution of 1688 had, indeed, mixed within a single government the
several categories of politics that had been known to the Western
world for centuries.'" Pocock, as we have seen, has already supplied
the clue. The Whig Aristocratic order attacked by the American revo-
lutionaries was not an ancien_reg1me, but a recent outgrowth of mer-
cantile and patronage politics Instituted in the search for social
stability combined with expanding empire. The authority of
Parliament was overthrown because its appropriateness as a government






.ut Us content ,n «tte. w.e.e t.e.
own1nte.ests as Bn-t,-s. subjects «e.e conce.„ea. The,
.a.
..eUe.
aga.nst a parliamentary oligarch, run by a new Whig aristocracy
oligarchy which put Us Interests ahead of their own.
The nature of this rebellion, the mivatlons for It and the
theories used to Justify U were
"Ideological" In the sense that they
revolved around political theories and values concerning the organiza-
tion Of the political co-unity, the distribution of power and the
role that the Individual ought to play In civic life. As Bernard





controversy between \^r li struggle and not primarily a





What were the values the Americans held, how did they come by
them, and how did they mold them Into the foundations of a new govern-
"lent, once the Revolutionary ferment had ceased? Here, If „e are not
brief to the point of being Laconic, we risk being prolix to the point
of tedium. Bailyn 's study of the pamphlets of the American
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Ideology of the Revolution had L!^ substance of theyears of the eighteenth
^entur^ ^f'" t^^e earlyinstantaneous- and fn. ^! ^ " *° ^eein almost
early *erican o?u cs TeTe%TeH '"'^ ^"^^an importance, a relevance in polU cs^^il'^^" ""'"''^have-and never would have in Fnl,Sharp break between a placid re rivo? l'"'^^' ^^"^turmoil of the 1760s and n70s ""'"^ "'"^ ^"-^ the
counter-claims, the fears^„H 1 u ^'"9""»"t, the claims and
pamphlets, letiers ne^spapeJs ^^n.'^';'!""'
f
" ' t^e
Revolutionary years had ?n k 'J^*^^ P^P^'"^ of the
century. 198 ^ ^ ^ fact been heard throughout the
The energing American political thought fell sguarely in the
republican tradition both with respect to the for,.l institutions it
Of political life.
starting with enormous and nearly universal respect for the
English constitution, the Americans emerged from the crucial period
1760-1775 with the view that it had been underlined by bribery and
corruption and was rotten to the core.^^^ Referring back to such
Classical republicans as Harrington, Milton and Sidney^^O they evolved
a conception of political life characterized by a fundamental and
unending struggle for power between rulers and ruled.^Ol The
intellectual atmosphere, widespread throughout the colonies and enc^-
passing individuals from all classes to a truly surprising
degree,202 combined with radical Mhiggism and the language of intense
142
liberalism Into an almost paranoic mistrust of po„er.203
The E„„1sh settlement of 1689
.ad l„„lted the powers of the
commons In carr.ln. forward
—^^-'-^^
^° compromise acceptable onl.
as long as the rulers promoted the public interest.^"* m the
background, held in reserve, lay the ultimate sanction against execu-
tive power: the people's right of resistance.
had wrirte'nl^-'nl'e^ss'th: s'biect"' I''''"
^^^emon Sidney
hands as .a; obli fthe pri ce to ?flV.\''''. ' ''''''Thus the people authorized their rule t° ^^reed."cute laws to govern them hiit^L. "^^^ to exe-
right and power to choose . lj\ ^-^ ^'^''^^^ they retain a
themselves, to be a reDrLpnt^I "'"^'^'^ ^^^ng
... to have a voice n he'^a' l^,'^ ^ P°'p^^
and in the management of ITi ^ °^ ^ ^"^^ ^^^s, . . .
state." "For depnJe us I^IT^ "^'"''l' '''''''' the
and properties our own LnL . ' ^^Z'"'^'' liberties
secu?it.\gai^st°?;r::/a:d"^b'^o?ut^5:s7oti:::ia-
Here is the Institutional crux of Whig theory: executive power
™st be Checked lest It become overweelng. it is not sufficient that
the powerful exercise their rule once that rule has received the as-
sent Of the people in principle. More than this Is necessary. Active
consent by the people is necessary, i.e., frequent, watchful par-
ticipation by the people with their representatives in the conduct of
daily affa1rs.20' The proper instrument of such participation in
power, When not the people themselves, 1s a representative body chosen
by them whose members are drawn from among them.
This was, in essence, the system of government which both the
radical Whigs and the people of England held to be instituted in that
143
90ve.n.ent. then the ,i.e.t. of the people 1s proportionate to the
Share the 50d. Of the people have 1n the ,eg1sWe. Second, one
tlonalUed checks on executive po«e..20«
,„ words, represen-
tat,on oeans nothing If the asse*,, can
.e overc«e the „„archs
or the magistrates.
For the Whigs, then, popular liberty absolutely depended upon
the strength of the Colons, the ^*ers of which "actually had to
represent the.. This sche.e «de sense only Insofar as It could be
Shown that there was, Indeed, a popular Interest generally opposed to
that Of the „narch. In practice, however, the Whig viewpoint was
coding under Increasing pressure In England. First, Parliament sat
for a long time, made laws In a context free of constituency
pressures, and as a result Its ,ae*ers had begun to resemble magistra-
tes themselves, independent of the popular will Instead of subject to
H. Second, and a related development, the doctrine of "virtual"
representat1on-1.e., that the member of Parliament act In his
constituency's best Interests, but not as an agent of or attorney for
those interests-was gaining general acceptance ..^^ This quiet evolu-
tion in English thought and practice the Radical Whigs splutteringly
denounced:
14.
tenu;eJ°PaV'M:entf seeled ZatZ'r '"^^P-^-ce of long-While it might be necessary fo? Se'„.^ the people's liberty,power in the State to whirh ^° Wo\nt a
''ills, dress it up in the i^„-„^f
individually transfer their
with legislative auiKorU, ^ ^^f^-^lsnty. ^nd an/uthis "sovereign power was "no more ?h«^ ?h ''™"the people declaratory of theirwin .„h k ''T^^^"''^tUe ofsubservience to their interest " Ih^ m ^T'^ ^ intatives could do what they lik^d wis %i ' represen-conceive." Can there be imaain»H f «nstrous tothan that the trustees ^hnnf^ K ^ ™°'"^ striking absurdi tv
son reposing the lust ''""'^ independent of the fr-
creator?" Parliamentary '.rii^. 'i'"^,"'""" 'Wronger than the
"lUes fro. the 'House I ™ n" 'd ^ ^^'ms"^"^^'""
°'
tion, only aggravated this fear nftS --epeated elec-
of the House Of Commons a fear tLl lJ^'^''rj independenceradical English mind sinrf II ™ through the
as Catharil Maca aV ecal fed V;"'''"'^' century? "«hen."
affected an entire Ynaln^VAl.' -"epresentatives had
sovereignty
ove*r?he??'?:n1«S;enEs. "aS"''^'- ^''^'""'^
Adding to these fears of a Parliament cut off from the
people-a situation which mooted the question of preserving its power
in order to preserve its representative capacity-were new ones
prompted by the domestic political tactics of George in.^U Porced
to cooperate with Parliament after 1689, His Majesty set about the
commonplace task of working with allies within the body and trying to
build a consensus for his policies. Both Alexander Hamilton and
Franklin Roosevel t-not to mention a score of lesser American
presidents-have struggled to do no less. But His Highness quickly
ran afoul of His critics, and to those on the American side of the
Atlantic, the ancient English Constitution appeared to be in serious
trouble
It appeared to those who clung to the original princiDle. of
POwerrth'at''^;rr'"'
''''''''' Sf sep r ^0po s tn the Crown, in its painful efforts to build
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:^T^^^^"^ and the d. stn.utlon of
upon this principle " American. , "f^ tyranny, "u
1°
Great Britain
-s ab oluL fo %h„"f''' ""-^'^ ^'"9 ofthe parliament, by peaces" pension."^ hl'^ ""'^ «' thouthe obtains the sanction of fh» 1^ , •' aid pro,n1ses,
pleases. The ancleni fom ,s i 'T"* ""'"S « He
constitution Is evaporate™. '212'"""'''' ''"^ ^P'n't of the
«as t.ere,
.l,ht there be a ere, The Machiavellian notion of
corruption" began now to play a major part In Whig
government but to the people of
.nglan. themselves who theoretically
had the power to act as a corrective. Once again, then, we see the
a society and Its constitution which appeared earlier in Aristotle's
Pol Itlcs and Machlavelll '« m^n^-^i11 s Discorsi^, and seems to have been derived by
the English from the latter source.^^^ Therefore, the Whig radicals
advocated returning English government to Us first principles by
securing Parliamentary representation for themselves and resisting the
encroachments of executive power. This was the context In which
Americans viewed English attempts to shore up their empire after 1763
While the mother country grew old and haggard under the Increasing
strain of corruption, and made a conspiratorial drive for the entire
subjection of the colonles.^l^ the Americans revolted to secure a
theory of popular government and political liberty which their contem-
poraries in England supposed them to have enjoyed for over a hundred
Such was the Ideology In play at the time the Americans began
years
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to move toward revolution wu,
^hen «e turn to the Institutions they
actu.n.
.ounae. u the na.e o. those ,ene.,





,ove™,„ent, and a nu™.e. of state constl^-
t1ons «e.e drafted. These Institutional Ued Whi, doctrines according
to a variety of fo^ulas. The second phase is that of Federal is.
This was su™ed up in the United states Constitution of 1787, ,ased
upon Whi, doctrines hut with a powerful dose of institutional conser-
vatis,n added to ,uel the new social instability that followed the
«1despread establishment of political liberty during the revolutionary
period/-^"
Arneri can ConstutionaVUm
on 15 May 1776. the Continental Congress passed a resolution




the authority of the people of the colonies," in effect abolishing the
Older colonial governments which had been established with the sanc-
tion of British authority. Wood considers this resolution to have
been the real American Declaration of Independence .2'' The effect of
this act was to electrify the Americans who rushed to their respective
state capitals and energetically took up the problems of drafting new
state constitutions. Indeed, such was the general animus against the
power of a central government at this time, that the design of govern-
ment at the state level was held to be the primary focus of
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anse to set up a strong central government.
independence ended ne.ther the American ha.it of thinking U
-
- 0. gover^ent asthe. had long conceived U: for the
..encans, republican magistrates
were no «re
"representative" of the people than
.onarchs.^" Po«er
was still assumed to exist autonomously, and the tas. of the ,.ment




At stake was the problem of representation. Representing the
people in the legislature was not al 1 that simple. The English, as we
have seen, held that every British subject, whether he had had a role
*° Parliament or not. was 'virtually
represented there.
g?bfe"what"'gIve'°?t'?Ji°; °' ^^P-'esentatlon Intel 11-
homogeneous order with a fundamental ^'{eetAll depended on the conception of Engl 1 shmen as a sf n„i'» ' 'people with one definable interest.221 "^'^
This conception of a unified people with a single Interest In
turn made It possible to hold quite specific views about the nature of
representation itself. As Burke told his constitutency in 1774.
Parliament was not
... a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
Parliament is a deliberanL ,f J advocates; butjnterest. that of'lhe': o lllTlt CV'^'^" ' °loca prejudices ought to guide but ?L "^ Purposes, notresulting fro,„ the general
'r^alon'of Z Zre^'-zTz"''
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Hence, for the English, it was not election that gave the
--r his representative po«er, but his mutuality of interests with
representation uUimatel, justified the binding of the whole people
Whether the. voted or not. or whether their particular representati.s
fonned part of the majority or the minority within the cha«,ber.223
If the Americans were to reject this conception, as we have
that the colonists never decisively repudiated the concept of virtual
representation.224
^^^^^^^^ ^^.^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
virtually represented in Parliament because they saw a profound
disparity of interests separating themselves and the English. With
respect to their own domestic arrangements, however, the tune was sub-
ject to change. Having conceived themselves as a "whole people
distinct from England-^^^
^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^.^ ^^^.^^
^^^^
they were a "whole people" when it came to justify a system of repre-
sentation based on an exclusionary concept of citizenship and a
franchise limited to white males who held property in land.
Republicanism, with its emphasis on devotion to the transc-ndent public good logically presumed a legislature in wh?c"the various groups in the society could realize "the
rhers''''"Ours??:.'?
'"' """^"<°h" ^^ch had with theotn . Our situation requires their being firmlv united inthe same common cause" with "no schism in the bSdy pob t?c ."
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.ut virtual representation. An, other vie. of
-f,el.«heren™ero.s partial views wo.l. str.,,le for preference
and destroy the ho.ogeniety and har.ony upon which repuhlicanis.
rested. At least, this was how ^^ericans approached the proMe. in
1776.
AS frequently happens, however, political theories begin to
wUh an external ene.y to one of arranging a distribution of power
a.nong themselves. Internal differences, first of ™ere opinion but
very soon of interest, all insignificant during the revolutionary
period, suddenly emerge-often with unanticipated force. Drawing upon
their own disenfranchisement in Parliament, many /taericans began to
Challenge the concept of virtual representation itself once it dawned
on the. that they might be on the losing end of divisions of power at
home:
v^>i2al^y^°r^onrhl^^"y, ana not just the colonists but people anywhere. 227
According to this view, the popular consent that was so impor-
tant to the workings of the British constitution seemed justifiable
only if the people actually choose their own representatives. For it
was becoming clear to many that "the elected are not representative in
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th>e. own n-,.t
....^ of the,> election."
,e„ce t.e ^eHcans
found themselves emphasizing the sufferage Itself as a necessa., con-dU,o„ Of legitimate representation. On this vie., the Interests of
the various Individuals In the community were so pecular, so personal
that "the only ground and reason why any man should be bound by the
actions Of another who meddles with his concerns 1s. that he himself
Choose that other to offlce.-^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^
carried? It was difficult for some of the ^re radical to resist
holding that the doctrine of actual representation meant that every
individual in the community ™st expressly consent to every act of
legislation.
As has recently been pointed out, at the very time in tho
theoretical foundations for parliamentary sovereiqntv thp
TerlT",- representation we^e movinT ^'^^ dif-f ent direction, regressing in fact to an older medieva
at
'"'^''^ constituents and p sen-
fnnutl
While the American experience was recreating JheEng ish medieval practice of attorneys or delegaLs soecifica ly empowered by counties or towns to vote suddHp. to Ihlrulers and present grievances from their ?ons?tJeces t eEng ish from sometime in the late fifteentTce turv h^d aradually but increasingly regarded their members in the Ho. se
distrT^s^ rL'^
''''''''' '''''''' '^'^ particular
peop^e!230'"^
spokesmen for the entire estate of the
Thus, by 1759, the Reverend John Joachim Zubly had been able
to confront the official English concep.tion of virtual representation
by arguing that "every representative in Parliament is not a represen-
tative for the whole nation but only for the particular place for
which he hath been chosen
. .
."231 y^is doctrine was eventually to
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enshn-ned Constitution o. the United States In the division
Of leg,s,at1ve power a.nong representatives elected loca, districts
Of the several states. But It should
.e dear that within the
, oca,
strict itself,
"actual 1/. represented in the American Congress
something me the doctrine of virtual representation «st appl,.'
The controversy over representation can never be settled
once so.e body is Instituted to stand before the people and legislate
-
the,r na«. so.e »,1salign.ent between the Intentions of the one and
the deeds of the other will always occur-unless it can be shown that
"the people" are one and have but a single Interest. With respect to
external forces or threats, such as those of a tyrant or an ene.y
beyond the borders of the state, the unity of popular interest is
relatively easy to pronounce in theory and attain in practice. The
difficulties cone with respect to the formation of a political consen-
sus about matters of the internal distribution of goods, and the
simple fact that as soon as discriminations appear in the deter-
minations or applications of law, divisions arise among those to be
affected. These must be overcome somehow If the political process is
to embrace al, of the body politic, without losing the allegiance of
its several parts. We will see this formal dilemma recurr again and
again in what follows: not only does the fundamental disparity between
the general and the particular appear in local district politics, it
has been a perennial difficulty for the Congress itself as it has
struggled to muster Internal consensus while exercising the represen-
tative function in the governance of a heterogeneous population. Wood
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-^es it ,une evident that revCutfona.y Men'ca ca.e perilous,,
close to absolutely breaking apart over these political
contradictions .^^^
«st-dem:dlJ''r;pJS??ca:'°„rrr Tl'.
ni tted to the'chl^acJ:" iicf f1,:'conc::t*jacT^S
representation--equal elertnr;,! Hnc!
concep of actual
of consent through boaeedf
a^J^^
particularity
for both the elected and ?he electors' J^^f/^^^^q^i^^^'^ents
tability of representatives to the foc.l Piir'^''"'"-
UcuU?"L%^°r^'^^^ ties'bet'See^^;;^ str?h" ^p^r^''
Be these things as they may, the controversy over represen-
tation persisted. Despite the fact that small towns throughout the
united States pushed for their right to be free of regulation by state
governments during the 1780s, the ideal of an independent and deli-
berative legislature, attending to the common interests of the state,
would not die. "Submerge all particular and partial interests into
the centeral good" was still the common cry.^^"^
When we turn to a review of the actions the Americans took as
drafters of constitutions, it is clear that the mixed government
theory-as it had been interpreted by the radical Whigs-had something
of the status of a basic postulate. In most of the states, it was so
axiomatic, so much a part of the Whig science of politics, that it
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went largely unquestioned ^35 . ^
''''' then, was to refinethe conception and purge it of th» .
t„ ,
.
P 3« ° errors and corruption which had ledo Us undoing in England. The central
,„hn .H • ^
"^"'''^^ PO^ed by
'^"-^ I^OHShUo^Joven^o^ p„,,,3,,, 236
^ad to .e determined was the
..i.ture" of the government or, in our
Adanis had proposed a balance between contending powers i e
between executive, Aristocratic and popular interests. Throug^ou^
colonies, however, scores of alternative proposals poured forth, each
wUh its particular scheme for arranging the balance, and each
possessed of a degree of r^Hir;,iicm ^y r ad cal s that could be measured by the
extent of its author's confidence in the people.
"That a mixed government is the best th^it r;,nthe respective Colonies" was thurtL accepted in
niost constitution-makers in 1776 J^^/^^t^'nient ofbe inclined to that which is mn.; ^^^^ naturally
been used to," that is a mao?cL ^^ ^^'^ ^^"^ ^''^ ^^^^^s
"two orders in Se b d; f e s ai? n'"1^t'°r'''^^^^'the orders of their new reouM r. "nn °5^^^"sly since
authority from the 0^001! ^ni ^"^^ ^^"^^'^^ their




. to cLtit ;J^h requires the utmost
as effectuaily to ec re thP ?-K '° ^^^^'^ P^^ers
their mxed polities that would have enormous repercus ionson their understanding of politics. 237
"'"""^ s
Among the changes they actually instituted, the most evident
«as the near universal elimination of the governor's role in state
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;;-Ut,on.
,n UU. sout. Ca.o,.. «s exception. Vet t.eAnstoctlc" ele,.e„t, so „„ponant to the en,,u., continue. i„
9enera, favo. The A^en'oans, anting nothing to .0 with heredlta..
anstocracy, nonetheless believed In a "natural aristocracy" consist
-g Of «n Of outstanding
.erit. wisdo™, or ability. These were to
seated In the upper houses of bicameral legislatures, and to be
t.c element Into the state portended was little understood at the
t-™e, but 1t was clear enough by 1780 that the concept of a Senate
was in for trouble. Either a distinct social order of ,nen was to be
brought into belng-which all the revolutionaries had opposed-or the
body Of citizens. In that case, what sense did It «ke to have a
Senate? Two homogeneous branches would not make a mixed
government.




pose for instituting a mixed polity. One but not thp nni
th r/nost'of'SheT'^^^ 'i'/' ^^^^P-^'^' -I'fca' 0 s"^^'
The essence of "special qualifications" turned out to be pro-
perty. Although wisdom and integrity were difficult to measure, pro-
perty was not. In property Americans found a means by which their
"Senatorial part" could be clearly distinguished. Wood notes the
obvious: "The meaning that many had intended to give to the mixed
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While




the people to perceive the truly talented. This shift
.
'"^5 S , then, pushed
Americans toward a change in their hac<.basic assumptions about the nature
0 their society, a change that was to have serious repercussions for
their ideology of repuhlicanis..^^ Property was now becoming an
-terest in Its own right, to be specially represented in the legisla-
ture. Wood draws the implications:
the
"d^^fe^^nl'a'",' ZZZtT.lT.'f^'''"' '«'^e
sociptipc " i-hr. y'^t-oraant interests existina "in i
could "for convenience" al l P™f«sional s-who
invented lona ann Jh! / ?"l>sumed under "names,
or beUer!°;gosT:ho'' ost^r- ri"gh?r of*"""'^ r^«'°->"those Who possess "the' rights 0? pr^'er'ly^-zi!'-^""^
The tarn toward property had nurterless consequences, not the
least of Which was that it was now possible to pollute the theoretical
notion that the people were a unity with the acrid assertion that they
actually embodied separate and rival interests. In 1784. Benjamin
Lincoln, the Revolutionary General, set out a justification for bica-
meralism in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution that opposed the
Revolutionary assumptions of 1776. Turning his back on the ancient
distinction between the few and the many, he substituted instead the
notion that society consisted of a vast difference of Interests,
interests which contain the seeds of its destruction if their
influence is unchecked. In republics, such interests
.nay be traced to
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in danger" from "a maioritv ...Mj nty
. . . unued by a common interest or
pass1on."^« ^^.^
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^
most Americans in 1776 had lltlL '' P'"?P\^ti'. nghts thatdentified." and by assigninq S ,^°"J<^.^,^<«'-^ ^"d morelegislature, the Americans ?n a ftlt V"J^' '^"^^ t*'^
nagging problem of cons?.i tnt^J ! ""^ ^"^"^"^
i-n so 3oing they ad pir erted'th^'cT!?^- but
government, which had nlTlH h„ ^ '"^^"'"S of """d
property, in the m die br ch "rt^ir ''?™; "^^^ " ^"^explicitly violated the homogen°L of tSJf ""^ ^^"^
republicanism was based. 2™6^ ^ interests on which
But property and a diversity of interests did not c«prise the
sum Of corrosive issues. Wood reviews the history of revolutionary
Pennsylvania.
,„ 1776, radical Whigs prevailed at the Pennsylvania
convention, and explicitly disavowing the mixed government fo™,
ratified a constitution with but a single House. The educated, the
upper classes, did everything in their power to undermine the new
government, and in the process of attempting to rally popular opinion
to their viewpoint, were compelled to lay out the social basis for a
balanced constitution with unusual starkness and c«prehensiveness and
thus were even driven to call into question the egalitarian nature of
American society. A simple republic, the opponents of the 1776
Constitution argued, was impossible in America because of "the great
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--notion 0, pe.o„,








; 7 - ^-eate t.e p.o.e.s t.e.thought they had settled in 1776' Was th. ,American society to be
egalitarian? Could it be if •" , ,f us instuutions reflected a heteroge-
nous political and social order, Pinally, if Whig republicanism
-ted on the assumption that the people have but a single wi„ or
-terest, Why need the legislature have two houses, Upon reflection
wny agreed with Condorcefs observation that »th»n e representatives of
a single nation naturally form a single bodv r. ni i y
. .
. [hence] there was
no place for a Senate in an egalitarian republic. "^-^
bera"?^]rr;iec"?:d'Jhe°:!Lf'1-r'''=*' ^el1-
possessed a s zab,e and tic'u It^
"
defend comprehensi velT Z ll ltll T"^]^'"" "™Pelled to
do. the merits of a mi^ed repubhc ^^^""'"i ^
engthy and expanded arglenro er'the nature Jf"?^house in American hi^tn^w o the upper
traditional Sefense of Se llf/r:' ^^9^" "^t^- '»^^
ended witb.an entlrelv new t^l^'' constitution and
politics/"^
i y and revolutionary conception of
The Whig parties generally assumed that there was but one rank
of men in America, and therefore there should be but one represen-
tation of them in government. In 1777 one Benjamin Rush, in a compre-
hensive criticism of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, advanced a
host Of arguments in favor of bicameralism of which one was to become
crucial. A single legislature, said Rush, was dangerous to liberty
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«as .au.n, a .oge. u,at cou,d st.Ue te..o.
.„to the
.ea.t of a .a.-
cal Whig." since the Whigs tank if fh.^-wrn oo it that power anywhere was
dangerous to the people and the,V
„-.e.t.. the Penns.lvanU
.ad,ca,s
Rush pointed,, as.ed why such devices were necessary, was not there aMMsh need fo. an uppe. house-1.e.. for a double representation of
the people so that one could chec. the other. On this argument, which
abondoned the rhetoric of property and ™erit, the upper house
.as to
be only a Whigglsh rein on unchecked power.^^l
^
«as a complete disavowal of the traditional defense of ,„1xed government
as a structure that reflected a diverse social order. Here was a
reversal as profound as that which had reordered the positions of
Court and Country parties in England a hundred years earlier. When
the Pennsylvania Republicans held that there was now to be a homoge-
neity Of interests between the two houses, they expressly defendeed
what other Americans had seen as the principal fault in the bicameral
system.
At stake in all of this was the issue of sovereignty. With the
conclusion of peace with England, the Americans found themselves
living under the loosely structured Articles of Confederation, and
became more eager than ever before to affirm local politics over
central government and "to oppose all encroachments of the American







people s so.e.e,>t. as t.e.
.a. neve,
.een wU;, aspect to .e
— • AS t. posWe.ol.t1on pen., con.n.e..
,e„e., „,lence about the entire dilemma of represent.t inn •a o increased to the





This proble™ ca™e to a head 1n a series of debates over the
power Of the senate to pass ™„e.Mns Which arose in the
.ar.iand
House of Delegates in the «i„ter of 1786-1787. One side held that the
tions fro. the people before acting. The other side disagreed. Out
Of the ensuing debate over instructions a new doctrine of represen-
tation began to emerge.
question being debated here in Maryland ^;iih d:>^o
borough or the majority of the nati^ Thus Paca
s^i :^^ns^^c^!?S^-l^^^^ ^-^^ thi^^broadTn^d use ofpo itive instructions on general questions of public interest
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t'c,pate 1n the exe?cise of leaioJ"'^^ ' ^°"^^y- ^ Par-



















.onarch. peerage and c««ns. Transferred,,
unprecedented pressures, as we have seen.
F'>st. English poIUks, clear Into the nineteenth centur,
renamed a restricted real., separated fro. trul.
.road-hased par-'
however, not onl. was the franchise w1de„ extended, hut popular'par-
t'cpatlon 1„ a host of formally constituted legislatures and ad hoc
political gatherings me constitutional conventions was the no™ for
the overwhelming
.ajont. Of White
.ales Who lived there. Second the
animus against monarchical tyranny did not die away with emancipation
from the monarch, instead It was translated Into a deep and growing
suspicion first of executive power, but later of all central or
governmental power 1„ genera,, u was this fear that lay behind the
continual conflicts over representation and the constant theoretical
tension that held between those who advocated popular sovereignty and
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^"'-^ Of t.e peop,e
,„ eve..
^e.UUt.ve
.ecUion as« - -e .eo. Of .e c.o.






snuat,ons an. pom.cal traditions e*.e. the van'ous pans of t.e
A-.-can populace
.t. concrete,,
.st,-n,.s.a.e interests s.c. t.at
--ere. together in centra, p.„ic spaces sue. as t.e Continental
'
congress or t.e various state legislatures, the centrifugal forces of •
the emerging societ. i.pinged upon its politics with the effect that
the co«on interest-ta.en for granted h. everyone in the revolu-
t-o„ar. period itsel f-5eca.e increasingly elusive. Wood shows that
these tensions increased in influence throughout the 1780s and
f nally resulted in a radical transforation of the ideas that
Americans held about popular sovereignty, the nature of legislative
power, and their theories of politics in general.
One vexing question arose again and again: if sovereignty was
essential to a republic, how could it be derived fro. the people and
constituted such that its exercise would not degenerate into abuse and
license? The search for a re.edy-i.e., a way to control and restrict
the power of elected representatives-dominated the politics and
constitutionalism of the Confederation period. Hence the question of
instruction continued to hang like a brooding presence over the
general issue, for here it seemed lay the only means of checking
legislative power. As usual, however, absolute adhesion to this view
prompted sympathizers and opponents alike to draw the consequences: if
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the legislature did not oos5P5< th^ e i,p sess the full power of the people to do
anythin, it
.shed for the ,ood of the state, if sovereignty did not
-
fact reside there, then there could ^ no lo.ica, wa. to prevent
legislative authority fro. passing c.pletel, to the people at
1 arge. °
practice and the triu.ph of the particular over the general. Writing
h.s own American Magazine 1787-1788. Noah Webster
„unted a cogent
attack on the notion of instructions that clarified the issues:
JatireT'Iaid^Web'sllr' 'l"sZ'rirVr'
tuents. on a vilw oTihei local ^'^^^ ""^ti-
none, or very imoerfert l-'"'^'""'^' and either with
propn-ety of^ Ta^^Tnd o? ?hT"°"* """^'^ j^^S" "f he
Judiciou^ ™en arrifo^'su^cV n aTl^ar^elhe''"
::?^:r?r^'*::liy^\^^e^«^" r^r the^ejrofficiai ^n^o-
subject in an !sfe*?y where clashlnn'-'i"' <'^=""'<>'> of thedetect error and su ^sf il r
""1n1r*uth°"sa'!-d'
ticuiar part, they "must be founded on the best aenerli
0 aTL themselves have no r?g t f^ent
i"LS:d\-





people or of their Representatives
.
. where is the richtof instnjc^^
The local sense of the^
1^^^^^ ^i^^-^ ^ genrral^n'o^ledgeui tne ODjections, and reasonings of the whole statp " r;,n
never produce the general good; each district is but "pa?t of





uiterally hundreds of mict^< H^if*voices dnft
,„ and out of his account, alter-
nately defending and attaching
"actual representation" or central
3tate power respectively, u see^s that the Whig radicals had gained
t^e upper hand in ™ost of the state legislatures of the ti^e. written
-ate constitutions that gave those legislatures sweeping grants of
power, and then proceeded to "instruct" thpm th ue through a complex politi-
cal process that reflected the will of the popular majority on a host
Of particular issues. The result was an experiment in Whig republi-
canism Which, in the eyes of most Americans, ultimately failed to
function as effective government. Alternately, paralyzed Py faction
and Charging gamely into the thickets of heated issues, these legisla-
tures enjoyed a tenure that proved to be short lived, but which pro-
vided Americans with an historical experience that profoundly altered
their views about politics, government and the art of the possible in
collective life. The debate, then, focused increasingly on the nature
and extent of legislative power, and its ultimate, practical result
was the Constitution of 1787.
HOW were the representatives to be drawn from, the people? Who
Should sit in the chambers of the public space, and what ought they to
do once so seated? Wood characterizes the fundamental debate as













— to chan.es 1„ ......
.eha.o. a„. ,e,.,,,e
.3.that set the
.epub^cans' teeth on ed.e. u was th.s e«..ln. .
conflict over socU, position and p.^.n^.e that demonstrated wUh
-solute cant, that Hhe people" «e.e rapid,, p.o.ln, the.selves to
e a
.unip.cu. Of particular interests,
.or the repu.lcans,
.0
had anticipated no such thina an of^n g, air of corruption hung over the
young republic:
™T^e„??::n?^; ^i^T^-i^-^" the pre.
seem only relative to oartir, w ^^"^"t times, they




the people, it was argued were obv om^
.^^"'s^'ons among
selfishness and InfirmUy in the soc?e?v "pf^""'dangerous diseases of civil freedom fh^ the
stage of anarchy, clothed'ln'^tid^anju^^e'lef"'^ "^^^
Political conflict centered on the issue of state legislative
behavior, where Whig radicals had cane to dominate in case after case
Not only did these bodies begin to pass laws affecting such crucial
relationships of property as those involving creditors and debtors,
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P-eeae. to aue. «u.o.t
..cease. T.s p.c.ce pU.e.
.avoc „U.
tne Uw an.
.o.Hfled the bette. educate.: persons m civl, a*1-
nistration scarcely
.„e„ „hat the law was. and such lu.tnaries as
Madison began to decrv a Uri^ • ^a y lack of wisdom and steadiness" in
'e9is,ation.^^^ the states, U seeded, were being s«thered a
to pro»te the rights of
.en over the rights of property.
,a„s which
e*od1ed the composition of the legislative majority on a given day
only to be changed to reflect the composition of a different legisla-
tive majority the following wee.. Soon the law Uself began to become
a contemptible thing In the eyes of those fro. whom U traditionally
should have commanded respect, and a healthy disregard for It began to
spread throughout the former colonies.
Nor was this all. For Madison, the representative assembly in
the several states was not only corrupting the law; it was "drawing
all power Into its Impetuous vortex. "2" All the functions of govern-
ment, it seemed were ending up In the legislative body. The student
of Aristotle will not be surprised by the reaction to such
developments: the American suspicion and jealousy of political power
that had once been directed against the Crown now emerged with
reference to the various state legislatures.^" and the educated
classes began a tightly orchestrated public campaign to channel the
growing popular animus against power into a force that would return
privilege to Influence and reason to government. From the standpoint
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Of classical political theory, "the citizens " in •J', trie , in their various public
spaces, had begun to administer an un.ixed polity. i„ „Mch the
-terests of important groups or classes were he1ng systematically
ignored. Those who were excluded set about agitating for change
The upper classes began to dispute the principle of unchecked
popular sovereignty, and noted that it might not always be the case
that the majority who rule in republican governments are the safest
guardians of both public good and private rights. "The people " it
seeded, were as capable of despotism as any prince; and public liberty
was no guarantee after all of private liberty.265
^...^^^^
^^^^
learning was that the equality of social and econcic conditions which
they had supposed themselves to enjoy in 1776 did not exist after all,
and that the excess of power wielded by majorities in the state
legislatures had led to abuses of authority that violated centuries of
property law and legal tradition. What Shay's rebellion pointed out
was that the dispute involved no simple class conflict between popular
representatives of the poor in state legislatures on the one hand, and
elitist American gentry on the other, for this was an outbreak by New
England farmers who lived far fron> the centers of power and wished to
remain unhindered by them. Confronted by such an uppity challenge,
the Whigs in Boston made it clear that when all was said and done, the
doctrine of virtual representation would prevail:
The rebels, announced the town of Boston, must obey the
majority. Let the majority be ever so much in the wrong "It was the only remedy for grievances "compatible with theIdeas of society and government" The insurgents, argued apublicist, must rely on their elected representatives for the
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demonstrate the absurdUy'^afX:bncrS?sr2r
As the young country moved Into the 17SOs the crisis
atmosphere Increased. Ooubts about the success of the republican
experiment began to spread. Republican state legislatures continued
to sow seeds of resistance. The writings of ^ericans in the eighties
became a series of self-diagnoses, an intensive examination of the
sources of political decay characteristic of the age of Gibbon.^" o„
the critical accounts, what seemed to be amiss was that private
interest had succeeded in capturing the legislatures, and "thus the
whole of that care and attention which was given to the public weal is
turned to private gain or self preservation.-^^S discussions
and intellectual dialogue became concerned with the problem of citizen
virtue, and the rise of 11 tigiousness among the populace was decried
in press after press. Behind these maneuvers, however, as we have
indicated, something of a class conflict simmered over ranks of social
and economic degree. This, as I have Indicated, was not a simple
conflict, and it would take considerable research to explore its con-
tours and assign the contending parties their respective places.
Nonetheless, it seems that there was a general popular animus against
government, a popular majority which was, at times, willing to use the
instruments of government to despoil the privileged of some of their
property, and the privileged themselves who for a variety of reasons
held a more positive view of the possibilities of govern.nent than did
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If a thorouijh exploration of the social ;.nHa and political forces involved
vera to yield any such simple conclusions.
acts of the various state legislatures, the combined strengths of
those «ho favored no government and those who were disfavored by such
government, and the writings of the inte, ligentia all coalesced
throughout the colonies to strengthen a wave of refo™ which swept the
states in the early nsOs. Wood offers the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780 as an example of the changes that went into effect. On
balance these consisted of trimming the powers of the legislature, and
strengthening the hand of the executive branch. It now seemed
unquestionable, for example, that the governor should participate in
legislation through some sort of revisionary power.2"
,,,,
starting to e,nerge. then, is a doctrine of checks and balances:
aution> :?nh:';lg'isfa?:;er' ^ ^
invigorated, the
Jefferson exol rit^fl Constitution
any person on account of his reliaiou<; HpI pfc " 1 ?l
p:s?;actSt:r^ r.'^- '-^"S?:^^i?;^s1}^I^?;in ^n'S 'eTtacto laws.
• The constitutions themselves refomerTargued. must be made more fundamental, drawn directly by the
fegfslattes'^fo^^"^^-^
-^^^-^^^^ by ordina^y"^'^'
Once put into practice, such proposals abruptly curbed the
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power Of popular sovereignty as U was then being exercised by tbe
lower houses in the state legislatures. As such, the. were bUterl,
resented and resisted h. those who saw In the. a complete betrayal
Of the principles of 1776; the reforms appeared to ™a„. as Insidious
devKes to return to the aristocratic and anarchical tones of the
former colonial governments. Wood notes that the raising of such
-for. proposals denotes the onset of fundamental change In American
conceptions of constitutionalism Itself.
mtu'^as^o'^ong^r iTf l^lZr""''" °' ""^'^^^^ ''^-^
decade earlier th^t fh! ^ «uld have been a
was fesrpopular Uss llhertf.'"'"'?' Constitution of 1780
Pennsylvan'?rJo^st!tut1o: :f*l7;r^7l"=
democratic, than the
This was a crucial development. What is emerging Is a concep-
tion of "constitution" closer to that of Aristotle than to the notion
embodied in the English tradition. The Aristotelian constitution is a
set Of fundamental rules according to which political activities are
carried out. These rules are, in a sense, the fonn of political life,
and specific political decisions and the daily round of political
activities are its content. While constitutions are, and must be sub-
ject to change, such changes and the processes through which they
occur, are extraordinary. The English constitution, on the other
hand, while also not something which has undergone effortless or easy
change, can nonetheless be altered either by acts of legislation or
through the slow accumulation of precedent or even by royal proclama-
tion or mis-statement as we saw in the case of Charles' Answers. The
Americans of this period, having begun with the English notion of a
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consmution.
™a.e sue. st™c..es alte.a.e
..-.atWe actw-n s.. acts we. ca.ne.
..e. special p.oce..es. T.e a,.
-
.se. to
..St.. was us.n. ™a.e . te.s o. t. notion t.at
'twas the asse*,. o. 1eg1s,at..e wMc. e*oa,e. the popuW w,n of
tne sovereign people. Havin, once put forth the notion that the
Asse*„.s power was not the extension
.ut the antithesis of popuUr
I'^erty. opponents of the 1776 Constitutions attempted to alter those
documents hy removing the,n fro. legislative purview.
,f there was
even the slightest possibility that asse*,y power
.ight lead to a
despotls. by popular majorities, and It could be shown that a consti-
tution was a set of fundamental rules for structuring the political
order, then the powers of the legislatures could be legitimately
restricted to spheres that had been constitutionally defined In
advance. Hence In Pennsylvania, opponents of the assembly held thatU could not Change the constitution, saying that "Whenever the
Assembly assume the exercise of powers not granted the,„. they act
arbitrarily and without authori ty. ""3
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^
profound Change In the structure of linked concepts that bound





p sentat o , and the proper role and extent
Of government were shifting their meanings simultaneously:
tf^iof ^n^h'''* "''"3 """^ t° the concept of represen-
fnte^esi bef^eL^^H'''"'^? the mutual Uy o?i r t tw en the people and their delegates and thp rr^r.
pr sentl lon"i?"




measure n? \ f"'"' " the foundation andof representation. Therefore all elected officials
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not just the houses of representati>,»=
representatives of the olonlp "^""^ "me way
devolved sovereig ty Of the peoD?e fr"'''*'"'"
no essential distinction seoarat nn tJ 'T'"'legislature from the other allrtpH^ ! '"f ^"^"^ °f
government. 274 e ec ed parts of the
The Assemblies were losing their special mandates. Political
power was heing homogenized In terms of its representing consti^tien-
cies that were subsets of the whole. Hence, on the basis of the
emerging gulf between populace and government, the powers of the
latter would be restricted first and later divided up to make the
application of those powers more difficult. All governmental offi-
cials, whether executive, judicial or even legislative were ultimately
held to be magistracy. Upon this development hinged the concept of
divided sovereignty that would be institutionalized In the Federal
constitution of 1787. ,f all elected officials were magistrates, and
if some of them, in the form of the legislatures, had evinced a ten-
dency to exceed the limits of justice in the laws that they passed,
then It was reasonable to divide the sovereign power and limit the
reach of any particular part of the government.
It was in fact only in the years after 1776 when the
b^'^—eS'^^iJarth^^r "'1 ^'-"-enttom^'hat hadueen expected, th t t e idea of separation of oower*: ;ic:c„maH
Is'st'a^Id'" 'tr:;
in.these'years
.^s^C^UrlvTn'a st te in he early consti tutions--"that the leaislativp
epar ;:';ndl^K^"'r7
departments, ought S'be'for e^^'s ate and distinct from each other"-made truly reciorocalby those seeking new justifications for strengthening the
TJaiT.?"' government at the expense of thelegislature Seizing upon this relatively minor eighteenth-
^ffl'i'lT''''.^^' constitutional reformers in the years
tll^,"^




.e.e. then, 1s a c.p,e. set of constraints uponthe actions of popular representatives. The public space Is
-tncte. so t.at the political or.er can
.e .el . to a 1 1 .1 to. ran.e
undertaking actions that Interfere with the private or the soda,
,n
effect, this amounts to a return to the
.Ixed government fon. after a
brief experiment with unchecked asse*l, po„er-5ut now, as we hav.
seen, the status of the underlying r.Us of the constl^tlon has
Changed, "hlle the detail
s
of the new arrang.ents are historical ly
specfic. It is Clear that the actually existing differences In social
and economic standing of the various parts of ^erlcan society were
now to be instituted In the mixed government fo™ adopted by the
Americans at Annapolis. This Is consistent with the rec«endat1o„s
of Aristotle and Machiavelli.
Yet the differences between the earlier institutional prac-
tices and the new ones of the Americans were drastic. Al, branches of
American government were to be elected, and no matter how many steps
were Interposed between the people and the higher orders of govern-
ment, all were given roots in popular sovereignty. Authority and
sovereignty were held to reside in a populace which made temporary
grants of power to selected individuals and groups who were empowered
to act in its name. The powers of the representative agents were to
be restricted, and their courses of action so arranged that concerted
movement among them became nearly impossible unless proceeded by
compromise. This not only assured that the various social orders
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have mnuence on t.e acts author., u ™a.e tt a vinua,
alone against the others.
convention wh.ch to Cose the pen'o. we have Just reviewed. The.
Show that the.e 1s «.e than one „a. to .n„, a.out the processes of
-teg^ation and co.p.o.1se necessary to the function of a public space
politics when that kind of politico i« n,.* tr nti s IS part of a mixed government.
What we have seen emerge here Is a r;.rtir,i »a S radical transition from the notion
that the common interest can be held to exist because there is no
"schism" in the body politic, to an acceptance of the practical dif-
ficulties of finding political c»prom1ses which will allow a hetero-
genlety of political Interests to move forward together.
In a sense, the U.S. Constitution would reflect the notion
that conflicting Interests are present in the polity and that c^pro-
".ises between them are possible first If the sphere of application of
political power Is limited and second, if the potential exercise of
that power is fonnally divided among those interests. Therefore, the
public space of the Congress was not to be the repository of an undi-
vided sovereignty, any more than the Consiglio Grande of Machlavelli
«as to reign unchecked. Unchecked popular assemblies, taerlcans had
seen, led to abuses of legislative power. To this they responded with
what we can see was an Aristotelian" compromise between competing
class interests and a return to the mixed government form-with the
crucial distinction that all now depended upon the frandse and the
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fact that those
,„ p„„er were to be selected those subject to U
The constitution of 1787 would carry forward the Whig anti-
pathy to governmental power by Instituting a set of ll.lts upon what
could be defined as Its legitimate sphere of activity, and then pro-
vide an institutional structure designed to ensure that it would not
overstep those limits. While this protected privilege, and ensured
the social positions of what passed for aristocracy In the America of
the t1,„e, It also served to prevent the reapperarance of the civil .
strife that had threatened the states in the years 1,„,„ed1ately
following the revolution.
,n this sense then, it can be seen as a •
political compromise in the Aristotelian sense. I think therefore,
that the period of /^erlcan history between the attainment of
independence in 1776 and its closure at Annapolis in 1787 could serve
as a clear exa»,ple of the kinds of unmixed politics which Aristotle
enumerated in Book III of the Pomics, and the Constitution of 1787
as the kind of compromise between all parties that he rec(,n,nended. If
we apply Aristotle's test of a properly mixed government, i.e., that
no party to the agreement would change the constitution even if given
the opportunity to do so, we find that the founders of the American
republic forged a compromise which was to last until 1860.
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Greeks in (heir on acrwrth'^othe'r'n. °^^^^vation ,„ade b, the
trandUions. that what in oSe cSuntrf .h"'" '^"l''"-^!
custom might be abhorred^rL^?^"!^ " '.^^ '^"^ 'aw or
nevertheless, there appeared to . . "/T'^"'" """t''^- ^"^ that,
though not 1dent1canrfo™iated or af!Lr^ T'l P""^^Pl« which,the same fashion, yet inTqeneral W't ^ ''^^P^^^ n
valid everywhere! From this observation th^^
to be acknowledged as
the laws, rules, or customs of the f,r?t
1'^^^"°"^^"^'°" drawn that
their existence to mere "convent nn
' fl™ ^ "^'^f «n-made and owed
the second type were in 50^ !^! ^' 'i!°!!!05.' "file the principles of
said, existed physe, Sy nature^ T ' ""/'.T"' ''''^^
latter prihciptirW?;e only oartlv Irf ^"^l^/ '^^^t these
various nations or noH??r^/^^! ^ ncorporated, and, within the
the positive or "wr t L """Ih^'Vo? Z?. '^^'^'^funeral speech which Thucyd?dls attr buies 0 P ric^^s 'Ih'"' ''T'
transgressor bui u lolZT^.^yTl'^fl
^T^b'T, "Itto me that one could ^hnw th;>f fr.J^ l\^ ' P' It seems
rooted deep in '^iZT.^ ?raJittn\"d^'°p c^i,?r'':n?thiffl"^emergence of rich and poor classes is ViZ, If , ''^^
population reaches certain devils Th?s ?n fLr.
relative^^^;.-if^'i^;^^; "''^
^"^ Aristotle's discussion of the •
iu t?ce ;hSt ^ '"^
fundamentally self-interested concepts ofj s i t a oligarchs and democrats hold respectively Each U












general discussion of OT,ia t„n„! - 1281a2ff; 1282618. For a
approach, seef AntlyT I:^he Pont?c'fo$'p *^'^totlesNew York: Pro,netheus Books igBTTT^^^-^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^ (Buffalo,
ferent init:td::in^^^;^ou7s"^:kl Z luslil^tSli^^^'"^power over others. Ibid 1281aM ^ """" ^^rcise of
constituti ? 'b e 'o io .lir^of ""J" '^-^
bourne in turn by an This k ^n'^f "^^^ ,nust be
be a source 0? great gaii
°^ '^'^^'•^^ <«^''<*«<i to




,v;- ^e-r dlv^^ r r
''^
judged to have done badly they were ostracU^^ ?hf!^ ^^^^
so.eti.es they were executed!' Thucy d ' ^ve
'
a?™?',' ^ To^f"
^^trei;^^ (J.^^;8T%eir"L,^LT"r.s^ -"^^ - -
^^See also the argument at 1332bl2ff.
^^Ibid., 1282alO-13.
Q^Ibid., 1282a32ff (Robinson translation).
^^Ibid., 1290a7.




^^Ibid., 1275a3-5; See also: Newman, 111:134, 174; IV:177.
94lbid., 1275a7.
^^Jhere is an obvious howler here. Robinson points it out at
p. 7. ^One of Aristotle's early criteria of citizenship is that both
of one s parents be "citizens." But women, of course, are not
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cmzens--they are only native-born Greeks flric^.^^zenship in both a broad sense (nat vP M.tM ^^/'^^^totle uses citi-(exercise of privileges) and thp JiI? ' '^^^'^^^ ^^"se
the broad sense are al o citizens in thf'''^" "^^'^^ ''''''''below that even citizens in ihe brLd ^L
''''''
^^^^ ^
stipulation- it is at iLcJ i^n.- ?? ^^"^^^ ultimate
provide Citizens p'to L c^Tnd ^^ llT'' ' ^institution to
called "citizens." We sha 1 ?h^^ J"-
'^^^^hey would "justly" be
practical wisdofn cannot b^ defined a olillV'T'u '''' '''''''the ultimate and final admissib e teft^'^" 1 ^ "9 . ^^nsti tution is
Aristotle is doing here see Newman n I • 141
'
Z'r] "^^^
logical error, but the confusion oie^ women "er^i Its! '
''''' '''''
M-. 1275al6-32,







^"^Commentators have argued over this dilemma for centuriesThere is no coherent doctrine and selected passages add ud to a rp^l
III-i45''l5r^6^S%^]?' 'r^"i '-'T'-' ^39-24^234;^ en'Si^ B^'^
III A '
Aristotle says that the politikos cannot be other than thespoudaios. Yet apparently, "goodnes s" per se and consti tutiona
requirements for good citizens can be identical either in the case of
hS! h ' r"^"' ^hen the absolutely good manhas absolute power {284b26; 1283bl5; 1288al5). One of the major con-
tprnJ%;"
Aristotle's theory is his failure to reconcile the attr bu-es of the phronimos and the spoudaios .
The phronimoj^ seems to be his ideal political actor-but inso-far as the Ideal actor is a good man, he must be a spoudaios too. Theprob em IS that the spoudaios of the Ethics follows the via c orn-
tempi ativa while the phronimos is always a man of actionl^d-^Factical
affairs. Strictly speaking, then, there is no reason why we should
ever expect to find a spoudaios in politics, but Aristotle clearlydesires to make room for him in the best or ideal constitution and
clearly wishes to say that the people in a democracy can be good
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called neoteroi ^"d if " played t e^?S^' "^'^^^
change.
-Tteiib?Fs of the second aroun TI^ TJ "^^inngtunity to develop phronesis aql^ati^n f^. ^ '^'='' '^'^^ "PPO---like good citizeKs-^-TRpal^ned jMnn^K^/'^f?'' ^'t
successfully revolt and ch ^ e the LtrtutJo.'^r^'^tion about citizenshio and m^Vo rL„ i '^''^"9^ ^'s stipula-
then, Anstotle sa^s %hey wo Id e u t?v dl"""' full sense,
"citizens." (1267a38ff) An ^u-^""'^ deserving of the ter™
carried by the const t ion the 5 i:?t?o„''^^'^."'
"'"'''''^
p™ S^t'thf"^^"^ -gt:^^r'?,"e" ns' :r"haT?o"-^X\s "





^'^5lbid..l277bl3-22; Newman, 111:157, 174.
^^^Pol. 1332a2.
"flir-is,-
1277b7; Newman, 111:168-169, suggests thatAle blades expereince of being ruled was probably fir too sh^^thejigures as a leading statesman at Athens at a'comparative?y ^arfy
ir;m?:!SS'??v
exper?s ir^n'
''''''''''' ''''''' ''''''''' problems by
109po^., 1282a35; Barker, (1946), p. 124.
ll^Barker, (1906), p. 464.
mPol_., 1281a40ff; Newman, 111:213; Barker, (1946), 123ff.
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^^^Pol 1268a40.
attributL''or?;hr^ to have the
way. Hence the fe-iW the argunen? here ' ''''''' '''''
^^^Ibid., 1331a31; Newman, 414-415.
but note!^t^'tie^s?ate caf opJ recanmends both practices
are insufficient Athens car ed ut Z'"'' I'''''' '^^^"^^important evidence of the exLnf to whlh Eh''^^"' ^ ^^'^go to insure a meaningful poli ea itv th.'^^'
were willing to
class divisions. In effort thi
^ju^nty at could circumvent
poor to go down an debatf^nd casTvour'vnT''if you participate in politics- wp-ii nl ^^^^ '"O'l^y
note on all this is ?ns?ruciive Tf \ ^°"c^° ^^^"i^n's
17.
i t t i lengthy. See: Newman, IV:530, n.
116po^. 1281b25; 1286a20-25.
ll^lbid.. 1286a25ff. Barker's additions in brackets.
ITTTM^-D^^ ed. Jonathan Barnes et
The MacMn'lan'L'';^%^ (New York:
^^^Newman, IV: 240ff.
1 ' 1 -
- Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (New York: Seabury, 1978).
12?
Univ. r,u..''lj76)f'^^''"'' ^'"^ '° ""^ Cornell
Press IqLV ll^'^li^.l' ^^^^f Humanism (New Haven: Yale UniversityK , lybJ), pp. 47ff, cited in: W.K.C. Guthrie The SoDhic;t^(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), p 180.' -
^°P^^^^'
1
^'^Von Fritz and Kapp, p. 63.
^^^11 Principe Ch 25. In Machiavelli: The Chief Works and






UUnia'^'-^'^^^^^^^^^^-^i^^^r^- Book III, Ch. 19. In: Gilbert.
2^2^, 3.U. This exa,np,e concerns the Ro.an Tribunes.




through crooked and u known roads tllTJ''. 9oes'
-
not. ,1.e up. in
...ITkrZl Z ^irt^Je^^^fi ?c1lo?iS?,
involved'ln'L[:g*??;n'cU«?cirH:i",''%"r^*^<''^ °f '^OP
Max Weber. "Ancient nd Me e afo ^i rLv " fn'p"'"" Ualy.%ee:
2 vols., ed. Guenther Roth and Claus wm^^h I§»L^nlioc1etj^,California Press 1978) n n^Q i^L 5 ^ (BeTkeley: Univ. oi-
of the Clompi r t? n 'pWce in "acllavel 11 's accountGilbert, III: 1158-U68. '""^"'^^ "78. History of Florence, in




^^^See: Wolin, p. 228.
MM^'<Ne:v:^^r'Har?i^i|^§^^
,„ .
/^^Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Ea rly Italian Renaissance
iac ?ave?l"i
^^„^^"^eton Un.versity Press. I%b) Fel 1 x I ber "
"
M hi l 1 and Guicciardmi: Politics an d History in Sixteenthcentury Horence ( Pnnceton: Pn^ceton UniversUyVress; 1965 ): pp.
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SkTPiniF, The Foundation ^; of Modern Pol t,vli t?' P' ''^'^TWinTH
''^™bridg?r-Cii5?11J5rffim7T^ 2 vols.
l^erlin, p. 39.
basic to'hl^enj?rtap;roach'io"":??t?c^'""; -^-terial is
note that the "father of modern po u ca,' soil r^'\' '"'''''^'"9 total a concept from scholastic ohilololh! ^i'^"^^.. so fundaren-the relation between for^s and mater?au' Z°/ e"""" statement oftial form which served as the reso?u^_?I^J l'''^ doctrine of substan-
medievals, see- r n r^L^ , "^f^" "^lon of the antithesis for the




l*3pocock, (1975), p. 184.
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^Discorsi
. 1.1; 1.55; 3.3.
I'^^Ibid., 1.18.



























1641 Ifift^M^J* ''h^^^'^A "^"t^odi^ction," Three British Revolutions-
fe^^WTTiil' fqm (Princ^toiTTTH^^^tofr-^^^
these three^?mDor;.i^'^;^^





^^^Pocock, (1975), p. 335.
1 78
Political Ideoiogies'-'in Po?uIT'/^"' '^^^^^''^Ston and EnglishPocock (New York? Tt^^eneuJrm^^ ed' j.g.a.
^^^Pocock, (1975), p. 198.
l^^Ibid., pp. 199-201.
^^^Ibid., 201-202.
Pocock, 'TnlZ,^^^^^^^ - drawing upon: J.G.A.
ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridgi^^^TlHiF^^
130ff.




and institutional p;act ce orreorpl'ntf.'"""' general concept
England, starting wUh rather mT. l.J ''' "'-'^ evolved'in
see: A.E. Pollard ihe Evolution
p^^^^""^"^^ the Medieval Church,
Longmans, 1926), ppT^T^I^T^^^^^ ^^^'^ion. (London:
^%ocock, (1977), p. 136.
^^^Ibid., p. 142.
^^^Ibid., p. 140; 146ff.
^^^Ibid., p. 140.
^ uh,-i^!^'^^!
Plumb's thesis. A Tudor Aristocracy was reolaced
con.ti?,?,-l ™" °f ^''<ed governinents tution was preserved, but the distribution of power among itsbranches was altered at the expense of the king. At the sane time itshould be clear why a doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty too so
a??ve than'?h: necessarily'o'^re'cons rv ti t e undivided sovereignty that applied to the Athenian
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power, or the place where PolitK^'l^LNhtu/on-^inlSld^^"' °'
l^^ibid., pp. 143-144.
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American debases and'i^rns'orthouah? 'Mir'" thenatives available among historians of thJ t """^^^^ ter-important to sketch the
-najor lurns In tL''t['°^: '^"^ ^^'^ nioreIt is to become immersed tn [he scho ariv^'J'"3\^ P^^'od thanoff from another. l ly arguments that set one view
l^^Pocock,
"Introduction." (1971), p. 14.
(1971), l7.76l%]Vo]^^^^^ Harrington and English Ideologies,"
^^^Ibid., p. 270. .














21lAfj,ong numberless studies of English politics during the
reign of ^.eorge III, see: Richard Pares, King George III and the
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Politicians (Oxford: Clarendon Pr?<;<; iQf;-^^ ^ u .jll^ogOndPopular Pol itics at ^hp^i ^ ^ P^^ty
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS
The matter that detains us now may seemTo many, neither dignified enough
'
Uhn 'i
^^"^^ be scorned by them
Tu.l have observed the tieshat bind the perishable hours of lifeEach to the other, and the curious proos




Congress is not a Parsonian object of knowledge. ^ The whole
cannot be displayed before one's view at a given time. Indeed, as one
focuses one's attention from one aspect or process to another, the
whole thing seems to change. It shifts in turn from something where
moral activity takes place, to a repository of power; it shifts from
being a public space to a system of political networks and personal
relationships. Sometimes it appears to be a bureaucratized hierarchy.
Seeking the whole, the student of Congress approaches his subject-
matter by grasping its parts, each of which is examined as containing
its peculiar strengths and weaknesses, each of which contributes to
and takes away from the strength of the whole. At the same time, the
various parts, even if added together, do not reveal the entirety of
193
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the institution as1tVea,„ls" and pe.haps It Is tMs «.1c.
explains
,„ost professional students of the
.od. see,„ to ,..e ,1ven
UP an atte.pts to .rrUe at an o.e.a.ching synthesis and .ec« spe-
c-Ksts in the analysis and stud, of so.e pan or aspect of the
whole
.
very often, however, one can sense a kind of incohate or
"felf synthesis behind the technical analysis of the expert pro-
fessional student, hased upon so.e l.a^e of „hat the
.ody 1s and how
n functions 1n essence. The beginning student, seeing his own
synthesis, tries to overlay a welter of received l.ages one upon the
other, to see what fom,s anerge. What results Is not a collage, or a
complex 1.age, but a multiple exposure, blurred, Ind,st1nct and suf-
fused with far ,„ore light than necessary to .nake fon„ or surface evi-
dent.
At the heart of the proble,,, Is a set of Lplidtly contested
assertions about the flow of power itself: where It "begins" or first
impinges upon a complex structure and who is primarily responsible-or
subject to pressure on behalf of--whom.
While many students try to confine their researches to
.natters
pertaining to the internal affairs of the body, a significant number
of important studies have found It necessary to go beyond Congress in
order to explain it-to the electorate; to the bureaucracy; to the
corporate structure; to the activities of lobbies and special
-1 nterest
groups. What studies of the latter sort reveal is that "Congress," be
it a concept or an institution, is context-dependent, and that
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possible solutions to particular questions Involving Its nature or
operations
.epen. upon clarification of t.e surroun.n, circumstances
Finally, the elucidation of an, such context itself depends
upon how a given student evaluates Congressional perfo«nce of Its
evaluation of what those duties comprise. Roger Davidson and Walter
Oleszek have noticed this:
respect'^toTongr^ss' 701^1^^^!"^^ ""f^'''"'^ -^'^
notion of Congress' oUce n It f ^ ='ear
is difficult ?o now'ihe?h
^^e eaisl'ff
^
^^"^ t''''"-tloning as It should nr . , '^S^ ative branch 1s func-
^1ght Ud;'ns ] eg°d d% c? n?i>s'"''sZ^^°^°=f ^
A second difficulty which arises with respect to a student's
fundamental evaluation of the basic relationship which Congress has to
the polity in general can be seen In terms of focus: does one look for
the effectiveness with which the Congress operates In relation to the
general order, or does one emphasize the more concrete and discrete
relationship which the Individual member has to the district which
elected him?
tho ^o^K*
"^^^^ institution may be woefully unresponsivethe members can act very responsively in their casework andon specific district-related policy problems; the evaluation
a
^^sPonsiveness depends upon'whether the bod,s a whole or the individual member is considered.
3
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Such evaluations, of course, depend upon the "politics" of the
student. Most start with an i,„a,e or representation of the flow-chart
Of power Which animates the rest; the analyses which follow the selec-
tion Of the i,„age can be quite complex and sophisticated. But. again
when any such image is held up before the full range of possible
interpretations, each see^s condemned to partiality. I„
.y view, this
IS a necessary consequence of the emphasis essential to the fonnation
Of any perspective. Aristotle would probably note here that systema-
tic or comprehensive explanations of Congress are impossible to
attain, even in theory, because Congress is not among those things
which can be so explained. Long ago, Woodrow Wilson expressed very
similar sentiments about the confusing nature of Congress, and while I
am unable to find his "system which underlies its composition." I find
his general statement true enough:
;
•
Like a vast picture thronged with fiqures of emiaiprominence and crowded with elaborate and obtrisve detailsCongress is hard to see satisfactorily and appreciatively ata single view and from a single standpoint. Its clpHcItedforms and diversified structure confuse the visio and on-ceal the system which underlies its composition. t is toocomplex to be understood without an effort, without a carefuland systematic process of analysis. Consequently, very few
a^aa?^t ^h""'''''^"'' are practi a l^shutg ins the comprehension of the public at large IfCongress had a few authoritative leaders whose figures were
very distinct and very conspicuous to the eye of the world
and who could represent and stand for the national legisla-ture in the thoughts of that very numerous and withal very
respectable, class of persons who must think specifically andin concrete forms when they think at all, those persons who
can make something out of men but very little out of
intangible generalizations, it would be quite within the
region of possibilities for the majority of the nation tofollow the course of legislation without any very serious
confusion of thought.*
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one crucial difference between Wilson's generation and Its
successors Is that he has sought his controlling 1,„age In the hu.an
figure. While we have proceeded to analyze structural relationships
power flows or Interest networks. For example, over the .ears. NeUon
Polsby has consistently emphasized the
"representative function" of
congress; David Mayhew. the consequences of which the never-ending
pressure of Impending elections has upon the behavior of Its
.e.bersh1p;6 Davidson and Oleszek describe a body riven by Internal
conflicts and at war against Itself;^ and Dodd and Schott are pri-
marily concerned with the place that the legislative body has cc»e to
occupy within the distended structure of the adoilnlstrative
state.8 Michael Malbin and J. Mclver Weatherford are struck by the
problem of rising staff power-something unheard of twenty years ago-
and approach It from the standpoints of political scientist' and
anthropologlst.lO The collections of articles edited by Dodd and
Oppenhelmer^l and Mann and Ornsteinl^ inadvertently bear out the
Aristotelian doctrine that politics be studied through aporiae or
selected problems, for each of the articles presented In these collec-
tions takes as Its subject some crucial attribute of the Congress and
none attempts to grasp it as a whole. Taken together, however, this
multiplicity of perspectives adds up to a body of information about
the variety of problems and circumstances which now beset our national
legislature. Though they cannot be said to reveal the true nature of
Congress "as a whole," they provide a rich context for raising the
questions pertinent to our own inquiry, and together, they add up to a
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consensus t.at ,s cmical of
.an. of Us c™ practices
one crucial question that «11
,
,e constant!, before us 1s the
:7 " l^e..ers has a.e. or
-n-ere. theaMllt.of the ,enera,
.0.. to carr. out Its proper func-
tions within the
.ixed constitution of the United States. Evidence




.une exceptional fTr^r^^O^h^ '^^^ ''^
Specialization presents difficulties for the theorist of
public space because through It, the legislature finds Itself
intellectually and politically divided before it can assemble to deli-
berate and decide. ,n what follows, we shall explore both the origins
and the political consequences of this division of Congress, and try
to determine whether or not Its powers have Indeed been upheld by such
specialization.
That Congress in its present form Is the product of a lengthy
evolution and rich history often fails to take a pr™inent place, or
even serve a cursory role, in the researches and discoveries of ™any
of the best students of that body-despite the fact that the need for
such research has been widely evident among political scientists for
some tirae.l" This general omission of the historical dimension Is
unfortunate. It seems obvious to this student, at any rate, that any
adequate explanation of what the Congress "is" entails some apprehen-
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cesses Which are rooted first of an in the practices of the
Federalist period, hut e.ual,, i„ the explosion in c„p,exit. which
took puce in stages beginning early in the present century. Coeval
wUh these developments are the processes which Congress has insti-
tuted in response to the vast changes in the nature of the national
government which it initiated during the New Deal period.^^ decent
developments within the professional literature indicate that others
are beginning to recognize the advantages which can accrue fro. taking
Polsby's advice and heeding the vital importance which the history of
congress has for our understanding of it. With luck the number of
studies Of congress which incorporate the history of its development
will increase.
The "historical" approach primarily involves explanation as a
matter of the unfolding of a simple chronology of events and develop-
ments in the history of the Congress itself. This approach will be
useful for our purposes, first because it will permit us to move
directly from the arguments of the founders about the powers and pur-
poses of the national legislature to the actual practices they carried
out upon finding themselves seated members of the first Congresses.
In other words, additional evidence for the founders' notions about
the nature of a possible national public space can be gleaned from
their actual constitution of that space as they struggled with the day
to day problems of legislating. We will find, I think, that practical
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tr,ed to co.e to grips with the concrete problem which arose in the
course of governing a large and heterogeneous polity. Second the
historical approach facilitates analysis of the functions of current
-stitutions and practices within the Congress by providing the oppor-
tunity to review the forces which preceded their emergence as prac-
tices within the life of the legislature as a whole. Here we will
find Congress struggling to maintain a balancing act between its
internal requirements of democracy and consensus; between ™e*er auto-
nomy and party leadership; between its own powers and those of the
executive. 18 The history of the Congress is one of a series of
oscillations in each of these areas, between personal and individual
power and powerlessness, and a constant struggle-.anifest in periodic
rearrangements of the formalities which govern its internal
organizat1on-to co-exist with a continually changing governmental and
political environment. 13 Has the member of Congress qua citizen been
lost in all this? This is what we will have to determine, for without
a real citizen, there can be no public space; and if the public space
be rendered powerless, ignoble, largely ceremonial or in some other
ways Impotent, there can be no real citizenry.
Congress in the Federalist Period:
Failures of the Democratic Form
For purposes of analytic simplicity, the ideal approach to
the sketchiest review of the history of Congress would be to
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separate Its development of interna, ccplexU, fro,„ its externa,
ba,ance of po«er with the Presidency. Unfortunate,,, in this as in so
™any other cases invoiving institutions, analytic elegance and strict
Chronology do not
.ix-yet. the requirements of chronology are such
that they cannot be separated. After some ruminations and a few false
starts, the student of Congress finds that the opening pages of any
such history
.ust include three crucial factors which impinged uoon
the membership fro. the very outset, and quite firmly steered the
organization away from the mass meeting form of conduct which it
received at birth. These factors, which we shall explore in some
depth, are first, the problem of legislative detail; second, the
problem of attaining political consensus among a heterogeneous group;
and third, the partial Imposition of order upon an unruly and disorga-
nized Congress by agents of the executive branch. Once history has
begun to Intrude the executive Into the internal processes of
Congress, however, it is very difficult to extrude it later for pur-
poses of analysis. And yet it seems that the two must be kept
separate if theoretical questions about the nature of representative
government in the U. S. are going to be raised at al 1
.
The founders of the American Republic were not citizens of a
city-state. Indeed, the America of 1787 more resembled the entirety
of Greece as It was in 338 B.C. than it did any single city-state of
Aristotle's era-and the student of history notes that It took no less
than Alexander the Great to unify the former. Hence, if we take the
relative simplicity of the polls as a benchmark, we see the
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Constitutional convention nf i7»7 +,i •. o 17<37 taking place w1th1n the context of '<
heterogeneous confederation or league of allies, fo™e. pr1,„anl,
,n
opposition to a foreign power, onl. to .e beset centrifugal forces
once the period of armed conflict was over. The task the Convention
faced then was to subdue these forces without subjugating the., b,
seducing the. Into jointly cooperating In the creation of a central
authority. All of this material has been reviewed 1n an earlier
Chapter.
Drawing upon a complex fusion of Enlightenment political phi-
losophy, Roman history and law, English precedent and radical Whig
doctrines, not to mention their own experiences in colonial govern-
ment, the founders constructed an artifice which, in their own view,
was to revolve around the open space at the center of the Legislative
branch of the new republic. Accordingly, most of the substantive
powers of government having to do with domestic policy were explicitly
placed under the purview of that body which was to lie closest to
those upon whom its decisions would have immediate effects.
Unfortunately, despite the Constitutional attention lavished upon the
powers and duties of Congress, and upon the qualifications for serving
there, little mention was made about the nature of the Congress per
se. Indeed, the members of that body itself were to "chuse their
speaker and other officers
. . and, by implication, to regulate
their internal affairs themselves.
Once assembled, the new Congress set about readying Itself
for joint political action. The record shows that the individual mem-
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^ers had had considerable pn'o. expen-ence. Seated tn the House
.„e.e
n-ne representatives who had been «bers of the Constitutional
convention and thirty-six who had sat in the Continental Congress
Thirty-nlne representatives had served In state legislatures, and
fifty-two had been
.e™bers of either a state legislature, the
Continental Congress or the Federal Convention. There were sixty-five
.embers In all.^O
, House quorum straggled In on 1 April. 1789. chose
A. C. Muhlenberg as speaker, and he promptly named a committee to
draw up the first rules of procedures.^! our first Important clue to
the riddle of Congress therefore lies in the discovery that a commit-
tee was prior to everything else-even to rules of procedure. That
Muhlenberg's committee duly met and performed its functions we can
infer from the historical record: by 18 April, the House was already
debating the first tariff bill. Here is how they proceeded in those
early days:
In the early years of the House, it was the practice to beain
fl^'ul'Tu'^ "^'J^' legislative proposals ?n CoLittee ofthe Whole House on the State of the Union. After broadagreement had been reached on the principles nvolved aselect committee was named to draft a bill. When thi^ Com-mittee reported back to the House, the bill itself was
referred to a Committee of the Whole for section-by-sectiondebate and approval or amendment. Its work completed t ecommittee rose the Speaker resumed the chair, and the Houseeither accepted or rejected the amendments agreed to in
uommittee of the Whole. This was followed by a third and
by^the'^HoSse^
engrossed or complete bill and passage
Since there were no time limits as yet on the right of
members to speak, even the small membership of the First andSecond Congresses found this procedure cumbersome. Rep.James Madison blamed the "delays and perplexities" of the
House on the want of precedents. " But Rep. Fisher Ames of
Massachusetts saw the problem as an excessive concern with
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George Galloway goes on to report Fisher Amos' remarks at
greater length, and they are interesting because they indicate
something about the value of the contributions which the c«ittee
system made to the legislative process at this early stage, ^es was
quite strongly in favor of committees, and had little apparent use for
the committee of the Whole-in part, no doubt, because of the rather
poor quality of the debates he observed there. Contrary to received
wisdom and mythological assumptions about those good old early days,
Ames' account makes clear that there were times when the Congress did
not so much debate matters of high principle as it indulged itself by
wallowing in trivialities. Writing to a friend in July, 1789, ^es
described the procedure as follows:
The bill was at first very imperfect. We laboured upon itfor some time, settled some principles, and referred it to alarge and very good committee. They met, agreed upon prin-cip es, and the clerk drew the bill which they reported We
•
ITn l
^' committee of the whole, and we indulge a veryminute criticism upon its style. We correct spelling or
erase may and insert shall, and quiddle in a manner whichprovokes me. A select committee would soon correct littleimproprieties. Our great committee is too unwieldy for this




While Ames was objecting to Congressional preoccupation with
the details of rhetoric, details of an entirely different sort quickly
presented the earliest Congresses with a challenge that could not be
adequately met by the committee of the whole; challenges which con-
cerned a problem that has plagued Congress throughout its history:
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how is it possible for an assembly to keeo un with •
.
_ ^
^ ''^^P an increasingly
heavy and detailed work . ^ •
1ss.es and . •
-"Haneousl,
.ebate the substantive
u bas,c pnnclples Involved 1n eve.,
.atte. of pCic.,
C'ea.,.. the Intention of the Pounde.s, and those of thel. conte.-




-e*,e and debate to.ethe. fl.st the
.oadP-c,p,es and then the substantive detail s comprised h. each bH,
Th.s procedure guaranteed that each of the
.an. Interests actual,/
present In the emerging American society would have an effective voice
-
the legislative body, indeed. Galloway holds that In those first
assembly and to stage great debates on national questions. But
apparently, the organizational difficulties which followed fro. this
arrangement proved to be Insuperable, and 1t gulc.ly turned out that
it was impossible for each and every Interest to participate on an
equal footing with all of the others on every legislative tas. which
the congress then confronted. The paralysis of the body by a mass of
detail, then, provided a ready historical answer to the question posed
earl,er: It Is not possible for an assembly to keep up with an
increasingly heavy and detailed work load and simultaneously assemble
to debate the substantive issues and basic principles Involved In
every matter of policy. The fo^al and politically necessary solution
to the problem, of course, was the institution of the standing
committee: in order to conquer a burgeoning and detailed workload, and
manage its own growing numbers, the assembled body itself would have
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to divide:
of 1800), tte House began to del »a.?!
^''^^ t^^t
slbiHty for initiating ?«g1sill?o^f!„^""^^""9 --"pon-
commlttees. Four were «;^M w^, Permanent
1809, six were added'25"^"'^'"^"'' 1"5; between 1802 and
So goes the conventional wisdom of the standard account; Fr™
n one could draw a variety of implications and raise important
questions. First, on the negative side, a subdivided legislature for-
ces its individual member to specialize and. perforce neglect his
general responsibilities to both his constituency and to himself as a
citizen, second, a subdivided legislature comprised of specialists is
structurally impeded from bringing its collective wisdom to bear on
matters that concern the common interest. Third, a subdivided
legislature cannot Vepresenf the generality of society or speak in
its name, but delegates its responsibilities to its parts which then
presume to speak in the name of the whole. To claim that the part can
adequately represent the whole is. in effect, to commit the logical
fallacy of composition and to subvert the founders' notions of the
true relationship which a representative body should have to those who
have elected it to act for them.
Such arguments, however, tend to leave out the element of
politics. If the Congress had to subdivide because of the wealth of
detail involved in drawing up legislation, then the act of legislating
can ultimately be reduced to a problem of perception and this thesis




,„ that case, the fundamental question would be "
does a group intersubjectlvel, establish consensus about the nature of
reality with reference to a given question?" Unfortunately, politics
1s not always so easily reduced to problems of perception. On the
positive Side, the delegation of responsibility for specific legisla-
tion to certain individuals is a division of labor that makes it
easier for an unwieldy body to approach consensus on a variety of
detailed matters, and to move a vast workload through its legislative
calendar. Such a task would have been simply Impossible had the
entirety of the assembly attempted to pore over the minutiae necessary
to the drafting of effective legislation. Second, insofar as it might
be said that it is in the general interest to maintain legislative
control over those areas where Constitutional responsibilities are
clear, then in those cases where legislation is necessarily detailed,
specialization, in fact, serves that general Interest. It seems that
there can be no "final solution" to this dilemma. While the standard
account emphasizes the problems which detailed legislation presents to
an assembled body, it remains to explore its political dimensions in
26further detail. We can put the problem this way: suppose that all
members of an imaginary assembly can agree about the nature of a
problem wanting solution. This in no way guarantees that they will be
able to agree on what should be done about it. We will call this the
problem of formulating a consensus for political action--wi thout which
any legislature is impotent.
James Sterling Young has shown, for example, that the early
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congress was not paralyzed by Us Inability to sit en banc and debate
an infinity of details, but rather by Its nature as a representative
body. For Young, the Intersubjecti ve and psychological attitudes of
much Of Its early membership prevent It from agreeing about very much
at all. The characterol oglcal structure of the Individual members led
them to hold certain attitudes about political power and authority
Which, in turn, led them to value particular forms of Institutional
organization over others-and this led to a breakdown In the potential
for collective action. Young points out the problem: '"The
Americans,' observed an astonished Britisher, have taken "the prin-
ciple of democracy
. . . [and] applied [it] to a legislative
body.'"^^
Given Gordon Wood's analysis of the social attitudes which
swept the country in the years immediately following the revolutionary
period, this is precisely what we might have expected the newly-
liberated colonists to do as they assembled together to make laws.^^
Yet, once having moved to form and operate a government, these indivi-
duals perhaps continued to adhere to principles more appropriate to
revolutionaries than statesmen. In any case, their continuing to base
their actions on an unallayed principle of democracy gave rise to what
the modern student of Congress--not to mention of ancient
democracies-can only define as bizarre activity: there was here 'no
spirit of cooperation, conciliation or deference to the opinions of
others; individuation of behavior and opinion was valued, and
following the lead of others was scorned. These psychological atti-
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tudes 1„ tun, fostered a dogged persistence 1„ the practice of
^-crac. and a delicate concern
.t. the e..a,1t. of each person such
that the concerted action which res.Us In the passage of blHs-and
Which, after all. ™ust be directed by so,„eone-beca™e nearly
Impossible to ach1eve.30 These outwardly appearant difficulties were
underscored by fundamental differences of outloo. and culture which
separated the .en who gathered In the well of Congress fran' one
another, for In the Jeffersonlan era.
.en fro. different regions were
».en fro. different cultures.^l The result was a highly contentious
lower house. lacking party discipline and organization^^ and
recognizing no leadership of Its own.33 speaker Henry Clay proceeded
to aggravate such sectional differences by distributing c^mittee
Chairmanships equally a.ong the sectionally-oriented fraternal groups
that attained social and political cohesion in com.unity boarding
houses, and which constituted the actual power blocs and Interest
groups of the Congress at that time. By multiplying the number of
groups involved in policy-making, "the committee system" under Clay,
"multiplied also the opportunities for obstructionism and
. . . intro-
duced a whole new set of disparate organized interests Into the
congressional establishment. "3" For Young, then, the com.ittee
system-which we are exa.ining as the logical response to the
complexity of legislation-did not enable Congress to function effec-
tively, nor can its emergence be laid to the complexity of the
Congressional tasks at hand. Instead.
... the standard Interpretation which sees the committee
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applicable to the JeffeSnian e?^ ™* '^'"^
"ilnority formations thaJ were thl ^.n^
nay well have been In narr . Jnn^. ^ comraittees
early Congress' incaDar,-?v
*^"""iO"al adaptation to the
policy-Jing by SrU?es% ^"^"''^^
undaunted by preceding historians and political scientists
Young took the view that early Congressional paralysis resulted fr«
US failure as a body to develop institutionalized
.eans of attaining
consensus-i„ short, that the proble. lay in the internal structure of
congress as that structure reflected the psychological attitudes of
its
.e,nbership. Congress lacked leadership; it had no coherent party
structure; its committees held themselves responsible to nothing
beyond the informal and regional affiliations of their constituent
n-embers; and the body as a whole could neither bring itself nor force
itself to act. And what did we have then? Government by separate and
rival interests; government without the possibility of compromise;
government in which subjective independence was valued more highly
than government itself. Young's description of the inability of
Congress to respond to the deepening crisis brought on by the Mar of
1812 stands as a graphic illustration of the consequences which can
follow from a kind of naive self-indulgence in internal democracy; a
week after the British had sacked the Alexandria waterfront. Congress,
unable to agree about even the most fundamental policies for the
defense of Washington, decided to go home.^^
How does Young explain the problem of Congressional inactivity
then? How does he evaluate the consequences of the struggles of the
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early membership to maintain a government of separate and rival
tioned. First, the members of the early Congresses placed a much
higher value on their notions of "equality" than they did upon
leadership, guidance or discipline. Individually, they abhorred and
distrusted power; collectively, they acted to check any move by any of
their membership to raise himself to a superordinate position.
Second, instead of identifying with the institution of Congress and
with its responsibilities as an organ of government, the members
stayed attuned to their constituencies, embodying in microcosm the
disparate forces of the larger society which had sent them to
Washington. Instead of seeing themselves as "governors" or agents of
government, they persisted in seeing themselves as "outsiders," even
while occupying seats of power. Young sums up:
It can scarcely be accident that a community whose members
deJfrnpnr^n^?'
Immorality in power was also a community
^hl^h f • "-^^f
behaviors and the informal institutions by
which (majority) power is acquired. What, indeed, was the
iVlZ^ to develop any system for getting majority agreementIt not another expression of the governmental community's
aversion to the sorts of behavior that mark a man for a poli-tician and^a seeker after power? What, after all, but thelegislator s antipower values created in them that compulsion
to play the constituency advocate--the outsider in power--and
to avoid the behavior of rulers? The psychology of the gover-
nors themselves would seem to explain better than any other
single factor their deficiencies in the statecraft that is
necessary to make a truly representative institution into an
effective governing institution. 3/
To the extent that this aversion to power is an expression of
the desire for and belief in "equality," note that this not the notion




equals and are ruled 1„ turn), and that it «ould probably have
.ade
very lUtle sense to the andents. Note also that it did not last-
not in the social order, and not in the political order. The sub-
sequent history Of congress can be read as a succession of attempts t<
institutionalize inequality within the cha.nber in order that it ,„ight
act and carry out its public business. What characterized citizen
equality for the ancients, as we have seen, was participation in the
dally affairs of the state or the plausible expectation that one not
so engaged at the present «n,ent might yet be at a future time. This
-ade the affairs of the polls co^on and shared, and political action
a necessary dimension of a fully human life. By grounding their con-
ception of citizen equality in individualism rather than in par-
ticipation, the Americans succeeded not only in giving power a bad
name, but also in driving a wedge between the state and society which
they have yet to remove. It is important to contrast this ethos of
frontier anarchy with the freedoms enjoyed by individual citizens in
the classical tradition, for the Americans distrusted government and
often cared little for its success or well-being. All too often the
early members saw their primary responsibilities in terms of pro-
tecting themselves and their constituencies from the predations of
government and their own terms of service there as an unwelcome chore
to be got over as soon as possible. Enjoying power in one sense, they
literally did not share it among themselves, and therefore rendered it
impossible to use for either good or ill.
Young's distinction between representing and governing is
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'^npo^tant and fundamental to ou. analysis, u „n, necessan..
.ave
i-nponant consequences for an. theory of a puMic space, and for the
h-story Of that concept as it has evolved in the y. s ,f the
Americans did not value participation as «h as they did equality
and desired to see themselves living in isolation, free of government
and away fro. government, then the primary duty of any self-respecting
representative must have been at that time to diminish the prerogati-
ves of government and hold it at bay while a suspicious citizenry
1-ked in the distance. And this more or less accurately charac-
terizes Young's account of the attitudes most ^nericans had toward the
unsung little group in Washington until the time of the election of
Jackson in 1828.
As Gordon Wood has pointed out at length, this represented a
radical departure from the Whig theories which had sparked debates
throughout the colonies a mere twenty-five years before the first
Congress gathered. For the government to protect its citizenry from
tyrants is one thing; for it to express their views and interests in
the construction of positive policies is another; for it to be
expected to draw away into itself and leave them alone is something
else entirely, and while it is my contention that this deep-seated
attitude has gone unsung for too long by political scientists and
historians alike, it can hardly serve as the basis for evaluating the
historical failures and accomplishments of the Congress.
Suppose, then, that the representatives served their consti-
tuencies well by refusing to cooperate with one another? There was,
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nonetheless pressing business to attend to. bills to draft, an econ.,
to strengthen, taxes to gather and war debts to pay. At what point 1s
n necessary for the representative to abandon specialized consti-
tuency interests and devise compromises with his colleagues so that
the co«on or general interest
.night emerge with respect to the actual
products of legislative action? At what point is It necessary for par-
ticular interests to maintain a strong presence in the representative
body so that no important part of the represented constituency is
Ignored when decisions are taken which affect the whole? The first
question is posed from the standpoint of one who looks down on the
body politic and realizes that the requisites of governing are not
always identical with those of "actually" representing. This is the
view that Young takes. The second question is posed from the stand-
point of one who looks u£. distrustingly perhaps, and seeks to limit
the power of government and of individual governors alike. This is
the view apparently taken by many of the members of the early
Congress. The first view is that held by those who believe in
theories of virtual representation; the second accords with the theory
of actual representation. The first view is that taken by those who
hold that the common Interest will be best served by a government
which is able to act; the second view is taken by those who stress
that government is or ought to be an instrument of the popular will,
and who tend to favor discouraging government action. In theory, the
two views stand in a relation of parataxis. In practice, such dilem-
mas are always resolved, and were in this case when the second view
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emerged as dominant and the Congress al.ost lUera,
.an out the bacK
door Of the Capitol building while the British ca™e In the front.
The practical d11e™a which Congress always faces as it orga
mzes Itself to do business can be expressed as the need to maintain a
balance between the requirements of actual representation, and the
proble. Of resolving its internal differences and establishing mecha-
nisms for attaining consensus in order to use its powers. We shall
see that whenever sectional or class differences have prevented
«jor1t1es from forcing about or acting upon general questions, or
whenever the formal mechanisms for achieving consensus have broken
down. Congress has been unable to maintain its power as an
institution-even in those areas where its Constitutional respon-
Sibil ities are clear.
It follows from these considerations that the problem of
representation is now cast in a very ambiguous light indeed: clearly,
this concept is central both to theories of republican government and
to the particular array of powers which the Constitution has conferred
upon the Congress, If the Congress does not provide a forum for the
articulation and clash of a diversity of interests in a public space,
what reason could we as citizens possibly have for valuing such an
institution? At the same time, we have tried to show that there are
both logical and political limits to what can be demanded or expected
of the representative function: such limits are reached via either the
route of legislative detail or that of the consensus problem. If the
Constitution was deficient in having failed to stipulate an internal
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structure for the Conarp<;<; th^f k^^i^ongress, that body nonetheless found itself having
to invent such a structure on an a.d hoc hasis if it was to c.rry outUS mandated duties as an organ of the new government. Thus we find
that the ,ne„,ber of Congress has a dual responsibility: first to
represent his constituency; second, to uphold the institution of which
He is a ,ne.ber. His ability to carry out the first absolutely depends
upon his willingness to carry out the second. This duality ,s forced
upon the ,„e™ber by virtue of the practical necessities of government,
but it can be seen to undercut the radical Whig doctrines and the
American ideals of "actual" representation which we saw so animated
the revolutionary impulses reviewed in the last chapter.
We thus find ourselves forced to turn away fr« the problem of
actual representation and take up the series of Congressional efforts
to institutionalize procedures for the regular attainment of consensus
which have preoccupied it intermittently right up to the present day.
But this shift from representing to governing will not free us fro,n
paradox: if „e are to take the problem of positive action as the con-
text of Congressional self-government, we run smack up against the
usual gamut of problems that attend the conduct of groups which ,„ake
decisions on other than strictly democratic lines. Not only shall we
find Congressional majorities and minorities, we will encounter big
men and little men, reform movements which are restrained and reform
movements which are successful; leadership coalitions that manage the
chamber with an iron hand and others which fail to muster the
discipline necessary to enact programs. We may even find
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congressional ana.c... Beh.n. al, sue. poss15,e an. actua, ™anou..s
and discussions
.ay be found the Individual
.e™be. of the Congr.s
now seen In the guise of participating citizen rathe, than represen-
tative, instead of the d11e™a of governing vs. representing «e
face that of the one and the
.any: can Congress solve the proble. of
positive action only at the Pxnpnca • ^
'y n e pe se of internal democracy? To state
the sa.e difficult. In different te^s. Is consensus something that Is
possible only through the efforts of strong leaders, or can It folio,
the .ore or less smooth workings of a properly constructed
organization? A theorist like John Rawls
.Ight ask whether, in the
absence of personal authority, rules could be conceived according to
which such a syste. might be Induced to work. We will here try to
reach toward a historical rather than theoretical answer to such
questions, as we have fro. the outset. What have men actually done In
real situations when they came upon one another to decide c«plex mat-
ters, found that they disagreed, and that they st1l, had to decide?
How has Congress organized itself in order to c«e up with positive
proposals and actually carried them out?
Institutionalization in the Federalist Period-
A House Divided '
Nelson Polsby drew attention to the "institutionalization" of
Congress, as an analytic category, nearly fifteen years ago.^' For
Polsby, the House is not and never really was the mass meeting which
the founders probably imagined that it would be.''° Instead, his
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account draws upon that of Young, Galloway, Harlow and others to
upon Its inceptlon.^1 Por Polshy. the division was entailed by the
rap,dly expanding real, of responsibilities of the national govern-
ment. Starting with a government without duties and a Congress
Without established practices. Internal institutions or foUways he
posits something very lUe Hume's causal connexion in the following
hypothesis:
no;"™:" f c'tediy^ ?[ff;„rs:^'°a;
c1es Of the national gov^r^ntln^mu'tfo'naffzel:^^''^^
Shifting from the general to the specific, he continues:
dn*''lhf "^'^ 5°'"^ amount of work to
^i.^^"n!;^:lg^v::^p-L^;^^o^^d^^i?o^rLlnsT^r
Institutionalization seems to be a complex process ultimately
linked to the work load, in which the mechanisms through which a group
organizes itself for the conduct of affairs proliferate in number and
increase in refinement. For Polsby. it follows growth in the number
of people involved, or greater complexity-he says "density"-in their
common affairs. As a response to responsibilities entailed by exter-
nal events, we note that institutionalization is a way of making it
easier for Congress to reach consensus by formalizing and subdividing
the processes through which it is reached. A crucial difference bet-
ween the approaches of Young and Polsby is that Young focuses on poli-
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tical dynamics, and Polsbv sees the o„noy n entire phenomenon with reference
to problems of organization.''*
According to PCs.y, institutionalization has several deter-
".mate Characteristics. Pirst. an institutionalized organization is
relatively differentiated fro. its environment, its members are easily
identifiable, it is difficult to become a member and the leadership is
recruited from within the organization. Second, the internal organi-
zation is c«plex, i. e.
.
the functions of the whole are separated on
some regular and explicit basis and its parts are not wholly
interchangeable. There is a division of labor, roles are specified
patterns of recruitnent to roles are regularized, and expectations
about the performance of roles are widely shared. Third, the organi-
zation tends to use automatic rather than discretionary methods for
conducting its internal business." The balance of his article is an
effort to support these generalizations with reference to the history
of the House.
On the level of this history, he indicates that the growth of
complexity in the House can be shown in three ways:
in the growth in the autonomy and importance of committeesin the growth of specialized agencies of party leadSand in the general increase in the provision of various
emouluments and auxiliary aids to members in the fom of
sLfM6^'"'
salaries, allowances, staff aid and committee
But what "set off" the process of institutionalization in
Congress in the first place? Was there a prompting impulse or spark to
this development, or can all be laid at the feet of legislative
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co.np1exn. and Increasing
„.*e.s as we have «1„ta1ned so Ur^P0U.ys account U Cea. enough, though the process he
.esC.es U
not s1.p,e. the Institution of the standing c.n.lttee
.egan to
ta^e ho,d-..the c^^ttee syste^'.-othe. developments exerted sl.lUr
pressure on Congress to coalesce via the
-part, s.ste. Alexander
Hamilton too. control of the administration of George Washington and
extended his Influence toward
.en of 11,e mind In Congress.
,n the
f.rst two congresses. Hamilton Is said to have used the Federalist
caucus to guide debate In the Committee of the Whole.« Thus we see
emerging 1„ nascent form, as early as 1790. one of the ™st fundamen-
tal problems to plague Congress throughout Its history: Its tendency
to seek cohesion of both conduct and policy by abrogating Its preroga-
tives to agents and agencies of the executive branch. Here we see
that the gap between the legislature and the executive, created by the
constitutional system of separated powers
Mzatt^L^^rth^^^?^s?^?::;-:rei:"^^?::i\ro^"^^-
grI:t'"ori:rrf '''7 wL'fpeTrl^d n
"J^ e whe?I
InTfZ .V'' ^' of government were evolved through the g^ve
become In ffeTff'''''
discussion. Congress as such ado i e ect a mere ratifying body. The real work
el^e 1::s1o"r„?"V'" le isulur 'b ins cr t sessi n of the majority party. In this oraanlT^^n^n
unknown to the Constitution a^d beyond the ch o he 2 lesof either chamber, the executive could work wUh ?he partyfollowing in Congress, and secure the adoption of
7
prearranged program. " [Harlow, 1917:145.] Thus oartv tartics, already familiar in state legislatures made an eartvappearance in Congress. They attained thefr'peak o oe flc-
Re°ed :nd"c"rnnL%'^'"
'^'^'^ °f ^P-^'-
Party tactics, of course, are interbranch tactics and cut
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across the l.nes of Institutional distinction drawn by the
constitution, u „e ta.e the view that a diversity of Interests
e-ts1n the U.S.. „e can ^ard,y
.e surprised by the appearance of
different parties to espouse such different Interests. At the sa.e
time, however, the Constitutional deslqn for th. ^ . .a ig t the conduct of govern,nent
's predicated on the division of governmental an»„. .au gency and Us sortition
or assignment to different branches. Party necessitv „„hi-a t y undennines this
design precisely to the extent th^t ft-MS a it requires interbranch coor-
dination for the enactment of policy. The danger, of course, is that
insofar as Congress may be bumptious and unruly, it could be easier .0
control events from the White House and impose Congressional
discipline from without. Under such conditions. Congress becnes the
cart, and the executive branch the horse. The reins of power will be
held by the President and the party leadership-a preferable alter-
native, for some, to seeing them fall Into the well of the chambers of
the assembled, to be trampled in a legislative melee, or simply
shunned.
According to Polsby, Hamilton's use of the Federalist party
caucus to guide debate in the Committee of the Whole led to sharp
clashes between his followers and those of Jefferson who Pelt that the
House was being stripped of its constitutional authority over finance.
When Jefferson's Republicans finally gained the upper hand in the
Third Congress in 1792, they restored detailed power over finances to
the Committee of the whole. "This," Polsby tells us, "did not work






.ve . ,,^0.. to
Co«Utee Of t.eH.ole not „o..,. PUc.e.
.es' observations pro-
vide evidence sufficient fo.
.Lectin, suspicions.
, thin. «e can
infer that the formation of a standing c^.lttee on finance reflected
a co,„.1t.ent to the Idea of at least starting with procedural
agreement In the face of regional and political diversity and conflict
wUhln the bod. coupled «1th external pressures fr» the other branch
indeed. It see^s that the appointment of this and other c»«1ttees can
be seen as partially successful strategies Congress to defend Its
territory fro,n executive encroachment and to maintain the institu-
tional integrity which was threatened by the derivative sort of power
provided through interbranch party organizations. Polsby Includes a
quotation from Harlow which bears directly upon Republican theories of
the proper role of the Congress which I here reproduce in full:
''Says'and'MeIn; ' '
'''"'^"^ committees, particularly
Reoublir^n fhi^ ^ ^ ^ manifestation of thep ca theory of government. From their point of view
t e' Ztel? :L^%Tr:.'' '''''' repres'enJattr:?'yi vot rs, ought to be the mainsprinq of the wholP cvctomHitherto the Federalists had sold the'ir bfrthr g t brper:muting the executive to take a more active part In thegovernment than was warranted by the Constitution TheRepublicans now planned to bring about the proper'balance
scooe ofM':"""^' ^--Mlening at on e he
exeTnfle it'^""'*!r\°*^ ' ""^ --estricting thecutiv . It was the better to enable the House to take its
out""t '''' °' o--9anizat1on was worked
Zh,. f\t "^^^"^ departments were looked upon asagents of the executive, so the committees would be con-
sidered as the agents of the House. 52
Note that each party, in its own way, had turned to the execu-
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tlve branch for guidance: the Federalists by wording «1th Hamilton-
the Republicans by at first attempting to ,ni™ic. so.ne of the charac-
teristics Of executive branch organization, and ultimately by allowing
President Jefferson to exert al.ost total Influence over the appoint-
ments of committee chairmen."
^^^^ ^^^^.^^^
stages of the development of Congress,
"coordination" between the
legislature and the executive was obtained at the behest of the
executive; that the earliest precedents show Congress beginning to
occupy the role of "patient" with respect to executive agency; that a
semblance of Congressional control over policy was obtained by sub-
dividing the tasks of the chamber; and. finally, that the allocation
of positions of authority was subject to both party and factional
-not
to mention executive-influence. These factors add up to
"institutionalization." that is, the primitive mass meeting proved
unequal to its legislative and political tasks and the internal orga-
nization of Congress became increasingly complex as a result. For the
somewhat Innocent republican, the political consequences were
enormous
... the effective decisions on legislative issues were
reached behind the scenes in closed caucuses of the majority
party. As Federal i st Josiah Quincy lamented in 1809, the
House acts and reasons and votes, and perforns all the
operations of an animated being, and yet, judging from my own
perceptions, I cannot refrain from concluding that all' great
political questions are settled somewhere else than on this
f 1 oor
It seems that the gradual emergence of such House institutions




variety of responses to a vanet. of p.oble.s. The cn.utees
apparent,, were essenttal to consonsus-.un and the p.o.le. of
the cha*e. with respect to legisUtlon;^^ the caucus and floor ,eade
seen to have risen pr1,„ar11y 1„ response to requirements of the e.er
C'se of institutional power and as a direct resuU of executive branch
willingness to Impose Its programs and views on a d,sorgan1zed and
unwilling assembly.
At this point, the ta,e begins to grow murky. Quoting fr«
Henry Adams. Young notes that "The whole structure of Mr. Jefferson's
administration toppled over and broke to pieces in its last days.»
Mddison, in his turn, inherited a wreckage comprised of
... as Secretary Gallatin advised the new Presi^dent'57
Under these circumstances, the President could acconplish
IHtle, and the entire government sank into lassitude and inactivity
as the pendulum of power swung rapidly from the President to the
Congress. Beginning in 1811, this shift was strengthened and con-
firmed as another House institution emerged which was sufficiently
powerful in its own right not only to command the internal affairs of
that body, but to eclipse the Presidency itself. This newly-emerging
Institution was the speakership. With the aid of the War Hawks,
Speaker Henry Clay expanded his powers from those of a mere presiding
officer to become an active party leader.
Clay for the first time used the speaker's prerogative of
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doubt that Clarwo 'for'the Speakershira'n "° '''''' ^independence as a power ^.s^^Zr^^^^^^.^^
Clays election to this post, and repeated re-election to it, ".arked
a profound change in its character and in the effective leadership of
govern.ent,5^ With this, the nation embarked on a period of
Congressional supremacy over the executive, which lasted until the
elevation of Jackson in 1829. While the emergence of the speakership
was a crucial part of this shift in the balance of power, we have
already seen that an impotent Presidency did not entail a strong and
institutionally viable Congress. Indeed, Congressional failure to
deal adequately with the crisis of 1812 was perhaps the outstanding
incident in what can be seen as a long period of dilatory inactivity
on the part of Congress. Since Clay's power depended upon his making
every committee representative of the general body, and since the
general body was riven and paralyzed by faction, the consequences of
Congressional supremacy in government did not equal the Constitutional
image. A government dominated by the Congress was also rudderless,
for the faction-dominated Congress excelled at opposition, but failed
utterly at construction. With this, the other side of a great
historical pattern seems to have been set: when the Presidency is
strong. Congress is Jed; when Congress predominates, government
accomplishes little that is positive. Is this, philosophically
speaking, necessary?
Here, analytical distinctions and chronological accounts begin
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to .ec«e ,une H U t.e
.at Congress institutional Ued
and that Us e,ne.,1ng institutions too. on lives and powe.s of
o™
.efo.e the,
.a. .een ,on, in Place. U is also t.e t.at part,
--nutions. i.e., the
.,00. leade. an. the caucus, see™ to h:;:;een
bound up With the executive
..anch and its needs at the «ent of
their inception. The co«ittees, however, and the Speakership itself
ca.e into being as ™,uch to oppose the Presidency as to assert
seething positive with reference to the electorate. Indeed, even the
institutions of the party syste™ changed roles in relation to the exe-
cutive once the balance between the two branches had shifted.
Galloway sums up:
The great question which one would like to have answered, and
for which there appears to be no clear answer, is whether the institu-
tionalization of the Congress both enhanced its independence and
enabled it to function niore effectively. Even the briefest glance at
the rest of the nineteenth century affords us no help. Mr. Jackson
(1829-1837) was effectively able to dominate the Congress through his
use of the appointment power and the veto--despi te the lessons
were
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congress had learned 1n standing up for Uself tn the t.ent.
.ears
previous to his election.^! The period 1837-18S0 showed freguent
fluctuations In power as the relative strength and weakness of the
various Presidents changed, and as the assembled representatives
.
or were not able to co.pro.1se on the overriding Issue of slavery
During the Civil War period Itself. Lincoln, of course. do,.1nated
everything Including a Congress effectively comprised of a single
party of Republicans radically opposed to hi.. The Reconstruction
period, in its turn, is as famous for the domination of the government
by congress as it Is for any of the specific policies then undertaken.
At this point, the Radical Republicans used the institutional forces
Of the assembly to assert their doctrine of legislative supremacy in
the Wade-Davis Manifesto:
t^l;.%'th^'i^^ °!
Congress is paramount and must be respected-hat the whole body of Union men in Congress will not submit'
ut on^r^f'1 '''' President] ^f rash and c nst-t i nal legislation; and if he wishes our support he mustconfine himself to his executive duties-to obey and t^ exe
rTeuL'\T^ ''1'"'' arms armedebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress. 62
This manifesto rapidly changed from a statement of intention to a sta-
tement of fact when Andrew Johnson succeeded Lincoln and shortly
thereafter was impeached for failing to heed the Tenure of Office Act.
Congressional power during this period, however, was not asserted so
much by the institution as it was by the Republican Party within it,
and was focused in particular by
... the shrewd management of Thaddeus Stevens of
Pennsylvania, leader of the Republicans in the House of
Representatives and for two years the virtual ruler of the
United States. 63
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According to Galloway, Congressional s.pre.nacy was to continue
without a break through a succession of weak Presidents who were
either unable to assert the.nselves, or perfectly contented to follow
the lead of Congress.^^ The period was characterized by strong
Republican leadership in the Congress and a gradual but continuous
strengthening of control over legislation by the various standing can-
mittees. Although it is difficult to determine precisely from the
record, I think it not unreasonable to infer that this next stage in
the development of internal House institutions was related to its
simultaneous external dominance over the executive branch: a superor-
dinate Congress presented vastly enriched opportunities for public
notoreity compared with a subordinate one, and as the nineteenth cen-
tury wore on, the individual members gradually began to lengthen their
stays, and House career patterns began to change.
By 1899 ... the proportion of newcomers among the 357 mem-bers entering the House had fallen to 30 per cent while the
mean period of service had increased to more than'three
terms. As more members sought to stay in the House forlonger periods, it became of increasing importance to them
that they have the opportunity to gain political recognition
through specialization and rising influence within the co<n-
mittee structure. There was thus a growing demand among mem-bers of both parties for assurance that their seniority wouldbe respected in assigning them rank on committees of their
choice. The resulting new expectations contributed to the
reaction against centralization that began under Speaker
Cannon. 03
From the days of Thaddeus Stevens to the revolt against
Speaker Cannon in 1910--of which we will hear more below--the power of
the speaker to appoint committee chairs had been gradually subjected
to increasing pressure by the chairiien on behalf of the seniority
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system.
As more and more meinbers made careers nnt
service, their committee membershiD. .nH i /'"f '''^"^"^^
opened routes of advancement with nrnn ^^^^^^^^^P Posts
regularize these intern l^^Ve ,' ,^^ to
rule" became virtually inviolable!66 ' ^^"^^rity
This development, which consumed a period of decades, finally
brought into being one of the major characteristics of the contem-
porary House Of Representatives, and institutionalized forces for
decentralization of power within the chamber which cut across the pre-
viously existing lines of political conflict and tension. We have
seen that geographical and social factions within the Congress were
capable of paralyzing it; we have seen that party discipline and the
Speakership were capable of uniting it to successfully oppose, and
sometimes even to dominate, the executive branch; we have seen that
this same party apparatus could be effectively turned to suit execu-
tive branch purposes at some times but not at others. Now we find an
entirely new basis for centrifugal forces within the chamber: the
self-interest of the individual member and his pursuit of his own
career. This element was to grow in power and influence until it was
successfully able to assert its decentralizing claims against the
office of the Speaker in 1910. It was to provide precedents for later
House revolts against centralized power and authority as the twentieth
century wore on. Occasionally, it was to provide arenas for the legi-
timate airing of public grievances which otherwise would have gone
unnoticed, and as such, contributed to the preservation of the insti-
tutional strength of the legislature. But these developments, as well
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as the forces they unleashed and expressed, were highly uneven 1n
their influences and subject to seasonal changes and cycles of
influence and power. We will take up those cycles in their turn but
before doing so, I think it important to turn to the work of Woodrow
Wilson, who observed Congress during the late-nineteenth century
period of its dominance over the Presidency and in the midst of the
rise to power of the committee chairmen.
In turning to Wilson, we leap a considerable historical
distance from the practices of the Federalist period, to the begin-
nings of contemporary American political science. Wilson is important
because he is the first "modern" political scientist to give us a pic-
ture of a fully institutionalized House. At the same time, however,
he carries forward into the twentieth century some of the political
values of the eighteenth. The generation of Wilson
-which can be
seen to have included Neitzsche, Weber and Henry Adams--faced life at
a crucial historical moment when the foundations of our modern
parliamentary democracy were being laid in an age of high capitalism.
This generation of scholars and intellectuals held a vantage point
unavailable to its successors: raised by citizens of a relatively
simple society, they stood witness to the sudden overturning of an old
world, conceived and built on a human scale, by a new one as tech-
nically and powerfully superior to it as the dynamo was to the horse
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and stea.-engi„e U replaced. But. as Henry Ada™s pointed cut. there
«as also a shadow here: the power was all on the technical side in
the instrumentalities of hu.an creation and not in the
.en themselves.
Hence the emerging world, infinitely more complex than what it sur-
passed, presented the humanist sensibility of this generation with a
dilemma: to put the problem in American terms, was it possible to pre-
serve the spirit of the old Republic in the new containers of tech-
nical proficiency and institutional complexity that were entailed by
the emerging new order? Could the values of public participation and
self-government be preserved in an environment of high technology,
world empire and corporate power? Could men retain control over their
collective destinies and remain men, as history-going clear back to
the time of Pericles-told them they had to be? Or would we strike the
usual Faustian bargain with our organizational machinery, and exchange
our political liberties for the technical mastery of human events made
possible by the technical mastery of nature? Wilson's generation bore
witness to the initial phases of the reconstruction of our institu-
tions of self-government on technical lines.
None of these factors, of course, can be found anywhere in the
manifest content of Wilson's Congressional Government
, but I take them
to be among the set of general background conditions that made up the
historical moment in which the book was written. Without the benefit
of this or a similar set of assumptions, how can we account for what
we find in 'Wilson: the richness of the language, the concern with mat-
ters of debate and civility; his analysis of the structural deficien-
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cies and lapses from Constitutional prescription evident in the
Congressional practices of his day; his careful and passionate rehear-
sal of republican values. The brevity of the book enables it to stand
as a pithy presentation of the fundamental problems which confronted
the modern Congress at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nearly
every student of that body begins here.^^
However, for the serious student of modern government,
Wilson's book has many of the characteristics of a primer: it presents
an overall description of the customs, mores and institutional poten-
tialities and liabilities of the Congress. It is neither painsta-
kingly researched nor copiously annotated; the narrative voice
constantly assumes the tones of instruction rather than of discussion,
and it is clearly written to the general, rather than to the academic
or specialized audience. In it, the serious student will find
expressed the values, but not the theory of representative government.
The value of Wilson's arguments for us is that they
demonstrate that what many commentators have taken to be fundamental
changes within the institution of Congress are really fluctuations
endemic to its institutional being--i.e., necessary consequences of
imbalances in power which are entailed by the design of the
Constitution. On this reading, then, such fluctuations are essential
to the basic nature of Congress. For us this means that the ebbs and
flows in Congressional fortunes, first with respect to the distribu-
tion of power among the various institutions within the body, and
second in the balance of power between Congress and the rest of the
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government Itself, are perhaps better measured the generation or
even by the half-century than they are by the recurring
"realignments"
and reforms which
.ore frequently disturb both the institution and its
stu dents.
For Wilson, the primary fact about the U.S. government of
his day was to be found in the depotism of the Congress over the rest:
. . .
to adopt Mr. Bagehot's description of Parliament
or*i;.. iHif ' ' b^'g "leeting orLreess Idle people. In proportion as you give it power U
e y h?nr' In'^anTrd'f^'^h ""^-^ -^ryt^in ,^m'edX i
'
ver tmng. an ordinary despotism the powers of thedespot are limited by his bodily capaci ty
, ^nd by the cal 1 sof pleasure; he is but one man; there are but twelve hour in
oln Z du I'h ^'^ 'I'''''' ^ '^^'^y more ^h n m
"
part in ll business: he keeps the rest for the court orthe harem, or for society. " But Congress "is a despo^whohas unlimited time-who has unlimited vanity-who has orbelieves he has, unlimited comprehension-whose plea ure isin action, whose life is work. "69
[j't^a^ur
This despotism is a consequence of the ascendency which the
central government established over the states as a consequence of the
civil war; an ascendency now compounded by a distinct movement in
favor of national control of all policy requiring uniformity of treat-
ment and power of administration.^^ Given these developments, and a
liberal interpretation of the implied powers clause, Congress has
become capable of confering on the federal government powers of almost
any extent. The next move in his analysis is crucial: Congress early
divided itself into standing committees and conferred upon them
comprehensive and thorough-going privileges of legislative initiative
73
and control. As a result of this, we now have government by
standing committees of Congress.''^ The leaders of the House, there-
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fore, are the chairmen of its principle standing co„,„ittees.»
curately be calirt ,„
'"^i^- fi3"'-atively, but not inac-
t1ons. Time would fa?f
't to "scusslrlPnTT^^
ioubt^^ w\i^h:r^LeTn°;i H "^r^ ^
Of debate anTa^end^ n 'wo'
•to'li^^'ir'^^jr?""the wheat in the busheU Miil 1 , ' <^*'^ff fi'O"'
clerk's desk. Accord gly°' no t l^at^efnt'l'^' T"
anything of the Unrt t^;
""/'^'"e t mp is made to do
Thus Wilson finally sets the stage for a number of substantive
criticisms of Congress. Wilson does not say that the organization of
Congress into committees was a consequence of its inability to create
majorities within the general body. He simply lets it go that this
form of organization was adopted for purposes of ef ficiency
. What
he does say, however, is that this fon. of organization constitutes a
structure of power which prevents cooperation^^ and places the great
power to formulate legislation in the hands of small groups. This
has the crucial consequence of making general debate before the
assembled body impossible.
The practices of debate which prevail in its legislative
assembly are manifestly of the utmost importance to a self-governing people; for that legislation which is not
thoroughly discussed by the legislating body is practicallydone in a corner. °^
At this point, of course, it is difficult not to recall the
complaints Josiah Quincy penned in 1809. For Wilson, once under the
sway of the committees, freedom of debate finds "no place of
allowance," for the House must consider the reports of 47 committees.
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The order of business 1s fixed; each member must content h1,„self with
"such cru*s of time as fall fro,,, the tables of the four c^nlttees of
highest prerogative. "^^
What emerges as one of Wilson's central themes is an
overwhelming preoccupation with the problem of what constitutes a true
public debate, and with the consequences that such a peculiar fon. of
discourse has or can have for the political order.^^ ^ ^^.^^ ^^^^
could sum up Wilson's study without doing violence to either his posi-
tions or his intentions by saying that he affords us a charac-
terization of Congress as a public body without a public space.^^ For
Wilson, the essential purpose of an assembly is to enable a "mass
meeting" of representatives to superintend administration and get good
84laws made. Such a meeting, of course, must be conducted in full
public view, and the quality of the debates among the membership will
determine the quality of the decisions they make. Since, however,
"the committees meet in private, "^^ the kind of debate essential to
the making of good laws does not exist, and Congress, despite its
domination of the rest of government, is incapable of carrying out the
purposes for which it was instituted.
Wilson's critique is interesting because we can use it to show
that the term "public" is commonly used in two senses. First, in
relation to the nature of the debates inside the Congress, he indica-
tes that "public" applies to those discussions conducted in the pre-
sence of the general body. This is contrasted with what goes on in
the dark corners of committee rooms. Second, and equally important,
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Wilson's notion of "public" concerns that bod, of educated
.ass opi-
nion in the na™e of which Congress conducts Us business, and in the
eyes of which its
.ove.ents and deliberations
.ust be visible For
purposes of expedience of expression, „e will call the first sense of
"public"
"Publlci" and the second sense, "Public^."
"Public," speech
here is something that takes place in Publici spaces in order to
determine the courses of action that the body in question will under-
take or rec.n.end.
"Public^" law or policy 1s what Issues fr« the
deliberations of "Publici" bodies: it Involves the general order and
indicates both the alert constituency which follows the debates of the
legislature fro. a distance, and all of those citizens upon who. such
legislative prescriptions will fall with equal weight. In the first
place, then, Publici speech «st take place before the entire body
assembled; further, it must reach the ears of the general Public2.
Publici ultimately arises out of the deliberative function of a
more-or-less-democratlcally-constituted-assembly; Publicj concerns
those in whose name that body acts, and could not exist without a
"representative" form of government. Should either Publici
Public2 be severely circumscribed in Its political functions, dire
consequences shall eventually appear first in the content of legisla-
tion and later throughout the country. Though falling to explicitly
distinguish between the two senses of "public," Wilson nonetheless
finds that the partition of Congressional act1v1t1es--the loss of
Publici-serlously undermines Its responsibility to make its pro-
ceedings and conclusions clear to its constituency, that is, Publicj.
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publishing. They are , ?u , account worth
pleaders, the argun,e t o? a ocates'
none of the searching crit?rl? ni' - ^l^- ^^"""^ them
the higher order of l;,rulll l ' ^''"""""'"9 character of
between antagonistic interest? not ; ? Represent a joust
Responsible for the fonnation of national policy, Wilson's
congress not only fails to fulfill its didactic purpose (about which
the Constitution is silent, however) but has also so structured itself
that low interests are served at the expense of high principles. One
alleged consequence of this sheds light on Wilson's conceptions of
what constitutes a truly "national" policy, and concerns the gen, of a
theory of what he considers the proper extent of the legitimate range
Of governmental activity. Wilson excoriates our representatives for
• • • establishinent of the very questionable precedent ofexpending in favored localities monies raised by ?axation
which bears with equal incidence upon the people of al ec-tions of the country. 87
Wilson's objection to such practices may strike the liberal
student of contemporary government as somewhat bizarre, for it con-
tains a theory of the common interest which is not linked to notions
of distributive justice. Whats at stake here is whether, and under
what conditions, benefits locally disbursed can be said to be in the
"common" or national interest at all. If grants of this character can
fairly be considered as made for the common benefit of all the states,
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1t can only .e because all the states are interested in the welfare of
each; or it must be the case that certain local expenditures will
redound to the benefit of everyone, as was widely assumed with the
canal building projects of the early nineteenth century, and has been
recently assumed with respect to the dredging of the harbor at Hampton
Roads. Virginia, which will enhance the nation's coal
-exporting capa-
city and improve its balance of payments. The problem, however, is
that carried to political extremes, such practices may destroy all
distinction between local and national matters of concern. At the
time of writing Congressional Government , it seems that Wilson cared
less for the increasing economic interdependence of the various sta-
tes, and the need that this entailed for federal projects beyond the
means of any particular state, than he did for notions of a national
government limited in scope, and a polity not dominated by any par-
ticular set of interests which could control any single branch of the
government.
Thus, the redistribution of goods from the whole to selected
localities did not comprise national policy for Wilson. National
policy, we must infer, included only those things which concerned the
nation as a whole; tax monies unequally disbursed may have struck him
as a form of corruption which the entire body of legislators in
Congress assembled ought to have been able to resist. Of course, such
notions no longer comprise the prevailing liberal theory of government
according to which such payments and projects are not only desirable
but necessary. However he could have spelled it out, Wilson's body of
e coffle
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assumptions about the proper relation between the state and society
between the whole and Its constituent parts. Is profoundly different
fro,n that which characterizes ™st of professional political science
and congressional liberals and conservatives alike. What we hav
to take for granted-and earlier generations did not-is the assump-
tion that one of the primary duties of government is to distribute
goods and services, and this is coupled with the wry, if not eager,
congressional acceptance of the obvious necessity that such goods will
be dispensed unevenly and local ly.^^
^^^^
problem is "the struggle to maintain representative incumbency."
What makes the raising of this issue particularly difficult is
that regardless of what their respective evaluations of Congressional
performance may be, contemporary students almost without exception
indicate that the one thing Congress rarely botches up is getting the
goods to the special Interests. But nonetheless, this is a fundamen-
tal question, and for students of U.S. government in the latter part
of the twentieth century, it may well be the central question. It
contains an issue not often confronted within the republican political
tradition Itself, and that issue is hidden in the faith that a
"common" Interest will somehow emerge once the diversity of particular
interests has been transsubstantiated by their clash in the public
space. Wilson would have the representatives somehow leave their par-
ticular Interests behind and argue from principle to the defense of
the national Interest. Aside from being a doctrine of virtual repre-
sentation, this approach begs two political questions. First,
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according to the Constitution, individuals are not that which Is
represented In the Congress, nor Is that
.ystlcal entlt.
.no«„ as the
American people. " Local districts are represented there. The second
question going begging Is the consensus question which
.ust be settled
for both the Publlci of the Congress and the Public^ of the nation-
how is It possible to build majorities among heterogeneous unlike
representatives and build a sense of national union sufficient to
sustain the government in power without the chicaneries of bargaining
compromise and tradeoffs among local and special Interests? To follow'
Wilson's prescription, the individual member of Congress not only
would have to abandon the articulated needs of his district-upon
which he depends for reel ection-but the Congress as a whole would
have to completely reassess what it could consider "justiciable"
issues, and perhaps restrict the scope of its activities to all and
only those areas of policy, such as defense or the post office, which
tangibly affect all citizens in Publicj in approximately the same
ways
.
Despite these reservations about Wilson, the thrust of my own
critique of Congress is that it has so evolved by now that it is vir-
tually incapable of addressing the broadest and most general kind of
questions, having been driven by headlong institutionalization to vir-
tuoso performances on matters of special interest; virtual paralysis
on the larger questions. Between Wilson's principled critique and
contemporary practice, of course, lies the abyss into which we shall
poke about for a bit, however cautiously, in an effort to find some
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Middle ground. The student of Congress notes, however, that Wilson
i-ust be given credit for having pointed the finger at the primary cir-
cumstance underlying the growing crisis in toerican political
institutions: if we use the Congress as a battleground in a war of
each against all, and its decisions to reflect the distribution of a
modicum of goods by all to each, the devil will take the "c^on
interest." There will be more about this when we reach our discussion
Of the spending and budget processes.
Twentieth Century Contests for Power
As the Congress crept forward into the twentieth century, the
power relations among its internal institutions began shifting.
First, the speakership took an immense leap in its ability to control
the chamber; then, buttressed by the seniority system, the committee
chairmen began to move against that officer; finally the hoi polloi
attempted intermittently to break ranks from either the hierarchy
imposed by the committees or that settled upon them by the parties or
both. Such efforts were episodic and met with mixed success. What we
see occurring in general during this period is a contest between local
district need and the discipline imposed on the membership by the
national parties. According to Morris Fiorina,
. . .
curbs on the arbitrary powers of the national party
leadership at the beginning of this century were a natural
outgrowth of the increasing professional ization of
congressmen. With more and more congressmen wishing to
retain their seats for long periods, iron party discipline
became intolerable. The individual congressman desired the
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tunny to take actlo'ns't'e^h f t et^ L?ec'uo„'%%?!:^r-The semonty system wa<; thp n;>+,,.,.V i^^ iecnon efforts.
budding c^relVolTr^llleT ow^^e". ard?";^^,^?^ f"""
We are at this point somewhere around the middle of that
period of Congressional dominance of the executive branch which lasted
from 1865 to 1898, a period characterized by widespread acceptance in
Washington of the doctrine of congressional supremacy. Again,
however, as we saw during the period which lasted from the end of
Jefferson's tenure in office to the beginning of Jackson's,
Congressional power did not translate into Congressional leadership.
In the first case, the paralysis has been traced to the obstructionist
tactics of the various House factions, and to Clay's successful
efforts to appease them. In this case. Congressional paralysis was
due to the obstructionist tactics of the chairmen of the various com-
mittees who, thanks to the effects of institutionalization, were able
to exercise pluralistic dominance. Galloway quotes Binkley's picture
of the situation:
The culmination of this vast assumption of power by Congress
in the 1880s coincided almost exactly with the decline of the
lower house to almost the nadir of incompetence. Despite its
assumption of sovereign power in the government, it lay
floundering in a confusion of warring committees. Spurning
all suggestion of external leadership, it yet found no trace
of leadership within. ... The cause of the confusion lay in
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tens of thousands of measure. «ong the
something like sheer caorirP h^H ' ^"'^"3 ^"^ion




appears to be to prevent the transaction o^'businLs "91'
When Reed hi.nsel f ascended to the speakership, he moved
rapidly to change everything and made the Co^ittee on Rules his cho-
sen instrument. The two major tactics in current use by those who
would block House action were the disappearing quorum, created by mem-
bers physically present and refusing to vote, and who thereby denied
the body a quorum; and dilatory motions, which included quorum calls
and other parliamentary manouvers designed to delay the speedy execu-
tion of business. Moving to overturn these practices. Reed was
challenged by the minority Democrats. The ensuing dialogue encap-
sulates the dilemmas faced by the House as it confronts the problem of
positive action:
It Sf^'^''/u^ ^'''^ ex-speaker Carlisle, defendedthe traditional House practices, stressing the minority's
need for protection from arbitrary majority rule. The chiefRepub lean spokesmen, Joseph Cannon of Illinois and William
McKinley of Ohio, argued that the majority must be given thepower to govern. Reed's ruling was finally upheld by a
party-line vote. 92 *^ ^
Reed ruled with an iron hand for six years, and the precedents
he established were generally followed by his successors Crisp and
Cannon. He thus filled the vacuum of leadership in the government at
Washington and established Congressional dominance over Chief
Executives Harrison and Cleveland. Galloway's brief account of the
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period of Congressional Government (1865-1898) indicates that, in
general, a contest for power between Congress and the President
occupied
.nuch ti.ne and attention, and a legislative history of these
years would show little accomplished of outstanding ,nerit. Weak domi-
nated Presidents, or those who harbored the old Whig doctrines within
their breasts did not, again, create an atmosphere in which the
Congress could use its overwhelming powers for productive work.^^
Matters shifted to a new footing with the assession of
McKinley, who had served six terms in Congress prior to his elevation,
and who was interested in cultivating the assembly and knew how to
work with it. He quickly fell into step with Joseph Cannon, who
became Speaker in 1903, and who exercised uniquely enonnous and legen-
dary power over the House.
ch!??\^"''i?^ ^^"T' Danville, Illinois, was a hard-shell Republican who adhered to the principles that underlaythe founding of the Grand Old Party-the Union cause low-
cost western lands, high tariffs, and minimal governmentalinvolvement in social programs. His failure to bend these
principles to the winds of changing times, in fact was one
reason he failed to preserve the powers he had inherited.94
As beneficiary of the Reed rules. Cannon enjoyed such powers
as appointing committees, designating chairmen, referring bills to
committees, sitting as Chairman of Rules, and determining who would
speak on the floor. As the years went by, Cannon's use of his powers
began to verge on the dictatorial, and he was forced to call on them
with increasing urgency in his attempts to block the refonn movements
that gathered force during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency. Standing
with the orthodox Republican "stand-patters" the speaker successfully
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blocked the strenuous efforts of reform
.ninded representatives to
extend the sphere of Federal action to such arcane areas as food and
drug laws, income and inheritance taxes, federal investigation of
labor disputes, liscensing of corporations and child labor laws.'^
But this impasse couldn't last: the insurgent ho^ HlM 1" the House
were responding to constituency pressures, and by the time that Taft
had succeeded Roosevelt, the new movement had begun to break out a»ng
certain Midwest Republicans as well, and the fat was in the fire.
Cannon's opponents now consisted not only of members from the majority
party per se, but ccnprised a new majority of House members of both
96parties. As the resentment of Cannon and his control of the chamber
finally boiled over in the form of an important refonn resolution,
representative John Nelson of Wisconsin summed up the feelings of the
i nsurgents
:
Have we not been punished by every means at the disposal ofthe powerful House organization? Members long chairmen ofimportant committees, others holding high rank--all with
records of faithful and efficient party service to their
credn--have been ruthlessly removed, deposed and humiliated
before their constituencies and the country because, for-
sooth, they would not cringe or crawl before the arbitrary
power of the Speaker and his House machine. ... We are
fighting with our Democratic brethren for the common right of
equal representation in this House, and for the right of way
of progressive legislation in Congress.
The upshot was the famous "Revolt of 1910" which issued in the
revocation of many of the prerogatives of the Speaker, including his
seat on the Rules Committee, and his powers to make committee assign-
ments and to schedule floor debates. With these reforms, the
decentralization of power in the House and the professional ization of
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the
.e..e.s had ta.en a huge step: co™utee a.to„», and sento.t.
careens, became pervasive, and the senlorUy pn^nclple as the «Jor
criterion for the selection of co™„1ttee chairmen
.eca.e vl.tua,,.
inviolable. AUhough this
.eant f.nher Institutionalization In the
formal sense-1. e.
.
the "personal" power of the speaker had no«
.een
supplanted b, the "^personal
" «chan1s,„ of the seniority rule-thls
Change did little to alter the dally «dus Vivendi of leadership that
continued to be characterized by contemporary observers as "Invisible
or in co™iss1on."59 As things stood at this point, then, the
increased professionalise of individual ™e*ers ™ade the. ,„ore sen-
sitive to constituency pressure, and more likely to respond to the
reform movements which were then agitating for changes In the social
role Of government. As a result, the concentration of power In the
Speakership now for the first time had become a real Impediment to
House actlon-that Is, Its manifest ability to enhance House power of
twenty years earlier had been negated. That the refo™ ,„ovement
itself was bipartisan yielded little comfort to the party caucuses,
and one might have expected to see a general erosion of House Institu-
tionalization had not the Rules Committee emerged at this point to tak
eup again In dally practice what the other organs of the chamber had
so recently lain down.
As House business burgeoned and the calendars bulged with
bills awaiting action. Rules became more crucial than ever In regu-
lating the flow of business to the floor. Its chairiien wielded even
more power than in the days of Reed and Cannon, including the power to
247
"pocket veto" bills approved by their o«n co,»1ttee. or to defy the
caucus for whom they were nominal agents.
Davidson and Oleszek point out that the enhanced power of the
Rules Committee «de It guilty of greater abuses after the 1910 revolt
than the Speaker had committed beforelO^-and we should therefore take
note that the unintended consequences of reform movements always may
Include factors which make the cure worse than the disease. The
zenith of Rules Committee Independence occurred during the 1937-1961
period, when it became dominated by a bipartisan conservative coali-
tion and acted as a semi-institutionalized constraint upon both




the House explicitly rejected [institutionalized
leadership] in 1910 and by 1919 had abandoned the alternative
of caucus control as well. Although partisan leadership was
not impossible, the most successful leaders were those wholike House Speaker Sam Rayburn (1940-1946, 1949-1952
1955-1961) and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson'
(1954-1961), bargained skillfully with committee leaders and
represented their interests. 102
With the institutionalization of seniority and the automatic
promotion came a formal decentralization of power quite unlike
anything which had existed previously in the House. "^^^ The ultimate
outcome of the Cannon revolt was to strengthen committee autonomy and
independence and weaken House leadership and the party system. In the
very earliest period of House history, before the assesion of Monroe,
House power had been decentralized, and the capacity of the body to
take the initiative with respect to important policy questions had
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been wea. to the point Of COS. Now we see a
.etu.n to fonna,
congressional dominance In government, and again centrifugal forces
see. to ,nake positive legislative
.ove.nent next to Impossible
Although the reformist or progressive Impulses which swept the country
and us legislators succeeded In passing much extremely Important
legislation during this period. I think It crucial to distinguish
between ordinary and extraordinary times: in moments of national cri-
sis, congress occasionally has shown Itself capable of throwing
caution to the winds and acting. The deeper and more difficult
dilemma rises with respect to the proble. of positive action in ordi-
nary times: even when aided and abetted by willing Chief Executives,
the Congress has, for much of its history, been unable to conduct
Itself along lines of equal representation and participation for its
.nembership and simultaneously take active responsibility for domestic
policy.
The decline of the Speaker and the rise of the committee
system moved the House not one whit closer to becoming the kind of
publici body which Wilson had maintained was essential to good govern-
ment. The difference lay in the fact that the earliest absence of
centralization reflected the general will of the membership, which
stubbornly refused to be guided or coerced by authority. The revolt
of 1910, on the other hand, had the consequence of weakening the
Speaker, and therefore the grip of the national parties over the




hierarchical arrangements against which many of the representati
had allied themselves. That the Rules Committee and the various
.ntee Chairmen were able to continue to assert a dependable dominion
over their fellows indicates that the struggle over the Speakership
was ultimately about whether power would be centralized or decentra-
lized within the Chamber: it was not about democracy for the represen-
tatives. What continued to matter was control: policy would not be
coalesced by a heterogeneous body of individual members of Congress;
it would be enacted by relatively well-drilled minions at the behest
of senior men, whose public careers depended in part on the status
conferred through the exercise of power. The efficacy of this House
organization can be seen in the disciplining of the Progessives by the
Republicans, 1924-1925; in the blocking of the Norris amendment by the
same party during the 1920s; in the struggle over reapportionment
which lasted from 1920 to 1929, and finally in the imposition of Gag
rules on the hoi polloi by the Democrats in 1933.^^^
As happens with so many "reforms," however, the 1910-1911
revolution produced problems of its own-or rather, placedthe dilemma of House organization in a different light. Themost important single result was, of course, to reinforce theparticularistic tendencies of the body. True, neither Reed
nor Cannon had ruled alone, preferring rather to rely upon a
small coterie of lieutenants; nor, for that matter were
post-Cannon Speakers barred from exerting a leadership role
Nonetheless the circle of leadership was perceptibly widened
to include such people as the floor leader, the chaimen of
<ey committees like Rules, Ways and Means, and
Appropriations, and, during the 1920s, members of the
Republican Steering Committee. To the extent that influence
shifted to seniority leaders rather than elective ones, power
was not only dispersed but autonomous as well. "Nowadays "
wrote Robert Luce in 1926, "the leadership of the House is in
commission, with the members hip^pf the commission more or
less fluctuating and shadowy." ^
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Davidson and Oleszek go on to point out that an important con-
sequence Of the new arrangements was a ver, rea, decline in the possi-
bility of pushing "national programs" through Congress. First the
Speakership-an ar™ of the party-had been vitiated. Then the Party
caucus was tried, only to founder on the factionalism which reigned
throughout this period. Since stable partisan majorities no longer
confronted one another on «,st issues, the caucuses were unable to
achieve party cohesion within their ranks. These developments led to
the heightened independence of individual members and diminished party
loyalty. What must be stressed 1s that this member independence
existed with respect to programs of a national interest. I.e.. that
despite the organizational changes and fluctuations of Congressional
power which had taken place since the writing of Congressional
Goyerrarjent, Wilson's primary objections to Congressional practices
were still applicable. As one early student put it, "freedom fro>ii
party control meant freedom from assuming responsibility for a
national program."10' The specialized tasks of the committees and the
often self-interested perspectives of the committee chalrren continued
to be well served. These individuals not only controlled the outcome
of legislation in their respective areas, they were generally able to
categorically assert their powers in the face of united opposition
from below-whether that opposition be based in the committee, or
throughout the chamber. While the following quotation does not
describe the attitude of every chairman during these years, it does
illustrate both widespread attitudes and the real distribution of
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di3a3.ee,n.„t. He.e 1s House Rules Chairman P.n
,p p. ca^p.ellof
Kansas refusing to report a „u*er of resolutions, approved a
majority of his c«1ttee. to authorize certain Investigations-
be done. I am the clml Uee ^
disapproval. It shall not
tive powers. 108
':™'"i"e . In me repose absolute obstruc-
So much for the view from above. Fr«n below, of course,
perspectives were reversed, even while the hostility was no less
healthy. Since hierarchical power arrangements have been equally tan-
talizing to both Republicans and Democrats, we may safely assume that
the following vainly-expressed sentiments against the Republican party
hierarchy were felt at least as often as they were expressed by
Democrats as well. Here are the members of the Progressive Wisconsin
delegation upon finding themselves subject to stringent discipline In
1925
chanenrl K ='"'9'""= ^°<^^y " "ds itselfall ged by those assuming to be in control of theRepublican party by threats and intimidation on the one handand by the offer of party recognition with its favors !nd
^
patronage on the other. We refuse to compromise or t^bargain with Mr. Longworth or with any other Member of theHouse on an issue affecting our rights as Representatives inCongress to vote our convictions.
. . . Neither flatter^ no?suggestions concerning committee assignments nor threats willcause the Wisconsin delegation in the House to deviate.109
The foregoing quotations should provide some indication of the
rich qualities of mutual animosity which often erupted between those
who looked down and those who looked up at one another within the
House. It is clear from both this and other evidence that when debate
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concerned matters of import for the leadershin Vn'^^^^^s^iP> consensus" throughout
th,s pen-od «as not evo.ed
.ut created th.ou,. the suppression ofA -i ^ ^ j_di ssent
In genera,, then, the new arrangements Inaugurated what Roger
Davidson has called the "era of the Co«1ttee chair.an"-that is the
period 1937-1971 which ,nar.ed the zenith of c^ittee government;' that
period during which those strong enough to seize the,,, were wont to
exercise the prerogatives of power so clearly articulated by represen-
tative Campbell above. We have now seen the locus of power ,,ove away
fro. the floor, away fro. the speaker and finally even away fro,n the
party caucus; away fro,™ the practical possibility that the general
.ne,nbership of the House ,„ight assert control over the fo™al arrange-
-nents of legislating. Instead, power is now ledged either in the
hands of the chairmen of the various co.n,nj ttees , or in the Rules
Committee, itself controlled by a conservative coalition of Democrats
and Republicans. From ti,ne to ti,ne, of course, we hear cries of rage
or anguish rising from those quarters which usually found themselves
flagellated into obedience, and such cries indicate that al 1-too-often
the House had circumvented anarchy only to divest individual members
of a considerable degree of freedom.
At the same ti.ne, this syte,«, historical in its origins and
peculiar in its attributes, came to be endowed with something like an
"ontological" permanence by members of the political science pro-
fession, finally coming to be seen as "Congress" itself, rather than







-.an,e,.nts of po„e. the.. Pe.aps
.1s conHatlon of
.sto.ca,
accident wU. institutional essence-.^lc was also a professional
suppression of awareness of the political forces
.oth
.as.ed
arranged House Institutionalization at this staae-«as due the
longevity of the arrangements. During this period, several
tions Of academic observers fledged and «lted. and Initiated thei
own graduate students Into the mysteries of Capitol Hill m t.rn
the committee system and the autocratic power of Its chairmen and the
wondrous «„1nat1ons of the Rules Committee persisted and flourished
for them to study. It was not until Congress became severely out of
step with crucial elements of national sent1,nent during the Viet Nam
war period that geological forces once again came Into ™t1on and the
strata of 35 years' practice began to ;nelt and flow. This Is neither
to say that the House had not had Its professional critics all along,
nor to deny a swelling tide of professional and political criticism of
the ineffectiveness of the House qua Institution. But what actually
happened, under extraordinary circumstances not unlike those of 1910,
was that reforms followed in the wake of pressing urgency to deal with
national questions and a series of national crises, and this urgency
manifested itself in the reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
If there Is a lesson in this history, it Is that the House either will
not or cannot stir Itself to reform Itself in ordinary times, and that
given a leadership vacuum without. It has shown Itself unable to
generate the institutional coherence necessary for positive action
from within.^^''
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The importance of the relationship between Congress and the
executive branch-and the difficulty of making clean distinctions bet-
ween the internal" affairs of Congress and exogenous influences upon
either its institutional fate or internal devel op™enf-bec«es clear
When we look at so.e of the so-called refo™" ^ve.ents which have
surfaced within the institution fr™ time to ti.e during the last
fifty years. Ill It was the case for both the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 and the succession of refo™ ^ve.ents
which transformed the House between 1965 and 1975, that a primary
1-npetus involved the members consciously expressed concern that the
balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches be
set right. In the view of many members, Congress suffered from a
plethora of procedural, substantive and hierarchical ills which
required remedy if it were to carry out its Constitutionally mandated
functions. Chief among these was its incapacity to perfora any other
than a negative role in government with respect to the initiation of
broad policy.
In this section, we will briefly examine some of the major
steps which the Congress has taken on the way to turning substantive
and extraordinary power over to the executive branch; succeeding steps
to recover itself; some of the unintended consequences which followed
from these, and the conditions which held there--for both the mem-
bership and the political science profession--at the onset of the





We have already touched briefly on so.e of the obvious high
points in the pendulum swings of power between the Congress and the
Presidency during the nineteenth century. The twentieth century tells
a somewhat different story, one which I think reflects almost unin-
terrupted decline in Congressional power and influence and which has
left us with profoundly changed attitudes about what constitutes
proper relations between the two branches, and where responsibility
for the initiation of policy should lie. The causes of this decline
can be found in a series of actions, incrementally taken decade by
decade, to transfer primary responsibility for the initiation and exe-
cution of key governmental functions away from the legislature and to
the executive. The rationales behind such shifts have usually been
accompanied either by allegations or demonstrations of breakdown in
the efficacy of House action. This substantial shift in power can be
most clearly seen in what I call the structure of interbranch rela-
tions, i.e., in the institutionalization of agency outside the
Congress, but not in veto-overrides, bipartisan consultations or
periods when the executive and the legislature found themselves mem-
bers of different parties and struggled with one another to accomplish
little until the next election could come along and throw the ball
decisively into someone's court. Examples of the kind of changes in
the structure of relations I think important include both the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921, and the behavior of the House during
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Fran.,,-„
.ooseveU's f1.st ten.. Each provides evidence of Ho.se con-
fus,on and a surrender of substantive powers to the executive branch
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the refo^s which swept
the lower chamber In the early 1970s were both collective attempts to
remedy Imbalances which followed upon the first two.'^^
Beginning as early as 1900. the prerogatives which Congress
had enjoyed. If not exercised, nearly without challenge since the
Civil war came under repeated and increasing pressure by a series of
"strong" presidents-including McKinley. T. Roosevelt and Wilson-who
had their own ideas about necessary programs, foreign policy, and the
locus Of primary responsibility for initiating and controlling




^^rtja^rrf-^^; poiici^Lffi ^--^^ co:s'ov°:rthe
By far the most important place to find evidence for this is
in the budgetary process. Until 1920, there was no central system for
drawing up the federal budget or for its consideration by Congress.
The Secretary of the Treasury would compile estimates of the spending
needs of the various executive departments, and these were submitted
to the House, which in turn referred them to eight diferent conmit-
tees, each of which would report an appropriation bill without
reference to total expenditures or revenues. The cumulative results
of these practices was a steadily growing national debt which, by 1919
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had reached the then astronomical sum of $25 billion, amidst a rising
tide of^cr1tic1sm>rom both the well of the House and the country at
large. a bill finally passed, and signed by President Harding,
became the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The measure directed
the President to prepare and transmit to Congress each year a budget
Showing federal revenues and expenditures for the previous and current
years and estimates for the succeeding year. It set up a Bureau of
the Budget as the executive agency which would do the actual work, and
created a General Accounting Office to assist Congress in exercising
oversight of the administration of federal funds and therefore the
implementation of policy. Almost at a stroke, then, the power of
Congress to set policy through stipulating spending levels was trans-
ferred away: "the president's exclusive jurisdiction over budget
totals gave him an advantage over Congress for half a century. "^^^
The consequences would be incalculable.
The student of Congress is never certain whether the plethora
of viewpoints which can be brought to bear on a given issue or moment
in history is a blessing or a curse. Despite the foregoing evaluation
of the 1921 act, and the general assessment that here, if anywhere,
began the real erosion of Congressional power which has taken place in
the twentieth century, many who were on the scene at the time hailed
it as a breakthrough which enhanced both the prestige and the real
power of the Congress. All we can do is to note, again, that pre-
sently apparent future goods are particularly elusive when it comes to
Congressional reforms.
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In launching the new executive budget system in iQ^i
was an individual in the House [the chair.;n ofTheAppropriations Committee] who could put on his hat .nn w.i^to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenu d U o he
Meanwhile, the era of committee hegemony and party control of
the House continued. The record of party high-handedness which the
Republicans accumulated throughout the 1920s was matched by the
Democrats once they found their hands on the levers of power in 1931.
During the 1920s, as the minority party, they had been controlled by a
small group of southerners, some of whom had entered the chamber
during the first decade of the century. Dominated by this group,
which owed its power to its seniority, the now ascendent Democrats
were largely able to resist demands for reform on the part of the
newly elected freshman class members who, naturally enough, sought to
reorganize the arrangements of power within the party to reflect their
own numbers. By 1933, the nearly two-thirds of House Democrats who
were from states outside the South had succeeded in getting the party
to set up a Steering Committee to oversee its affairs. But the suc-
cess of this innovation was limited: during the 73rd Congress, as we
have seen, the Rules Committee became the implement of choice of the
House Democratic leaders who used this device to bypass the Steering
Committee. This was the Congress which
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^•uuyriL uu tne House floor under sopri^ii "r^r^^^Al>
order, and shlrplTlfL-^eTde'bTte^u"'"^^"'^'
^^^'^^^ ^^^^^
The colloquial term for such procedures is "gag rules" and the
question can at least be raised whether it was proper for the
leadership to acquiesce in stopping the mouths of Congress that it
might enact such measures as the Emergency Banking Act, the Economy
Act, the Emergency Relief Act, the First Agricultural Adjustment Act,
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, and the National Industrial
Recovery Act. When the Rules Committee, in 1934, brought in a rule
that would bar, for the duration of the session, any amendment to any
appropriation bill which conflicted with Roosevelt's economic program
enacted during the previous year. Minority Leader Bertrand Snel 1 spoke
up
... saying that he had never been opposed to special rules
so long as they were "fairly fair," [he] called this "the
most VICIOUS, the most far-reaching special rule" ever pro-posed. No majority, he said, had "ever dared bring in a rulethat not only hog-tied and prohibited the members from
expressing themselves on the legislation in hand, but even
extended throughout the entire session of Congress. "118
Snell was joined by all of the Republicans, 84 Democrats, and
five Farmer-Labor members in voting against the rule, which passed
nonetheless by a bare margin, 197 to 192.
The point is not to pass judgment on the historical or social
merits of Roosevelt's programs. What counts here is that they origi-
nated in the executive branch, rather than in the legislature, and
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that their passage was secured largely at tne expense of the substan-
tive and wide-ranging debates among the membership which should have
preceded such crucial and important changes in the relations between
the state and society in the United States. Given what we now know
about Congressional tendencies toward paralysis in times of executive
branch weakness, perhaps this was the only way that the institutions
of government were capable of organizing themselves for action in a
time of acute national crisis, but we are going to take the view that
this form of action was contrary to that which the designers of the
Constitution had intended. Roosevelt himself was no doubt aware of
this, but seemed willing to waive the Constitution in order to help
the country solve its problems. His attitude toward Congress was
reflected in his opening address to the Seventy-third Congress:
I come before you
. . . not to make request for special ordetailed egislation; I come rather to counsel with you wholike myself, have been selected to carry out a mandate of the
whole people, in order that without partisanship you and I
may cooperate to continue the restoration of our national
well-being and, equally important, to build on the ruins ofthe past a new structure designed better to meet the presentproblems of modern civilization. ... Out of these friendly
contacts we are, fortunately, building a strong and pennanent
tie between the legislative and executive branches of the
government. The letter of the Constitution wisely declared a
separatio n, but the impulse of a common purpose decl^rp^ ^
union . -^^^ [Emphasis added. I —
Roosevelt succeeded in achieving this "union," which ultima-
tely resulted in a permanent change in the minds of most people about
the proper structure of interbranch relations. On the level of daily
political action, the new scheme worked flawlessly only until FDR sent





„ the .es.UIng fu.or. the Republicans and conse.atWe
Democrats decided to .and together and to «o.< In tande.. Hlsto.1
call the emergent combination the
"Conservative Coalition" and th1
union was so successful that It outlasted the other and pers1st7;or
near,, thirt. .ears.^^O By wielding effective power on the Rules
Co™i«ee, the coalition was able to defy the Democratic leadership b,
acting as an effective check on Its ambitions. It did so b, refusing
to clear labor legislation and other Actalnlstratlon programs. While
the views Of members of the coalition on social and econ^lc Issues
were In conflict with those of ^st Democrats In the House. It is
important to note that they reflected the legislative preferences of a
bipartisan majority. Fr« 1939 to 1956, the coalition won almost all
Of the roll calls on which Southern Democrats and Republicans opposed
Northern Democrats. The success rate during this period falls below
eight percent only once.l^l The problem as usual was that this
bipartisan majority did not show itself capable of initiating poli-
cies. If Roosevelt's "union" between the executive and Congress
.neant, in terms of its daily operations, executive initiative and
Congressional ratification, then the conservative coalition
inaugurated a period of Congressional strength solely in the area of
Its capacity to refuse, while providing little in the way of positive
accomplishment. This system, such as it was, seemed to replicate
inside the Congress what the Congress was now being reduced to with
respect to the rest of the government: its strength, and the strength
of its members, lay in its capacity to obstruct rather than to create.
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Finding lUtle to create, then, 1t provided obstruction in plenitude
and succeeded in blocking most of the proposals which Roosevelt and
later Truman were to make in the domestic areas of civil rights, labor
law and social welfare policy.^^^
By 1945, irritation with this unhappy record had begun to
mount, and the end of the war found many in Congress and the political
science profession in a mood for reform. A report by the American
Political Science Association summed up the problem as it appeared to
many who were in positions to know:
Congress must modernize its machinery and methods to fit
modern conditions if it is to keep pace with a greatly
enlarged and active executive branch. This is a better
approach than that which seeks to meet the problem by
reducing and hamstringing the executive. A strong and more
representative legislature, in closer touch with and betterinformed about the administration is the antidote to
bureaucracy
.
Notice what is being warned against and what is being advo-
cated here. First, the warning is not directed against the presidency
per se, but the "bureaucracy" which humbly acts in his name. It is a
novel complaint in the history of our institutions, for we do not hear
much of it before 1945. It is symptomatic of sea changes not only in
the conduct of the U. S. government and the nature of its institu-
tions, but also in the assumptions tacitly held by educated mass opi-
nion about the proper character of those institutions. Roosevelt had
done more than simply borrow the cadences of Lincoln (i.e., "to build
on the ruins of the past a new structure . . ."), he had successfully
initiated what amounts to the third American Revolution.
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There are really two kinds of criticism which the American
Political Science Association of the day might have leveled at the
Congress: the Association could have looked either at the degree to
which it fulfilled its formal institutional role, or it could have
focused on the content of the legislation which Congress passed or
obstructed. We might borrow a heuristic device from students of
literature at this moment, and say that the Association could have
focused either on institutional form or legislative content. Here we
have a critique of institutional form based on the failure of the
legislature to pass particular measures then being originated by the
executive. The Congressional legislative process, then, is being eva-
luated solely in terms of political judgments about its failure to act
on executive proposals. This kind of critique of institutional fom
isn't all that one might expect, however: the institution of Congress
is not seen as having grown weak with respect to executive branch
power. Instead, it is held to be out of step with it. What is
^^^"'"^^ is that the initiative ought to lie on the executive side;
what is politically demanded is that Congress modify itself to serve
the necessities embedded in that assumption. To this student, both
the assumption and its consequences follow from a misplaced emphasis
upon the liberal agenda of the late 1940s and the successful tactics
developed by the Conservative Coalition in expanding its own powers to
say "no. " But the possible long-range consequences of fundamental
change in our institutional arrangements, both in the actions of the
Coalition and in the proposals in favor of Congressional adaptation
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launched against it, go begging here. What was important was not the
fate of any particular agenda. What was important was that the
conservative Coalition made it impossible for the majority party to
enact its program of government, and this meant that it was making it
extremely difficult for the Congress to enact much of anything, mto
the vacuum stepped the executive branch, as any historian might have
expected. Meanwhile, Congressional positive action had now to be con-
ducted along the lines of a coalition politics-shifting alliances of
ad hoc groups were now to be assembled as a prior condition to the
passage of bills. This, in turn, made it even more difficult for the
majority to govern, and the House began to look dilatory and balky to
the outside world. And so it became possible to begin the custom of
running "against" the Congress, which not only marked an important
step in its institutional decline, but also served to provide ample
ammunition to those who would strengthen the Presidency at its
expense
.
Be these things as they may, the American Political Science
Association offered the studied advice that Congress adjust itself to
meet the changing times. Advice of this sort is rampant throughout
the literature of the period and can be seen to characterize one of
the three basic arguments which Davidson and Oleszek noted are peren-
nially advanced in the cause of Congressional reform. What such
proposals fail to note is that Congress, having "adapted" its ini-
tiative over domestic policy by thrusting it into the hands of the
executive, first in 1921 and then in 1932, is now urged to make
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further adaptations of the same order. We note that if Congress 1s to
"keep pace." it cannot be Congress which sets the pace. Agency, in
the minds of most commentators had irrevocably passed to the
executive, and the literature is replete with comments that Congress
accept the situation and adapt. "^^^
As the members of Congress themselves took steps toward inter-
nal reforms, the language of adaptation began to become more concrete,
and the long and sustained campaign to "modernize" the national
legislature at last began to focus on the particular problem of its
"efficiency." For those who sought reforms, adaptation for pur-
poses of efficiency translated into the necessity for streamlining and
restructuring the committee system to weaken its powers of obstruction
without damaging its effectiveness in drafting detailed legislation.
But note that the intentions of the members differed from the inten-
tions of the scholars: members of Congress didn't talk much about
adapting to the presidency. What they wanted was to reassert the
power of their institution.
Of all the external stimuli to reorganization, ... the
growth of executive power is undoubtedly the strongest. By
1946 this phenomenon--triggered by the great depression and
augmented by the second world war--led reformers to view a
reorganized Congress as a way to redress the imbalance of
power that had developed between the branches. ^27
But it was the committees, after all, which developed public policies,
decided which proposals were important and which not, presented alter-
natives to executive branch proposals, drafted complex legislation and
had oversight responsibilities. Davidson and Oleszek emphasize how
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important the members of Congress thought the committee system was to
the overall strength of the legislature:
Like members of the Select Committee on Committees of fhp q-^hCongress, the reformers of 1946 bel i pvpH th^f L
the committee system strengtLL ss sel his^^Lnecessary because Congressmen were concerned aboui thegrowing power of the executive branch, and recognized the
K'rgo^^rTmln^f Ik^^^-"^ ^ ' -e,u\1
The product of this reform movement was the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, specifically designed "to provide for
increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the government. "^^9
Modernization of the standing committee system was its first aim. it
was widely held that a crucial step in buttressing the coimnittee
system lay in straightening out the tangled snarls of conflicting and
overlapping jurisdiction which frequently set the various co.miiittees
at odds with one another and added yet another set of formal barriers
to the attainment of either consensus or policy. Hence the Act moved
to make the committee structure more formally elegant by reducing the
number of standing committees. It also attempted to strengthen
Congressional control over the budget, reduce the workload of
Congress—which was becoming overwhelming—and improve the quality of
staff assistance to individual representatives and standing
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committees. Hence, altogether, the number of standing committees
was reduced and their procedures made more formal, public and
m
regular. At the same time,
The entire legislative domain, as it was then understood, was
set forth and divided into categories, each assigned to a
separate standing committee. In the process, obsolete com-
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mittees were eliminated or consolidated resoonsibil i t. fn.
What went absolutely unanticipated at the time were the con-
sequences that would follow the provision for reduction in the number
of committees. The jurisdictions of the eliminated committees were
apportioned among the remaining and newly-created ones, but primary
responsibility for it was delegated to permanent subcommittees. These
bodies thereby took on a new permanence and influence, for they began
gradually to emerge as independent centers of House power, and,
as the years went by, flourished in the darker and less inspected
corners of the House.
Other measures taken in the 1946 Act included steps to
strengthen the Congressional power of the purse. The Act directed the
House Ways and Means, the Senate Finance, and the Appropriations
Committees of both houses to prepare a legislative budget each year
including estimates of total receipts and expenditures. The Budget
Committee's report was to be accompanied by a concurrent resolution
for adopting the budget and fixing the amount to be appropriated. At
the same time. Congress attempted to lighten its workload by prohi-
biting the introduction of four categories of private bills and pro-
vided limited professional staff support to each standing
committee--an innovation which would turn out to have truly horrendous
consequences a mere 30 years later. Finally, the Act required that,
for the first time, lobbyists register with and report their expen-
ditures to the Clerk of the House.
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Regarded as a breakthrough at the time of passage, the Act
ultimately did Uttle to realign the areas of jurisdiction either
within Congress or in Its relations with the executive branch. The
reduction of the nu*er of co,„m1ttees proved to be niainly cos.etic.
The provisions for the legislative budget turned out to be
"unworkable" and the Acfs provision for a Joint Con„mttee on the
budget which would set an appropriations ceiling by February 15th of
each year was implemented twice and then abandoned. The Regulation of
Lobbying did not go far enough, and the reduction of the number of
committees turned out to be only temporary: new committees were almost
immediately instituted and subcommittee proliferation assumed acute
133proportions. Finally, by reducing the number of standing co.nmit-
tees and hardening their jurisdictional lines, the Act tended to
strengthen the seniority system, reinforce committee autonany, and
inhibit the ability of the House to grapple with public problems of a
national scope as time and political change invariably brought them to
the fore.-^^^ Samuel Huntington summed up the act as follows:
The net effect of the Reorganization Act was thus to further
the dispersion of power, to strengthen and to institutiona-
lize committee authority and to circumscribe still more the
influence of the central leadership. 135
In general, then, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
should be studied for what it can reveal about the problems which
faced the Congress at that time, and which it was to confront all over
136
again in 1974. But it will provide the historian very few examples
of constructive acts successfully undertaken to solve them. In my
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estimation, its most important long-range consequences lay in the dra-
matic increase in the number of joint committees and subcanmi ttees
which followed in its wake and the proliferation of supporting staff
everywhere upon the Hill. These developments strengthened the hand of
the centrifugal forces within the body and, as Huntington has indi-
cated, weakened the central authorities of Congress. Decline in the
powers of Congress continued.
The era extending from 1946 to 1965 was characterized by a
Congress dominated almost continuously by its committee chairmen and
the conservative coalition-a Congress of which neither its pro-
fessional students nor the general citizenry expected very much.
While time quickly outran the reforms of 1946, events seldom inter-
vened to alter the increasingly common practice and widespread
viewpoint that the primary responsibility of Congress was to implement
the President's programs--or obstruct them if it were able to so
choose. Some crucial point with respect to the problem of
Congressional initiatives over policy was passed about halfway through
Eisenhower's first term. The shift did not escape Clinton Rossi ter,
and Galloway cites his The American Presidency at some length:
The point was reached and passed in a press conference on
January 13, 1954. During the first session of the Eighty-
third Congress Mr. Eisenhower had submitted few proposals to
Congress and had exerted little continuous pressure in their
behalf. Observers were wondering aloud whether he was aware
of the change that had come over the Presidency or of
Congress' need for guidance. But as the second session
approached the President began to gather steam, and within a
few days of the opening of Congress in 1954 he was sending
over detailed messages outlining his wishes on farm policy,
social security, foreign policy, labor, and finance. And now
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P»;ess conference this exchange took place-
away or to look good. ... He was going to work for the renactment. Make no mistake about that.^ That was exactlywhat he was in the White House for and what he Intended to
Twenty-five years ago this remark, especially as and townom delivered would have brought mo^t members of Congressspluttering to their feet and set the President's few
remaining friends to shaking their disbelieving heads. Evenas late as ten years ago it would have been considered a qra-tuitous insult by the die-hards and a show of bad taste bythe moderates in Congress. In 1954 it passed unchallenged
and even unnoticed, exceot by those whose reaction was,
Wei 1 , 1 1' s about time. "137
Meanwhile, for his part, Lyndon Johnson, arguably the most
effective majority leader the Senate has ever seen, took it upon him-
self to support his President against the political forces of the Taft
wing of the Republican Party and the Conservative Southern wing of his
1 38
own. Though never one to blindly support any program that did not
or could not be made to coincide with his interests, Johnson's basic
strategy of cooperation with Eisenhower reflected his understanding
that limited but real goals could be achieved by Democrats even though
they did not control the presidency. While this action resulted in
solid legislative accomplishments, it further institutionalized execu-
tive initiative over broad policy. Few students of Congress, however,
whether seated members or holders of academic credentials, seemed to
question the emerging arrangements, and Johnson's legislative suc-
cesses were widely applauded.
Again, it is important not to underestimate the significance
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Of these developments. First, the relationship between the executive
branch and the Congress had changed fundamentally in less than a
generation; second, both the participants on the Hill and the obser-
vers in the academy not only accepted these changes, but strove
throughout the late 1950s and 1960s to put their shoulders behind the
wheel of this historical development and edge it along as best they
could. Third, when criticisms of Congress were leveled, they were
usually couched in terms of its inefficiency in carrying out executive
branch proposals, rather than questioning the alteration in
interbranch powers. As for those times during which the Congress was
undeniably productive and performed its job well, Huntington has made
it clear that we should not confuse the personal power of individuals
with long term evolution in the functions and powers of institutions:
At times individual central leaders have built up
impressive networks of personal influence. These however
have been individual, not institutional, phenomena. The
'
ascendency of Rayburn and Johnson during the 1950s, for
instance, tended to obscure the difference between 'personal
influence and institutional authority. With the departure of
the Texas coalition their personal networks collapsed.
Rayburn 's personal power and prestige," observed
Representative Richard Boiling, "made the institution appear
to work. When Rayburn died, the thing just fell apartT"
Similarly, Johnson's effectiveness as Senate leader, in the
words of one of his assistants, was "overwhelmingly a matter
of personal influence.
. .
." [After Johnson's successor had
taken power] ... The majority leadership role was uninsti-
tutionalized and the kindly, gentlemanly, easygoing qualities
which Mansfield had had as Senator from Montana were not
changed. ... The power of the President has been
institutionalized; the powers of the congressional committees
and their chairmen have been institutionalized; but the power
of the central leaders of Congress remains personal
,
ad hoc
and trans i to ry. 139
For Huntington, then, the powers of Congress itself depend upon
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"institutionalization" of power in its central leadership.
One meaning of
"institutionalization" is that the practice so
designated takes on an aura of permanence in the minds of those who
have occasion to be aware of it; one consequence of institutionaliza-
tion is that it gives rise to practices and arrangements as
appearantly permanent as their causes. And so, by the mid 1960s,
Robert Dahl was able to write:
If Congress were to do no more than to consider the princinle
LT^^^ntrtoru^O ^'^^^ ^-utive, it ZZ''''
From about the mid-60s onward, pronunciamenti generally critical of
Congress began to flow from the pens of the academy, which proceeded
to discuss current problems as though Congressional attempts to
strengthen its hand against the presidency had never taken place.
Most of the criticisms will be familiar, and so should be also the
absence of any Whig strains in the lamentations: increased
Congressional strength was to be sought not in order to redress any
imbalance of power between the branches, but in order to increase its
efficiency of operations. Samuel Huntington, again, praised the effec-
tiveness of Congress in providing for specialization but criticized
it, as we have seen, for having "failed to combine increasing spe-
cialization of function with increasing centralization of
authority. "^"^^ Holding that the basic function of representation in
the twentieth century had passed from the Congress to the administra-
tion, he went on to echo the sentiments which the profession had
expressed in 1945, and noted that Congress was facing an "adaption
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crisis" which involved three major aspects of its existence as an
institution: its affiliations, its structure and its functions. It
had insulated itself from the new social forces of the twentieth cen-
tury, dispersed its internal power into hopeless chaos, and reduced
its role as creator of legislation to one of delay and amendment.
A mere six years later, in 1971, the Committee for Econo.nic
Development proceeded to unburden itself, seeing Congressional
problems primarily in managerial terms:
In this perspective, Congress has two primary respon-
sibilities. One IS to reconcile or compromise divergentinterests so that the informed will of the people may find
IZul-l^'' \"
legislation. The other is toVeview program
execution and agency performance in order to check tendenciestoward improper exercise of executive authority or per-
^^Mf' programs. Both functions are indispen-sable, but Congress as it now operates is unable to fulfill
either satisfactorily. 142
The Committee went on to recommend that Congress absolve
itself of its sins by (1) streamlining [sic] its committee structure
because adequate coordination between its decentralized power centers
was lacking, and (2) bringing its methods, approaches and structures
into conformity with the dynamics of a changed polity.
What all of this was building up to was yet another widespread
movement for reform. While it would take an extensive review of the
professional literature from, say, 1950 to 1970 to document this
thoroughly, there is a real difference in tone between the complacency
of Dahl's 1965 view, and that of the Committee for Economic
Development written only six years later--the same year, in fact, in
which Polsby wrote his essay "Strengthening Congress. "^'^^ This did
274
much to sum up the developing viewpoint that Congress was in trouble,
and that its troubles were largely organizational. Taken together,
'
the articles by the Committee for Economic Development and Polsby
express by implication that for many observers there existed what we
can only call a causal relation between the internal organizational
problems of the Congress and its external, institutional weaknesses.
Polsby advised that we "consider the ways in which the House and
Senate organize to do business as a means of gaining insight into how
a legislature can cope with the complex demands of a large heteroge-
neous society, including the rest of a big government. "144 He went on
to make three specific suggestions which would incrementally improve
the capacity of the Congress to function effectively. He ended by
raising the fundamental difficulty, saying that while incranental
reforms may not appear to accomplish a great deal,
. . .
they give recognition to the continuous needs for
institutions to provide means by which they can respond to
outside demands, yet at the same time retain the capacity to
exercise independent choice ... and seek to enhance the
participation of these institutions in the processes of
policy-making by improving their capabilities rather than
destroying their power. I'+S
Change was not, for once, to remain incremental . As the next
wave of reforms coalesced into action, it became clear that the mem-
bers involved conceived their task less in terms of augmenting the
powers of the institution of Congress as a whole than with dismantling
the hierarchical structures of seniority and the committee system
which had successfully stymied their particular efforts to bring about
legal and social reforms. Of course, strengthening the Congress
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against the Presidency was also crucial: their desires for increased
democracy and personal power within the body were greatly whetted by
highly misplaced penchants for secrecy and deceit on the part of two
successive administrations, each of which strove to conduct the war in
Southeast Asia with a minimum of Congressional hindrance. A new
generation of younger and more liberal representatives and senators
agitated to expel the conservative blockage, upheld by Congressional
hierarchy, that threatened the institution with ruin. What they did
not anticipate, however, was the anarchistic incontinence that would
fol low.
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^OGalloway, p. 313.
cited in^Ganoi^lJ/ibld"'''"'- ^^^iySnljnl^ongress, 1947, p. 53.
^^Galloway, p. 314.
^^Ibid., pp. 311-314.
^^Davidson and Oleszek, p. 25.
^^Ibid., p. 27.
^^Congressional Quarterly, p. 113.
^^Davidson and Oleszak, p. 33.
^^Davidson, p. 103.
lOOjbid.
lOlDavidson and Oleszek, p. 33.
^Q^Davidson, p. 103
103.,, .
ironically, the House under Speaker Cannon was rlp;iri^/
rt^inrs?.™-.-^^°-:f,---p-^
These matters are discussed succinctly and senaratPlv hvthe writers at Congressional Quarterly. See pp. 121-128 [3^132?^
lO^Davidson and Oleszek, p. 33.
lO^ibid., p. 35.
Cited in^Ib?d^^"^
^^^^ Congress (New York: Knopf, 1943).
lO^Congressional Quarterly, p. 120.
lO^ibid., p. 122.
llOuntil a very few years ago, students of government in
general and students of Congress in particular were instructed in the
mysteries and minutiae of the Committee system in the House as the
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l^ri. J^c
°^^"d^^g':^duate courses, to learned monographs fnd echo
0^:




past Congr^ rs?oJ^arpr:c%?c:s°":^^t^f It ^^^a^r^'to" ^y^^^'^"^Congress of Lyndon Johnson's day no longer exists Thouah Itture of the earlier period comprises moft of whalpol t c^ ci^nt ^t".now about Congress, it is important that those who' hv'pst"age of thirty realize that the institution is no longer what theystudied in graduate school. From the standpoint of a writer of a PhD
ftVlf change has brought the incan lrabie advan-tage of drastically shrinking the quantity of written materials forwhich he may reasonably be held responsible. For added d^sJu sion ofthis subject, see Joseph Cooper and William West, "The Congress onalCareer in the 1970s," in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.). Congress
Reconsidered
, p. 92. • ^
^
lllwe are nowhere going to attempt any kind of treatment ofthe role Congress is, has, or ought to be playing in the foreignponcy area. The domestic side of its difficulties and history pro-
vide ample material for a good sized cud for even the most pedantic
student of U.S. Government. But I. M. Destler has pointed out what
ne calls a core pol i tical
-procedural dilemma" in foreign policy whichis parallel, if not identical to the one we have been tracing through
Its consequences for domestic policy and the changing nature of
government in the U.S.: the tension which persists between the
requirements of representative government and the requirements of
effective government. "In significant part, this flowing and ebbing
of congressional standing is a function of two factors: substantive
preferences and the presence or absence of crisis. ... The second
factor, crisis, usually reinforces presidential power and the argument
that the president needs the flexibility to respond. But the
deeper cause of executive-congressional conflict is a core pol i tical
-
procedural dilemma. Americans want two things that often prove incom-
patible in practice: democratic government (involving ongoing
competition among a range of U.S. interests and perspectives) and
effective foreign policy (which requires settling on specific goals
and pursuing them consistently). To reconcile these competing needs
insofar as they can be reconciled, the framers of the Constitution
established, in Richard Neustadt's apt phrase, a government of
"separated institutions sharing powers." See: I. M. Destler,
"Executive-Congressional Conflict in Foreign Policy: Explaining It;
Coping With It," in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.). Congress
Reconsidered
, pp. 297-298.
^^^congressional Quarterly, p. 130. "The focus of reformers
became much broader during the [Second World] war. . . when the capa-







' { Uhacr^^ T^^^^^M^^i^^T^^^
^^^Galloway, p. 318.
^l^Congressional Quarterly, p. 131.
^^^Ibid., p. 132.
^^^Galloway, p. 322.
Of the sL'ttern'DSaSir'wIna'or^hfr:'''' V' "'^^ ^ ' '"™^er
these years, see: John F 'm^ ^y°'"T ^ Co ^rJatJJe r°.lV-V°"
pp. ya-107. See also: David E. Brady and Char l p^ RmI I nr^T-^-^^TT-'w^'
conservative Coalition in the House?^ JourLlTS^^^^^ '
rese^ta? vel '-'tn'onHd'^^'^^^ '
"CoaTTtT^TTT^TlTTrfthe
^^ofKep n tiv s, in D dd and Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered , pp.
l^loavid Brady and Charles Bullock, 1981, p. 198.




' ^^^^^^^ion of the Bal kanizal?on of
D.i-^- !^^^^P^^^
the Committee of Congress of the /\merican
Political Science Association, The Reorganization of Congress(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 194b), pp. 80-81. Cit-d inCongressional Quarterly, p. 135.
^^^Davidson and Oleszek, p. 3.
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divide the pro?;;sion weri n tl Z\rr 'h^h' ''''''' ^^^'^^ °^9ht to
current di s?ussions°of'Lng s o 1 1 I 'ZlTtriages through the literature to find colments'abi ? ro'passivity and executive initi;,i-nwl T : ..^^^ Congressional
^r^^i^z^^zic^^'i^ discuss?: ror:o".r^t?;™£i^eir^
become ever more fractional ized and unmanageable t ?s poss ble ofcourse to reject the assumption that Congress i prooerlv oa . vlwhich IS embodied in the part of this staLe t bo ^Congre l al
fraclioLllpT!;
accept the assertion that the House i o?hactional! zed and unmanageable. Other examples of this viewpoint
^in^p^n
^" ^^^^/^^l^^tion of articles edited by Mann a d Ornste n we
si tves^for JJf°" "'^'^^ organizations, Congr ^tri self-preservation, protecting its autonomy and influence
Lter^irdpJn'n ''n'r'^ ^"^^ '^^^'^ successf 1 J ioexterna demands while coping with internal pressures." Again at




^a^bin, in his "Delegation, Deliberation, andthe New Role of Congressional Staff," in the same collection, pagei/U, notes that Congress is coping successfully: "The increased use ofpersonalized, entrepreneurial staffs has helped Congress retain itsposition as key initiator of federal policy, despite the growing power
of the executive branch." Barbara Sinclair in the same collection
makes an observation which goes to the heart of the problem for one
who seeks an evaluation of the institutional efficacy of Congress in
ordinary times. She finds the body at its best during crisis periods-
Congress is a reactive institution; it cannot anticipate. It is not'however, impervious to strong stimuli from its environment. A crisis'
a strong clear demand from the public for action, will produce a
congressional response, as it has throughout this century." See page
220. For Charles 0. Jones, executive initiative sets the pattern of
action in government, and Congress is best off when it does not try
too hard to play this role for itself: "I have used the word
pretentious' to characterize the initiator role because I believe it
is inordinately ambitious for Congress to prepare itself to initiate
comprehensive policy programs. Having undertaken such a coinplex
assignment, a legislature may not know where to stop imitating the
executive." See Ibid., p. 234. Finally, in the collection of
articles edited by Dodd and Oppenheimer, p. 345, we find Morris
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Fiorina undertaking a cogent di <;rii<:^inn nf .
institutional reform whi?h cou d -nrrpL ,. "''^ ^''''^^^ ^^^""^^
government to a variety of pre sure^ It '
responsiveness of
"bringing congressional 1' re de Ual i ce^H:f ' -'^
agreement.
.
." via the imnn^iHnn^; l^^^^^ives into closer
acce t without qJesttn'the'^^^tJ^n
^t lltlVrcll llZVs l^T
Conqress^can'orshoMl'dM''.H
^^reement among scholars about whether
r iff
prescription. The fact that, for the most part. Congress does notinitiate major policies can, in its turn, give ri sH^a plural i?J ofscholarly viewpoints. One such, as we have seen is that t should
e bran?h'%h'o'ulH"H'^'jJ°" '''' Congress noi'the e ecu-
DoMcv it nn
the Primary initiating agent in areas of broad
Eh I Tlt^ "^'^ 'I distribution of particular goods. Givpnthis latter approach, the interesting question is whether Congress ranbe constituted to enable it to so act,\nd what coSu?ons and cir-
cumstances seem necessary to make real Congressional agency possible.
126Galloway, History of the House
, p. 60.
^^^Davidson and Oleszek, p. 13.
128ibid., p. 7.
^^^Galloway, p. 61.
l^^The Act is discussed at various lengths in numberless
places. Among them see: Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1973 ), pp. 16, 290; Congressional Quarterly,'
pp. 135ff, et. passim; Davidson, p. 102; Davidson and Oleszek, pp.
51-52, et. passim; Malbin, 1980, p. 165; and Galloway, pp. 60-64', et.
passim.
See Weatherford, p. 179. After three generations of •
public pressure, committee meetings were finally opened to the public.
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Davidson and Oleszek, p. 52.
Report:
'1111^1^17^^^^^^^^^^^
subcommittee proliferation since fL„ hh K u?^° 3anuation Act,
separate working groups in tte House t. L i"^*'?'
the Select CommitLe on Committees 111 1,'^^"^^! '^'3^-" "^P"--* '^^
^r^i^i^eJefomAme^^ Rept 93 9?6 ""t'/f'"^'^^^^^'
confusion'l'resp:c?l??y'S?evaUnf;n'h"'HP- "J^^^^lictional
emerged since 1946 Mas, Jr^nlfl i - r"!'^'^^"^^'' that had
T ^- .i^^^^^^el Huntington, "Congressional Responses to theTwentieth Century " in David B. Truman ( ed J , ThrConqress andAmerica's Future (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-HiHTTl^^
^^^Galloway, p. 63.
-^^yciinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York-
330 Note that even the landmark legislation contained in the civilrights bills of 1956 and 1960 was Republican in origin ad pushedthrough House and Senate by Rayburn and Johnson only through t fuseof what were considered fairly drastic measures.




Committee for Economic Development, Making Congress More
Effective: A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy
Committee (New York: Committee for Ecnnnmir npvplnpmp nt, 1971), p. 1 1.
143^|elson W. Polsby, "Strengthening Congress," in Nelson







THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS: THE COLLAPSF of
INSTITUTIONAL PAIDEA AND THE ISOLATi
'
OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER
It was now late in the evening about in-i^n ^,.a ^-u
chamber was crowded with over three hundLd '
^
of whom were anxious to go home LerJ til a P^p's'"^""' ""''^propose an amendment to [the billl ll k '^"^^^ "^^'^
orde?l Tep^^tedir ounde^S^;?s^^^a::^^^
o^cf:nd 'f'ol ''^Z^
Of the^House".: r^^nfs^^h debate
.uicU. conside:. :::^]^e^^^Z^^^l,^
tion'o? thrfb?n'l'''Rnn" ''^^''^ ''''' adop-r e LbillJ. Boiling demanded a roll call vote a<.
rushed tn'Ld^ "i!'''''' '''''' proponents a d op onen s
Zl rit ^ J'''' ^'^^'"9 with their colleagues; the? mannedthe doors leading into the chamber and grabbed members a^they entered urging them to vote this way or that and the
llllTV'' ''''''' advice'on how to vote fasked by a colleague. As the allotted fifteen minutes for arecorded vote slipped by, with members following the tally onthe electronic scoreboards on either side of the chamber i?became c ear that the bill would be adopted.
.
.
. Bollinqsat calmly throughout the vote, remarking to an aide that at
^hl'pK f?i ^ ^^"^^^ democratic process to work.
.5 ' 203-165. The Committeeof the Whole rose, and the House voted 359 to 7 to approve
Davidson & Oleszek.
House passes Committee Reform Bill
8 October, 1974
Birth of the Contemporary Congress: The Reforms of the 197Qs
From the late 1930s to the late 1960s, a very distinctive
type of House existed. It took shape over several decades in
response to the breakdown of the highly centralized and
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constellation of nornis quUe fa,nn[,r ^^1^'*^ ^t-on of political scienti ts- sei on'tv .nHreciprocity, specialization civil L i.T ^PP'-^^ticeship,pered partisanship and n^^^it ,^ ! ^ accommodation, tem-
also distingulshed'by the hL hI^ Patriotism. It «as
co«ittees and commUtee ch i .en' nd ll '.TZof majority party units such aftL dominant status
steering or p^H^y commit
.'%he pr' ; ^l"md '"tstyle was accordingly highly oerson,! In]l ^^^''^''^'''P
and consensus-oriented
P al, informal, permissive,
at ful/;jr'eng?h' ailhe^'ul/'^'^r'^ '''' ^ouse was
political sC^nce! ConseoLnl'lt
'''"'"^'^ revolution in
Like so many other movements in politics, the reform movement
of the 1960s and 1970s did not appear sudden and unannounced, as we
have seen. In part, it grew out of certain manifest failures of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; in part it grew out of genera-
tional
,
demographic and electoral changes which had been held in
abeyance during the World War II years only to begin to impinge upon
the two major parties as the 1940s came to a close. In part, the
reforms can be traced to fundamental changes in the ethos of the
country at large-now considerably more liberal in its basic political
philosophy than it had been before the Roosevelt years. Such factors
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-.ained
,„ t.e .ac.,.ound ror a consI.e.Me t1,„e,
.nd
.e,an to exen
historical influence only gradually and Incrementally.
If one «ere to see. out an e,„bryon1c incident, a s,nal 1 change
that would foreshadow ™uch that «as to co.e, one could do worse than
to Single out the imposition of the "dohnson Rule" upon the Senate in
1954. Here we find a new generation of party leader seeking ways to
distribute power more widely and equitably throughout the chamber
Looking at the Senate fro. the vantage point of his new position as
Democratic Party leader, the forty-six-year-old Johnson could see the
drawbacks of a seniority system under which only those senators who
had considerable seniority were able to serve as members on one of the
"desirable," i.e., powerful, committees.
now je^^a^ -
something about it. He called a meeting of the SteerinqCommittee of which as leader, he was automat callTc alr.anand by way of softening what would be an unpopular orooosa
i ns nd IT '"^"^ ^^"'"^^ ?n':;aryi e ! 's o a under varying circumstances-
When I was a boy in Texas, I was a good friend of theC rider boys, Ben and Otto. Now Ben was older, and he waskind of sturdy and outgoing and popular among'the boys ndOttOj well he was more shy and retiring.
So one day I was over there at the Crider house and it
if hern.nf '''""^ "^^^ ' I asked OtioIf e could come over to my house for a day or two. But MizCrider, when we asked her, she said, 'No.' No reason, shejusi said, no.
"And Otto, he began to protest, and he said, 'But mama
why can t I go? Ben, he's already been twowheres, and I
'
ain t never been nowheres!'"
And then, in case the analogy had escaped anyone, Johnson
went on to correlate the less desirable committees with
nowheres, and particularly this year when there was such agood crop of new Democratic senators-John Kennedy of
Massachusetts and Stuart Symington of Missouri and Mike
Mansfield of Montana, to name a few—wouldn't it be a good
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idea to revise--not scrap, mind you iust revi^P fh.
committee?^ '^^^^ one good
Johnson got the plan accepted, first by the Democrats and
later, as Majority Leader, made it the rule of the Senate. Here «as
an early precedent then: those lower down the ladders of the
seniority system would have positions of power and influence available
to them. It was a kind of opening wedge, and it provided those who
looked up with leverage.
Throughout the 1950s, the general level of Congressional
legislative achievements was high, and its public approval rating, as
measured by the polls taken at the time, was consistently above the
60% mark. This was due to the combined internal influence of Rayburn
and Johnson and the external popularity of Eisenhower. The
Congressional leadership successfully used personal knowledge of indi-
vidual member needs to informally enforce discipline upon the Congress
with respect to important legislative initiatives. At the same time,
however, the House found itself blocked repeatedly, as it strove to
enact liberal measures, by the continuously long-playing and deeply
entrenched conservative coalition. This minority now controlled the
Rules Committee--without the approval of which no bill reported by any
committee could reach the floor. Much has been made of the genera-
tional, sectional and ideological differences which separated the mem-
bers of the coalition from the representative body at large in this
3period, and such factors were to play a crucial role throughout the
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,„e*e.s of u,e House p.evaned upon Spea.e. «a.bu.n to
"
acquiesce in their efforts to enlarge the reralcit. .
^ c t rant ominittee and
alter its balance of power." Again in iQfiR« d , , 1965 this same group, engorged
wUh new hlood by the Johnson landslide, succeeded in further
weakening the Rules co«ittee, first 5. reinsti tuting the lapsed
Rules When remitting passed legislation to Conference.^ ny 1967 it
had at last become possible for an electorally altered «ules Co™,ittee
to i,npose on itself formal rules of internal procedure and to diminish
-ts Chairman's powers. These innovations enabled the House as a whole
to provide substantial cooperation to the Democratic leadership and
ended ten years of agitation for refo™, of the Coimni ttee.^
Simultaneous with this came another set of developments,
rooted in the Democratic Study Group (,,SG). an organization of
Democratic liberals co.„mitted to liberal legislation and l.beral
control of the House. This group pushed for changes in House proce-
dures and party practices which at last resulted in the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970. Operating largely at the expense of the
hierarchy of committee chairmen, the Act served to liberalize and for-
malize^ pari iamentary procedure in committees and on the floor of the
House
But these were really minor changes compared with what was to
come. The historical tide was running to the younger liberals in the
chamber, as the old conservative southern chalrnen reached the ends of
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their careers, the civil rights
.nove.ent captured the sympathy of the
country, and the ever-escalating war in Viet Na. gradually gave birth
to a congressional resolve to shorten the Presidential tether in the
foreign policy area. Finally, the Watergate scandals provided the
members of Congress with an extraordinary situation in which the
ilML-Xmite liberals, at last within reach of the highest rungs
of institutional power within Congress, could successfully open the
spillways of a vast pool of stored up political ambition and desire
for change. Successive waves crashed over both Congress and the
Presidency, each leaving an altered landscape behind it. As we shall
see, it was the Congress that would be the more changed, and the
changes themselves would engender unintended consequences--as institu-
tional changes usually do.
How might we sum up the forces which swept up and over the
Congress at the period of greatest reforms since the Cannon revolt of
1910? They produced changes in Congressional procedures and changes
in the structure and power configurations of House institutions. As
such, they constituted a fundamental upheaval in the manner that power
is held and exercised there. Since these internal institutions, as we
have argued previously, provide the institutional context for the
daily habits of life of the average member, they exert the greatest
possible influence over his activities. To the extent that changes in
House institutions produced a different House, then, they also are
even now beginning to contribute to the emergence of a different kind
of individual inember--one who, as he has gained influence and con-
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fidence with each successive wave of chanap h.c kd r C ge, has been proportionately
enlarged in numbers and emboldened in designs. What follows is the
briefest sketch imaginable of the reforms of this period, taken pri-
marily from the account of Davidson and Oleszek. This will be here
presented to provide background evidence for the notion that a new
kind of House institution has emerged. If one were to attempt to
ascribe a general pattern to the politics of this development. I would
say that changes in one area of internal House political activity
themselves became the basis for subsequent and more far-reaching
alterations later. For example, neither the Johnson Rule in the
Senate nor the reform of the Rules Committee in the House at first
signalled matters of great import. But these innovations themselves
insured that subsequent questions of organizational change could not
anticipate traditional modes of treatment, and when the all-out
assault on the traditional committee system finally came in 1973
,
that
system proved unable to exercise the vital functions of self-
preservation.
Substantive changes began in the Democratic Party Caucus,
which first tentatively and then decisively focused its attention on
the power of the committee chairmen who had effectively ruled the
House since the overthrow of Speaker Cannon. Elevated through the
autonomous processes of the seniority system and acting as agents of
local constituency interests, these individuals had long prevented the
formation of effective national constituencies for general issues
within the largely decentralized House. This had set up a situation
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which many of the younger and more liberal members had found
increasingly nettlesome:
JK^n^rt^^^o^^^e^^^" ^r^Tdence of members and diminis ed pany oyalt ' "FrLdnffparty control." one writer observed " ^ean^l' tlfrom assuming responsibility for a nationrprog;am/'8^'''^^
Though the chairmen embodied personal concentrations of power,
they owed their influence to the seniority system itself-that effec-
tive and equitable mechanism which the reformers of 1910 had thought
could replace the arbitrary decisions of party leaders in distributing
powers and privileges. That the seniority system had effectively
taken the personal element out of such distribution was undeniable;
that it had also entailed other consequences, equal in political
impact and as fully capable of giving rise to resentment and opposi-
tion, was also undeniable. According to Davidson and Oleszek,
seniority overrepresents certain political factions at the expense of
9
others. The south, of course, was chief beneficiary here, and Its
"apostate barons" worked together to make Congress an extremely
inhospitable environment for liberal legislation as we have seen. The
old Chairs were at odds with the national policies of an increasingly
liberal national party they reflected the electoral victories of
the party as it had existed a generation earlier;^^ they tended to
make their House careers their life's vocation and clung to power
until well into their seventh and eighth decades, effectively robbing
the middle ranks of the party of influence, and denying an effective
sphere of action to the energies and ideas of those who were in the
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pr1.ne of llfe.^^ As Davidson and Oleszek note, "Not only does such a
syste-n waste talent in the niddle seniority ranks, but it generates
frustration and resentment. "^^ The attack on the seniority system,
when it ca.e, occurred on three fronts: first, fro. within the caL
m-ttees themselves; second, from within a rejuvenated Democratic Party
Caucus; third, through rules changes which increased the number of
leadership posts and multiplied the powers and influence of subc^nmit-
tees
.
Revolts from within committees were episodic and piecemeal,
and while they both served to correct specific malpractices within
limited areas, and reflected the first effective stirrings of
widespread dissatisfaction, such "localized" corrections of the errors
of power did not have fundamental effects upon party or House prac-
tices in general. Nevertheless, the Education and Labor Committee
experienced two revolts-one in 1959 against Graham Barden of North
Carolina, and another in 1966 against Adam Clayton Powell of New
14
York. The Post Office Committee had its own fling at the expense of
Chairman Tom Murray in a 1965 revolt which "took everything away from
Murray but his gavel ."^^
But much more far-reaching and historically important actions
were undertaken from within the Democratic Party Caucus. This group,
nominally supposed to ratify the committee assignments made by the
Committee on Committees, had allowed this function to lapse unused
since 1951. In 1965, however, it rather suddenly determined itself to
apply the rules, and strengthened in this resolve by the new influx of
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liberals following the previous fall's elections, prevailed upon
Speaker McCormack to call a second caucus. With this foot in the
door, the liberal reformers struggled to establish precedents for
caucus review of seniority privileges-based on the notion that
neither committee assignment nor seniority was an automatic right, but
that each was a privilege granted by the caucus.
A number of actions swiftly followed this refreshing change
from the language of "rights" to the language of "privileges." Two
Democratic supporters of presidential nominee Goldwater lost their
seniority in 1965; Adam Clayton Powell lost his own seniori ty-though
not for supporting Goldwater-in 1967; in 1971 two challenges were
turned back by close Caucus votes. Each of these actions helped to
establish precedents that would make legislators more responsible to
the Caucus.
Finally the frontal assault on seniority was launched by the
Democratic Study Group initiative early in 1970. It was proposed that
the Caucus select a committee to study the questions raised by the
seniority system in general. This move met with the approval of the
Caucus, and Chairman Dan Rostenkowski appointed what was to be known
as the Hansen Committee. The Hansen committee's recommendations
further clarified procedures for selecting committee chairmen: the
caucus would take up the recommendations of the Committee on
Committees one committee at a time, and any ten members could demand a
separate Caucus vote on any portion of the recommendations.^^ These
and other innovations were adopted by the Caucus.
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Other challenges to the chairrnen followed, m 1971, John
McMillan, head of the District of Columbia :on,,„1ttee, was vigorously
Challenged in caucus and given a bad fright. In 1973, the liberals
managed to secure secret ballots in the caucus, if requested by one-
fifth of the Democrats present. This device, of course, shielded
insurgent hoi polloi fom possible vengeful machinations frcn above,
inasmuch as some of the powerful chairmen were known to be capable of
holding grudges.
By the time that the 94th Congress convened, seniority
leadership had been decisively altered and the traditional arrange-
ments were in shambles. In a series of actions taken in December 1974
and January 1975, the Caucus completed the process begun by liberal
reformers ten years before. First, the functions of the Committee on
Committees were taken away from the Democratic members of Ways and
Means and turned over to the Steering and Policy Committee. Second,
secret ballots were now to be taken on the selection of all chairmen.
Finally, the chairmen of three committees were actually removed by
votes of the caucus. '"^
Davidson and Oleszek note that a third method of cir-
cumscribing the power of the committee chairmen and weakening the
influence of the seniority system was the institutionalization of sub-
committees. In terms of our own concerns with House evolution and
institutionalization, I think that this will turn out to have been the
most important and far-reaching development of all.
. . .
Though not unknown in earlier times, subcommittees
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'^'^^^^^^^^^^^^ Reorganization





This alteration had two major consequences. First, the power
of the committee chairmen was inversely related to the vigor and auto-
nomy of the subcommittees. Second, as the subcommittees gained in
power and influence, the goals of increased democratization and
meaningful participation in the direction of House affairs were
attained for a broadened stratum of the membership. At the same time,
however, we shall see that this historical turning did not necessarily
yield a more effective House, nor did it serve to help redress the
imbalances of power between the branches that had steadily elevated
the Presidency for forty years.
Among the Hansen Committee recommendations was a provision
which had affinities to the Johnson Rule: no legislator could be a
member of more than two legislative committees, no member could head
more than a single legislative subcommittee, and no chaiman could
head more than one subcommittee within his own committee. Two years
later, the caucus further strengthened both subcommittees and the
individual member of middle rank by enacting what came to be known as
the "subcommittee bill of rights." This gave the subcommittees
greater autonomy from control by the chairmen of the full coimnittees.
The writers for Congressional Quarterly outline this important step as
fol lows:
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1] Establishment of a Democratic Caucus on each full cc^nmittee, forcing chairmen to share authori t/wi th othe?Democrats The committee caucus was granted aulhoritv to
jurfs ic" ons'"''to''' ^'^7^^' ''''''''' subc^Mi 'ee''i d ti provide adequate subcommittee budgetsand to guarantee all members a major subcanmittee assign-ment as vacancies opened up. ci^bi
2] Requirement that committee chairmen refer legislation toappropriate subcommittees within two weeks, thus ore-
'^'''"^'.1 ^^'^l^'^S bills by not schedulingthem for committee action.
3] The right of subcommittee chairmen and ranking minority
members to hire one staff member each to work for them onthe subcommittee. The purpose of this staff assistance
was to help keep the subcommittees independent of the
chairman of the full committee. 23
In addition, subcommittees would be able to hold hearings,
receive evidence and report to their full commi ttees
. Note that the
basis for allocating subcommittee chairmanships and memberships would
continue to be that old standby: one's seniority on the full co.nmit-
tee itself.
This reform had two outstanding consequences. First, it
immeasurably strengthened the power of the subcommittee chairmen, at
the expense of the chairmen of the full committees, and considerably
decentralized House power at the expense of the leadership. Second,
it benefitted the liberals who dominated Democratic Party middle
seniority ranks and who were therefore in line for the lion's share of
the new subcommittee chairs. These were the individuals now empowered
to hold hearings, initiate legislation and generally push for a more
activist role for themselves and their little committees. The cumula-
tive effects of such developments were to further reduce the powers of
3U5
the Chairmen and force the,n to adopt a ™re consultative style of
leadership.25 and to drastically Increase the
.uantUy of hearings at
both the subco^ittee and full committee levels. David E. Price wrote
that "pressures for the dispersal of authority and resources show few
Signs of abate.ent."26 uote, however, that sunk in this pudding of
caucus and subcommittee reforms was a large fat raisin of irony:
In one sense, the seniority principle emerged evenstronger with the 1965-1975 innovations. True thfcaucuswas not committed, at least in principle, to the idea thatsen onty need not be followed inflexibi; in selecting cl-mittee chairmen. Yet, the thrust of the reforms was tospread the benefits of seniority beyond the s™ d'ng committee Chairmen to the more than 130 subcanmittee chl?ri,enIronically, there were in 1975 more seniority leaders than
Ve% ^Jhe ln°"''/' representatives, and. w'lthtn tS TZh-t es t seniority principle was extended to apply to sub-
rZ]ll'^ chairmanships-again to circumscribe capHcioucommittee chairmen. 2/ ^ ^>uu:s
Those inclined to keep track of and worry about such problems
as jurisdictional politics within the chamber will not be comforted by
noting that increased decentralization and democratization entailed a
leap in the order of magnitude of the number of conflicting jurisdic-
tions. Although by no means the only factor involved, this particular
problem contributed much to the overall tendency of the House to
divide against itself and to collapse into fits of paralysis when
confronted with general issues:
3y the 1970s, jurisdictional entanglements seriously impaired
the ability of Congress to respond in a timely and coherent
fashion to public problems. Studies initiated by the Select
Committee showed unmistakably the disarray into which the
House's policy-making structure had fallen. Jurisdictional
conflict was endemic, and hundreds of such cases, involving
virtually every committee, were detailed in the staff-
prepared monographs. Following the imperatives of bill
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?h:'s"L?urri$^dranl^^b?lu'5°:L'^^ histoncally shaped
their o«n co,nm1ttee ke« t ^
mental agencies preferred tn hl'm f ?' 9""!^^ 30vern-
1t would be haLled% friendlv ra her ''''tees. Once handled a give c^mftLp .there by precedent. The result ™s a !!;. h , T"^'""*
of responsibilities that often b^r nl? he vaquest''''""''resemblance to the House rules. 28 ^ "guest
The result, then, was twofold. First, the power and standing
of those in the middle seniority ranks had been increased and their
outstanding grievances redressed. Second, the complexities of bill
referral politics were also increased, and, therefore, the amount of
time and energy required for matters of fonnulating and passing
legislation were proportionately dirainished. The final outccne was
that the powers of Congress as an institution were not particularly
enhanced, nor was the efficacy with which it handled its
Constitutional duties improved.
According to Davidson and Oleszek, these changes ushered in
the era of 'subcommittee government"^^ „h1ch was characterized by
increases in the number of working units, leadership posts, hearings
30and meetings. Note, however, that on their analysis, these develop-
ments did not yield the greater benefits usually held to follow from
the committee specialization and expertise, and which Polsby and
others had praised earlier.^^ The average size of House Standing
Committees had increased; so' had the number of committee and subcom-
mittee assignments for which individual members were responsible.
Indeed, the average member now had a total of 5.56 assignments'^^ and




.eeting-hopping-both, as we shall
symptoms Of deeper evolutionary changes in our national institutions
Davidson and Oleszek hold that by this ti,ne, in the early 1970s, the
committee system was seriously overextended33
,nd that the problem
ultimately stemmed from a lack of adequate central coordinating mecha-
nisms in the chamber. In other words, from our own perspective we can
see that the problems which underlay Congressional ineffectual i ty in
1814 had returned, even though they now had different causes and took
a different form. During the earlier period, a rough system of actual
representation on the various committees had made the formulation of
consensus virtually impossible; during the 1970s, the consensus
problem was compounded by squabbles over jurisdiction. This meant
that the political question of "who is going to decide," which the
Constitution had adjudicated in favor of the national legislature, was
taken up anew inside that legislature. It therefore posed itself two
great questions instead of one. That this was and continues to be the
primary characteristic of the jurisdictional maze of subcommittees in
the House will become apparent soon enough.
It is important, meanwhile, not to lose track of the fact that
all of the reforms so far reviewed took place within the Democratic
Party Caucus, and had not been extended to the formal rules, and
therefore to the structure of institutionalization of the House
itself. However, by 1973, it was becoming clear to an increasing
number of members that the restructuring of the entire committee
system had once again become a piece of business that could not be
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postponed:
increased their autonomy Anv 9ffnrfl\.
actually
Davidson and Oleszek provide several fundamental reasons for
which the House as a whole was persuaded to undertake internal refoms
at this time. First was the problem of decentralization:
Reforms involving institutional prerogatives usually seek to
strengthen Congress as a co-equal branch of government.These might involve both a restructuring of Congress' organi-
zation and procedures, and the redistribution of authority
within the chambers. They are designed to enable Congress to
assert or to reassert control over governmental activities
and constitutional responsibil i ties.^S
The lack of central coordinating mechanisms and leadership within the
chamber made it difficult if not impossible for Congressto consider
the broad and general questions at the bottom of public policy;^^
second, the committee chairmen, as leaders in some sense of a national
party, were unrepresentative of the Congressional members of that
party and therefore of that party as it had been articulated by the
electoral decisions of the voters;"^^ third, the problem of jurisdic-
tional politics, as we have just seen, was on the way to becoming
insurmountable; fourth, and most important in my view, was the
309
generally recognized need for an effort to strengthen the House.
That some committees functioned better than others was clear
39
enough, and that, taken together, the co™ittees constituted a
structure of power within the institution which contributed to its
weaknesses in the face of executive power was becoming more widely
40
accepted. As far as many members were concerned, it was just
possible that "committee reform might help to restore the health of
the policy-making partnership that the Framers had intended. ""^^
Such reasons introduce a healthy dose of ambiguity for the
historian to reckon with. Some of these issues concern individual
member power and career needs; some of them concern factors which go
to the heart of the problems raised by the presence of parties in a
legislature; some concern the perennial conflict between actual repre-
sentation and the need for coordination and consensus within an
elected collegial body; some concern the balance of power between
branches of a mixed government. Obviously, none of these can be con-
sidered "ultimate" or "final" or "the" reason which most ccnpletely
explains why the reforms were undertaken. It should be clear,
however, that an absence or negation of actual, usable House power
moots all other questions.
Unlike other congressional bodies, the Select Committee did
not begin with those habits of cooperation that can develop
when members work together year after year. Its members had
to learn to work together as a group and master their subject
matter, all within the span of a single Congress. Their
assignment, moreover, was a complex and delicate one,
demanding a working knowledge of every one of the House's
standing committees. The task had not been undertaken in
twenty-eight years, nor had any of the members ever served on
a reorganization commi ttee.'^^
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This select Co™ittee was a bipartisan affair" to which the
Democratic
.e.nbers were appointed Speaker Albert and Representative
Boning, and the Republican
,„e*ers by minority leader Gerald Ford «
in its political principles, it see.ed to be an ideological
,„icrocos.
Of the House itself;^ in its actions it exhibited ,„any of the charac-
tenst,cs co«n to House co«ittee procedure: it held hearings, it
delegated specific areas of responsibility to its individual
.e*ers-
and in general it refused to adopt proposals which a majority of the
committee were convinced stood absolutely no chance of passage by the
wider body.
Since the history of the Select Committee's deliberations and
the fate of its proposals are the subject matter of Davidson and
"^^'^^'^'^
there is no need to detail them
exhaustively here. What is important to note is that in concentrating
on the problem of enabling the House to come to grips with the broad
and general questions of national concern which were emerging during
the 1970s, the Select Committee attempted to substantially alter the
structure of the House Committee System, and failing to rest content
with changing the jurisdictional boundaries that separated some com-
mittees from others, went so far as to propose the outright abolition
of some committees and the formulation of new ones. In addition, it
attempted to strengthen the role of the Rules Committee in assigning
bills to the various committees for deliberation and tried to enhance
the power of the Speaker as well. Its proposals were, for the most
part, not adopted: the Republican Party generally supported the draft
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resolution brought forth by the co™ittee. but the De™ocrats-„ho
after all, had the ™st to lose as Individuals-refused to go along
and decided In the Caucus to relnstitute the old Hansen Co™ittee
instead. This group, ill-prepared to perfo™ In six weeks a task
which had occupied the Select Co«1ttee for over a year, nonetheless
succeeded in formulating an alternative plan which retained so.ne of
the select Co™ittee's suggestions with regard to procedural changes,
while simultaneously divesting those proposals of nearly every schene
that Involved substantive committee reorganization. Nonetheless, it
was the proposals of the Hansen Committee rather than those of the
Boiling Committee which were finally adopted by the House. Davidson
and Oleszek sum up:
!af H°!!'' ^Pfo^^d.^hen It adopted the Hansen substitutewas a mild dose of comimttee reorganization. In effect theHouse adopted the version of committee reorganization that
have tn .p^in'^-^U'^''^^''^^'^"'^ • legislator wouldo relinquish a committee, and no committee was abo-lished. Responsibility for major policy areas (energy
environment, and so forth) remained scattered among several
standing committees. Some committees (Ways and Means) w-re
still overworked and others underworked. ... The jurisdic-tions of several major commi ttees--Appropri ations
, ArmedServices, and Rules--were basically left untouched. The
reshuffling represented little change from the status quo. 46
Note that what had taken place here was an action unprece-
dented in modern times. Not since the days of "King Caucus" had a
party committee dared to take over a House committee's measure and
completely rework it."^^ All in all, however, the Hansen Committee's
alternative proposals did not add up to a very great deal of reform
and this, of course, was the secret of their success in the House as a
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Whole. With hindsight, it is easy to see that the fate suffered by
the Boiling Committee proposals followed as an unintended and unan-
ticipated consequence of reforms already taken, i.e., by the rise or
emergence of subcommittee government and the distribution of power
articulated by that rise. What is most important about Davidson and
Oleszek's account of these events is not the specific characteristics
of the Select Committee's reform proposals, but the political process
through which they were formed and the manner in which they were
defeated. In essence, the plan for committee reorganization- fel 1 ath-
wart a newly entrenched and quite sanguine power structure which was
not about to relinquish recently acquired advances in its own
fortunes
:
Li.r^^r ^''^^i^S.^P committee reorganization plan, the
t. T^^?"' ^^^^^ P^^'^^P^ -^^^^ a fundamen-al conceptual miscalculation. They assumed they weredealing with a decision-making structure of standing commit-
tees rather than one whose power had passed in large measure
to the subcommittees. The focus on full committees was
understandable, in view of their historic primacy in Congress
and the attention paid them by the plethora of scholarly
writing from Woodrow Wilson to the present. Yet recent
changes inaugurated by the House Democratic caucus in 1971
and 1973 have accelerated a shift from committee government
to subcommittee government. Subcommittees have assumed
increasing authority and independence in legislative decision
making at the expense of the standing committees and their
chairmen. The dispersal of power bestowed upon more legisla-
tors a power base to nurture and protect. Thus, committee
realignment is a more dangerous minefield than ever before.
It must accommodate not only the committee chairnien but more
than a hundred subcommittee leaders as well. Predictably, a
majority of subcommittee chairmen opposed the reorganization
proposals in H. Res. 988.^8
It is therefore possible to see that the political context in
which the Boiling plan was derailed is more or less the same as that
313
wt^lch persists in the House of Representatives • to this day-despite
occasional and intermittent changes which have been inaugurated since




sen?oru! VSI'a Z^^^ bypassing the norm of committeeiority Second, the reforms increased the number and
giving him considerable control over the referral of leaislation. A fifth change, which was not actual y part of thesi
cr auo'n'in' ^97^? '^'^^ wafthe
Hou1e'Budget'?l?«:e?'"
congressional budget process and
Finally, the defeat of the Boiling Committee Drovision<;
restructuring committee jurisdictions left the maze of
ve^ untouL'd?^^^"'
'""^ subcommittee jurisdictions relati-
What we see, then, is that the party caucus--but not
necessarily the party leadership-has regained control over the
distribution of positions of influence within the House. The impar-
tial mechanism of the seniority system is no longer guaranteed to work
with automatic regularity, but its extent and reach have been
increased. Reforms made in terms of the general interest to
strengthen the House were undercut by particular interests which had
only gained the power to undercut them by virtue of reforms already
made. Outside interest groups, lobbies and support staffs joined the
subcommittee chairmen in building the opposition forces that defeated
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the Boning proposals. Altogether they probably provide a strong
bas,s for the prevention of farther reforms. Whether the new power of
the caucus will last remains to be seen.
There are three important lessons in the history of proposed
reforms and the battles to which they give rise as that history is
presented by Davidson and Oleszek. The first involves the general
.matter of jurisdiction; the second concerns the importance of personal
power and influence within the chamber and the third concerns the role
of special interest groups as supports of personal power.
Jurisdiction can be seen as a formal division in law or
authority of the realm of justiciable matters by a court or legisla-
ture. What happens, in effect, is that the legislature examines its
universe of responsibilities, subdivides this into particular areas,
Aristotelian fashion, and assigns them to subsets of itself for
action. In practice, in the common law tradition of the United
States, such subdivisions have been refined, evolved and solidified
according to the dictates of political power and legal precedent. As
we moved into the 1970s, a set of broad and general problems began to
Impinge upon the central government which were not only urgent and
important, but cut across the general lines of the logic which tradi-
tional jurisdictional areas embodied. Matters concerning energy and
the environment provide the most outstanding examples. Morris Fiorina
notes that even as late as 1976, jurisdiction in energy matters was
divided between eleven subcommittees from six standing
50
committees, making Congressional action on such important questions
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almost impossible to achieve. But "energy" had quite simply not been
one Of the fundamental categories or organizing concepts in the ,ninds
of the members of Congress-not even as recently as the late 1950s.
With regard to rapidly emerging problems, then, it does not seem
unreasonable to view the institutionalized jurisdiction in Congress at
any particular point in time as a representation of a past reality.
In this respect the institution literally faces its future backwards,
and while the jurisdictional structure is also a valid fonnal ization
of past practical experience-and, as such, embodies practices known
to work for over two thousand years-it can be seen as an elaborate
and deeply ingrained institutional habit that makes it extraordinarily
difficult for the assembly to deal with novelty.
The second lesson that can be gained from Davidson and Oleszek
is probably older than any known turning to precedent: men in power
are loath to part with it, and it was this reluctance to see them-
selves overruled which defeated the Boiling plan for committee reorga-
nization. The surprise for many had come at the moment that the
supposedly liberal Democratic caucus voted to substitute the Hansen
Committee for the Boiling Committee. Majority Leader O'Neill best
explained why the caucus voted the way it did: "The name of the game
is power, and the boys don't want to give it up."^^
The third lesson is in some mys an extension of the second;
it has to do with the emergence of coalition politics as distinct from
party politics, i.e., with the emergence of alliances that come into
existence to suit the purposes of the moment as opposed to such as are
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founded on long range programs or plans of government. The Boiling
Committee reforms were defeated by the liberals within the Democratic
party allied with their usual foes, the chairmen of the few remaining
exclusive committees, plus the chairmen of those committees destined
for cancellation. The members of this internal ad hoc coal i tion were
aided by their personal staffs and the staffs of the potentially
affected committees, and further strengthened in their aims by the
efforts of external interest groups whose past political contacts,
campaign contributions and inputs into the legislative process had all
been formed within the context of the prior existing jurisdictional
and power structure. We shall return to the matter of coalition
politics later, but just now I want to point out that first, one would
not have expected a reform movement such as this one to have been
blocked by liberals, and that second, their successful forays against
the Select Committee were made possible by the democratization and
decentralization which had themselves been institutionalized only a
few years earlier. Reforms which benefitted the individuals in
Congress, therefore, seem to have had the consequences of preventing
subsequent reforms that might have benefitted the institution as a
whole. Nor could solutions to the twin difficulties raised by indivi-
dual and institutional powerlessness been approached in reverse order:
had the reforms with respect to individuals not been undertaken, it
would have been even theoretically impossible to attempt changes in
the organization of power and authority throughout the institution.
That changes of the first order prevented those of the second.
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however, could not have been predicted. Representative Boiling
described his victorious opponents as follows:
wh^lU^ tteir'-oa'Sr^'k '"iddle-rank liberalsriu iiKe zneir pads. They are going to use anv exrii<;pprevent change simply because they like i^whe e they areNow they re not just time servers-some of them are preUvgood men and women who feel strongly that their contribuJin
critical'' Z'''' P^^^^-^^^'^ little sub[om"e r
^nH IS
30ing to devise a variety of techniquesand they 11 join with any allies they need to. And they're'very dangerous. 53
To sum up all of these developments, the key to understanding
the contemporary Congress-as that Congress revealed itself through
its opposition to the Boiling plan-is decentralization of power and
the rise of the subcommittee. In what follows, we will trace the
emergence of the autonomous "entrepreneurial" member on the level of
the individual, and the increasingly institutionalized and powerful
subcommittee on the level of the organization. The individual member
has been raised to uncommon stature by his position on a subcanmi ttee
and by his ability to separate crucial issues of local concern from
those of either a party or a national interest. Since his own posi-
tion depends upon the faithfulness with which he addresses the first,
he is held to no high standard with regard to the second or the third.
Highly trained and proficient in local district politics, he is at the
same time less inclined to strengthen and defend the institution of
Congress than at any time since the late Federal period. As Cover and
Mayhew have put it:
. . .
party voting has reached new lows . . . reforms have
been decentralizing ... the House Democratic Caucus has
been used less for making policy than for weakening committee
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declined preciX.lT']"'
^e'? e?? 'S^ '"""T'' ^«can be seen in the shoddv hanHiL! * declines
recent years.
. In short u P"^'^'"
is Characterized by «eak SarJ; le^d^^h' °^ '^''"^^ "80s
committees, a vast arrav H^'"' """'"'^'-archical
can do the r own thina ^nd .n^?'?'"!" '^''^^ '"^^^rs
member 1ndi vid^al
i 't e co g e ^.e shan'b '""l''''
::n\^ iL":/°de7:^tr^]fr i dVVT^"^
-
a reversion ton^e^rrlg^^Vc^s^l^^t^ll^L-ts^^n^sI "^^^
^^^^^^^^S^^T^^^^^^^^-^i^^^t^^^ Memberand the Predominance of Partim u^ T.^„r."'t7
over General InteresTs
llJ^",^"'^- politics is exploitive. What -Ise i^
em'for T^coZ'^'J. "P^'""^'"" °f the'Sashl tsysL r a second, more serious reason. Public oolirvemerges from the system almost as an afterthought The shaoeof policy IS a by-product of the way the systeirooeratL
^
rather than a consciously directed effort to deal Tth so ci
iTnJf'Tl' Congressmen know that the s ecificmpact of broad national policies on their districts ' dif-ficult to see, that effects are hidden, so to speak Theyknow too that individual Congressmen a^e not held responsiblefor the collective outcome produced by 535 members
congress Thus, in order to attain reelection, congressmenfocus on things that are both more recognizable in theirimpact and more credible indicators of the individual
congressman s power- federal projects and individual favorstor constituents. In order to purchase a steady flow of thelatter, congressmen trade away less valuable currency-their
views on public policy. The typical public law is simply theoutcome of enough individual bargains to build a majority.Maybe that s just politics, but we don't have to like it andpolitical scientists need not construct silly defenses for
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Majorities are built in Congress, not elected to it. So far,
we have attempted to explore some of the characteristics of the inter-
nal House institutions that determine and constrain action on the
floor of the House before anyone ever rises to speak. Internal House
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mstnutlons were originally Intended to aid the process of consensus
building by enabling Congress to focus upon great nu*ers of matters
centers of power within the body, and hence bec«e platfo™s for
Obstructionism and give rise to a kind of Congressional paralysis,
such institutions thus exercise functions that are clearly vital to
the whole body, yet which are far removed fron the floor, fr« the
theoretical nerve center of its activity. Here we take another step
away fro. that vital center, this ti.e going beyond the legislating
institution Itself to the local district origins of the membership.
From the standpoint of consensus building and institutional
function, this is a move away from the politics of fonnal aspects of
the organization of House agency, and toward its "raw" political
aspects, in the sense that we are shifting fr™ the dispositions and
distributions of acquired power to its necessary conditions. If the
construction of majorities in Congress is a consensus building process
undertaken to instantiate some policy, election to the Congress
follows a consensus building process of its own. No member of any
internal Congressional consensus is free to consistently oppose the
wishes of his district if he expects to preserve that external consen-
sus upon which his position depends. This is the most obvious fonii of
district Influence upon members of Congress as they act both indivi-
dually and collectively.
Less obvious than possible direct district pressure on mem-
bers, but perhaps more Important 1n our era, is what local district
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representation
.a. be co.ing to ,nean m'ten^s of the focus on Indlvl-
dual
.e.ber actlvUles. I.e., the kind of policies in the service of
Which the
.e.ber .ay focus his energy and organize his ti.ne. Under
the Classical model of the representative, he who was sent to the
legislature, if he was a delegate, could expect to be cupelled to
undertake policies or courses of action on questions that involved the
polity as a whole according to the wishes of his district. If he was
a representative in Burke's sense, on the other hand, he could pro-
bably count on keeping a clear conscience no matter what happened, but
in any case, consultation with the district was not a great concern.
Under the emerging regime, however, the activities of external consen-
sus building that occupy the representatives are incremental, highly
diversified, and unremitting in their demands on his time and atten-
tion. Local district consensus must be created and maintained, not by
a few great, but by hundreds of small acts, each of which is perceived
as vital or favorable by some piece of the electoral mosaic, which
must be pleased in most of its parts if the whole is to register a
favorable picture of the candidate. To the extent that this is true,
issues of a national import have difficulty entering the picture.
The logical place to begin exploring the relationship which
the Congressman has with his district is what David Mayhew has called
"the electoral connection." Mayhew adopted the heuristic device of
assuming that
. . .
United States Congressmen are interested in getting
reelected--indeed, in their role here as abstractions,
interested in nothing else. 56
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He continuously argues for his second fundamental assumption
throughout the book. This Is, s1.pl, stated, that In acting to
enhance their reelection prospects. Congressmen c«e to discover that
electoral rewards are conferred upon members for the positions they
take publicly and not for the actual effects they achieve In the
world. It's not whafs done. Ifs whafs said about It that counts.
For Mayhew. this ultimately means that It Is nonsense to speak of the
goals of Congress in terms of collective goods:
It may occur to the reader that the earlier discussion of
IrllZJ Tutr''' '''' ' collec ° 0 s
li u °" '"^^^^'•s like regulatory policy memberscou d have been portrayed as seekers of effects unable to
u'lZlt^oT 'ITU '^%,^i"'="'ty Of gfnera^'Jnrconec-tive action. But to argue this way would have been amistake. The notion of members as seekers of effects needs a
noTeffeas.s"?
''''
''''''''' '''''''' for positions'!'
'
If, then, it is a matter of empirical research for Mayhew to
discover that the typical member of Congress does not act in order to
achieve "effects" that are in the common interest, what sorts of
effect does the member seek, and how does he go about pursuing the
quest?
What emerges from Mayhew' s analysis is that the member of
Congress, qua member is formed primarily by the nature of contemporary
re-election pressures'. As those pressures have changed, so has the
relationship between the typical member and the general body. For
Mayhew, Congress has become professionalized and promotes careerism
58
among its members. He thus defines the body as "an assembly of pro-
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fesslonal politicians spinning out political careers.""
successful
pursun of a career requires continual re-election. Now the «ay in
Which Congressional candidates win party nominations is by direct
local primary, rather than by caucus or convention. This weakens tra-
ditional ties between
.e*er and party.^^ Morris Fiorina, who follows
Hayhew pretty closely at ti.es. traces al, of these developments back
to 1910
I'eadership^rthTbe'glnn'^no'of'^thi: f I'' ""^'""^^ ^^^^
ToZidi' '^t:^"^"^" p-"s^o=^:i^^^ty:n^\?
-^-^
reJa^n tte?; .e J Z^'"" '^'^ congressmen wishing to
became neb I ° h "^^df^^dual'vl"" '''''
d1rt:?^l^r?i;?r" "s^dirtrict^tlar^S-
around the chamber gave individual members a greater od nortunny to take actions to enhance their rlelect on effortsThe seniority system was the natural response to a qrouo of
w del^v^o'^Lo'"'''^^"^'"; ''''' '''' d?stribu'?ed ^o^r^
°'
Ttt^lli t^^"^
^roup of standing committee chairiien
t ^in thl'
'''"^^'"9 committees in 1910) who woulda ta their positions by the automatic workings of theseniority system. Acceptance of the seniority system gave
lhe"J.f/Jo^^r^:ss^%^^^^^ '''' natio^a/^pa'^t^i^rin
That members, acting on their own behalf, are able to improve their
chances of winning reelection is supported by the electoral advantages
of incumbency. ^2
^^^^ advantages which accrue to them
"
through their office, not only can they retain their positions, but
they can do so with a statistically-significant margin of safety."
That they must so use the office as a condition of retaining it is now
becoming recognized. Fiorina notes that those who do not seek reelec-
tion first over all other goals get weeded out.^^
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For Mayhew, then, congressmen
.ust constantly engage in acti-
vities related to reelection.^^ A.ong such activities, three are pri-
niary. and all of these are directed beyond the legislature. The three
activities are: 1] self-advertising; 2] credit-claiming; and 3]
position-taking. The meaning of the first should be obvious. One
puts one's name before one's constituents as often as possible, pre-
ferably in the form of messages which have little or no issue content.
The object is simply to become as well-known as possible. Dan Flood,
for example, was well known for turning up uninvited at weddings and
shaking hands. The family would be grateful; their friends would be
impressed. The day would be a success. Everyone would have been
immensely cheered by that wonderful Congressman Flood.
The second election related activity, credit claiming, is a
bit more complex and more portentious in its implications for
Congressional action. Here the representative tries to demonstrate
that he has been responsible for getting the government to do
something desirable. The best way to do this is to traffic in par-
ticularized benefits, i.e., to secure "goods" that can be distributed
among individuals or groups back home in the district. What counts
is that the recipient unit be of such a scale that it can recognize
the congressman's efforts and applaud his good works. While some par-
ticularized benefits require legislative action, such as the pork
barrel, the greater part of them are comprised of casework--thousands
of favors performed for individuals who encounter separate dif-
ficulties, usually in obtaining government services. To their succor
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the valiant representative, or a „e.ber of his staff, immediately
hastens. Thus the constituency co,„es to see the representative as a
personal contact In government, a cutter of red tape and a supplier of
goods-1n Short, as valuable and valued."** o„ similar principles were
once constructed the wonderful city machines of 19th century taerican
urban politics.
The third reelection activity which continually preoccupies
members of Congress is that of position taking. The representative
makes clear and striking pnoruuici^ on the issues of the day, sta-
tements of the form, "I oppose the President on this," or, "I am in
favor of an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons." Such statements are
fundamentally harmless in that they seldom yield concrete results or
require the member to do anything. But they do enable him to sound
good, and they play well on the evening news.
Why are such apparently trivial and largely ceremonial or
bureaucratic activities so important? First, they are crucial to
keeping incumbents incumbent. Second, however, a review of
Congressional history makes it clear that while not new, these prac-
tices have assumed a much larger role than previous both in the daily
life of most members and in making up the member-district rela-
tionship. Hence they point to deeper developments within the legisla-
ture and perhaps to changes in the meaning and substance of
representation itself. Among such important changes in member acti-
vity, the following should be noted. First, individual members in
some cases wind up acting as principal lobbyists for clientele groups
tend to
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the1. app.oaches to pa.t1cu,an-.ed
.enefUs. Those f.o,„ o,. machine
cn,es
.,.e cona. constUuendes ten. to
.e.ote ™ch t1,„e to t.e
distribution Of benefits; those fro. upper-.l.^e-Cass bases «
dea, 1n positions.™ Third, the satisfaction of electoral needs
-quires re.ar.abl, little zero-su. conflict a.ong
.ne.nbers.^^ and this
-kes It possible for the. to collectively act to
.eet their separate
needs. This becomes particularly Important when «e turn to the poll-
tics of congressional spending decisions, as «e shall see.'^
in general, however, the full implications of the "electoral
connexion" do not emerge until the goods-distributing representative
1s seen In the context of subcommittee government. Fiorina notes that
marginals have disappeared, as the new system has developed, because
congressmen have found it possible to base their reelection on non-
controversial activities-such as their casework and pork procure-
.ent-rather than upon other kinds of traditional activities which
lead to controversy and tend to divide the district.^^ This tends to
provide them with a good deal of independence from their fellows,
because on such issues as direct constituency service, procedures have
been worked out to make compromise and consensus absolutely painless.
Further, to the extent that members of Congress are on their own with
respect to seeking reelection," they are also on their own with
respect to depending on the national parties to help them secure their
seats. This, in turn, leaves them on their own with respect to par-
ties when they take their seats in Congress and find their separate
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ways to their far-flung subco.n.i ttees
. Mayhew notes that the subc.n-
^ittees themselves are related to the reelection process here
described in that they provide small group settings in which indivi-
dual congressmen can make things happen,^^
^^^^
^^^^^
cialization in Congress is, at bottom, a quest for credit.^^ When we
combine all of these factors we get two kinds of disaggregation or
decentralization within the chamber, both of which follow the
emergence of particularized goods as central to the daily round of
activities of members, and both of which historically came after the
democratization and reform movements of the 1970s. These are the
structural disaggregation of the subcommittee system, and the politi-
cal disaggregation of a weakened party system.
At the beginning of the 93rd Congress, there were 143 subcom-
mittees in the Senate and 132 in the House. With disaggrega-tion earned to this extreme, the number of members covering
subject areas becomes small enough to permit relatively easy
credit claiming.// ^ ^
This system, as Mayhew repeatedly asserts, serves the reelec-
tion needs of members remarkably well. Each is free of traditional
constraints to follow a national party program, and free to take posi-
tions that serve his own advantage. Therefore, the key characteristic
of the typical contemporary member of Congress is that he pursues
self-interested aims in a legislative and political environment that
has evolved in support of an ethos of decentralization. The pro-
fessional literature has begun to designate him the "entrepreneurial
member. "^8
The forces fueling the individualistic tone of the present-
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day Congress remain strong. As far Piori-io„.
tzZuT"." !i^':r::Hs
As we shall see later, the entrepreneurial member sustains his
personal power through Washington networks as well.
At first glance, the self-interested entrepreneurial member
looks like the participating, educated citizen of a classical
democracy or city-state. But there is a crucial difference. The
classical assemblies held and used power to jointly carry out collec-
tive aims. Members of Congress, collectively carry out individual
aims. The earlier legislatures determined the disposition of the
polity with respect to common policies and problems; our contemporary
Congress excel Is at the distribution of particular goods. As Peabody
notes, "members are relatively free to follow the dictates of their
consciences and to pursue the interests of their districts. "^^ If
this is all they follow, we are in trouble. The outstanding form of
"institutional universal i sm" now practiced in Congress is neither the
pursuit of common aims and goals nor a collective approach to common
problems, but takes the form instead that members of Congress protect
each other so that all can keep their jobs.^^ Two important con-
sequences follow.
First, in recent years, the rate of retirements from Congress
has increased to the point that retirement from Congress now exceeds
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electoral defeat as the primary factor in the turnover of seats,
cooper and Wesfs analysis of this phenomenon indicates that even
though congress as a whole succeeds in promoting the re-election chan-
ces of its members, the personal returns they get from the Job are
declining fast. Members individually face higher "costs" and lower
"benefits" in struggling to keep their seats.
For example, upon resigning his senate seat in 1978, Senator
James Pearson remarked:
Several factors are pushing in on us today. We havp an enormous increase in the amount of business to be done ^nd agreat increase in time pressure. And the parochal demandsfrom back home are greater. People today, more than everbefore, expect you to come home to your state just aboutevery weekend. ... if this government ever falls, t won'tbe from any external pressure. It will be because those
Tr^^inte'pl^'ror'^t'hfnk.^a'^"^'"'^
''''' ''''
What this means, as Cooper and West see it, is that the incen-
tive system of the House has changed, diminishing the stakes that
older members have in acquiring or exercising authority, and that the
decline in such authority accelerated precipitously with the 1970s
reforms. With the subcommittee dilution of power inside the chamber
comes the increase in particularized-and often trivi al
--demands on
members' time from the folks back home. In a sense we can say that
the self-interested expectations which so many ordinary citizens have
with respect to government are resulting in the selection of similarly
inclined individuals to Congress. Those with "higher" aims, who used
to make service in the body their vocation, are giving up.
Representative Otis Pike (D-NY) recently remarked:
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Being expected to put in a full day's work at the office anda full night's appearance on the banquet circuit can ae? ?nbe and has come to be a bore P^nni^ L ^°
thev !i<;pH , . • • • '^^ople bug me more thany used to. They are asking their government to do morpfor them and are willing to do less and less for thernse ves
... So much of the work is nit-picking trivia. 84
It should come as no surprise, then, that some older members
get tired and disgusted and worn down by the service orientation of
the job, and quit.^^ Among those who remain, "particularized
legislation," in Mayhew's phrase, becomes the only game in town.
The second problem that arises with the emergence of the
entrepreneurial member and the quest for specialization is a matter of
what I call the institutional paideia of Congress. This term here
refers to the process of socialization to and education in the folk-
ways of a body which has its own culture, traditions and positive role
in government. The student of classical politics is dumfounded to
find that the members of the national legislature are resigning their
seats, not because there are greener pastures el sewhere--as was cer-
tainly the case in the nineteenth century--but simply because they do
not want to be there anymore. Members of the boule
, the signoria
, and
the Parliament were not widely noted for resigning their seats.
Why were those seats attractive, and why was it usually a matter of
law, revolution or terminal illness to get someone to relinquish his
place there? The answer, in a word, was power, and the fact that "the
boys don't want to give it up." What seems to be going on in the con-
temporary Congress is that the members are being forced by cir-
cumstance to give up power in a number of ways; unanticipated ways;
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ways Which were not forestalled by defeat of the Boiling c.n.ittee
refo™ proposals. The old apprenticeship system 1s gone, the "in
order to get along, go along" rule has been repealed.86
authority of those in senior positions has declined even though it has
by no .eans ended. This factor is crucial to a weakening of institu-
tional cohesion that can hardly lead to anything but a general decline
in .e™ber loyalty to Congress itself.S? Barraged by trivial demands
from outside, the individual ^e*er becomes an entrepreneur in a body
Of professional politicians who have little incentive to seek the good
of the Congress itself. But. less inclined to keep the institution
strong, less bound together by the paideia or syste,n of acculturation
which is always necessary to make individuals members of institutions,
how can it be expected that modern members mobilize themselves singly
and severally to maintain the power of the legislature against the
spreading influences of bureaucracy and executive branch? Fiorina
notes that
• . .
increasingly, the individuals members can achieve theirprimary goals independently of (and even in opposition to)
the ends for which the Institution was created. 88
So where Mayhew and Cover saw a "reversion to the original
QQ
constitutional design, Fiorina sees a perversion of its ultimate
aims. Whether the Constitutional design has proved adequate to carry
out its aims is not something that we will take up in this place. The
point is that whichever of these interpretations seems more plausible,
we have a serious problem.
Having looked at the increase of interest in matters which
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concern
,„e.bers 1n thei. local particularity,
„e now need to turn to a
closer examination of the kinds of legislative action that the
congress normally or typically takes. According to Tho.as E. Mann,
the rise of the Individualistic or entrepreneurial member Is a centri-
fugal force when it co.es to legislation.^^ Here, again. 1t Is Impor-
tant to distinguish between the localized Interests of districts and
representatives and the possible generalized Interests of a national
constituency which Congress. In Its governing rather than representing
function, has a constitutional obligation to carry out. The pro-
fessional literature Indicates that there 1s a considerable difference
in the efficacy with which Congress carries out each kind of respon-
sibility.
Following Mayhew again, we see that members mobilize with ele-
gance and efficiency on particularistic issues. They do more than
stage simple referenda on Bills.^^ Instead, they mobilize activity,
determine the content of measures and effect the way legislation is
92implemented. And when will they mobilize? When motivated by clien-
tele (i.e., interest group) scrutiny. Mobilization is, in the final
analysis, a matter of having an audience, a matter of public2" par-
ticipation, just as Wilson claimed so long ago. The problem is that
the public itself has changed. It is no longer moved, as it once was
capable of being moved, by a daily press of important national
94
issues. And, unfortunately, without a national audience, a national
constituency, there is no movement on national issues. One final
comment on the dominance of local over national issues should do it:
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. . .
members are increasingly de-emphasizing their role asformu ators of national policies-a controversial role after
fnl^lit ^"^Phf^zing their role as ombudsmen who str feari to tne hearts of incompetent or arbitrary bureaucrats
f.-nnc ^'^'l^.''^
increasingly tolerate members' posi-tions on major national policies. What does it matte? ifone s representative is a conservative or a liberal
Republican or Democrat? One vote of 535 can't make'much dif-ference. But as subcommittee chairman or ranking minority
member, the representative in Congress has been a whiz atgetting water treatment plants and mass transit feasibility
llfnl^\
Moreover he or she kept the old coke ovens frombeing shut down by EPA and tracked down umpteen lost social
security and veterans' checks. Why give up the incumbent's
seniority and experience just because of disagreements aboutthe MX or national health care?95
What Fiorina is describing is a kind of tradeoff between
representative and constituency on the daily routines of representing
and governing. The public, so it seems, forgives the representative
an occasional sin of position taking, an occasional lapse on a major
issue, so long as he provides the district and its constituent groups
with the services and favors they have come to expect. This amounts
to a kind of absurd doctrine of "entitlements" with respect to consti-
tuent demands and representative responses. Again, it is the national
constituency which goes begging. On measures lacking particularized
benefits, intrinsic member interest in the impact of such legislation
97
vanishes. For Fiorina, what all this adds up to is a change in the
fundamental "mix" of Congressional activities.
At this point, the tale begins to grow murky again. I have
held that there seem to be two kinds of issue area, and distinguish
between them according to their form. First is the particularistic
issue or good which can be distributed more or less equally across the
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country, district by district-or at least in a nu.ber of districts
sufficient to secure the support of a majority in Congress. Closely
associated with this are the rise of the entrepreneurial
.enber and
the bureaucracy which oversees the administration of such goods.
Second are goods, someti.es distributive, sometimes not. which concern
the nation as a whole. With regard to these generally broad and
Inclusive problem areas, the professional consensus is that Congress
has considerable difficulty acting upon them. Yet our fragmented
Congress constantly acts and passes hundreds of major pieces of
legislation each year. Indeed, Congress is a hub, a beehive of acti-
vity. Twenty-three thousand people work on Capitol Hill, if we take
the notion that the pursuit of particular, at the expense of general,
aims is the primary motive force in Congress today, we will be able to
show that most of the primary characteristics of what Fiorina calls
the "Washington system" follow easily. The primary characteristics
are: the emergence of a new form of politics within the assembly
which we will call coalition politics and which is encroaching upon
older forms; the growth of personal and committee staffs and the
increasing importance of staff roles in lawmaking; the convergence of
particular interests, caucus politics and staff influence on the
legislative process in general and upon the budget annd spending pro-
cess in particular, which results in spending patterns that now seem
beyond political control; and the spreading bureaucratization of the
syustem, both inside and outside the Congress itself, which defeats
reform attempts and is undermining the collegial processes of the
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national asse.bl,. Meanwhile, the activities of Congress, as it goes
about its dail, business, are becoming increasingly ritualized and
e.pty Of real political content. If the Congress is no longer-or :nay
soon no longer be-a collegial bod,, if its
.ne.bers are resigning
because they are losing power, and if its deliberations no longer
carry real national weight, then we shall have lost it. And Congress
was the centerpiece of the Constitutional design.
The Predominance
°IZ^Zt^cuTar;Ov^
Nothing renders Congress less capable of action than theneea ror it,
... the fact remains that Congress is a nnnderous decisionmaking body, more adept at delayi g d
^
d uting legislative proposals than 'taking clear-cut decisive
1933 and I'qdi' ?ln''''' """"^h, such as those of
the lea?, .i :. ^"'"'
'^^'^t^^'
"^^^^^ timesgislative process takes time. One reason is of
course, structural: Congress is large and complex! But amore fundamental cause is political. In Congress there arelots of conf icting opinions and objectives to be reconciledand no underlying base of agreement that allows a
congressional majority to govern with parliamentary ease. Inthe absence of overwhelming consensus
. .
. conflicts overpo icy are represented in the Congressional parties
^nn'^^n"? ^"^^ factions that have to'be accon-modated before Congress can make any decisions at all
Majorities are built in Congress, not elected to it: hence
Congressional politics is coalition politics.^B
These remarks were written in 1973
,
before the final wave of
reforms had transformed the House. Congress has sat in continuous
session for 194 years, and there is little even remotely compatible
with its basic grant of powers that hasn't been tried there. Almost
every development of the past 20 years that could be pointed to as new
or emergent can be found in some earlier era if the student is willing
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to look hard enough. Yet the professional literature, as reviewed In
these pages, expresses the consensus that a "new" Congress has
appeared arnong us. What makes the present body different from Its
predecessors Is what Fiorina called the "mix" of Its activities 1 e
the reigning division of powers, the rules according to which It orga-
nizes Itself and the kind of politics that occupies Its membership
every day. In this section I want to briefly discuss what Is called
"coalition pontics," a process through which groups of members, orga-
nized sometimes formally, sometimes informally, come together in c^i-
m-ttees and on the floor to draw up and to pass legislation. While
Congress has long been renowned for its facility of obstruction, the
methods through which it acts positively are more complex and more
obscure. Coalition politics is particularly Important at this time,
not because it is a truly novel development, but because the current
context-of weak parties, weakened leadership, the entrepreneurial
member and a strong executi ve-not only provides the background for the
emergence of coalition or caucus power, but contributes to the
progressive weakening of customary institutions that formerly mastered
the legislature and bent it to the conduct of its business. While it
would require empirical studies to establish this definitively, I
think it could be shown that the portion of legislation either passed
directly or strongly influenced by In-House coalitions as opposed to
the party leadership, is in a period of marked Increase.
We are here concerned with coalitions of two kinds: first,
those which have some formal organization, perhaps Including a name.
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an office and even paid staff
.embers. The congressional memberships
of groups of this sort is drawn from one or both parties and these
individuals exchange information about impending legislation and act
collectively to block or influence it. Such coalitions are usually
organized around a single interest or issue. The second kind of
coalition may be, but is not necessarily, an outgrowth of the first.
It comes into action in cases where members find themselves united in
opposition to or support of specific proposals for differing reasons.
An example of this second kind of coalition can be found in the ad hoc
group that emerged in opposition to the Boiling Committee refoms.
Two of the prominent components of this group were the entrenched
chairmen of the standing committees, who found themselves under
attack, and various scattered individuals who had strong ties to orga-
nized labor, itself strongly opposed to Boiling's suggestion that the
Education and Labor Committee be separated into two committees. While
nothing formal or habitual conjoined committee chairmen to members
with ties to labor, in this particular instance they formed an
alliance which can only be termed ad hoc and which, nonetheless, suc-
ceeded in fulfilling its aims as thoroughly as any solemnly incor-
porated House institution. The refonn movement was diluted.
The activity of coalition building itself is generally
understood to take place at the behest of the executive branch,
operating in conjunction with the leadership of the majority party in
the House. At least, this is the form with which most students of
Congress would normally begin. It is the easiest to understand
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because the most visible, and our discussion will begin here because
we shall see that the difficulties faced by the contemporary
leadership in building majority coalitions are canplicated by the
emergence of these special interest fon.al and ad hoc coal i t ions
.
What I want to show is that the expanding influence of the new coali-
tions represents the onset of a new form of internal House politics,
parallel to the older forms, but having a different basis of electoral
and financial power and a different way of bringing its opinions and
influence to bear upon the general body. Much of the legislation pro-
posed and passed by the new coalitions is drawn up and supported at
the behest of single interests of both the economic and ideological
varieties and therefore constitutes, if one is to believe Woodrow
Wilson, private business.
First let us look at coalition politics as a consequence of
House organization and House rules. As we have already seen, the 1910
revolt against Speaker Cannon produced a decentralized House in which
the majority party leadership could no longer command the various
organizational units. Both party control and Speaker's prerogatives
over committee appointments and the Rules Committee had been con-
siderably weakened. Some students may take the view that these
changes made it easier for individual members to vote their conscien-
ces and represent their districts; some may emphasize that the problem
of building majorities had been redefined. In either case, what mat-
tered now was that, from the standpoint of the leadership, majorities
were hence to be solicited instead of commanded. Further, since the
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committee chairn,en held independent sway over diverse centers of
power, the majority party leadership under Speaker Rayburn found
Itself having to function largely as petitioners of c«,„1ttee support
and floor managers of committee legislation:
• . .
In sum, by 1940 the role and power of the oartv
Thouoh' h^ " h''^ 1!°"^^ substant? lly aUeTedg t e leadership retained responsibil 1 tv for and ron
VuTt c,f'"f,r»'''''°'r'''
9"^-^^"" dirlcuon in the con-
fJ:\ I business, 1t now had to operate within afar harsher set of constraints than in 1910. At the floorstage the leadership usually had no choice but to engage in
pa t Ur bn?r?hrf hT'^^:"? «jor1ties'b^hir cular ills t oug bargaining and maneuver At thP
committee stage, the leadership was often forced to~ inintricate and prolonged negotiation with committees and L
nnluln^'r'"' J"?''^' leadership was now p aced n apositio where inability to accommodate an organizational
unit would mean failure to pass party legislation, unless it
^nv
' '"^Jonty of such strength and inten-
sity that It could force a vote on the floor through the
cM^h'f^
of opinion in the House or the use of a mechanism
such as a discharge. The result was that by 1940 the oer-
sonal, political skills of the leadership, rather than its
sources of institutional power, had become the critical
determinant of the fate of party programs.
The painful process of assembling majorities through
bargaining and maneuver has been with the leadership ever since. Most
of the coalitions in question were based on party and region and all
were of what we might call the ad hoc variety, i.e., they had no for-
mal meetings or organizations. But one in particular came into being
at this time which was to serve as a model for others that would begin
arriving on the scene nearly forty years later. This was the conser-
vative coalition, about which a dense and lush literature has sprung
up. Its motives were primarily negative, i.e., to block liberal
legislation, and its success over the years has been remarkable. It
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too was an ad hoc coalition for the ,nost part, but aohn Manle. reports
that old Joe Martm and Howard W. Snilth were not above getting
together for Infonnal Inter-part, conferences with respect to certain
bnis.lOO What interests us here Is that an Infonnal association of
interests, "Two souls with but a single thought," as one observer put
it, could co.e together without organization and without fanfare and
exert enorrnous negative power over a period now approaching fifty
years. In his well known Th^_Congr^^
Charles L. Clapp provided a classic picture of the conservative coall-
tlon in operation, using the rules that govern debate In the House to
prevent House action. These particular events
occurred in 1950, on February 22. February 22 fell on
tt^lTtl Ihf ^'''^''^ ^EPC bill onhat day. The Southerners wanted to avoid that. First therewas a quorum call, then a roll call on dispensing wUh thereading of the Journal. After that came the readin of
rnx nJ^r^"
^^^'^^^^11 ^ddress. When that was concluded. GeneCo of Georgia rose and said, "out of reverence to the memoryof George Washington I suggest we adjourn. I move we
^
adjourn. Then there was a roll call on the motion to
u^H^'"'!!* u^^^
^^"^^ question of taking up CalendarWednesday, and there was a roll call on that. It was 11 inthe evening before we began consideration of the bill
We had to exert every effort to keep members on thefloor. The opposition was watching all the time. Every timethere was a quorum call, a group of the Republicans wouldleave the floor. John Bell Williams of Mississippi walked
through the aisles on the Democratic side saying, "there is a
cotton caucus in the cloakroom," and many Southerners would
walk off the floor leaving a quorum absent. Finally, at 11
p.m. Speaker Rayburn over-ruled a point of order that no
quorum was present on the grounds that it was dilatory a
similar point of order had been made just a few minutes
before. Then we began consideration of the bill and passed
It at 4 in the morning. In that situation one rule had been
brought up after another which resulted in a form of fili-
buster in the House. The rules can be used in that way. 101
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By virtue of its longevity and success, the conservative
coalition has become what can only be called an informal but
"permanent" potential obstacle to liberal legislation, and while its
effectiveness is subject to fluctuations of electoral strength and
vocal intensity, every winter of dormancy has been followed by a
hyperactive spring of negative access. The impulses it impedes
generally come from the leadership which, even in its reduced role as
bargainer and solicitor, continues to hold ultimate responsibility for
transforming the anarchically inclined House into an agent. Combined
with executive branch influence, the majority party leadership has
usually borne the brunt of the struggle of getting the House to carry
the ball, and we will begin our examination of the contemporary coali-
tions with Barbara Sinclair's work on the problem of attaining consen-
sus as it is faced by the leadership . 102 j^h^^ she finds is that the
internal changes of the 1970s have vastly complicated and even changed
the conditions which confront the leadership, and that the problem of
attaining consensus is more difficult than it was in Rayburn's time.
Sinclair divides the Congressional agenda into "issue areas,"
following the scheme laid out by Aage Calusen in his How Congressmen
103Decide
. She then tests to see whether Congressional votes on
questions in a given area reveal consistent voting alignments of indi-
viduals, by assigning each member a numerical "support score" deter-
mined by the number of times he or she voted liberal on a given issue
such as social welfare. A support score for a group, say House
Democrats or Northeastern Republicans, is the average of its me'.ibers'
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scores, and allows Sinclair to determine whether the exposition of
voting alignment groups has changed, or whether it is possible to find
movement in the substantive positions of determinate groups.
What does she find? On questions of government management of
the economy, Republicans and Democrats both began to split along
regional lines during the 1960s, and these splits deepened into the
1051970s. Regional splits within the parties also appear during this
same period with regard to the other major areas she singles out,
i.e., social welfare and civil liberties. (Questions of foreign
policy are more confused, because the reactions of the various voting
blocs to questions of this sort depended to a considerable degree upon
which party held the White House at a given moment. )^°^ In one of her
notes, however, she makes an important distinction:
. . . Democrats from all regions seem to be more willing to
follow party lines on those issues, especially broad economic
ones, considered by the congressional leadership and the pre-
sident to be crucial to the party program, so long as their
constituency interests are not fundamentally compromised.
Unfortunately, for the president and the leadership, the
latter condition excluded many of the most crucial issues
such as energy.
The energy issue, as it arose in the 1970s, is cited so often
in the literature that it is paradigmatic of what is being systemati-
cally neglected by Congress. It is neglected because it is a broad
issue, a general issue. It is true that the establishment of a
rational and coherent energy policy would benefit the general order of
society. It is also true that no matter what its method of treatment,
there would be powerful interests that would find themselves adversely
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affected, it is precisely such interests which are able to exert
leverage upon the ,ne,nbers, undermining party programs either by giving
rise to ad hoc coalitions, or single interest coalitions, either of
Which is capable of preventing positive action by the general body.
Sinclair's analysis shows us a House changing rapidly during
the 1970s. Member coalitions have found new bases for ccnmon action
in response to changes that began to take place in the national poli-
tical agenda, 1969-1976.108 Sinclair has shown that when the general
public strongly urges changes in the national agenda. Congress usually
responds with realignments of House voting blocs on questions of
policy legislation. Here, what seems to have happened is that
several broadly based sentiments for policy change impinged upon the
Congress simultaneously from different constituencies in different
regional areas. Congress, always responsive to particularistic
constituency pressures, shifted its internal composition accordingly.
But the result was no new set of potential majority alignments with
regard to the new agenda. Instead, the problems of majority formation
on the broad general questions became even more difficult.
Now the reputation of the House Democratic leadership rests,
in part, on its success in gaining passage of presidential
priorities. -[-^^5 ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ difficult by the entry of
entrepreneurial members who, while not a subject of Sinclair's analy-
sis, arrived upon the scene and declined to vote in fixed or predic-
table patterns--making it necessary for the leadership to solicit
their support again and again.m In common parlance, this means that
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the leadership had to expend scarce political capital every ti.e U
.anted to win a vote. But. as with any banking or financial syste.
its supplies Of capital are neither infinite nor infinitely renewable.
Sinclair also finds that the percentage of those who are consistently
supportive of the leadership increases as their seniority
112increases. Clearly, then, party loyalty is positively correlated
with increased personal power in the chamber and an increased stake in
the efficacy of its operations as a legislature. Given what we have
already seen of the shift in power away from the most senior members
and its decentralization throughout the subcommittee system, it should
come as no surprise to find that the leadership confronted an
increasingly unpredictable and intractable party membership after
1969. The result was that
coalitions were quite fluid; few Democrats were highly
reliable across all issue areas; few could be written off.AS a result, coalition building was more complex. The number
of members the leadership had to contact and persuade had
grown. Gauging the probability of winning was more dif-ficult, and so was deciding how to spend scarce time and
resources. The frequency with which the House leadership
lost votes which it subsequently turned around is indicative.
The list for 1979 includes the debt limit increase bill an
amendment cutting the State Department's authorization by 19
percent, a "killer" amendment to the stand-by gas rationing
bill, the second Budget Resolution, an amendment immediately
terminating oil price controls, and the Panama Canal Treaty
implementation bill conference report. In each case, the
leadership's position prevailed on the second attempt--clear
proof that a winning coalition could be fashioned. That a
skillful and active leadership lost the first time shows how
difficult it is to gauge what, and how much, needs to be done
to win.-"-^-^
As we saw earlier, the problem of majority formation has been
further compounded by rules changes: by the decentralization of House
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power; by new member Impatience with the old nor.s of apprenticeship-
and b. the rush of new members to participate full, at the c.mittee
and floor stage as soon as they began their ten.s. Note that these
Changes have also resulted in a severe decline in inter-committee
reciprocity, undermining one of the most secure means the House has
developed for facilitating the formation and passage of legislation:
Jeld^'TlnL^^'\r' 'J'"^^ "9° ^^'^^ the committee" no longer
nit .^cf'^f "^^^^ "^"^b^^ 0^ amendments offered on ?hefloor rose astronomically. During the 87th Conaresf ?4nrecorded votes were taken; during'the 95th ' IMo U^
What we are seeing is a legislature verging on chaos. But
more is to come. These amendments aren't harmless. They are used to
rewrite legislation and can utterly transform a bill. Sinclair points
out that the leadership, unable to predict voting outcomes and in
constant danger of getting "ambushed on the floor''^^^ has been losing
not only its ability to elicit or even to force consensus, but also
its ability to exert some kind of quality control over legislation
itself. The implication is clear: insofar as committee specializa-
tion and expertise are needed to draft workable and reasonable law for
a highly complex society, the benefits conferred by the cornmittee
system and its members' long years of specialized service can be swept
away in an instant by a wave of ill-considered amendments, urged on by
the inexperienced and the uninformed. While this is not the most
"democratic" of possible interpretations of recent developments, and
tends to lay the question of "representation" aside, the complex sub-
ject matters with which the contemporary Congress concerns itself make
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the question of the relationship between the c.n.ittee structure and
legislative competence one that should not be begged.
Sinclair finds, with Mayhew and Fiorina, that the "re-election
constituency" is a crucial influence upon
.embers" voting patterns.
These are the "people who have supported the member with their votes
in past elections. "11^ From the standpoint of coalition foanation.
however, all is again not well. The reelection constituency is
increasingly heterogeneous, the number of "hot issues" like energy, is
on the increase, and national politics is becoming "more intense. "^^^
As we saw earlier, controversial broad questions tend both to arouse
the special interests and divide the electorate, and the member who
takes evasive action when such issues come up is simply trying to
minimize the damage he can do to himself by speaking clearly. At the
same time, those who succeed in tacking special interest amendments
onto ;Tiore general bills protect themselves by enhancing their "credit"
with important parts of the home constituency. But tensions abound.
Sinclair notes that there may be disagreement between a member's
"supportive elite" back home and the re-election constituency in
general. This can cause the member considerable discomfort at elec-
tion time, and provide ammunition to his opponents should they be able
to alienate important segments of the constituency with quotations
from his record. The House leadership generally tries to persuade
members to vote their own views, since these usually are close to both
those of the leadership and of the supportive elite. A member will
usually comply when he can do so without giving rise to harmful and
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raucus publicity, but since the national parties and the president
have little Influence upon ,„enbers' re-election chances, their blan-
dishments can affect House voting patterns only marginal ly.
are some of the factors which now contribute to the growing tendency
Of .e*ers to rewrite bills on the floor, and add to the growing power
of fo™al and infon^al caucus groups to act independently of central
party direction.
That bills are now easily rewritten, after the conmittees have
done with them and despite the efforts of the floor managers and tac-
ticians to restrict debate and amendments, is another key to
understanding the contemporary Congress. The entrepreneurial member
has arrived; he tends to join ad hoc coal itions easily, and majority
coalitions sponsored by the leadership reluctantly. He always keeps
an eye out for the clientele and constituency groups who have
supplanted the national parties in providing him reelection security.
The circumvention of party and leadership interests, more often than
not results in floor dilution of broad legislation as the various mem-
bers strive to protect the special interests that are close to their
hearts or their pocketbooks
. Hence, the end product, again, is more
likely to satisfy local and electoral rather than national needs.
While House party alignments continue to be very important, and
regional blocs seem to be growing in importance, the role of the ad
hoc or special interest coalition, and the kinds of politics to which
it gives rise, must now be factored into any general review or analy-
sis of internal House politics. Such coalitions are rapidly becoming
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one of the crucial elements that dete^lne which Ue.s on the politi-
cal agenda will be treated as "national" and which of these, In turn
will become policy. They are also unexcelled at picMng apart certain
kinds of broad legislation and sending them down to defeat.
Therefore, Sinclair's work, which see.s cautious enough in its initial
emphasis on the problem of coalition building faced by the leadership,
exposes a host of problems which are new to the twentieth century
House.
These developments point toward deeper changes in certain
underlying aspects of the political philosophies of House ;nenibers, as
well as changes in their attitudes toward practical politics. The
following quotation sums up some of the contrasts between the House as
it was at the time of the Cannon revolt, and its present-day internal
pol i tics:
In an age when party regularity is far from an overriding
consideration, it is difficult to appreciate how important
party was in the House at the turn of the century. In this
period the great majority of members in both parties
subscribed to the doctrines of party government.
Representative government was seen to depend on the existence
of a responsible majority which had the power to rule and
which, as a result, could be held accountablefor perfomance
Only under such conditions, it was believed, could the people
effect their wishes. The individual representative was
thought to be elected on the basis of a party's platform and
was
_
therefore regarded to have an obligation to support party
positions, even against personal convictions or desires. ^21
It should be obvious, then, that a coalition or caucus is one
kind of organization and a party is another. Parties can be seen
as broad based alliances of a wide variety of interests, which band
together in order to gain power and use it to satisfy the diverse aims
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of their constituencies. Party programs thus tend to enc.npass a
somewhat broad ideological range and, when formalized, reflect the
processes of bargaining and compromise and tradeoff activity through
which a statement of an intended distribution of goods is collectively
determined. The promise of such a distribution encourages the members
to act together for the program as a whole. Party organizations per-
sist over time because they begin by establishing general agreement on
a program and then try to enact it piece by piece. If all are to
benefit, each must support most of the program-at least in those
areas where negative constituency pressure is not overwhelming. A
"coalition," on the other hand, is a diversity of individuals who come
together for the purpose of furthering a relatively narrow range of
interests, or even a single interest, and who act together with
respect to that interest alone. Coalitions are not generally held
together by wide-ranging programs or platforms and indeed, it is often
the case that those who comprise them act together with respect to the
single thing in question, allies at one moment and enemies the next.
. . .
Although two of the earliest groups (the Democratic
Study Group and the Wednesday Group) were partisan and
oriented toward broad approaches to policy and congressional
activity, the more recently established caucuses tend to be
bipartisan and interested in specific issues. Such a trend
does not imply that single-issue politics has come to domi-
nate these groups or the Congress as a whole, but it does
mean that most caucuses have organized around sets of issues
... or a particular point of view that affects a wide range
of issues (for example, the regional "lens" of the New
England Caucus) .123
We have seen that each member pays attention primarily to his
district, and to the specific requests and demands of clientele groups
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Which originate there. Hence it is possible to see the Congress
replicate this pattern as
.e.bers whose districts resemble one another
find common ground for legislative action. Mayhew calls this
congressional activity the sennci^^
^^^^
it is those segments of the electorate that are well organized for
political action which succeed in deriving benefits from this system,
as opposed to those individuals who (simply) have intensely held
preferences. Some clientele caucuses represent nationally organized
groups which happen to have electoral clout in many districts, such
as, for example, the National Rifle Association. These "target-
representatives one by one. Others keep tabs on the Congress as a
whole, rather than on individual members, and exert pressure on behalf
of their interests at appropriate moments of subcommittee and full
committee deliberations. This tends to be the method preferred by
agricultural interests such as the Tobacco Lobby. A straightforward
analysis of organized interest activity is complicated by the diver-
sity of such clients and by the number of stages in the legislative
process at which they might assert themselves.
In general, however, we can sum up the current state of
majority coalition building this way. Cooper and Brady hold that the
degree of cohesiveness of party votes is positively correlated with
the concentration of power in the leadership
. As party cohesivnness
has declined. Congressional government has become coalition
1 ?6government. " This means that Congressional politics has shifted
from a hierarchical pattern to a bargaining pattern, and that the pro-
350
cess of building majorities has become a constant search for
coalitions.l" whUe coalition activity to block legislation is rela-
tively easy to orchestrate, the problem of positive action daunts
liberal groups, which find that they must fo™ally organize if they
are to have any success at all.^^^
In what follows. I am going to lump together the two different
kinds Of coalition activity, that which marshalls forces in order to
pass specific programs or kinds of legislation, and that which
coalesces on the floor to reject or amend bills which have emerged
from the committee system. I realize that these are analytically
separable, but what is most crucial here is to explore the problem of
positive action and the dominance of special over general interests.
While Sinclair studies the problem of consensus building as
faced by the leadership. Burdette Loomis directs her attention to the
caucus groups which have sprung up among House members themselves.
She has provided a study of forty recently organized formal and infor-
mal House groups. " what this study shows is that when the
leadership confronts the general body, it faces a legislature already
organized into coalitions which tend to oppose entire bills whenever
such bills contain provisions inimicable to the interests they repre-
sent. Each of the groups included in Loomis' s study can be charac-
terized by its focus upon a narrow range of issues. According to
Loomis, the Democratic Study Group was the first of these to emerge in
1958. During the 1960s, two more were formed, then the Black Caucus
in 1971, nine more by 1975, and more than 20 additional since
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1975.130
For L00.1S. the emergence of such groups 1s no epiphen^enon.
She provides what ,n1ght be called the standard account: they arose
out of Changes in constituency pressure and widespread
.einber impa-
tience with national party agendas. She studies these formations
because they provide a focal point for us to see changes in the rela-
tionships among members and changes in the institution of Congress.
Prior to 1958, then, the institutions of Congress did not pro-
vide for or include organized subgroups outside those institutiona-
lized by the party/committee structure."! the political frustrations
of members during the 1960s and the reforms of the 1970s changed these
conditions as we have seen, but Loomis holds that the caucus, as a
general form of organization, is a function of member pursuit of self-
interest and the search for alliances which can protect such
interests.
Loomis presents a profile of four different caucuses or groups
which are "similar in their representation of identifiable
II 132interests." They are: The Congressional Black Caucus; the
Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition; the New Members' Caucus;
and the House Steel Caucus. ^"^^ While there are obvious differences
between them, they are, with the exception of the New Members' Caucus,
concerned with capturing government largesse for important clientele
or constituency groups. Hence they act on the basis of distributive
theories of justice and seek primarily economic goods. Loomis pre-
sents a Table in which the names of the forty groups are listed and
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some of their .ost Important characteristics arrayed, i am Including
that Table here instead of a more exhaustive summary of her study. ^^4
The groups span the ideological spectrum and the econ^nic
hierarchy, and some of them are famous or notorious, depending on
one's point of view. Some are organized with specifically econanic
aims in mind; others have social agendas. Few are concerned with a
national constituency, and none has been organized with the intent to
promote the vitality of national institutions. In aggregate, they
represent an impressive array of special interests, each of which, by
virtue of having organized itself, is now in a greatly enhanced posi-
tion to feather its nest. This last is furthered in those cases where
a given group has been designated a "Legislative Support Agency" which
means that Congress has generally decided that it is a useful and
important source of information with respect to its area of concern.
While it may appear that these groups present us with a
theoretical problem by representing a heterogeneity of interests in a
public space, I believe that such is not the case, and that the best
that can be said of them is that they add a layer of unelected repre-
sentation to government, a layer that falls between the local district
and the national assembly. The distinction between the contemporary
organization of special interests in Congress and the representation
of diverse interests in the classical assembly lies in what might be
called the "one-pointedness" of the modern enterprises, the almost
technical singularity of purposes and types seeking to promote them-
selves. It is important to note that coalitions of convenience fly no
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TABLE 1
'NONOFFICIAL" GROUPS IN THE CONGRESS
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Ad Hoc Congressional Commit-
tee for Irish Affairs
Congressional Suburban Caucus
Textile Caucus
Conference of Great Lakes
Congressmen
Congressional Ad Hoc Monitor-
ing Group on South Africa
Metropoliun Area Caucus
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The group bond can be variety of diWerent fsctori: ideologydemogrsphy, geogr.phicsl feature or region, a amgle itaue a ki
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- Clerk. hire. D - Due.. S - Sub«:nption.. 0 - Outside
House Administration Committee designation as legislative
support group (96th CongreM, 1979)
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regular party flag. These economic and social interests do not striv.
to promote the general welfare so much as they try to precipitate
Changes in existing practices which will be of direct benefit to them-
selves. Hence it is not unusual for certain industry groups to press
for the imposition of import tariffs and quotas in selected areas,
without giving thought to the national balance of payments or overall
export trade. Similarly, other groups come forward to press their
particular moral or ethnic concerns, seeking legislative authorization
for programs which have not surfaced as part of a national agenda
realignment and which would be costly to administer. If such special
interests are seen in this way, then it becomes possible to tar both
those of the Left and those of the Right with the same brush, and
perhaps show that with respect to neglecting the viability of Congress
as an institution with a national constituency, they have more in co.n-
mon than first appears.
It has already been stated that these organizations have a
palpable and growing effect on legislation. The positive par-
ticipation of their membership is often a necessary condition for the
formation of many majorities, and the legislative activity of those
members who have enrolled in their lists can be highly effective.
Very often it turns out that, with respect to the act of legislating,
what they do not alter by amending, they block by opposing. The
balance of their activities may indeed be to promote and strengthen
those interests in whose name they have come into being, but these







.I.e.e 1„.e.ests can u.e pUce ope.,
politically.
This 1s no simple
.atter on the level of theory. Regi
Voung's analysis showed. The parties themselves have long stood for
p™9ra,ns «h1ch have often
.een drawn up to change perceived l.palances
-
socal and economic power throughout ^erlcan society.
,n the one
case, as Young showed, the blocs which emerged In the Federalist
period evinced a lack of statesmanship and led to a paralysis 1n
Cohgress that ended only with Jackson's election In 1828-a develop-
ment that did nothing to strengthen the Institutional position of
congress. In the case of parties, the history of their successes has
usually hinged on converting a substantial portion of the electorate
to their views. Perhaps Congress Is the proper place for a minority
to attempt to build a national constituency for Its programs; perhaps
there Is no other available forum. But these new groups are dif-
ferent. They are more than affinity groups and less than parties.
Many are not concerned with even so broad a range of affairs as are
embraced by regional Interests. Instead, they have narrow foci and
very often are In no position to persuade a national majority to
follow them. This goes to the heart of the matters now beleagering
Congress: what sorts of Issues should be raised there? In my view,
only those which can be shown to belong on the national agenda.
Therefore. Loomls's work echoes what is becoming a general
theme In these pages. She finds that the growing power of special
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interests Interferes «1th Congress's ability to discover and serve a
general one:






substantial numbers of particular
Oodd and Oppenheimer link these developments not only to the
constituency pressures with which we were concerned in the last sec-
tion, but to the subcommittee system itself. Their analysis shows
that changes in the formal institutionalization of the House, i.e.,
the rise of subcommittee government, have led to the appearance of
other institutions, not expected, and that one apparent consequence is
that the quality and frequency of dialogue between those who disagree
has diminished rather than increased:
As power has shifted from committees to subcommittees cmrnittee decisionmaking has moved to work groups with far ^ rehomogeneous environments. In other words, when one cuts^committee jurisdiction into a variety of egments and qiv'seach subcomm ttee one segment to review, that egment w ninclude within It a fewer number of pol cy concerns Cuttina
reZZi'^Uil T'V''''' '''' P^*^'^^ and p^l^cisponsibility for decisions in the discrete subcoimni tteesencourages particularized single-interest groups ?o disengagefrom umbrella lobby groups (that is, lobby groups that aggre-gate numerous interests in a policy domain into one lobby
effort) and expend concentrated effort on the particular sub-
committee determining the fate of their particularized
interest. Concerned with only a few policy interests these
subcommittees are apt to become the captives of these'clien-
tele groups.
The move to subcommittee government thus has fueled the
rise of single-interest groups in Congress and augmented thepower of particularized lobby groups, increasing the probabi-
lity of clientele dominance of congressional
pol icymaking..i-^D
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SO goes the rise of particular over general interests at the
level Of the s.bco.a.i ttee. Brady and Bullock go considerably farther
than this. They focus not on the subcommittee but on the floor and
they discover that the fragmentation of Congress and the rising of the
special interests has national implications:








lt is early to begin writing seriously of Balkanization in ;ny
view, but not too early to see that as the variety of particular
demands multiplies, and as the effectiveness of the new organizations
serving them increases, the ability of the Congress as an institution
that serves electoral requirements of any sort is placed under
increasing strain. Consensus is a necessary condition of
Congressional agency, and the aggregation of special interests into
omnibus bills is but one of several possible kinds of legislative act.
The hard, synthetic, integrative, broad and general questions are
going begging because they are controversial. The new caucus and spe-
cial interest groups multiply the number of controversial attributes
of certain questions in proportion to their strengths in the chamber.
Now if we define the national agenda in terms of those issues Congress
actually votes upon, then it is clear that the special groups play a
role in setting that agenda for which they have received no electoral
mandate. And they need not go to the floor to do so: it is possible,
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wording through the subc».1ttee syste.. to craft one's specia, ai,„s
mto the complex legislation which Is the handiwork of these s.nal!
institutions of Congress. In ten^s of the proble. of positive action
then. When the subco^mttee syste. works at all-an eventuality that
is becoming Increasingly proble™atic-1 1 works best to serve the spe-
cialized interests who are well-acquainted with Its back alleys and
by-ways.
Nor is this all. If controversy is increasing at the can.nit-
tee level and on the floor, and special interest influence is on the
increase through House institutions, it is also rising rapidly about
the individual member from outside the chamber. The waves lap and tug
at him as he goes about his rounds in the district. They toss up
liabilities of an unprecedented sort in the form of an electorate
which, in its several parts, absolutely will not forgive his taking
the "wrong" stance on whatever question is dear to their hearts:
Culver recently gave a speech to the Wisconsin Democratic
Convention on single-issue politics, in which he said
Strident and self-righteous groups of voters are proli-
ferating in number and narrowing in focus." He said that in
the past politicians could count on the support of groups not
each of which would agree with them every time, and "being
right ^^on most of the issues most of the time was more than
enough. Now, he went on, "for each narrow, self-defined
lobby ... the worth of every public servant is measured by
a single litmus test of ideological purity. Taken together
the tests are virtually impossible for any office-holder who
hopes to keep both his conscience and his consti tuency. "138
If the member can tear himself away from the embrace of such
groups back home--as indeed, he must if he is to function as a repre-




Plunged into a Washington c«.nit. no less riven cont.ove.s. The
questions at Issue see. to .e ze.o-su.. They see™ to he questions
upon Which one Is able to vote only Vs" or "„o"-o. at least this 1
the forn, In which they are cast. If constituency pressure is one
the ultimate sources of these developments, then that pressure is
sweeping the Congress along towards an agenda of problems for which
the custcnary legislative methods of bargaining and tradeoffs are
inappropriate. It is impossible, for example, to draft a bill man-
dating the partial construction of nuclear power installations in a
given area, or, perhaps, a bill mandating the construction of small
ones, in an effort to appease both those who would end the national
dependence on fossil fuels and those resolutely opposed to nuclear
power. Unfortunately, for the average member, the lines of battle
have been drawn well in advance, and the notion that the entire House
:-.ight take on the fundamental question de novo does not seem to arise
The interin, is filled with a kind of mutual adversion with respect to
such issues that dries up the kind of communication and dialogue
which, on or off the floor, only the Congress can provide even in
theory. Congressman David R. Obey (D-Wis) had this to say about it:
"Yes. government is getting bigger, but whafs eating thisplace alive is the growth of one-issue groups-pro and anti-
abortion, pro and anti-B-1 bomber, pro and anti-nuclear
power. Neither side wants to listen to the other. Consensus
can t be achieved. You take that kind of pressure, add the
ract that one-half of the people in the Congress were electedin the last five years, plus the fact that the party systemis collapsing, and you see the fragmentation and frustration.
. .
Moses couldn't lead the country today. "139
It would be quite reasonable for anyone at this point to say
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that the foregoing analysis sl.pl, l„„-eates that the natur. of the
Pluralistic groups «1th effective access to Congress Is changing that
a different
.ma of soda, and technological order presses upon our
antiquated Institutions with a,, the force of historical change, and
that the responsiveness of Congress, the advent of the relative
anarch, we see there now 1s a positive thing. Congress Is alive and
well. It "represents" the tensions and conflicts of the various
active and organized political and social forces extremely well.
Indeed, with remarkable sensitivity.
To this there are two responses. First, the Congress exists
not only to bring controversy into the public space and air it. but to
deliberate about it collectively and to resolve it as succinctly as
possible, so that the government and the polity can ^ve forward,
congress must act; It must decide. Its specific function is to meld
alternative arguments and positions into decisions that will apply to
all collectively, and not simply to each severally. In order to
accomplish these things, members who do not agree with each other must
be encouraged to talk with one another and to work together. Indeed,
this was one of the most Important aspects of House service until
fairly recently.!"'^ Second, in the absence of a Congressional court
of ultimate resolution of conflict, the political questions do not
ebb, and the wheels of government continue to turn.
It is no longer an open question, however, whether it be
Congress which does the turning. Most professional students, at least




.as fallen to the p.esi.enc.. T.ls
can now be t.aced to the three decentralizing forces we hav^ Just
reviewed: the subcommittee s.ste™. the entrepreneurial
,„e.ber and theM hoc and special interest coalitions in Congress. To the extent
that these forces complicate the consensus building tas. of the
leadership, they contribute to Congressional Inaction. To the extent
that Congress fails to respond to urgent general questions, the presi-
dency
.oves to fill the void, either through requesting additional
powers from a compliant, because confused, Congress, or through
thousands of insignificant extensions of its prerogatives via the num-
berless agencies of the executive branch. The result is an evolution
in our political institutions which is moving forward apace, an evolu-
tion which neither we ourselves as citizens nor our representatives in
Congress have had opportunity to debate and to decide.
To sum up. then, the important consequences of the present
Congressional system are: (l) that "public policy emerges frw the
system almost as an afterthought; "1*1 (2) that new sources of obstruc-
tionisni and inaction have emerged in the House and Senate
142
alike; (3) that therefore the powers of Congress are "largely
negative";^^^ and (4) that the present forces are pretty firmly in
place:
nnht l^'^T^T.'^ ^^u^^^ elimination of an agency or programfigh harder than those with a generalized interest in effi-
ciency or cost-cutting. 144
In a sense, then, the pluralism which was once so widely
hailed as a strength of our Federal system may be on the verge of
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devouring 1t. All those hung.,
.ouths. All those eager, grasping
hands. At best, the non-partisan special groups represent a wil,
acquisitive people for who. government has beco,ne an infinite store of
easily obtained goods, and they flock to it, like the ladies at the
bargain counter in Filenes, elbowing and pushing and shoving to get to
the front. "Every person for itself?" Roger Davidson, in .ore
restrained terms, describes the present system thus:
These Capitol Hill groups, needless to say, mirror the oresent state of interest articulation and aggregIJ?on in thepolitical system at large. That is to say, policy concerns
?m?! !n''''^^'''^*'"^^^^^ ' ^ultiplic ty 0 grouDs b tlittle aggregation takes place. Few developments have been
declinf'o? ? 't'"H"'r"'i
'''''
tirl J: . ^
traditional political parties and the expan-
n^?l. h'"/!'''^3'°"P'- traditional producer
^
aq ?cuUur!l''hr'T^''^'; professional , business, andgricult ral
--have been added a plethora of groups, some withquite specific concerns (the famous "single- interestgroups ), some with an ideological cast. Lobbyists representsuch diverse interests as individual business firms ciUes
counties, states, beneficiaries of hundreds of governmentprograms, antiabortionists, born-again Christians, nuclearpower advocates and opponents, and all sorts of consumer and
environmental interests. It is not the narrowness of thesegroups that IS novel, but rather their number and range, andtheir unwillingness to accept brokerage by political parties.Faced with such a confusion of voices, it is little wonderthat legislators seek not one party label but many, shaping
their images in terms of their factional allegiances. In
turn, these groupings provide multiple access to information
and voting cues, permitting members to participate, however
superficially, in floor decisions that once would have been
controlled by party leaders or committee experts. I'^S
We can decry and condemn these developments, if we will, for
what they cost us in terms of government action in a common interest.
But they are also costing us something in terms of power. If govern-
ment is being increasingly influenced by single-interests, it may be
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-ch 1nte.ests. othe. wo.ds, we.e 1t posslMe to cut
.ac. specU,
1nte.est influence. U .ig.t 5e possible to cut
.ac. t.e po«e. and
s-e Of the central gove^nent. This at least Is one ^plication that
can .e drawn fro. the wort of Donald Morgan, who too. a so.ber view of
our future iTore than fifteen years ago:
too7 ^r:^:':l^t^^^^^± 9otSnts
tion. local and personal Lif !'ff -^^ geographical isola-
poi/t?:arjs::riii pt: :i?rto"::ag°g:ra^;: '""-"Kt^z
tLTr. '°T''" -alnt e 0 -the'cons rt
w^s":^^ :;^dev^t?(helr:;ln1i:ri""^' ^ f^^^^"^
^^^^^-^^^^^^^Hcr^^^ Structural
Enclosure ot the Pu&TTc^paci;
Power may change in terms of its distribution to political
actors, or in terms of the institutions which form and order it and
which, in a sense, stipulate the actual conditions sufficient for
holding and using it. We seem to be living through a period of rather
rapid evolution and change in both the powers of certain key positions
within, as well as in the relationships while hold among the institu-
tions of the U.S. government. Some of these changes are more dif-
ficult to perceive than others, those between individuals positioned
in personal networks being, perhaps, the most difficult. In this sec-
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t1on I want to explore briefly the increasingly bureaucratic natur. of
the entire U.S. government in order to show that this development is
gradually bureaucratizi
ng the once-col legial Congress. In order to do
this. I will need to briefly describe both formal and infoanal changes
in our existing arrangements. On the fon.al side, we have already
examined the birth of the subcommittee system and the fragmentation of
House power which followed. Rather than examine such internal
congressional problems as coalition building, however, the point here
will be to concentrate more fully on the daily lawmaking and
legislating activities of individual members of Congress as they serve
on subcommittees. We have mentioned the emergence of subgovernments
in passing. Now we will also turn to the activities entailed by the
close relations that hold between subcommittees, agencies of the exe-
cutive branch, and the special interest groups whose effects on
Congressional voting and bill amending habits we saw in the last sec-
tion. In other words, here come the iron triangles. Providing a
bridge between such formal, i.e., legally constituted by Congress, and
informal aspects of our changing institutions, is the Congressional
Staff. This organ of government, which some have called "the third
House of Congress" was encouraged to grow by the Legislative
Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970, and now appears in the service
of individual members, subcommittees, full committees, select commit-
tees, conference committees, House caucuses and even special task for-
ces. It has also begun to show up in the professional literature
where it is taking on the dimensions of a problem. The staff exercise
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a variety of functions, so.e useful, so.e not, and affect legislation
floor activity, and the reach of Congress throughout government and
society, our task will be to see whether the large staffs of the pre-
sent day serve to augment or diminish the powers of the Congress that
they were instituted to strengthen against the spreading powers of the
imperial presidency. 147 our basic question: does the staff, in
general, free the Congress to perform its legislative functions, or is
it enmeshing it so thoroughly with the rest of a canplex government
that it is changing the very nature of Congress as an organization at
the expense of its powers as a general interest body? We will answer
this question largely on the basis of information gathered on the
informal side of change: from personal power networks, infonnation
networks, ^ssue networks, the growth in information that staffs can
make available to members, and the daily round of ritual participation
in staged "events" which members follow every day. Changes of this
latter sort are called "informal" here because they were not specifi-
cally legislated by Congress but have simply followed, almost by acci-
dent, from the formally-mandated "reform" legislation passed by the
legislature at various periods. 148
There are two phenomena that it is necessary to clarify at the
outset. First is the contrast in both form and efficiency, between
collegial and bureaucratic modes of organization. Second is the dyna-
mic relationship that connects the Congress with those executive
branch agencies which were given birth in legislation. Congress
creates, say, an executive agency and later that agency returns to act
367
tion and the quality of the ends produced bv coli.n.- ^y uu a y legial as opposed to
bureaucratic organizations:
If one reviews the standard accounts of the state of the
congressional
.ind at the ti.e of passage of the Budget and Accounting
Act Of 1921. one will fl„d that they depict a Congress acting on just
such an understanding of Us situation as this. The budget seeded to
be unmanageable and the spending levels determined through legislative
co.pro.1se had led to a severe outbreak of national outrage. Feeling
guilty and humiliated and quite unable to cope «1th the c«.plexity of
government finance. Congress finally handed the entire messy business
over to the executive branch which, it «as supposed, would coordinate
spending policies and check the excesses of porkbarrel ing and
particularlsm.151 i„ other words, the inefficiencies of collegial
modes of procedure were thought to be radically unsuited to the nici-
ties of a complex budget process. Disregarding its Constitutional
grant of powers over the raising and spending of funds. Congress chose
efficient control over spending levels by transferring a tremendous
reservoir of power to that branch of government best organized for the
bureaucratic disposition of spending decisions by special 1 sts. 152
Hence, at a stroke, the powers to regulate and to distribute were
passed from the collegial and anarchic and undisciplined, but nonethe-
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both as an influence over and a constraint upon further legislation.
Rather than the competition that prevailed throughout the 19th cen-
tury, these two factors comprise the basic Interbranch d11e..a that
has impinged on the legislature for more than 50 years.
First, let us turn to the matter of bureaucracy, with which no
one can be more helpful, or more tediously familiar, than Max Weber.
Sharing a common generational vantage-point with Woodrow Wilson, Weber
saw the coming of the bureaucracy for what it was: a clear and
straightforward replacement of older, less efficient state foms by
newer and more efficient forms. As an instrument of social regulation
and the impartial distribution of goods, no other form of human orga-
nization could rival it. The following quotation will be as familiar
to the reader as the Gettysburg Address, but I include it first
because it is fundamental and second because what follows will be
based upon it:
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic orga-
nization has always been its purely technical superiority
over any other form of organization. The fully developed
bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations
exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of
production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of thefiles, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination,
reduction of friction and of material and personnel costs--
these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly
bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic
form. As compared with all collegiate, honorific, and avoca-
tional forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is
superior on all these points. And as far as complicated
tasks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is not only more
precise but, in the last analysis, it is often cheaper than
even formally unremunerated honorific service. ^"^^
Weber goes on to distinguish between the modes of daily opera-
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less elected. Congress to spreading hordes of experts, a bureaucratic
Officialdom whose interests were administrative and whose individual
careers were patterned along the lines of a permanent civil service
rather than on those fluctuations of fortune which always haunt the
elected.
But in handing away a set of responsibilities which it was
either unable or unwilling to claim for itself, Congress set in motion
a chain of consequences with the power to forge its own links. Where
Weber is helpful in pointing out the utility of bureaucracy for
accomplishing specialized and highly detailed tasks, Theodore Lowi has
some interesting things to say about the effects which massive altera-
tions in the policymaking process can have for the politics that sup-
posedly oversees it.
In his article, "Four Systems of Policy. Politics and
Choice, "153 Lowi starts with the assumption that "policies determine
politics. "154 Since government coerces, he says, it follows that an
aggregation of countless small coercive measures provides the context
in which politics takes place. While some policies directly affect
behavior, such as the application of general rules to particular
cases, others achieve their ends by working through the environment of
conduct, i.e., by acting upon the processes through which the ends of
policy are achieved. 155 j^is is important because through this for-
mulation we can see the relationship which Congress established first
with its environment and ultimately over itself, but now indirectly,
as it moved to institutionalize certain executive branch agencies and
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expand the role of Us own staff throughout the policymaking process.
The following details are provided primarily to illustrate the fonn of
this relationship, because it constitutes the fundamental structural
constraint upon the institutional liability of the contemporary
Congress, and hence upon the real powers of its individual members.
Dodd and Schott have provided us with what amounts to the
standard account of the primary characteristics of interbranch rela-
tions, as those relations have institutionalized since 1974.156 Like
most students of Congress, they begin their story at some time prior
to making the points that really interest them. They start back at
the turn of the present century. They note that by this time Congress
had already created an administrative state, and that this state form,
in turn, influenced the emergence of the modern Congress. 157 They
then go on to deal exhaustively with several themes. First among
these is that of the administrative state itself, which they see as
the product of countless acts of a Congress struggling to create exe-
cutive branch agencies for a variety of purposes. Today, such agen-
cies have become their own centers of power and the focal points of
particularized interests, and these developments are shown to have
important consequences for national politics:
Different agencies cater to different clientele and interest
groups, are subject to varying degrees of presidential
control, responsive to different political influences,
responsible for different programs, influenced by different
professional cultures, and conditioned by unique histories.
This balkanization has produced an administrative structure
extremely difficult to coordinate, direct, and control. Yet
it is supposedly the servant of Congress, not its equal, and
certainly not its master. 158
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Having found balkanization on the executive side of the
government, they turn to the legislative, where the. see a Congress
.arked by a decentralization which has steadily Increased since the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 gave Co«ittee government an
unneeded impetus:
A primary drawback of committee government i^ th;,t itc
co-51nrter•^n^^^
tion. Moreover, while the number of committee chliroerson.was small enough to allow informal coordination they eachprotected jealously their [sic] own prerogat ves and d^d not
h^M^lflo'el.fsl sm:;r^numb1rs^lu^°d
The reader who recalls our references to jurisdictional
squabbles and the prerogatives of seniority should not be surprised by
any of this. Committee government, however, led to something called
"subsystem" politics, the improved version of which is at the heart of
Dodd and Schott's analysis. They explain that the various conittees
began to develop their own peculiar personalities and group lives to
go along with their respective jurisdictions. 160 the same time,
the norms of courtesy and inter-committee reciprocity blunted opposi-
tion efforts to prevent passage of cocnmittee legislation that might
actually have been supported by only a Congressional minority. 1^1
Hence institutionalization eased legislative promotion of special
i nterests.
Meanwhile, on the executive side again, the policy implemen-
tation process often entailed considerable elaboration of the legisla-
tive guidelines established by Congress:
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tation occurred incrrasinolv ft ^'^''^ Tmplenien-
and were made by c?vil se,!ant1 IT" ^^^^ "^'^trative levels
appointees. To be successful n l'"''"?:"'^'^"" political
interested groups of cuLln^
i "^any policy areas,
attention not solely S Ihe nresldP^t ^^^^^derable
leaders but on actors at tL^cns ?^
°' congressional party
level-on congressioLrcnm^-tf ^ ^^^governinental
agencies.162 ^ °
committees and bureaucratic
This process of decentralization became increasingly elaborate
throughout the 1950s. It entailed a conservative political process,
far from the well of Congress, in which key personnel from within the
agencies and the committee system established networks of friendships
and working relationships with interested citizen groups that endured
for decades.^" Remember that permanent officials never and senior
committee members seldom suffer from the possible ill-fortunes of
electoral reversal and loss of position.
This tendency toward insulated politics was reinforced bv thelarge number of subsystems that emerged as the nationalgovernment grew-a phenomenon one observer has cal ed
creeping plural ism. "Ib4
^duea
During the reform period of the 1960s and 1970s Congressional
power was dispersed to the subcommittees, and their responses shifted
away from the committee chairs and to the full standing
committees. 165 The results could not have been anticipated: here we
see the appearance of an arena well suited to the needs of the
entrepreneurial member, one which enlarges his powers, his turf and
his opportunities for creditclaiming. The rise of subcommittee
government
meant a vast proliferation in the number of congressional
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congressional actors increased thf n K
tionships increased instead of 5n„r*""-°^ subsystem rela-be1ng the key actor in the proara?ns .^h '^"""'"^e chairs
ticular department, the number ?f eaU?.tf"'V" °^ '
authority doubled/tripled? quadrupl|d!li6'°'' '"9" <^1^^'"
This point is crucial, for it touches on the ™st fundamental
unsolved, and probably unsolvable problem in a representative
democracy: if the representative is to represent, he .ust have power
in the assembly. ,f the internal institutions of the assembly grant
the individual member power at the expense of those of the general
body, however, the grant of power to the individual is ultimately null
and void. Perhaps this is putting the case a bit too strongly;
perhaps member power is a function of member interest combined with
member perception that he or she is in control of those areas of his
political life that matter most. This notion of member power,
however, rooted as it is in the member's own assessment of his posi-
tion may be entirely too subjective. We will return to this matter
below.
The second paradoxical outcome that Dodd and Schott find
following the reform period should be obvious: instead of clearing up
obstacles to legislative initiative and oversight, the proliferation
of subcommittees has not only retained those obstacles, it has
multiplied them by spreading them more widely and deeply throughout
the chamber.
... if subcommittee government is not balanced by party
leadership, by central planning committees, by incentives and
mechanisms for independent bureaucratic oversight, then the
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sub-committee government ^ 0!! exacerbated in
power, this isVec?::iTwha? SpTned.i^r^ ^'^P--
The consequences of these two paradoxes are widespread and
serious. Fro. the. Dodd and Schott draw direct implications for the
current dynamics of the Congressional budget process which ensued, and
see it as having become a "war between the parts and the whole."169
They discuss the by now byzantine structure of la^aking activity
Itself, as each bill faces an enlarged number of subcommittees and
full committees on its way to the floor.l^O They discuss the dif-
ficulties decentralization raises for Congressional oversight of the
administration and its treatment of Congressional ly instituted
programs.l^l Finally they sum up the effects which decentralization
seems to be having on both the legislative and executive sides of
government.
The policy process in the executive branch appears at timesto be as truncated, disparate and pluralistic as in our
national legislature. Both Congress and the bureaucracy
exhibit many of the same characteristics that surround their
n^nM^!'""^ ?2
processes and, hence, many of the sameproblems. There are a number of parallels between the wayCongress approaches policy formation and the way the execu-tive branch approaches policy implementation. The executivebranch is not really a strict hierarchy in which decisions atthe top are passed down the chain of command, but is instead
pluralistic, with a number of competing centers of power and
expertise, each with their [sic] own institutional histories
norms, and outside power bases— anal ogous to the numerous
power centers of Congress that have proliferated with thedevelopment of full subcommittee government. If the national
legislature can be termed, as we suggest, "subcommittee
government," then perhaps it is not too farfetched to suggest
that the executive branch, in its implementation of public
policy, may be conceived of essentially as "bureau
government. "1'"^
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What are we seeing hereT Centralized government U undemocra-
tic, and decentralized government leads to chaos on general questions
and the sheltered protection of special Interests on matters of
detail. Dodd and Schott «.e a number of arguments and presentations
Of evidence to show that the gradual coincidence of fo™ and function
between executive and legislature constitutes the basis for unprece-
dented relations between the two. In both cases, there have been very
real downward shifts of power, to what were previously subordinate
groups or agencies. m both organizations, the decline of
hierarchy as the major control mechanism for the administration of the
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whole has contributed substantially to this downward shift. This,
they claim, leads also to an increase in the collegiality of superior-
subordinate relationships within the bureaucracy
. The decline of
collegiality within Congress as a whole, then, seems to be in the pro-
cess of being supplanted by its emergence within the subordinate units
of both branches where much of the real work of government and many
important political decisions now take place. Here is how they
begin to sum up these developments:
As power has shifted downwards in Congress (i.e. from the
committee to the subcommittee level) we have also witnessed adownwards drift in the executive branch from the department
or agency to the bureau as the central focus of activity. Wehave seen as well the rise of "single interest" lobby groups-
-a decentralization of interest group politics. The result
has been a proliferation of "mini-subsystems" in which the
political process revolves around a subcotnmi ttee, a bureau
and one or more single-interest lobbies.
What follows from this? First, it is clear that a crucial
point of entry into subsystem politics for special interests is the
ae
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congressional subcommittee. Decentralized and increasingly articu-
lated by specialization, these organs of Congress become more manipu-
lable as their respective spheres of influence have narrowed to a
short list of areas. In addition, to the new mechanisms of
Congressional interest groups, the subcommittee system itself has
altered in such a way that the organized are better served.
Second, the proliferation of interbranch subsystems creates
politics of decision and implementation over which Congress has littl
institutional capacity to exercise centralized influence or
179
control. Questions of general interest go begging and no one is so
positioned as to be able to assess the aggregate impact of the
thousand decisions taken daily throughout the subsystems. Third, the
general institutional ethos of Congress, as it is at present, is con-
tinued pressure for more decentralization and internal democracy
coupled with member resistance to reforms that might recentralize
180power. In other words, the entrepreneurial members, from their
relatively elevated roosts in the subcommittee system, actively plump
for further strengthening of those centrifugal forces which have done
so much to weaken the general body already. Fourth, the daily process
of government operations, having moved to the subsystem level, consti-
tutes a self-perpetuating power base of interbranch interest networks
maintained by those who share common fields of expertise, experience
181
and influence. These networks, like the subcommittee members within
Congress itself, have been known to resist the kinds of reform that
might move the locus of decisionmaking back up the hierarchy to those
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levels Where publicity and electoral pressures constantly l.plnge on
those
..ho «ke the .ey declslons.l^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
^mating re.ar. which John Gardner n«de before a Government Operations
Committee hearing on executive branch reorganization In 1971.
^2u^'r.?"'2l'"^ °' ^ep^ssentlt Jes ofa ^s^de
'
Congreis"''!':^'"'^
bureaucrats, and (3) sel"ec?ed Ibers
Participants in such durable alliances do not w^^nt th«departmental Secretaries strengthened A d theToppose even
Tui^nT'TX''' reorganization that might shak ' %
riin • . '^^J^^^ '"^^^^^ Shifted to another
Ly^TbX 'Tf'llr;^ the congressional leg of tSe trinityma oe broken. If the departments are reorganized astranger may appear on the bureaucratic leg of the 'triangle
Iuc^° ha'nal "'Tf' lll'll'''''
Particularly resista^tos h c nge. It took them years to dig their particular tun-
moied"l83''' ^^^^ want'tSe vau?t
Dodd and Schott conclude that the root causes of the decline
of Congressional authority lie neither with the bureaucracy nor with
the presidency, but within Congress. 184 j^^^ ^^.^^ ^^^^^^
Davidson and others, as the outcome of Congress's inability to orga-
nize itself such that it can provide legislative leadership and
authoritative oversight of executive branch activi ties .185 ^ave
traced the history of organizational confusion and reform efforts
within the Congress in the preceding pages, and the apparent
helplessness of all such efforts to stem the flow of power away from
the legislature to the presidency. In general, the evidence supports
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Dodd arid Schott's contention that
immobilized that it ha^ ^ftlr, S "^^/^Pt Congress so
and strong
rol\^\;\,^^%S:?^?3??a^^t]:rrta;:.fBl ^^^^^^^'P
But the historical evolution of our national institutions has
passed beyond the point of being merely a set of consequences that
follow from the confusions of a decentralized legislature. Other for-
ces are, and have been, at work here. If Congress has difficulty
overseeing its works, if it has problems exercising control, or even
understanding, over a polymorphous bureaucracy, we must also note that
it once acted positively to bring the bureaucracy into being. And
once there, the political forces generated by the deposition of power
in the executive branch returned to work with the Congress and stayed
to influence it and to change it profoundly. For Congress, the
bureaucracy is an environmental problein.
To the extent that the subgovernment systems now have primary
responsibility for the enactment and oversight of government policy,
we can say that with regard to much of domestic policy. Congress has
become no more than an adjunct of the Administration. The key to this
is to be found in the efficiency of bureaucracy, which Weber pointed
out so long ago. Bureaucratic methods characterize the executive
branch approach to problems, and at the same time, this approach is
incompatible with the confused and sometimes ambiguous processes of
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political debate and ccnp.o.nise that always plague assembled bodies of
-n. Hence, the Congress began by sharing its duties with the ,nore-
efficient Administration, but wound up adopting its methods. But
methods Of procedure and action engender habits of
.ind, much as the
environment of established and enacted policies influences the poli-
tics that co-nes after it. Congress began to think
.ore and .ore in
technical and bureaucratic tenns as the issues which confronted it
became more complex and its own internal structure refracted into
smaller and smaller pieces. Thus it began to turn political or
general considerations into areas of specialization and expertise that
could be handled compatibly with the structural and jurisdictional
demands of the increasingly bureaucratized executive branch which,
after all, had come to constitute the most important constant element
in its daily working environment. In undergoing such a process of
evolution, the Congress has become less and less like a collegial body
and more and more like an administration. Fiorina has summed up the
evolutionary dilemma simply enough: "Congress does not just react to
big government. It creates it."^*^^
In our context it is decisive that in the administration of
mass associations the trained career officials always form
the core of the apparatus; their discipline is the absolute
precondition of success. This is increasingly so, the larger
the association is, the more complicated its tasks are and
above all, the more its existence depends on power
Increasingly, the real work in all organizations is done'by
the salaried employees and by functionaries of all kinds.
Everything else has become window-dressing.
Two remarks are appropriate here. First, Dodd and Schott are
at some pains to emphasize that the classical Weberian characteristic
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^^^^ professional Izatlon of the
Public service and to the Increased emphasis now being placed on
collegial as opposed to subordinate-superior relationships. The key
to understanding this particular aspect of the contemporary Congress
does not lie in trying to match some diagram of its organizational
structure with that of the classical Weberian paradigm. Instead, what
counts is the growing professional izatlon of the Congress, which
Fiorina pointed out. and the growing size and professional izatlon of
its staff, to which we shall turn below. Further, if we are to accept
the notion that collegiality is replacing hierarchy, we need look no
further for supporting evidence than in the issue networks promoted by
special interest coalitions and groups, and the personal networks of
power through which individuals move back and forth between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government. Collegiality, after all,
seems to have become bypassed in Congress, except within the subcom-
mittee system itself where members work closely with one another, but
share responsibilities for narrow and specialized issue areas.
Therefore, what collegiality seems to exist is to be found in
interbranch relations organized along the fissures that divide and
separate one technical area of jurisdiction from another. In terms of
the daily operations of government, such fissures seem to have
replaced the great geologic divisions of power that were originally
mapped out by the founders.
Our second remark concerns the "window dressing." For some
330
Observers, particular,, the anthropologist J. Mclver Weatherford the
substance Is quietly draining a«ay fro,,, ,„any of the dally activities
Of the legislative process, and a Mnd of ,„ed1a ritual is ,„oving to
center stage, «h11e the staff works behind the scenes with increasing
responsibility for the real work and assu.es ever larger grants of
power, we will turn to this analysis shortly. What
.natters here 1s
not Whether Weber was literally correct, but whether he foresaw the
actual lines of development that democratic governments would follow
1n the 20th century. With regard to the increasing specialization of
tasks and enhanced Influence of salaried «np1oyees over elected offi-
cials, it seems that he was.
Now who are the people who fill these roles, who actually
attend the meetings and the lunches and the skull sessions that supply
the living tissue of human connection between Congress, interest
groups and executive agencies? Proceeding fro.n the standpoint of
Congress, many of them are not members of Congress at all, but members
of the Congressional staff. The essential nature of Congressional
Staff is ambiguous: it can be seen as the formally constituted
attempt by Congress to cope with a changing environment by providing
sufficient conditions of its own bureaucracy. Or, following Weber, we
can see it as a development typical of mass democratic societies which
have reached the point where most of the real work is performed by
armies of hired functionaries.
There was a time, back in the foggy mists of the nineteenth
century, when many members of Congress didn't even have their own
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Offices, let alone a secretary, let alone a staff, what did exist
«ere personal aides and a very tin. support staff consisting pr1.ar1l,
Of Clerks and secretaries. Throughout this period, and up until a few
decades ago. the elected representatives of the people debated
compromised and reached decisions about the nation's legislative busi-
ness on their own.
SSI..-';;!;"' " .«;-"2S s...,,
According to Malbin there are now, altogether, 23,528 people
busily at work on Capitol Hill, energetically supporting the 535 mem-
bers of Congress. Are the 535 helped or swamped by the 23,528? Not
all of the 23,528 work on legislation. Some are in charge of
constituency-related casework, some work in the Library of Congress or
for the G.A.O. But many are staff employees who work directly with
members or organs of the Congress in the daily conduct of its busi-
ness. For Malbin there are four kinds of staff with legislative
influence: committee staffs, legislative aides on personal staffs,
some support agency staff, and the staffs serving the leadership and
191
ad hoc groups. Malbin considers committee staff to be by far the
most important, and it is with this sort that his book is chiefly con-
cerned.
What are the major characteristics of this staff and what does
382
was llslTZsT^^^^^^^^^ Act Of 1970
large as they had been in iqIt [709 ' ^^"^ ^'^'^^
committee staffs were abou^ thrpp f '''''' Senate
232). These numbers keo? am In y"^' ^""9^ (^35 versus
committee staffs ne rirSoub .d Ztl'l '''''' '"'^^^(to 1,217) while those in ihl 1 ^ ^^^^ 1979
2, 073). 192 ^ouse increased tripled (to
second, more staff means more information c.ning into members-
offices, thereby strengthening Congress's ability to cope with a
complex world, and simultaneously raising administrative problems for
every member. Each representative now has his own little bureaucratic
operation to oversee and orchestrate.
^^.^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^.^^
for credit claiming and public exposure leads members to hire aides
^h^.-; kI!°
"^^1^ ^^'l^s and amendments bearinqt eir bosses' names instead of helping the bosses understandwhat IS already on the agenda. The result is fhat the new
'
staff bureaucracy and the workload it helps creal threaten
n tL^^S^^^:v^r^"t^^sl:d^?9^ P^P^-rJ.ust as'sJ^e^^L"
In addition to unleashing a flood of information on Congress,
and bureaucratizing its members' offices one by one. Congressional
Staff has also begun to play a political role. Professional co.miiittee
staff began to be developed in the 1920s on the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees and on the newly formed (1926) Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. 195 But the Staff were not
forever to remain nonpartisan and professional. As more committees
were authorized to appoint staffs, more staffs were designated
"majority" and "minority." By 1962. committee staff in general was
ceasing to facilitate the work of entire committees and moving to pro-
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mote particular pol1c1es.l96 The reforms of the 1970s strengthened
this movement immeasurably, for many of the subcommittees were
authorized to hire permanent staff to buttress their power and make it
possible for them to hold hearings. Such staff were invariably
designated "majority" and "minority." With these developments, the
power and influence of staff members took a quantum leap, for not only
were they the ones who gathered the information which made hearings
possible, their own personal and partisan preferences inevitably came
into the selection process. At this moment we are still in the full
flood of that increase in staff members which threatens Congress at a
very fundamental level, and the irony is that this increase was insti-




. . . staff growth and internal democratization
have gone hand in hand. The staff increases on House commit-
tees in the 1970s resulted largely from the 1973 House
Democratic Caucus's "Subcommittee Bill of Rights" that
liberated subcommittee chairmen from the control of the
chairmen of full committees. As a result, most of the com-
mittee staff increases in the House during the 1970s have
been at the subcommittee level.
. . . Since then ... the
distribution of staff resources has become more widespread.
This broader distribution both results from and reinforces
internal democratization, as more members have the staff
resources to pursue their own legislative ends.^^^
Not only have staff numbers increased in recent years. The kind of
Individual who fills these positions has altered radically. No longer
do we find the dry, professional, technically oriented individual who
came to fill a permanent staff position in the old days and stayed to





Washington. This individual is young, bright, usually a lawyer,
usually intent upon
.aking his or her time spent as a staff
.e.nber
stepping stone to a ,nore powerful, better paying position so.ewh..
else. 198 ^t the mercy of their Congressional employers and under
pressure to build network connections and some reputation for legisla-
tive creativity, these individuals give expression to their ambitions
by seeking first to have innovative legislative ideas, and second to
make sure that those ideas are written into various bills. When such
staff impetus is combined with the inability of most members to keep
track of the multitude of complex issues now moving beneath their
noses, qua district representative, subcommittee chairman, subcamnit-
tee member, caucus member and party member, it is easy to see how the
staff might come to exert influence. It is not difficult to gain
influence over the detailed affairs of a preoccupied employer. Staff
influences will inevitably be of the sort which the specialist always
exerts upon the generalist. Regardless of any formal distinctions in
their respective positions, many representatives must turn to staff
personnel to learn the details of the hundreds of technical questions
about which they must decide every session.
But problems arise for both the Congress as an institution and




for those who advocated the hiring of additional staff to increase
their personal power in the first place. When staff actively enters
the domain of policy formation, and this is what has been occurring,
it becomes a semi autonomous political force of its own, capable of
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influencing the Congress from within, and capable of shaping the
framework within which the individual
.e.ber disposes of particular
questions. This re.narK is not intended to i.npute either sinister
motives to, or to adduce unwanted legislative consequences fr^ staff
practices. But it must be noted that a changing workload and public
policy environment led Congress to hire more people who, once in
place, came into existence as a parallel structure of infonnation,
political knowledge and power. And now the two, Congress and its
staff, are inextricably entwined, one elected and one not.
The Staff's influence, we have said, pervades the
ta r han'?hrr'r ^^^^e in that ro'cess is ^ore impor-nt t an the first: determining Congress' agenda And
no stage have the newer-style staffs had geaer" impact onthe way Congress works. It is the one point in the orocesswhere the interests of the members, the goals Sf the sJaffand the position of staff in the Washington issue network
'
come together to influence what Congress does. 199
It is impossible to underestimate the importance of the poli-
tical leverage at stake in the simple question of agenda setting. No
one who has studied politics or history can avoid noting that the
first item in the minds of political actors from Lenin at Petrograd to
Roosevelt at Yalta, has been to obtain an agenda that will enable them
to move smoothly through a succession of intended aims. In collegial
bodies and legislatures, the task of agenda setting is usually carried
out by members of the assembly or by its leadership. Here we have a
case where the legislative membership participates in this crucial
matter, along with their hired servants. It is a little like asking
the butler who ought to come to tea.
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Different members and diffprpnt-a tterent committees use their staffs in
different ways. For Mai bi n
' s purposes thi. i .u, this is the same thing as
sayin, that they have different Mnds of staff. So.e
.e*ors Keep the
staff under tight rein, allowing the™ to su^arlze a legislative
situation and present alternative options, others loosen the reins
somewhat, allowing staff to criticize existing approaches and suggest
alternatives. The loosest reins are held by
.e™bers who let the staff
take the lead, while they content themselves with providing political
authority and support. Malhin notes that this third kind of staff has
been dubbed
"entrepreneurial staff because these are the ones notable
for coming up with Ideas that they can "sell" to meters. Thus
entrepreneurial staffs help advance the enterprise of credit-claiming
for both the representatives whom they serve and for themselves as
they pursue their own career goals.^OO Clearly, it Is the entrepre-
neurial staff, as opposed to the traditional, professional, career
oriented, non-partisan staffs, which raises problems for the practice
of representative government.
The basic and overwhelming dilemma that confronts the Congress
In Its staff relations. In Malbln's view. Is this: given the
overwhelming demands of a large and co,„plex government and a heteroge-
neous society. Congress needs a wealth of Information if it is to
carry out its Constitutionally mandated duties. It relies for this
infonnation upon its staff. The staff, for its part, generates so
much information, at office, subconimlttee and committee levels alike,
that both individual members and the general body are swamped by a
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flood of information. Congress cannot handle this staff-generated
workload. As ™ore and more papers get stuffed into the feeding
tube, the Wheels of the machine Urn with increased friction and
decreasing velocity. Eventually, we can expect
. .
. what? a fire?
A complete clogging up of all moving parts? Or will somebody decide
that the old machine is overloaded, inefficient, not up to the tasks
of the modern world, and must be junked? We are in this waiting
period now.
Once he has described the basic situation, Mai bin goes on to
point out a number of attending difficulties. Staff has its own
internal politics. Staff members wrangle over jurisdictions and
policy alternatives much as representatives themselves do in caucuses,
in subcommittees and on the floor. Staff politics adds a third level
of politics to those traditionally studied, i.e., that which goes on
among members in Congress, and that which goes on between me,nbers and
their electoral constituencies. This third level co.Tipl icates matters
by one order of magni tude .^^^ Further, with their own schedules and
outlooks foreshortened by the urgency to gain credit, entrepreneurial
staffs encourage representatives to "avoid thinking of the long-range
impacts of the policies before them"^^^ and encourage the kind of
short-run achievements which can be accomplished in a single session
and the results of which can be readily publicized. Finally, some-
times staff has been known to supplant members of Congress. A con-
ference committee, meeting to resolve differences over a G.I.
benefits bill in 1977, never gathered together to meet. Instead, the
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work was done when
sa« as issues of principle' ; sal the"'";LTfcompromise was no simple split-the-d ffe;ence Iffll t\find some canmon ground between the 1nte?Ists cfZ'Jbers of the House and Senate the staffs h^i ^fimaginative new fonnulat1on^s1gn1f^cInt^S rh.^ '""^ "'^^
aw These fon^ulations/some ff'I '
^"Le'n'
Malbin's discussions-of staff roles as "filters" of the
information which comes to inembers^^^ of rivalries between
legislation-and oversight-oriented individual s;^^^ of a conmon staff
tendency to prematurely leak results of investigative hearings, or to
publicize their own hypotheses, while neglecting to announce when pro-
jected scandals are not borne out by evidence;^^^ and of the manage-
ment problems that follow when one person is in charge of a
subcommittee staff of thirty that generates sufficient information to
sustain a public hearing one of every two days Congress is in
session- together suggest that the problems of coordination and self-
control that have plagued Congress throughout its history are can-
pounded anew by its staff. The difficulties that beset Congress in
the Federalist period now appear among the supporting staff members
who through their numbers present the body with what might be called
"bureaucratic" problems, and through their political activities make
those of the general body all the more difficult of solution.
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Nor are the problems of the new
.egl.e
.erel. organizational
and political. They extend to the quality of Congressional
understanding of the legislative matters. Simply p.,. .^es the «eU=r
Of 1nfor„,ation and technical expertise now raining down on Congress
help the hu.an beings who toil there perfo™ better service for the
country or not? Are they any better able to deal with the issues of
the day In ter.s of the basic principles behind the.-as the earliest
Congresses were so concerned to do? ,Malb1n presents one very clear
exa,nple, of a debate on a very broad question, which suggests not:
1977 'lOM rlt f'^"^'"^^ analysis in the natural gas debate of-1978 can tell us something about the wav Conare^'r
IT^'L"^ information have changed over the pas! two dicades. When Congress debated the issue of natural qasnricederegulation In 1955-1956, virtually all of Us quant ta4e
tiln^Te TJ/T. the'a3min? a"ion While all of its arguments about costs and sunnlipc
from flltt
°"
''^V'''' Judgments and as uS O S
be?ed took ni!nfkT'- should be mJ-r , place before any of the econometric models usedby the analysts of 1977-1978 had been developed.) On theother hand, the 1955-1956 debate was probably more detailed
and more sophisticated than the ones of the 1980s on the
thp'^cnr^J'
questions raised by price regulation and on
?n%h ^ .''''^^"i,'^^ monopolistic or oligopolistic controlin the industry. Thus, the fact that there was more quan-titative information available in 1977-1978, and the factthat Congress used its enlarged staff to help it cope withthe econometric technicalities of this information, do not
settle whether the senators and representatives of 1977-1978
were themselves any better informed than their
predecessors. '^^y
It seems then, that for all its technological advances, for
all its computers, its armies of attendant staff lawyers and Ph.D.'s,
its regression analyses and piles of tables and statistical data
covering miles and miles of computer print-outs, that Congress is in
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no position to .e an'mtenigent
.se. of t„e „eaU. of thus
spread before U. 'Me.be.s toda. are s1,„pl, too busy and not suf-
ficiently Knowledgeable" to do that sifting of all this material which
alone could strengthen their intellectual grasps of the technical
.nat-
ters at hand. The following passage fro. Malbln's boo. su^s up the
current state of affairs pretty well:
co^l^oi o^ertL^'a^n a'%o^^?L"^ia?r
''''' Ttherefore, that as more and more of Cona;e<;J i
.ittees and subcommittees ado t'thls'?? f ty f"? e"effe"ct
1 Stan " nL'aVh^''^' f''' '"''^'^ been !to L
Conqress instead nf h
S^n^^ating more work for
orcrncerns ahlfrn" ^^^'^ting workload,uur concern bout Congress's independence and about its ina
u n^fffr^Tn'" ^""^^^^^^-^gly fractional ized workload 11
care?ul . LT' Both will have to be weighed^
effect if rJnn"' ' ^^^^""^ assessment of theo Congress's new use of staff on the leaislativpbranch's ability to do its job. 211
g e
If the student of Congress sees legislation as its output and
voting as its activity, he will focus on its internal politics and
institutions. If, however, policy is his emphasis and his concern, he
will find himself talking about the politics of the administrative
state. In classical conceptions, what we call "policy" was the out-
come of political deliberations. Students of classical politics study
those who deliberate and who decide. In the modern state, however,
what was once united in the assembly hall has become separated and
widely distributed throughout the sprawling architectural maze of
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^dern Washington. However aw.ward the ,«ve .ay see,„. then U wefonow the Classical
.„o<1e1 we
.ust follow the paths of thos; who Gen-
erate an<..ec1.e. out of the wel 1 of Congress an. away fr« Capitol
H-n. This
.eans following staff
.e,nbers up Pennsylvania Avenue where
haunt their progenitors by bringing something of the bureaucracy Into
the structure of Congress Itself.^^^ „ congress's c«„.1ttees «.e
consensus building difficult, and the address of broad and general
questions next to Impossible, the tas. of overseeing the activities of
the executive branch bureaucracy see. equally beyond It. While the
contemporary literature on the oversight problem Is voluminous, little
of substance has been added to Wilson's summation of that essential
difficulty. What Congress has set up. It cannot control:
[:?^Jhe"Ad^min"?s%rit?^nV^^^::r;^e°"sL^^?:r^.T^^^^^^-"^
clous investigations wfllchTt"fr« ^tt^Zl^'X^^^Its spasmodic endeavors to dispel or confirm suspicions ofmalfeasance or of wanton corruption do not afford it morethan a glimpse of the Inside of a small prov nee o^ federal
hold °' <'"'9"'"9 officials can alwLsIt at arm s length by dexterous evasions and con-cealments. It can violently disturb, but it cannot oftenfathom the waters of the sea In which the big e fis o the
cl':i:si^^g";^: ZVJ^'r^- ^-^net st1?s^ w1tho^\''^
Therefore, we find that the Institutional powers of Congress,
far from being Increased by the staff which provides It infomation,
or the bureaucracy which carries out Its mandates, are overwhelmed by







J. Mclver Weatherford approaches the whole question of the
bureaucratization of the Congress from the standpoint of anthropology
instead of political science. He begs or ignores certain questions,
particularly those arising from law or organization. Many
field would find him weak on the role played by legal institutions
any society. His strengths, however, are in "off-beat" areas that
provide insights for the rest of us. Anthropologists do field work in
primitive societies where they investigate a number of fundamental
questions. For our purposes. Weatherford
' s background in kinship net-
works and the collective uses of ritual to posit and sustain shared
world views are particularly helpful.
Weatherford does not think that Congress is a bureaucracy.
Nor would he agree, necessarily, that the "bureaucracy is out of
control." For Weatherford, what counts is not the formal rela-
tionships and the academic and legal problems raised by the oversight
question, or questions of recursive interbranch influence. What mat-
ters to him are the informal bonds that connect people together. And
within this limited domain, he shows that to ask whether Congress is
able to exercise a reasonable degree of control over the rest of
government is really beside the point. What counts, in his view, is
that certain members of Congress exert considerable influence over
important parts of government. The key to this analysis, which is of
the sort anthropologists relish, is the personal or clan network.
When he looks at the role of Congressional staff, Weatherford sees
personal networks radiating out from senior "big men" in Congress.
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These are more fan,il1al than strictly bureaucratic:
calls VrLLl bu^eaucraci^ ^^'"'^'"3 politics in India
coalesce around ind^viduarn^iiti °^ ^^'^""^^ retainers
setting, the underlying princ Ml ;,?"^ ' bureaucratic
relationship of pat^rto'' ^ ^„ ^ ach^'orthe^M OM^^employees of Congress is thP rii-«n+^f /
the 535 members of Congress n t ^'"^ ^"'^^ of
become clients ofothe^m^^ber a'^'^:e shall lee''^
^'''''?
Other branches Of gov:rn::;?"^fh: ^er an^^gT^^s^nor^^closely resembles the ancient legislatures of RomfByzantium and Greece than it does the moder legislatures ofGreat Britain, Germany, Canada or France. 214
'^^'^'^^"^^^
When members arrive in Congress, they begin the process of
building up clans or staff networks to assist them. The choices they
make are crucial to their career patterns and help determine what
sorts of legislators they will turn out to be.^l^ committee chairmen,
for example, are not only in a position to recruit extensive personal
staff networks, but incorporate committee staff into their clans as
well. A very powerful member of Congress, such as Senator Kennedy is
or Senator Muskie was, can retain control over the entirety of such
networks-even when moving from one committee assignment to
another.
For Weatherford, such shufflings at the formal level change
little at the substantive level of power:
The nominal jurisdictions and the titles belong to the
facade of Congress. As part of that facade they are
rearranged every other year, when new shingles are made and
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congressional clans ,nay, and often do. expand away fr«„
CapUol H111 itself as individual staffers gain executive branch
appointments or «ve to other positions of power within Washington,
vet their clan-alliances persist over ti.e, and a wel 1
-organized clan
can continue to operate s.noothly, even after the death of its chief.
Crosscutting the fonnal organization of government departments, poli-
tical parties and lobbies, these extended clans fon« the network base
around which government operates. (Note that the "fonn" of these
arrangements is more or less the same as that of the iron triangles
described by Dodd and Schott. but that what ultimately connects the
participants is not "interests" ^er se, but their relatedness to one
another by clan membership.) Among other concrete examples,
Weatherford cites that of John Stennis, head of the "military clan"
which, even now, is bringing us the Tombigbee Waterway, an immense
project orchestrated not through the Public Works Committee, as one
might expect, but through the Army Corps of Engineers.^^'' This is the
old military clan of the Senate, the patriarchy once headed by Carl
Vinson, and subsequently passed on. first to Mendel Rivers, then to
Edward Herbert and finally to Stennis. Stennis's tenure is
approaching its end, and Sam Munn is the likely heir apparant.^^° The
power of such informal organizations extends far beyond the Senate
chamber and is exercised through more than the simple force of law:
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of Congressional Clans
.nanifes? itself rt r ^' 'f'^ P'^'^between the bureaucracy and the nitionii lln? """^^^lons
the most important relltio s n ov r
, L etout by Lord Brvce in hi<; nina^L^i^u ? ' pointed
A.eri^a. thisTonnect
" e" ing^wM^hlhr^'^l^^" fnotices and has the scanties^'mLnTo? :ncKin'g'!"2ff"" '''''
Weatherford says that Congressional clansmen stream down
Capitol Hill in a perpetual torrent,
filling the cavernous halls along Pennsylvania Avph.ip ;,nH
^nl
''''' ''''''''
'^'y become co:. ss 0 ers the
^nin Commission, directors of the NationalEndowment for the Arts, assistant secretaries for theDepartment of Commerce, and officials of every part of thegovernment from the Corporation for Public Broadcast?ng totne Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Behind ev.ry oak
r??v
simulated-wood conference tab e in the
colors of h rSn? " 'T'' '^'^^ '''''''' brandishing Zis Hill clan and congressional sponsor. 222
It would be foolish to confuse the power of Congressional clan
networks with the powers of Congress or to mistake the political
influence of the one with the institutional viability of the other.
The formal and legal framework of institutions, through which we
manage our collective affairs, both defines and limits the uses of
power in our society. At the same time, such institutions are not,
because they cannot be, structured to embrace networks of shared
interests and experiences, networks which sometimes are based on
something like the elective affinities of Goethe. Yet such networks
bind the influential together in every society, and are essential to
its operations. Unfortunately, there seem to be times when the fonnal
institutional framework defines the horizon of possibilities for the
informal networks, and other times when real political power flows
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along the lines of the personal connections established by every class
and generation. The recent drastic Increases In staff size and
influence strengthen the positions of the networks at the expense of
the «st public institutions, and as such ,„ay constitute a ,naJor for-
mative step in the gradual emergence of a not-yet-seen pennanent
structure of political power in the nasclent culture of the United
States. On the other hand, network Influence «y be temporary, but
given the nature and complexity of the political tasks at hand, and
the confluence of forces represented by subc»»1ttee gover™ent and
Congressional clanbuil ding, I do not see how this could turn out to be
the case.
Although I have dwelt somewhat at length on staff power and
influence, I hope that the reasons for the emphasis are obvious.
First, subcommittee government is one aspect of a decentralization of
Congress that goes to the heart of its internal organization and
institutional function. Staff inembers get their careers started here
and then either move into the bureaucracy or stay to work closely with
other former staff members who have. As clients of elected represen-
tatives, they also exist as elements in informal clan networks that
translate the de jure authority of Congress into real and immediate
power. Second, the increasing refinement, striation and canplexity of
institutional forms and government organization pushes these indivi-
duals into narrower and narrower spheres of active concern, in which
they pursue ever more technical and specialized tasks. These develop-
ments are attributes of bureaucracy, and I have tried at least to
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indicate the existence of a kind of institutional
"feedback" that
flows through the networks to influence the fonn, function and power
of the Congressional nerve center which gave this set of developments
its initial impetus. All of these developments can be subsumed under
the rubric of interbranch relations. They seem to point to a Congress
which faces an ever-constricting sphere of action, an ever approaching
horizon of possibilities.
There is one additional factor with regard to the role and
function of Congressional staff that needs to be pointed out. Again
the source is Weatherford. Here we are concerned with the public
space functions of debate and deliberation that constitute the philo-
sophical raison d'etre of Congress. What Weatherford' s description
shows is that the "public" nature of Congressional operations has
somehow gotten perverted from the open conduct of publici business in
the eyes of public2, to the presentation of ritual perfonnances of
stylized activities before a media audience in a televised forum to
which it has grown accustomed to look for entertainment rather than
politics. It is as though we had decided to dress our representatives
up in medieval costumes and put them on a stage replica of the old
Globe Theatre in London. What Weatherford shows is the extent to
which most of the work and many of the real decisions are still being
carried out, right where they have always been, behind the scenes, but
that in this case, the representatives, by spending increasing amounts
of time before the cameras, are being squeezed out of the real politi-




public body with public functions to perfonn, and maintains a
semblence of public responsibility by parading before the camera
eye. Weatherford'
s account is less than an analysis and more than
caricature. Though it is longer than usually thought proper for
quotation. I include it here because, better than any other published
source, it sums up one very important dimension of the daily life of
the average member.
Students of Congress who have had occasion to seek interviews
among the members themselves have doubtless had the experience of
spending twenty minutes with a busy representative, starting in his
office, hearing a bell ring somewhere in the distance, and then
running with him down the hall, into the Congressional subway system
and over to the Capitol building where both jam themselves into a
packed elevator and ride up, amidst a flood of jokes, to the entrance
of the chamber itself where the representative and the student
necessarily part company. Throughout this burst of activity, some
sort of colloquy is supposed to be taking place--if the member can
concentrate well enough to reply and the student well enough to take
notes. Since this rushed and hurried aspect of daily life seems to be
the rule rather than the exception these days, Weatherford is correct
to emphasize the proportionate increase in the ri tual ization of that
life and the production by Congress of what he calls its "ritual
record." Meanwhile, behind the badly oiled and clanky screen of such
media performances, staff specialists and technical experts busily
fine- tune the public's business.
the demands of ceremony r^UuIf an^th'^™"^^ centuries,have crept through the Congres 'like f^..f/^P^^yl "9 recordover one legislative forum'after othe
.-1^g"ar?L:f^f-o^p\S-,1„--- is spent
announces the subiect „Mrh J ?' '^^^''"'9 f™'" ^ sheet,
and welcomes the vfsUors who .r "'f ^ra.e importance,
dedicated experts ihill'tS distinguished and
issue, the senato^ 1, I's ?o Z'T.J'"'']'' ^^'^
upcoming meeting with a 4 H^lnh . fPlaming about the
batch of documents thrust'at hi^ k signs a
as another senator tumbles in o tL"'' ^^^r^t^--^- As soon
question cards the or« d?„^ ^ "''^^ '^^s handful of
to him and xcuses himse f 'he JL'rH'"^"'
''^
''^^"'"S
Senate floor, where he ore^ents f^l *° '^'^^
t^TL If ' ^^'^'^s ^"other round of disarmament
linh^! fi
Presented because the bells ring and the
fori vo?e''%''''^''''' ''''''^ b^'k the
sen^^orr L t' .^"""^"9 of the room with all the otherators he asks if anyone knows what the vote .night be onBefore they can decide, they are in the crowded hill in front
to fL'Jr^''- Surrounded by lobbyists and by aides tryinc








^"^^^^ to get closer than twenty feetto one another, the aide gestures a set of prearranqed
one'"" Stni'^nt'r' ""''l^ '''' '''' 9° ''is
rh^mhJ I topic, he hurries into thechamber registers his vote, and tries to get back to the
SittL ''''' ^^"^tors leave the chamber.it ing with two other senators for the ride back to the
office building, he asks if anyone knew what that vote wasan about. One thinks it was a motion to table the motion to
reconsider the addition of $5 million to build halfway houses
I Lt"! ,
.spouses. Another insists he heard something about
a medal of honor commemorating John Wayne's heroic services
to the American nation. Before a consensus can be decided
tney arrive back at the office building and each rushes off
to his next appointment.
tells him that he must go SackTtl^^ '"'^ ^'^ehearing because two teachers from h?! T''""^ con«nitteetestify as representatfves Of Se tl ^tfte.are about toState Education Association M h» f • P»l'tically active
Hearings, the teachers are ^l.i. t ""1"" ^'''^^ t^e
to welcome them Restate ?hff™ „ f'n'shed, but he interrupts
and distinctio^of the witnes es aL"" ° ^I^^S^ave subject
ho ri;S ^;=;9^I"9 ~ny is not for anofher o r
than telling them that he h.^ ^ '"™^^™ f°lks
several wepk^ ThonV ^ ^^'^'^^^ on the past
Each day for a member of Congress resembles the ^rhprini«of a film actor, which indeed a number o^po fticians mavhave been prior to entering public service An ac?nrin several different productions at once and m s? rush'f om
sce^e °?rcLch:d\'° '''-T''- POlHician'enters o
'
^nH^h by a waiting assistant for a few momentsand then performs the role. His particular performance navhave no relation to that of the actors who appeared justbefore or after him. but the pieces will be edited togetherina coherent fashion afterwards by the staff The im^or?Int
Se^vot d ''r'' ''f ''' ''' appet'ance' n r 0
'
o? TJj. ' '""^ ^^^1' he asked the questionf the witness, he introduced the bill, he co-sponsored theamendment, he spoke the sentence. The staff can ^ssue allthe press releases and printed speeches to show that this
made him a prime mover. The one question can be turned into
a probing inquisition on paper, the one-minute speech intothree speeches of oratorical grace spread out throughout theday s record. The picture with the President of Italy
-an be
released to the press with a long explanation of the
senator s active participation in Italian-American concerns.
I he film clip of his welcoming the members of the State
Education Association in the ornate committee rooin can be
shown on local television as proof of his sincere concern
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of what he appears to be doL ^^^^^"^^'^0 synboKzation
Politicians have become <:r.ori
figures who preside over and ^nS^l u'" '"^t^«l--cere,non1al
appropriate dash of au?ho? tv ?hPv h«/'"'°" "''"^
official mana. Symbolic^ v t-h-^ f-^^^" ' °^
stage as the star^f the eve^t buJ t e r«[ f'"^'''backstage. The member of r^nnAoef I. decisions occur
these public appeTances each f.^T'':- '"^"^ °^
where the decisions are ,n!rt» °/ backstage
rites of legi Ut on for hi^f. k' " ^° """" '^"^
actual sublCnce 223 "^'"^ '"'"l^^" its
A_Notejiri_jthg Budget and Spending Prore^





?hereMs'beIn TTrv'' Representatives,in re has bee a lack, we are told today, of willdiscipline, and restraint, and this budget control bill isgoing to cure all things.
. . . Everything and everybody sgoing to be reformed
. . .is going to be hunky-do^y and thegoose IS going to hang high. If we just pass 'thi bi'l wewill have brought into play all the will, all of the
restraint and al 1 of the discipline that is necessary tobalance the budget, stop inflation, and restore fiscal
sanity. Do not believe it for one minute. 224
There is nothing even remotely complex about the matter of
government spending. Indeed, this is perhaps the only attribute of
modern government to which we can ascribe "ontological " reality.
Money, after all, is tangible; more so than any possible ideology or
theory or alignment of political interests, for it can be counted and
weighed, gathered in from the people through judicious application of
the force of law, and disbursed with a finality paralleled only by the
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end Of ,1fe Uself. The 90.ern.ent. ,i.e any other entity which has
to co.e to grips with the
.atter of ,„oney, has methods for acquiring
1t and projects upon which to lavish It. In general, It benefits
acquirers and spenders alike to know,
.ore or less, how ™uch they are
acquiring and spending, and therefore how
.uch they will be forced to
borrow or able to save should their acquisitions and disbursements get
out of balance. Hence both the acquisition and disbursement of funds
are facilitated by something we have come to know as an accounting
process.
Wildavsky has made it pretty clear that those involved in the
spending processes of the U.S. government, whether they find them-
selves on the executive or legislative side of the government, begin
their annual deliberations from a base figure which reveals the
approximate level of spending for various agencies and programs in the
current year. From this figure it is relatively easy to go on and
compute how much you intend to spend during the following year and
what you intend to spend it on.
But politics raises its ugly head. What happens to this
simple and straightforward and altogether reasonable situation when we
concretize it, so to speak, and toss it into the maw of a feverish and
overwrought government? In a word: all hell breaks loose. Conflict
is instantaneous and pandemic: about the methods of computing the
base; about the form in which budget requests and projections are to
be tendered to those who have the authority to decide; about the




such conf, icts ,1es a deeper one: there are
bnter struggle against those who desire to spend less. One need
search no further afield than Dante to find an ipage for this:
side^L'd on''the'oJhe*r'"'wrth'ir..?H ""'^ °"
main force of chest ih^i ^i^eh n 5°"^' weights by
In Dante's image, the misers move toward the right, the
spendthrifts toward the left. And the weary futile round goes on to
all eternity.
The clash between hoarders and wasters embroils both the exe-
cutive and legislative branches; it reaches out to the professions of
journalism and economics. Even members of the political science pro-
fession become caught in its eddies, and this last raises difficulties
for the student of Congress who would evaluate its budgeting and
spending practices: the ultimate criteria for any professional eva-
luation of this aspect of Congressional life are to be found in the
hoarding or wasting hearts of the various commentators.
Once we have drawn this elementary fault line through the
scholarly and political landscapes, it is then possible to point out a
few of the lesser political problems that loom between the student and
his comprehension of Congress and money. We have already presented a
picture of a heterogeneous Congress, populated by entrepreneurial mem-
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bers. d,-sor,a„1zed a want of part, aisc1p,1„e and subject to the
sudden appearance and disappearance of ad hoc caucuses
. These and
other disorders can be traced bac. to «hat the
.e*ers of the politi-
cal science profession are wont to treat as "c^petlng cla1,„s." Beyond
these, however, lie difficulties to baffle the logician. Aaron
wndavs., starts his Pol1t1«oLthOufeir^
„Uh what we
could see as a purely fon„al proble. In the theory of resource alloca-
tion. Should budgets reflect the views and needs of those In the
field, so to speak, or should they be a reflection of the overall pic-
ture ds seen from a central point?
iUl ZZ"^l\lT"llV.' totals to be deter-
P^r^^esf ol '
'^^^-^-^ ag^enc^^eT:?e^^dd1^^;^^.^^rr-
a^T:r.::^?ha?"t;:^ete\Tthl i:"4^<;Ts"I •impossible for spending total s\o be dete^ ned ent rel bv atop-down" process, because that process would reaur' that
r»r'
no l^its below which govern,nentr pending ^ould be
In1"^o1:do^:^
-L^sls^^rt^Vll-LVttne u«??f f^ X
fn"^;;e°r?^terlc1i:!i?6- -"^^ - ^-^-1:^
Alan Schick begins his somewhat magisterial treatment of the
same process with a similar conundrum, though what interests him is
the struggle for power itself, rather than any distribution of goods
which may ensue:
While legislative norms propel Congress toward the fragmen-tation of power, budgeting invites the concentration ofpower. Budgeting necessarily involves the pulling together
of disparate interests and perspectives in a reasonably
comprehensive and consistent decisional process. Budqetinqdemands attention to the relationship of the parts and the
whole, to the linkage of tax and spending politics, as well
as to the priorities accorded to the competing claims for
public resources
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Such dilemmas are inherently unsolvable. but they plague the
theoretical rationalizations of oolitiV;,! ..^r p tical actors at every point. They
are worth noting, however, because they help us to see Congressional
spending decisions as outcomes of a political process which attempts
to come to grips with logical and organizational paradox through an
unruly and divisive clash of heterogeneous interests. As such, the
budgetary process in Congress provides the scholar with a focused and
unequivocal intersection of critical theory and practical difficulty.
Here, if anywhere, the organizational and political problems that pla-
gue the legislature should become evident; here, if anywhere, it
should be possible to determine whether special or general interests
have come to hold sway over the institution. The great problem is how
to square a general doctrine concerned with the maximization of public
goods with a kind of claim that essentially refers to allocation to
particular sorts of individuals and groups, for purposes which may not
be "public" at all. The budget process, through its very finality,
displays the distribution of power and resources throughout the
government and among its various clients more clearly than any other
political activity.
Taken as a whole, the Federal budget is a representation in
monetary terms of governmental activity. If politics is
regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences shall
prevail in the determination of national policy, then the
budget records the outcomes of this struggle. ... In the
most Integral sense, the budget lies at the heart of the
political process. 228
A history of budgeting and spending in Congress vvould be
almost as voluminous as a history of Congress itself. Fortunately, in
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this as in so .any other areas of its institutional 1He, Congress
•nade a great turn 1n the 1970s when U passed the Congressional Budget
and I.pound.ent Control Act of 1974. The legislative history of this
act, the reasons for which It was undertaken, and the Institutional
changes It wrought are all ground pretty well covered In other
Places.229 ,,,,
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^
parts of the act as briefly as possible, describe the unalterable
institutional constraints within which it operates, ask whether the
reforms it embodies have succeeded in realizing the aims for which
they were undertaken, and seek to discover whether it has the poten-
tial to restore Congressional power over the budget.
Prior to the passage of the 1974 Act, the budgetary process in
Congress was beset with conflict and confusion. Alan Schick has
referred to it as a war between the parts and the whole. 230 ^^^h year
Congress would take the budget submitted to it by the President, chop
It into small pieces, parcel these out through the committee and sub-
committee system and wait until the end of the legislative session to
find out what it had created. It was often the case that Pew within
Congress were even aware of the emerging budget totals. Thus the
decentralized legislative process resulted in a budgetary process that
was merely the sum of a series of Isolated, competing and unrelated
actions. 231
Ellwood and Thurber discuss six kinds of politically important
difficulty that followed from these chaotic practices. First was a
tremendous growth in Federal spending and a ballooning national debt.
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second «as t.e loss of
.,>ect Concessional cont.o, o.e. spend1„,
levels occasioned the «1.esp.ead 1nstU.t1ona, Uation of
.an.ato..
spend,ng, I.3., an increasing percentage of Federal outlays could not
^e altered 1„ a given year without changing the basic authorising sta-
tute Which had set up a particular spending program in the first
place. Third, profound changes in the national econ»„y had put an end
to the constant, annual Increases in revenues, forcing Congress to
Choose a.ong alternatives, when it had grown accustomed to annual
across-the-board increases in expenditures. This development was
accompanied by radical change in the composition of the Federal budget
itself, reflecting a shift in spending priorities as the percentages
Of the budget alloted to defense and to direct payments to individuals
were roughly reversed. confronted with hard choices between defense
and social programs, some reformers wanted to unify the budgetary pro-
cess to clarify alternatives and make the difficult choices stand out
against the background of overall budget totals. Fourth, the
existing, uncoordinated budget process made it next to Impossible for
Congress to determine or to carry out a national fiscal policy.
Fifth, in the face of a lack of budgetary infonnation. Congress had to
rely on the information supplied it by the 0MB to help it evaluate the
President's spending and programs. This left both political ini-
tiative and a monopoly on empirical Information on the Executive side.
Sixth, the impoundment of funds by the President, i.e.. Mr. Nixon's
refusal to spend money appropriated by Congress for specific programs,
had assumed unprecedented dimensions after 1972, and threatened to
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create a Constitutional cn<;i<; r>f i^r- ^risis of Its own as Members found the
Congressional preroqativo o^Pr t;,vin^ , ^
^
g . ve taxing and spending threatened at its
very roots.
Perhaps we can fairly su. up these problems by saying that
they were all manifestations of the institutional weaknesses of
congress, consequences of its chaotic and decentralized internal poli-
tical processes, and of the elaborate division of responsibilities
reflected in the organization of its committee system. Hence, the
budget process established by the 1974 Act is an attempt to redress
these problems and to serve as an integrating mechanism for the
separate tax, appropriations and authorizations processes which con-
tinue to function on Capitol Hill.234
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
give Congress a comprehensive and consistent means of making fiscal
choices and setting national priorities. Here are its purposes,
according to the Act:
pffJ?^
Congress declares that it is essential: to assureeffective Congressional control over the budgetary process-to provide for the Congressional determination each^year ofthe appropriate level of federal revenues and expenditures-to provide a system of impoundment control; to establish
'
national priorities; and to provide for the furnishing ofinformation by the Executive branch in a manner that will
assist tne Congress in discharging its duties. 235
In pursuit of these aims, the Act created three new
institutions: The House and Senate Budget Committees, and the
Congressional Budget Office. It also provided a new set of budgeting
procedures, a timetable for budgetary actions and a change in the
fiscal year, requirements for standardized budget terminology and
1nfo™at1on
.0. p.esi.enfs
...^et. provisions fo. cont.on
presidential impoundments. 236
Ellwood and Thurber provide a s-jrrinri-¥ ^ a jcc ct summary of the new
process:
The new congressional budgetary Droce<;<; <:Afc n ^ ubeginning of the fiscal vear nn m October 1 as the
must submit a curre t services budopr'"^'; ^^^sU.ntday after Congress meetrhl mL. ^u^? °" fifteenth
-St adopt at^e1s^"t:^^S cu^" nt" esoluuons'^^'-before May 15 (before rpvpn.,« Inn "^^^^ ' "^^^o^s : one on or
been passed) aid the oth r
^ Z^XTTi^'''''' ''''been taken on all appropriations MIU) '^^^
general
'nage's'^'urinfo'lt'^on llT''''paratlon, and sub™ s o o?c nqress onil"^K T'^^V'
budget ; 0 'ho is a d ""g^^slonal
This brief sketch does little justice to the extent to which
the new procedure embodies provisions designed to enable Congress to
attain a complex set of aims. Despite widespread alarm over rising
budget totals, the traditional functions of the allocations and
appropriations committees, when combined with the perennial contest
between hoarders and wasters, meant that Congress could not simply
subscribe to a set of arrangements which explicitly favored spending
cuts over increases:
To have done so would have curbed the legislative power ofCongress by making future outcomes dependent on budget proce-dures rather than on majority will. 238 ^ ^





tingent upon bipartisan support for such proposals. Hence,
Schick's analysis, the new process had to be neutral with respect
spending levels, and it attains this through the so.ewhat contradic-
tory nature of the two budget resolutions. The first resolution lays
out spending targets rather than ceilings, and preserves the power of
the Appropriations Co^ittees to determine specific progra. outlays
The second resolution applies to revenues as well as to spending, and
once this has been adopted. Congress cannot take action that would
raise spending above or lower revenues below the amounts fi^ed in the
resolution. "By treating tax and expenditure legislation in the sa.ne
way. Congress signified its intent to establish a process which would
not foreordain any of its outcomes . "239 congress thereupon provided
itself an escape hatch of the sort which any student of President
Eisenhower's speeches might well admire: according to the rules, once
the second resolution has been passed. Congress "cannot violate" its
self-imposed budget restraint. Nevertheless, Congress "can revise"
its budget decisions by adopting a new resolution at any time. This,
I think, lets the horse out of the barn. 240 what can "spending
restraint" possibly mean if the Congress can raise totals whenever it
desires?
So goes the script at any rate. Essentially, it attempted to
improve Congressional control over budget matters by instituting a
Budget Committee in each House that would have primary responsibility
for overall coordination of the various spending proposals which arise
from both the executive and legislative sides of the government. To
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aid these committees in their tasks, the Congressional Budget Office
was instituted to gather factual information and free Congress fr.n
its longstanding reliance on the executive branch for information and
hard figures. These provisions and others, including the anti-
impoundment measures, have been in place now for eight years, and it
is possible to see whether the new institutions have succeeded in
moving Congress smoothly through the pages of the script, and whether
such movement may be sufficient to restore its lost control over
spending. In general, the implementation process has had its ups and
downs: conflict has arisen within the decentralized Congress, as any
student of its history might expect, and Schick maintains that
... the new process enlarges the potential for conflict
within Congress because it expands the scope of participation
and compels Congress to make more explicit budget choices
than before. '^^l-
A full blown description and analysis of the new budget pro-
cess and its various consequences would occupy considerable space.
The legislative history of the 1974 Act is complex. The provisions of
the Act are also complex, as are the relationships between those pro-
visions and the intentions they attempted to embody. These factors
would have to be placed in the context of a complex legislature which
is rapidly changing, not only in terms of the composition of its fnem-
bership but also with respect to its underlying consensus about basic
spending priorities. Neither of these last two is uniformly reflected
throughout the Congress to any degree. In addition to all this, there
is the tangled web of interbranch relations explored by Wildavsky.
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Rather than attempting to cover this extensive ground here I will
Sl.ply allude to so.ne of the major problems which confront Congress
wUh respect to taxing and spending issues, and note that while th.
Short-term configurations of these dilemmas have been affected by the
new legislation, the underlying context has been little changed.
First and most important, for Congress as for any political or
legal agent, is retention of control over matters that lie within its
Jurisdiction. This has plagued the legislature since the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, and attempts to solve it have followed one
upon the other, at least since passage of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921. At the present time. Congress is in danger of losing
control over spending in two ways, both of which appear to be beyond
the reach of the procedures instituted by the Budget Act. First,
spending targets for a variety of programs are set within the execu-
tive branch before being gone over by members of Congress in various
committees. Wildavsky has made it pretty clear that it is not only
efficient, it is prudent to rely upon expenditure targets set by admi-
nistrative agencies when their representatives have proven themselves
competent and responsible .^^^ ^^^^^^^^ politically expedient
method of computing various budget totals is to draw up and evaluate




subtracting at the margins, based upon the preceding year's
performance-rather than to completely evaluate all of the political
justifications for a given program in a given year. Unless there is
very good reason for thinking otherwise, it is safe to assume that the
rme
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reasons for the Initial institution of a program still hold ^43
Wildavsky Claims that
.embers of Congress themselves, despite thei
highly developed capacities for specialization, have neither the ti-
nor the expertise to exhaustively evaluate every spending proposal
that emanates from within the bureaucracy, iron triangles and sub-
governments aside, then, the sheer complexity of these domains indica-
tes that responsibility for spending targets be shared between those
nominally charged with providing the money and those who are involved
with its actual disbursement on a daily basis. Formally, this looks
like a permanent loss of power for Congress, a loss which the new
budget process has been but partially able to offset through the
information-gathering powers of the CBO. Practically, such loss seems
unavoidable. If it amounts to a "loss of control over the purse" for
Congress, it is a loss which Congress has brought about for itself by
virtue of its past spending decisions and of the organizational struc-
tures that are necessary to implement them. I can think of but a
single possible method through which such "lost" power might be
regained for the Congress: wipe the authorizing legislation off the
books and dissolve the structures of implementation. Since neither
Congress nor the American public would stand for this, the loss is as
permanent as the. pel i tical desire for the programs in question.
Thus we have a Congress which does not compute the budget by
Itself. At best, it arrives at spending projections in tandem with




.1nd of loss of Congressional control over spending
levels
.ay .e ™.e directly amenable to change by Congress than the
first. This dimension is less a function of governmental structure
than it is a .atter of statuatory requirement. The 1960s saw a pro-
found Change in national spending priorities as reflected in divisions
Of the budgetary pie. The relationship between spending for matters
Of national defense and spending for social welfare programs was
roughly reversed. This is generally known as the "welfare shift."
Many expenditures of the latter sort constitute what the literature
has coine to call "Mandated" spending because disbursements are ,nade
directly to individuals, and the focus of the enabling legislation is
upon program goals instead of spending levels. Dennis Ippolito
explains:
Entitlement programs mandate the payment of benefits to reci-pients who meet requirements established by law ( ndeed a"
?haTln!f"'''-'''^''^'°"^ '''' P^^t two decade suggestt t beneficiaries may have what amounts to a property right
n their benefits.) The major portion of entitlement
^
spending is accounted for by trust funds, such as social
oroce^.^' fnl?.^'''
"^^.^^^J^^^ to the annual appropriationsp ss. Entitlements that cofne from general revenues
usua ly require annual appropriations, but that is essen-tially a tecnnicality; the legislation that created theprogram, not the appropriation, dictates the amount soent.
.LnT'^^^L^l S''^^^^^ expanded this type of mandatoryspending, the budgetary weight of entitlements has increaseddramatically. In fiscal 1967 entitlements accounted for 37percent of total outlays and about 60 percent of all
uncontrollable spending. By 1980, entitlement spending was
60 percent of total outlays and almost 80 percent of all
uncontrollable spending. 244
What counts is that such programs are placed outside the pur-
view of the new budget process. Further, it doesn't take a genius to
who
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see that this raises absolute hell with fiscal policy. For those
.
believe that there is a connection between federal spending levels
interest rates, the cost of capital available for borrowing or invest-
ment in the private sector, and the necessity for policy flexibility
with respect to this equation, the notion that such flexibility has
become statuatorily out of bounds nullifies one of the possible
substantive consequences of the act and voids one of its essential
aims. Ippolito ends his study of the budget process with an extensive
list of suggestions for bringing spending levels under control,
including the reevaluation of all entitlement programs, and even looks
favorably upon a Constitutional Amendment to put limits on spending
levels. His point is that the new budget process has failed, and he
marshalls the truly amazing 1970s increases in spending totals that
followed its adoption as supporting evidence .^"^^ For Ippolito, then,
the new process has failed to check the predilection of the
authorizing committees: as these committees sought support for
progressively higher appropriations, they took the position that an
authorization should reflect the financial needs of a program and not
the budgetary condition of the government.
But Ippolito cannot have it both ways: either Congress must
have control over spending totals, or it cannot engage in making
fiscal policy. Constitutional limitations on spending constitute a
completely unprecedented kind of constrain upon Congressional action.
In the final analysis, I fail to see how such formal limitations
differ from the constraints impsoed by mandatory spending itself:
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With regard to fiscal consequences, how is it different to say that
congress spend as opposed to saying that it
.ust not spend^ As
presently constituted, then, Congress is not really f.ee to decide
What it will spend because so
.uch of what it actually does spend 1s
out if its hands to decide in a given year. Pre. this tautology we
get the following result: fiscal policy suffers. The practical
effects of entitlement programs on Congressional freedom to decide are
pretty much the same as those which would follow a Constitutional
limitation on spending. At the same time, it should be clear that the
realm of possibilities covered by the Budget Act is more restricted
than first appears, but these are not deficiencies that can be traced
back to the new budgetary process per se.
Therefore the first two problems confronting Congress, i.e.,
the role played by the bureaucracy in the accounting process, and the
percentage of annual expenditures that has been made mandatory by sta-
tute, leave Congress little room to maneuver as it struggles to assert
its prerogatives over budgeting and spending. Now a third difficulty
facing the Members with respect to these issues is the conflict bet-
ween the general and the particular as these are embodied by the
appropriations and authorizations committees respectively:
Members of Congress respond to two sets of pressure when they
act on authorization and appropriations. Through the
authorizations process, Congress demonstrates its respon-
siveness to particular interests; through its appropriations
decisions. Congress deals with the financial limitations of
the federal government. The basic political conditions that
led in the past to different authorization and appropriation
outcomes have not been fundamentally altered by the budget
process. The continuing gap reflects the ambivalence within
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such increment 1n Budget Cc.fttee power necessarily would have to
come at the expense of existing committee power centers. The
Appropriations committees, for example, retain responsibility for
individual spending measures, and struggles over turf with the new
Budget Committees are common in both Houses. At the same time,
however, the new committees have succeeded in making members of
Congress in general more aware of the consequences which particular
spending measures have for the overall budget.^^ Further, there is
increasing evidence of a dramatic dropoff in the creation of new
entitlements since the implementation of the Act made their steadily
climbing costs evident to everyone.^^^ such changes reflect increased
attention to budget figures at the expense of program needs and can be
at least partially attributed to the new process. While the new
Budget Act does not specifically take power away from the older com-
mittees, it has established new epicenters of power, and by making it
necessary that the traditional institutions take the new ones into
account, can be said to have further decentralized and complicated the
Congressional budget process:
Prior to the Act, the parts of the budget were cordoned offfrom one another. Tax policy was made by a single set of
committees; appropriations went through their own process;
authorizations had their own committee roots and routes 'The
Budget Act means that there is hardly a single financial
decision that can be made via one set of committees alone.
Revenue decisions involve both the tax and the budget commit-
tees. The budget committees share spending power with the
Appropriations Committees. The wills of all these committees
have to be concerted in the development of the congressional
budget. 250
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budgetary role of ConarP<;^ L wi s strained by the
an adjudicator o buSgel y' la?^ ' jllTT 'll '''''
congress goes on reco^dln^u'
'of' c1 ic" r^^
This raises a complex and difficult issue: as I indicated
earlier, a key fact about the new budget process for both Schick and
Ippolito, is that even though spending and revenue ceilings and floors
are set by the second budget resolution. Congress has the authority to
alter them afterwards should it be so disposed. This may be a prac-
tical necessity, forced upon Congress by spending shortfalls, endemic
conflict, or the logroll, but it makes logical nonsense of the thesis
that the new process really contains enforcable or coersive stipula-
tions over spending levels. Schick sees the matter in this way:
The act directs Congress to make peace through the channels
and procedures of its new budget process. The Act facilita-
tes the search by enabling a congressional majority to do
whatever It wants to do. It can peg the budget numbers at
any level it prefers and change them as often as it wishes
Whenever Congress can organize a majority in support of anybudget position, it will be well on the road to budget peace.
But what happens when Congress is so split and individual
members cross-pressured that a majority cannot be mustered
behind any overall course of action? We pose this question
now to suggest that political strife within Congress rather
than the "Rube Goldberg" design of the 1974 Budget Act repre-
sents the greatest threat to the hopes and survival of
Congressional budget reform. Congress did no more than nego-
tiate a treaty in 1974.247
It is therefore likely that Congress may find itself suspended
between paralysis caused by internal conflict, and ever-rising
spending levels adopted by its several parts at the behest of special
interests--unless the new Budget Committees succeed in exerting real
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All Of this can be seen as the result of Congressional att.npf
to balance budget control „1tn other legislative values, such as «1n-
talnlng the role of the legislature as the representative of diverse
interests. This Is the perennially unresolvable tension.
Representation pulls Congress toward the fragmentation of power.
Budgeting's essential purpose Is the coordination of »any decisions
The ultimate effects of the new process therefore depend not upon Its
efficiency, or Its effects upon budget totals, but the extent to which
it can maintain an uneasy balance between these conflicting Impulses
and needs.
These three factors, i.e., that Congress jointly c«nputes
program budget totals with the cooperation of executive branch agen-
cies, that nearly 60% of total outlays are "uncontrollable," and that
the centrifugal forces of the legislature are at odds with the basic
requirements of budgeting, define and limit the scope of application
of the Budget Act and its potential to increase the power of the
Congress over the purse. In addition, there are a number of par-
ticular problems which must at least be mentioned if the Act is to
receive a balanced evaluation, and if we are to decide whether it is
likely to succeed or fail in realizing the purposes for which it was
enacted. As we shall see, this is far from being a matter of making a
straightforward eval uation.^^^
First, the Act was supported in its legislative phase by hoar-
ders and wasters alike. Conservatives hoped it would serve as an
instrument for the enforcement of fiscal restraint, Liberals hoped to
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use 1t to shift spending priorities in favor of the poor and elderly,
and to institute a .ore stimulative fiscal policy.^"
,,,, ^^^[^
its preferences into the Act. and saw what it wanted to see when it
turned to examine the finished product: the permissive ones got
targets in the first Budget Resolution, while the hardliners got
ceilings in the second.^^^ g,,, conservatives and liberals have been
disappointed by the budgetary turns Congress has taken since 1974.
Conservatives bemoan the deficits; liberals the increased share of the
overall budget going to the defense sector. Ippolito. a hoarder as
anyone can see, holds that not only has the Budget Act failed to
restrain Congressional spending, but also that further measures are
urgently needed. He favors statuatory or Constitutional limits on
Congress's power to spend:
What is needed to bring Congressional spending under control
IS something that will control Congress's political weakness-
clearly, the only way to combat this political weakness is
'
less rather than more Congressional discretion over
spending. '^^^
Neither a contemporary liberal nor a Whig of the Federal
period could agree with this. Ippolito would give up the most inpor-
tant power that the Constitution gives to Congress in order to save
money. Perhaps this is the time for Congress to cash in its chips and
get out of the game, but I don't think so. What counts in the moment,
however, is not the potential controversy that might arise over
Ippolito's views, but the simple fact that, along with many Members of
Congress, his conclusion is based upon a long look at the budgetary
figures themselves and what they reflect: rising expenditures, rising
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deficits, an increasing percentage of federal outlays going for
interest on the national debt, and rising interest rates.
Alan Schick takes a different approach. He looks not at the
figures, but at the process itself. Does Congress keep to the
schedule? Does it listen to its Budget Committees? Is the process of
Congressional budgeting instituted by the act serving as the script
that Congress follows on its way to making decisions? I suspect that
Schick is a waster, but a very politic one. When given the oppor-
tunity to comment on the rising deficits and expenditures, he tends to
look the other way. For Schick, it is erroneous to regard a budget
process as a means of limiting the government's size or expenditures.
Sixty years of presidential budgeting did not produce this result.
Since a budget process is both an opportunity for claiming resources
and a procedure for rationing limited resources among claimants, the
process itself can result in higher expendftures or provide a mecha-
nism for restraining the growth of government. Whichever side domina-
tes depends on the political environment, and not the budget process
itself. The budget process is neutral. Indeed, unlike Ippolito,
Schick does not even decry the notion that so much of current govern-
ment spending is "uncontrollable." Instead, he holds that mandatory
spending is simply the result of a wilful decision by Congress to
favor non-budgetary values over budgetary control. The balancing of
budgetary and competing values is, for Schick, one of the major suc-
cesses of the congressional budget process.
Needless to say. this evaluation completely begs the question
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of fiscal policy. Schick,
.0 doubt, is aware of this. The process is
neutral. Contress must retain its freedom to decide how to use it.
The Choice of ends varies with time and circumstance, but it ultima-
tely is the result of a political process which Congress has been
elected to carry out. This means that any poss^'ble evaluation of the
budgetary process must be procedural rather than substantive, and his
ultimate evaluation of the Act and its consequences unfolds entirely
along procedural lines.
Wildavsky's analysis is empirical and fraught with matters of
detail. He appears to have no axe to grind. Both critics and defen-
ders of the budget process have strong arguments and commit omissions.
For Wildavsky, budgetary reform had its genesis in the tension between
the particular and the general.
. . .
legislators were unhappy with the collective consequen-
ces of their individual choices. They liked voting for
spending but not for taxes. They got their way.
. .
.
Individual members of Congress won but Congress as a whole
lost; individual and collective rationality were at odds. 258
Like Schick, he emphasizes that Congress is an independent
body that operates in an environment of fragmented and dispersed
power. It has many committees, not one, and these specialize preci-
sely because detailed information is necessary if the collective body
is to exercise budgetary control. This argument, we now know, was
being made in Congress before 1300. But specialization breeds con-
fusion, and if Congressmen confuse themselves they will not be able to
act at all. Therefore, they need mechanisms to reduce the number of
decisions to be considered at any one time. The new budget process,
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then, can be seen as an effort to institutionalize aids to
calculation. He also notes that the CBO has immeasurably
strengthened the hand of Congress in its search for infonnation .^^^
But information alone is not sufficient. Which infonnation?
Whose? For example. Congress as a whole has not yet been able to
determine how to calculate the base or starting figures for a given
year. The House Budget Committee has used a "chairnian's mark," while
the Senate Budget Committee under Muskie listed three possible indica-
tors for action on any given budget item.^^l p.^^ standpoint of
establishing firm control over spending or fiscal policy, it is
disheartening to consider that the range of the figures embodied by
these starting points is quite large.
Nevertheless, there have been accomplishments, and Wildavsky
discusses several. First, Congressional knowledge of economic manage-
ment is much improved since passage of the Act,^^^ for the body is now
able to confront total figures in the budget resolutions. This means
that Congressional understanding of the relationship between the size
and makeup of the federal budget and the economy as a whole has become
more sophisticated. Second, the process works: the deadlines have
been met. This, as we saw, is the criterion most satisfying to
Schick. Wildavsky then raises the question of substance. What have
been the effects of the Act upon spending itself?
This question is more easily asked than answered. The dif-
ficulty is due not only to the short history of the refonn
but also to the requirement of estimating conditions that
might have been (what would Congress have done without the
reform?) but that now can never be. To know whether Congress
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that everyone agrees on wh t ihe r^oL"lf'"'
accomplished. For the oreclJ n,,^ f supposed to have
For the philosopher, this connection between an actual and a
possible past could have interesting ratifications that go to the
heart of what we nean when we say that any innovation
"works" at all.
Wildavsky, occupied with other
.natters, presses on. He notes that it
would have been politically impossible to specify the size of budget
deficits initially because specifying the size would have destroyed
the possibility of high and low spenders reaching agreement. ^^^^ He
also notes that the concept of strengthening Congressional
"control"
over the budget is itself problematic: obviously. Congress should get
the spending it wants, rather than be constrained to operate within
some predetermined level. Furthermore, control does not mean, for
Wildavsky, that Congress is necessarily better able to prevail against
the Chief Executive:
Interaction between Contress and the Executive Branch is so
strong ... that parts of each institution are likely to be
^9^i"st the other, and simple comparisons are suspect.Besides, the idea is to control the content of budgets not
merely to prevail over others, however foolish they may
In general, he notes that without a central committee that
controls all decisions, as on the Cabinet model. Congress has to
choose which committees it will support. This is a political choice
and one it must be free to make. The basic thrust of the refonn was
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that it would institutionalize and choose new co,„™ittaes of its own
rather than rubber stamping those of the Executive. Whether Congress
trusts itself enough to do this, or whether budgetary power will pass
by default to the Executive Branch is now being dete^ined .2^6
For Wildavsky. the Budget Con,.1ttees have succeeded ,„ore in
predicting outco.es than in Influencing the..^"
,,,,,
datlons tend to be predictions about future Congressional actions.
Since these co,n™ittees know that other c™,.ittees will not accept
budget directives that change priorities radically, all they can do Is
content themselves with trying to create a sense of 11,„lts. As indi-
cated earlier, this effort has been successful in changing the ethos
of Members of Congress with respect to spending totals.
The great problem plaguing Congress.nen today is the seeming
size of the budget deficit. If Wildavsky is correct, the new process
cannot be held directly responsible for rising deficits, though 1t „ay
be judged guilty by association. The Budget Resolutions attempted to
stipulate what will be spent and how large the deficits shall be.
Clearly, the capacity to estimate accurately has a great deal to do
with the fate of spending and deficit projections. If estimates
are too low and supplemental appropriations turn out to be necessary.
Congress must at the same time vote to increase the size of the defi-
cits. The accompanying publicity unsettles those who may have to
answer for such votes come election time. For this reason, the desire
of Congressmen for stability in their contacts with executive branch
agencies is on the increase--but the Budget Committees themselves do
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not have stable memberships. Instead. HBC members can only serve four
of every ten years. Wildavsky sums up the basic dilemma here:
People learn to play any system. The budget reform enablPsCongressmen to make intelligent decisions. There is a base-departures are identified; calculations are possible; votes'
are large enough in number to be discriminatory but not solarge as to be overwhelming. Beyond this point, procedures
can be permissive but they cannot be compelling. If the
House and Senate Budget Committees stick to totals they
wonder if they are predicting rather than controlling expen-ditures. If they try to alter the character or cotnposi tion
of expenditures within totals, they threaten all power of
otner committees. Fiscal conservatives are unhappy because$oO to $100 billion deficits are not their idea of control.
Liberal spenders complain because the Budget Committees are
another obstacle to their desires. So it is not surprising
that before Congress has totally tested this reform, new
reforms to improve it are being proposed. 269
Complicating the problem of estimates is the fact that we have
entered a period of economic uncertainty in which neither revenue nor
expenditure levels can be predicted with the accuracy of ten years
ago. This leads to constant, incremental efforts to adjust the budget
to fiscal reality as that reality changes over the course of a year.
But this new necessity tends to reinforce the political predilections
of Congress to ignore the ceilings stipulated by the two Budget
Resolutions whenever these are perceived as inaccurate or incon-
venient.
In general, then, an estimate of the efficacy with which the
new budget process contributes to the wisdom with which Congress
determines the financial affairs of the government depends first upon
whether the observer is a hoarder or a waster, and second upon the
extent to which that same observer thinks that the chaotic internal
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processes of Congressional politics should determine budget outco.es
Clearly, statuatory or Constitutional limitations would l.npose a par-
tisan interpretation of historical necessity upon the long-range prac-
tices of an institution which was Intended to engage in political
action and set policy. As fiscal reality changes, so does the general
sense of the country about what the ultimate spending priorities
should be, i.e., whether the lion's share ought to go to the defense
side or the social welfare side of the budget. The country reflects
its sentiments through the instrument of the ballot, and the c«-
position of Congress, not to mention its disposition, is affected
accordingly.
Does this mean that we need to come away from a review of the
new budget process with a sort of perspectival relativism? Do we just
throw up our hands and say, "Where you stand depends upon where you
sit?" Do the conceptual and procedural conundrums reviewed by
Wildavsky finally come down to his saying that Congress might or might
not succeed in centralizing its budget processes under the direction
of the Budget Commi ttees--but we can't tell yet, and, anyway, it's
ultimately a matter of political will and political power? In a
sense, yes. As I indicated earlier when I discussed Ippolito's propo-
sal that mandatory spending and entitlement programs be sharply cur-
tailed, the possibility of substantive change in our institutional
arrangements is limited by the desire on the part of the American
public for the programs embodied in current spending measures. Were
one to approach this from the standpoint of the separation of powers
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or Of congressional control over the purse, it is clear that the
institutional framework has evolved such that the context within which
such questions are posed has been profoundly changed. Take the
separation of power, for example. The interbranch structure of sub-
govern.ents and iron triangles not only constitutes an elaborate
syste. for the distribution of power, in part away fro.n elected repre-
sentatives, but also exists to serve needs of individuals throughout
the wider society, needs which Congress has determined can be legiti-
mately so served. Against this it is difficult to see how any argu-
ment might be rai sed-unl ess one were to claim that the political
processes through which members of Congress are selected for office
are themselves not legitimate.
There is, however, another question, one which has not been
determined by the new budget process, but the outlines of which can be
discerned through the new arrangements. This question concerns the
gradual "bureaucratization" of the Congress, and Wildavsky touches
upon it in his discussion of the Impoundment sections of the 1974 Act:
The issues brewing over impoundment are suggestive of a
general executive-legislative clash. Part of this clash is
over an Executive Branch perception that Congress is thought
to be not only concerning itself with overall policy direc-
tion but increasingly dictating program composition and theday-to-day running of government. The Executive views this
as impinging upon the flexibility of the Administration
stifling creativity under the guise of control. Congress'
general distrust of the Executive and especially the 0MB
comes at a time when government is getting more cotnplex. A
fear inherent in this distrust, voiced by both Congressional
and Administrative sources, is that as Congressmen take on an
increasingly activist orientation, they will spread them-
selves too thin and be forced to rely increasingly on staff;
the trend would lead to the gradual bureaucratization of
Congress .-^'U
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Obviously, this 1s the perspective of tabers oP Congress who
are beginning to sense that matters are getting oot of control. This
'3. and has been, our position throughout this dissertation. ;Vner1can
institutions are undergoing a period of evolution as rapid as that
being undergone by certain sectors of terican industry, while this
is hardly the place to chronicle the possible causal relations that
hold between the evolution of technological instruments and industrial
fonns within the econo,.y. and the simultaneous explosion in the num-
bers and power of unelected servants throughout the government, we can
recall the basic tenet about public space and political change. When
substantial alterations are undertaken in the institutional arrange-
ments of power and the society in question is a polity, then altera-
tions of such magnitude ought to be taken up and considered, in
public, through the political process and made subject to delibera-
tions and decisions by the representatives of the people. But this
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causes problems and the professional staff does not, why not reco.nmendthat Congress hire all and only professional staff? It is clear thatin some ways, Mai bin would favor such a solution to staff probl^ns
'
because we have reached the point where staff is indispensable to thefunctioning of Congress. See his review of the work of the pro-
fessional staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation as it functioned
under the tutelage of one Laurence Woodworth who served as its chief
of staff, 1966 to ca. 1978. (Ibid., pp. 170-187.) Here we find
historical evidence for the plausibility of what might be seen as an
Ideally functioning Congress: the staff was profoundly non-partisan.
It served as a buffer between the individual members and outside
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wasTf?er'a?l" "I^'Ji i''^ '''''' Laurence 'woodwor^h whoafter all. a salaried employee of the committee, had no businessvirtually dictating tax provisions to the elected representative ofthe people. What counts, on this view, is neither the relativl
^nwI^iLn
issues involved nor the level of expertise needed to
solve them. Experts," in fact, are frequently seen as dangerous
emissaries of alien and elitist powers which would control the inno-
cent people by plunging them into thickets of abstract cotnplexity and
abandoning them there in the dark, before retiring to wait in silence
until the cries of the bewildered should summon their triumphant
return. Those who shy away from the Laurence Woodworth's of this
world prefer to have their political decisions unalloyed by the input
of the intelligentsia, and seek political solutions cut from the soliddenims and polyesters that the folks back home would recognize.
Perhaps there is something to be said for this view; perhaps we would
be better served were the interests and rhetorical positions of such
Senators as, say, Jack Kemp or Edward Kennedy to be embodied in our
tax provisions--but this would beg the entire question of the possible
unintended consequences which so often follow the application of
sweeping generalizations to such highly complex and delicate mecha-
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1.1] What is a public space? Why do we need one? How should
it be used? For what should it be used? These are some of the
questions which I have tried to illuminate throughout the foregoing.
In turning to the matter of conclusions, however, I find it impossible
to bow to the ordinary convention and present a set of systematic and
interrelated arguments along which I could array my central findings
like fish on a string. Instead, I'm going to follow Aristotle's own





paragraphs, so.e of the difficulties to which see of ,ny central
cepts see. to give rise. In no case do I think it possible to am'
at exhaustive or co,nplete definitions of basic concepts, nor do I
think it is possible to discover arguments for following or not
following certain courses of action; arguments that would have univer-
sal validity. Instead, we live, as I've tried to point out here, in a
particular historical «.ent. In the context of political institutions
that are in part derived f-orn and in part illuminate a tradition of
discourse and thought about politics that I have called the republican
political tradition. In line with this tradition and its intentions.
I think that the following should be seen as areas of central concern
for those who would strengthen or perhaps refonn the institutions of
the present government of the United States-or criticize them along
traditional lines.
1.2] Of the three central concepts in this thesis, public
space, citizen and common interest, the key now seems to be the co.mnon
interest. This is so because it is only through a developed notion of
the truly common that it is possible to reflect critically upon what
citizens in public spaces may actually be doing, and therefore to
decide whether special interests are in fact prevailing over general
interests. If we find citizenship and participation actually working
to promote the goals of partial interests--as seems to be the case
with Congress today-then it is possible to say that the public space
is not giving birth to that issue for which it was originally con-
ceived, and that therefore, by a kind of teleological argument.
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Congress is not really a public space. But such an argument fro.n con-
sequences depends upon the coherence of the concept "public or general
interest."
2.1] What arguments of the preceding sort indicate, however,
Is that the "common interest" now stands in the position that other
kinds of "transcendental argument" have occupied in alternative
theories of political life. It has been the case for most thinkers in
most places that some kind of standard of morality or justice external
to politics and to daily political life had to be invoked in order to
make some kind of meaningful evaluation of that life possible. In
attempting to restrict such cricial standards to the political actions
of a given polity, both Aristotle and Machiavelli willingly ran the
risk of making it impossible to find some court of appeal outside of
whatever the constitutionally legitimate ruling group might decide to
do- -as long as that group held its power by virtue of a mixed govern-
ment or constitution. Alternative approaches to theirs have rested
upon such notions as that of "God" or "Natural Law," and the histori-
cal stage is now, in our time, taken up with the notion of "Universal
Human Rights." The first two have been rather thoroughly demonstrated
by philosophers to be incoherent and the third, I suspect, will be
liable to similar critiques.^ In general, it seems that what Kant
showed in his fourth antinomy, that there is no transcendental being
or concept which could make a given course of action or theoretical
evaluation necessary
,
may well apply to the notion of a common
interest as fully as it does to the concepts God, Natural Law or Human
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Rights. All may be a matter of taste or sentiment.
2.2] For many social scientists and thinkers, especially since
the second World War, the concept of "social life" has moved into the
position once held by these older concepts, as Sheldon Wolin was at
such pains to show, and in effect have become the transcendental argu-
ment for many students of modern politics. The development is not
new, but its influence is increasing.
The [19th] century endowed society with a status as distinc-
tive as that previously accorded the political order,
surrounding it with the affectionate metaphors that another
age had reserved for the church, personifying it as the life-
force ultimately shaping politics, economic life, and
culture. The century had adopted the article of faith that
no creation, no object, no thought, no act could be right-
fully called "mine." Everything was society's and
creativity— art, literature, religion and phil osophy--were
stripped of mystery and exposed as "expressions" of society.
All shades of opinion unanimously agreed that economic pro-
duction must be analyzed as a social process in which it was
impossible to single out the contributions of single indivi-
duals. Although it fell to the socialists to exploit this
particular line of thought into a justification for the abo-
lition of private ownership, property was merely the most
spectacular casualty among privacies of all kinds.
2
Wolin's critique obviously follows from that of Hannah Arendt who
attacked the "social" as a kind of catchall category within which the
"political" was in danger of being submerged and lost forever. But
the "political," as Arendt showed, is partly the result of individual
skills which must be acquired through experience and are not given to
all men equally at birth. Therefore it is necessary to seek criteria
for admitting selected individuals to participation in public life or
the public space, in order to ensure that all such individuals possess
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the capacUies needed there and to separate the fit fro.n the unfit.
Such distinctions and experiences, she claimed, are needed to ,nake it
possible for "political life" to function in such a way that the good
of the general order is served and that at least a few individuals
develop What Arendt saw as the higher existential potentials that
alone are uniquely human. Nowhere does she allege that such a life or
course of personal development will ever be available to al 1 . Her
critics, naturally, have taken umbrage with the elitism behind this,
and attacked her in the name of a theory of social equality ultimately
derived from Christianity. In our time, the problem of equality refu-
ses to go away, and its strength may be seen in the unquestioned posi-
tion that the social has assumed in comtemporary analyses of
collective life. If Arendt and Wolin are correct about the role that
the social has assumed in contemporary political thought, then I think
it no great leap to claim that the social has not only succeeded in
supplanting participatory politics as an organizing category with
which to study collective life in the twentieth century, but it has
done so by virtue of being able to insinuate itself into the place
where the transcendental argument once stood. In so doing, it serves
to remove from collective memory the notion that the full capacities
of the individual human person could only be developed by par-
ticipating with other members of the community in making decisions
that would affect them all in common. Yet if we would disparage the
erosion and loss of the political and the emergence of the social, we
still need either to support our own critique of contemporary politics
sa
453
with an alternative "transcendental argument," or explain why it i
possible to get along without one-while simultaneously maintaining
point of view that is in any way critical of contemporary political
practices.
2.3] How might we characterize a clash between contemporary
social theory and classical political thoery, other than as a dif-
ference over transcendental arguments? In former times, such a clash
of views would have been labelled "religious" precisely because it is
in the nature of such arguments to be based on metaphysical assump-
tions that are undemonstrable per se, have pretensions to universal
validity, and are clasped to the breasts of their respective adherents
as a consequence of either a leap of faith or a conversion experience.
On this argument, politics in the twentieth century occupies the place
that religion held in the sixteenth.
2.4] Bernard Bailyn argues that the American revolutionaries
did not really believe in Human Rights--despi te what Jefferson wrote
in the Declaration of Independence.
3.0] Let us return to the concept of the "common interest."
Suppose it can have no justification beyond the claim that it must be
being served if political stability exists. In other words, let us
assume that if the common interest is not made the object of attention
by the key political actors in a polity, a) that that polity will
decay or decline or otherwise come to some kind of a bad end: and b)
that those whose interests are habitually not taken into account will
make trouble for whoever takes things into account. In making these
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assumptions we have Machiavelli with us-though some may see the
assumptions as counter-factual, and others may think that I am begging
the question. How might we think through the notion "common
interest," not qua philosphical conept, but qua possible object of
political action?
3.1] My contention throughout this thesis has been that the
common good can be served through the melding of a heterogeneity of
interests into a synthetic political judgment, arrived at collectively
by those whose vital interests are to be affected by that judgment.
Hence, the kinds of political decision from which the common good
results incorporate a number of elements, and these are heterogeneous
both with respect to economic and political power, and with respect to
epistemology--i.e., that different existential positions entail dif-
ferent approaches to the same problems. The essence of a political
judgment made collectively is a compromise among the various partial
views that appear in the decisionmaking process and which together
synthesize the manifold of their plurality into a decision. Froin the
standpoint of the individual or of the competing group, ic offers but
a partial fulfillment of aims.
3.2] It is the easiest thing in the world to see what the com-
mon interest is in time of war: it is that interest in surviving as a
social and political unit which unites a country at the moment it per-
ceives an external threat. In the foreign policy area, then, vital
threats have a way of rapidly inducing a unitary self-consciousness
in the polity. But the notion must be applicable to the domestic side
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as wen. because the state does act in the domestic sphere and because
there clearly exist issues and questions which, once decided, will
affect the entire society for good or ill.
3.3] Domestic issues are of two sorts. First are those which
require measures applicable at all times and in all places throughout
the polity. Government regulations of commercial activities provide
one example, for the SEC and the FASB lay down rules which everyone to
whom they are applicable must follow. Second and :Tiore difficult are
measures involving the distribution or redistribution of particular
goods, or which undertake to provide services either to everyone, or
to selected parts of the citizen body. Some distributions come close
to being universal. Among these are public transportation, the postal
service and environmental regulations. Others are more particular.
Defense contracts, AFDC and public universities are examples of the
sort of domestically distributed good to which not everyone has
access. Hence this kind of good is made available to a subset of the
population on the basis of discriminatory criteria in order, we must
assume, that all may ultimately benefit. While the examples given
here are clear enough, it is the domestic policies of this latter sort
that give rise to heated disputes and, in fact, much of the substance
of American party politics.
Conflict arises over partial or local grants of goods because
local solutions to "general" problems are always discriminatory and
can be implemented only through a manifestly unequal distribution of
goods and services by the state. It was precisely such activities.
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undertaken by the Congress, which Woodrow Wilson saw as lying at the
base of the corruption he saw spreading through that body. For
Wilson, private interests were being served and public goods were
being ignored in the rush for the log roll. Hence the centrality of
Arendt's question: where is the dividing line between public and
private? Under what conditions might it be shown that "all" benefit
when "some" benefit disproportionately? Do we need some kind of
transcendental deduction to demonstrate that a given policy decision
is really in the common interest, or might an affirmative decision by
the elected representatives be sufficient justification for it?
3.4] Here, I think, it is necessary to part company with
Hannah Arendt. Her attempt to establish a set of universal criteria
through which a public-private distinction might be established is
really a reflection of a search for moral standards external to poli-
tics from which it might be regulated or judged. Let us go back for a
moment to the work of Werner Jaeger upon which it is clear that so
much of Arendt's project is based. Jaeger's studies in classical phi-
logy led him to insights about the nature of Greek political life
which Arendt attempted to apply to the present era. At one point, for
example, Jaeger came across the word pol iteuesthai
,
which meant "to
take part in civic life, or the life of the polis."^ What I now think
Hannah Arendt did was to read Jaeger and then start with an image of
that crowd gathered in the public space. "Public affairs" are those
things that concern all and only that crowd. So. on the basis of the
image, she attempted to draw the line between public and private.
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Since the "public" is separate fro.n the "social," the affairs of
social life are none of its business. nJow there is a contradiction
here: for Arendt, politics takes place in the real, of freedom, that
is, after the necessities of life and the issues of survival have been
settled for the individual participants. Once in the realm of
freedom, they can take up any question whatsoever. But if the
assembly is to be free to decide to take up whatever matters it wants
to take up, it has to be free theoretically to take up social matters
should it so decide. If we don't allow this, then we are left with an
assembly that operates in a highly circumscribed realm, and this
pushes us back into the search for a trascendental argument to justify
the circumscription. If Natural Law can't fill this void, neither can
Arendt' s image.
3.4.1] Therefore, the assembly itself can be the only ultimate
judge of where the line between public and private actually falls and
it follows that "the social" realm can be the legitimate object of
legislative action. This is consistent vyith Aristotle, for whom
social background conditions partially determine political forms,
political spaces and the kinds of activity and substantive decison-
making that will go on in such spaces.
3.5] If we can find no transcendental argument or external
standard to use in evaluating the actions of an assembly or govern-
ment, are we forced to give our reluctant approval to anything that a
government or an assembly might decide to do? Is the notion of the
"common interest" incoherent? Is it impossible to show that a
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legislature or polity could ever be mistaken about what its con.non
interest is? Again, let us return to a basic precise: it is possible
for a legislature or assembly to make decisions that not only can
adversely affect the fortunes of the polity as a whole, byt lead to
Us collapse and destruction. If this is true, it oiust also be true
that it is possible for an assembly or legislature to make decisions
which will enhance the strength or vitality of the polity. Acts of
such a nature then, whether they be advantageous or the opposite,
affect what I am calling the "common good."
3.6] We need to ground the notion of the common good in
something specific enough to enable us to distinguish policies that
serve the entire polity from those that do not, and at the same time
make it possible for a governing assembly to move to ameliorate local
calamities when it desires to do so. Suppose that we start with the
notion that there exists a "national constituency." This is not an
aggregation of partial constituencies, but exists simultaneously with
them. It is not necessarily the case that the needs or interests of
the national constituency are fulfilled when those of the partial
constituencies are met. To take a phrase from the logicians here, to
say that "the interests of each have been met" is not the same thing
as saying, "the interests of all have been met." While it is not true
that denying the interests of each will serve the interests of all, it
is no more true that serving the interests of each will serve the
interests of all. So, somewhere, the interests of all and the
interests of each must diverge. This is why "aggregation" does not
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provide an accurate accounting of the kind of collectivity that
Aristotle meant to designate with "Koinonia ."
3.7J Another approach to deternining when a particular policy
or distribution of goods may or may not be in the common interest may
be found in the inescapabil i ty of political conflict about such
distributions: i.e.. in the adversarial system which is entailed by
the notion of a legislature or assembly in which competing interests
are brought to bear in the decisionmaking process. The truth-value of
assertions that such and such a policy or distribution may or may not
be in the common interest can only be settled politically-thai is, to
the extent that such assertions provide the basis for ccnmon action.
The truth or falsity of such assertions can never be demonstrated
categorically and finally. Hence, to demonstrate that such and such
policy is in the common interest requires collective acceptance of the
outcome of debates. Acceptance is shown when those to be affected
accept policy outcomes without offering further conflict and without
needing to be coerced into following them. If political "truths" are
those which are actually acted upon, their ultimate justification must
lie in the intersubjective process through which their acceptance qua
truths is established. Hence the predominance of local treatments of
specific problems over the abstract formulations of theory in actual
assemblies. Hence also the widespread resentment against "socialisms"
and "imperialisms" of all sorts, under which localities chafe when sub-
jected to the unifonnity of deci sions--and taxes--imposed from afar.
If there are not prior restraints discoverable upon the range of poli-
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genera,
,00., then on,, possi.e chec. 0. restraint
,.st .e foon.
-
the adversarial process itself. Therefore, political truths are
not Objective, the. are intersubjective. That something is .rong
.th
this argument as a defense of the probability that a given assembly
w^ll find its way to the c.nmon good can be inferred from the career
Of Alclbiades in the Athenian assembly. By the time the general will
had worked its way. the Athenian folU was in shambles.
4.0] Aristotle took it as axiomatic that human societies are
divided up mto distinct classes and that different classes hav» dif-
ferent interests. He did not suppose that classes can be abolished.
The reader of such historians as Thucydides, Livy, Machiavelli, and
Guicclardlnl is inclined to agree. The notion "class" points out much
more than mere economic distinction. It points out differences of
life experience, psychological development, attitudes toward others
and conceptions of justice. Revolutionary experiences in the twen-
tieth century, which have attempted to do away with class distinc-
tions, seem to have inevitably foundered on elements in the human
psyche that are as resistant to change as traumatic experience. Witn
what motives and experiences can the individual be Induced to
consciously strive to alter the representation he holds in his heart
of his primary formative experiences? Such experiences underlie his
political views and are the substance of what must be changed if the
psychological attitudes which support class distinctions are to be
altered on the way to abolishing classes themselves. Some individuals
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can be expected to be able to work to change their attitudes, others
can be expected to resist. On balance, there see.s to be three things
that a society bent upon changing or refoming itself might do with
respect to class distinctions: first, the revolutionary group, or if
successful, the nouveau regime
, can shoot its class enemies.
Machiavelli recommended this; Stalin carried it out. Second, the
Agents of History might attempt a program of "mental rectification"
and seek to use political methods to reform the psyches of those
needing to be reformed. Mencius recommended this method and Mao
Tse-Tung carried it out. In the latter case a problem arose, however,
between the revolutionary moment and the social nirvana: those
involved in implementing the mental rectification campaign began to
disagree about what changes constituted reform and what changes
embodied reactionary assumptions. Therefore, they fell into epistemo-
logical heterogeneity over a problem that could not be negotiated or
compromised by definition. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy and educa-
tional system collapsed about them. So much for "zero-sum" solutions.
The third method is to try to effect a compromise between the various
classes through political means such that each gains some of the goals
it seeks, none attains everything it desires, and institutions are
founded such that no class is able to take over the instrumentality of
the state and use it to despoil the others. This notion is embodied
in the republican tradition.
5.0] The basic idea behind the public space conception of
politics is that individuals bearing with them different private and
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class interests will gather together in a public place at appointed
times and deliberate and compromise among themselves in order to
effect policies with respect to those things that affect them all in
common. The notion that the participants in such a politics consider
an agenda restricted to all and only common problems embodies the
assumption that the effective capacities of such a group are somehow
related to the extent of its responsibilities: the less it tries to
do, the more effective it will be.
5.1] Both theoretical and historical experience have shown
that there are two deficiencies in a "pure" public space mode. First,
a large assembly is really not an effective way to deal with matters
of daily administration and finance. Matters of detail are, it turns
out, better left to those who have some familiarity with them, and
lengthy assembly debates over "small" concerns amount to a waste of
everyone's time. It is better, therefore, to delegate some tasks,
either to experts or magistrates, or to leave them to be decided
within the localities where they arise as matters of immediate con-
cern. The second fundamental difficulty with a "pure" public space is
that it in fact does not always result in policies that are manifestly
in the common interest. Majorities can sweep over assembled bodies
like whirlwinds, carrying all before them, and by the time the distur-
bances have died down, policies are in place which might not have been
pursued had the atmosphere stayed calm. This is among the effects of
rhetoric. Another kind of unexpected consequence of decisionmaking
by large gatherings is that it is possible for a group within the
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assembly to consistently muster majorities such that minorities are
systematically created and their interests ignored. ^ This is not in
the common interest because it tends to divide the polity and speed
the institutionalization of divisions which have an interest in
changing the form of government itself. The possibility then arises
that politics could be supplanted by more violent means of making
decisions that affect the generality of society.
5.2] As a consequence of such developments, two patterns of
adjustment have historically arisen to comprise the soveriegnty of
assemblies. First is what I will call a "functional" co.nproinise
.
Both administration and executive organs have in fact frequently ari-
sen to direct the daily affairs of the city when the assembly held
sovereign power. From the Athenian assembly, then, arose not only
magistrates but a smaller assembly or boule of 400 men, which met more
frequently than the larger body and made decisions with respect to the
implementation of policies. The second kind of compromise is the
"social" compromise. It is based on the inescapabil i ty of contending
class interests and the need to contain them in an institutional fra-
mework. This seems to have been embodied in the mixed government
theory itself: given the existence of opposed classes, each would be
given control over some part of the state, but these all would be
required to act conjointly when matters of general policy were to be
determined. Recall, for example, Machiavel 1 i ' s suggestion that the
Provost, drawn from the popular element, be empowered to veto deci-




5.3] The theory of
.ixed government put forth by Aristotle
the ,nost practical fo™ of government likely to endure for the
-Jority Of ,„en in the majority of states. e*odies a legislative
assembly at its center. ,n Aristotle's theory, this assembly
.as
be "soverieign" in four «ays. First, in the sense that members of
magistracy were drawn directly from it; second, in the sense that it
always had the power to override decisions
.ade by the magistrates-
third, by virtue Of the fact that the assembly was open to al 1 of the
Citizens of the polis and hence not only represented but actually
embodied those social forces which were the source of legitimate
authority in this for. of state; fourth, the magistrates were always
"temporary officers, drawn in relays from the general rank of citi-
zens for Short ter.s and required to take their decisions in public or
report those decisions directly back to the assembled citizens. At
the end of their tenure in office, officials were publicly evaluated
and judged by the assembly and held accountable for their acts. If
approval was forthcoming, rewards followed. If disapproval was the
consensus, jail, ostracism, the seizure of one's property or even a
death sentence could ensue.
5.4] The theory of mixed government, then, was an important
development in the history of the idea of what properly constitutes a
"political compromise." Instead of deliberating, bargaining and ulti-
mately voting an agreement, the citizens attempt to structure a
general one into the organizational apparatus of the state itself,
dividing power between permanently existing social interests before
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the assembly gathers or a particular debate takes place. In practice,
the assembly becomes the arena of political action for the "popular"
'
element in the state and the ultimate court of appeal when the various
branches are unable to move forward. Sometimes, it is the ultimate
source of power or access to magisterial position, but specific appli-
cations of the mixed government idea have varied widely as we have
seen and are subject to the vagaries of tradition as well as a host of
other forces.
5.5] What is important is that a general compromise between
classes may be carried by a permanent division of power among several
branches of government, rather than hammered out at each particular
point in an assembly. In such a case, diverse modes of political pro-
cedure are incorporated into the modus Vivendi of the state and the
imbalances reflected in the outcomes of a given proceeding are compen-
sated through its conflation with the others.
5.6] Whether the ancients were correct in asserting that the
mixed government structure would long endure by dividing power among
the most important political blocs in a state remains to be seen: a
superficial glance at the historical record provides little assurance
that republics necessarily last longer than other forms. The Spartan
and Venetian oligarchies each enjoyed stability for nearly a thousand
years. The Republic of Florence, in which Mahiavelli served, lasted
from 1494 to 1510.
6.0] The task that confronts those who gather together in the
public space can now be outlined. They need to serve the common
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interest or national constituency by making collective judgments
about political problems that concern them severally. Political
truths, as we have seen, are solutions to conmon problems which are
"true" only insofar as they are the results of a political agreement.
6.1] What the public space makes possible is the integration
of a heterogeneity of political interests into synthetic judgments
through adversarial proceedings that resolve themselves in the process
of deciding what is to be done with respect to the general life. If
we start by assuming the existence of disagreement, some variant of an
adversarial system is entailed by the notion of a legislature or
assembly in which legitimately competing interests are brought to bear
in the decisionmaking process.
6.2] We have said earlier that political competition arises
over the location of the dividing line between "public" interests and
"private" concerns--or between the issues that involve the collec-
tivity and the troubles that involve the interests of the individual
or group. Another way of formulating this polarity is to ask which
issues can be "legitimately" raised in the public arena, or how we go
about recognizing norms that express and regulate general izable
interests? It is clear that conflicts of interest arise with respect
to possible courses of action by the state. It is also clear that
conflicts of interest arise in the sphere of private life. When is it
proper that conflicts in the private sphere become the object of
attention and decision by those whose activities take place in the
public sphere? Which specific conflicts of interest are such that the
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fom, of their disposition w11, affect what Is cannon or general to the
col lecti ve?
6.2.1] Let us go back to the Greek notion of koinonia or asso-
ciation. According to Aristotle, there are many kinds of association
within a society. First there is the political association of the
polU, the virtue of which is justice. In addition, there are num-
berless less encompassing associations, each with its particular end
or raison d'etre
.
Some are religious, some familial, some are based
on commercial activities, some have to do with the locality and the
village. Each of these lesser associations is held to be able to deal
with those matters that it was formed to deal with. Indeed, its per-
sistence as an association can be seen as a rough indice of its suc-
cess. Only the political association, properly speaking, is able to
deal with the matters common to everyone because only the political
association embraces all of the citizens and all of these lesser asso-
ciations. What the members of the political association have in com-
mon is citizenship or membership in the political association itself.
This is a specific status, a specific grant of a particular kind of
personal power that is conferred upon the individual by the deliberate
act of those who have preceeded him to citizenship.
Now the United States is a koinonia of lesser associations.
The most important of these are the several states, but there are
literally thousands of groups of all kinds which have come into being
for a variety of particular purposes. While it is not generally
accepted in the U.S. that the government should step in to regulate
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the interna, affairs of such lesse. associations. It has c« to be
w1de„ he,d-at least since the Hew Deal-that the government
.a,
legULately step in to lay do«n the ground rules for conflict and
competition a,nong private associations. By the arguments advanced in
(2.2) and (3.5) above, this notion that a government may legitimately
regulate the relations between conflicting groups in the private
sphere is valid.
6.2.2] From our standpoint, the implementation of such a
doctrine would not have been possible wihout the capacity of Congress
to effect internal compromise between competing claims. This
acknowledgment of the legitimacy of competing claims had to take place
simultaneously in two spheres. First, among the citizenry, who
pursued their particular interests to the point of clashing with one
another and stopped short of armed struggle; second, within the well
of the Congress itself, where representatives of the various interests
came forward and agreed to regulate their several relations.
6.2.3] When the Congress succeeded in mediating between the
conflicting claims of opposed interests in the private sphere, it
acted in the manner of a classical public space. The common interest
was served by confining class and economic conflict to the political
realm, and the success of the compromises there achieved was evinced
by the subsequent obedience of all parties to the decisions there
taken. Clearly, the entire process depended upon acceptance of the
legitimacy of opposed claims by each of the parties in the conflict:
The capacity to accept competing claims as legitimate is the
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necessary precondition of coinproini se . Insofar as I view mvopponents as .norally wrong, co.npromise becomes appea einentf my own claims are unjust, I can press them only out ofunwarranted self-interest. Tolerance in a society of c^n-peting interest groups is precisely the ungrudging
be our ued""'"^h?.' Ir"
''''''' ''''''''' 'o exist andp s This economic conception of tolerance goes quitenaturally with the view of human action as motivated byinterests rather than principles or norms. It is much easierto accept a compromise between competing interest thanbetween opposed principles which purport to bp objectively
valid. The genius of American politics is its ability totreat even matters of prinicple as though they were conflicts
of interest. (It has been remarked that the genius of Frenchpolitics IS Its ability to treat even conflicts of interest
as matters of principle. )6
• bc
6.3] Given the foregoing considerations, it is easy to see how
Sheldon Wolin arriv.ed at the following considerations when he took up
the questions of what a "political problem" is:
The importance that interest had assumed in Roman political
practice and thought added a new shade of meaning to politics
and heightened the distinctive character of political action.
The Romans had realized instinctively that the legitimizing
of interest not only entailed a limited form of action, a kind
of domestic diplomacy, but that the multiplicity of interests
presupposed as well the incomplete character of solutions to
political issues. If political activity was centered around
interests, the attendant problems had to be resolved on the
same basis; that is, on the basis of claims that conflicted
precisely because each claim had a particularity that set it
off from other claims.
'Harmony is very easily obtainable in a state where
the interests of all are the same, for discord ari-
ses from conflicting interests, where different
measures are advantageous to different citizens.'
(Cicero. De Res Publica I, xxxiii, 49.)
The rivalries for power and advantage taught the Romans
something else about the odd status of a political problem.
The common spectacle of competing groups, each headed by
experienced leaders with roughly the same patriotic motives,
yet each asserting a different policy for the same problem,
could not help but raise questions about the nature of the
problem itself. What was it about a political problem that
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It may indicate that that which is represented in the United States is
undergoing a process of change which shifts the focus of represen-
tation away from local districts and to specialized interests which
have no geographical base. Perhaps special interests and not
districts have been that which is represented in Congress since
Wilson's time.
In his Political Representation in England and the Origins of
the American Republic, J.R. Pole raises the notion that what has
actually been represented in the American Congress has undergone
periodic historical change.^ Who or what has been "represented" in
Congress, i.e., districts, persons, property, interests, or
principles? Pole's argument shows that any and all of these have been
represented at different moments on this side of the Atlantic.
From Pole's discussion, we can make a number of inferences.
First, when we consider the representative function of the Congress we
should note that "representation" itself is a complex concept which
can designate not only a number of possible relations that might hold
between representative and represented--such as the competing doctri-
nes of "virtual" and "actual" representation--but also that the repre-
sentation may be of either principles or interests. When we look at
the contemporary Congress, we find that a variety of principles of
justice come forward in the various debates that take place there, and
that these are not always correlated with the material interests of
various constituent groups. Controversies over abortion and admi-
nistration policy in Central America are two examples. Both prin-
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ciples and interests, then are able to press their claims to power and
goods under our present system, and it would be false to claim that
either predomonates consistently, or that either exhaustively charac-
terizes the system of "representation" as it has evolved in the United
States.
The second inference we can draw from Pole is that not only
are a multiplicity of kinds of goods represented in Congress, but that
they are liable to change over time. Our institutions evolve and
change. They embody procedural forms and institutional arrangements
that are articulations of compromises and victories about power
arrangements. That such arrangements are fundamentally fluid, no stu-
dent of the Cannon revolt can deny. That they have been in a more or
less continuous state of change since the founding of the republic
could be demonstrated with the materials I have brought forward on the
history of the Congress.
7.2] Given these assertions, I think it not unreasonable to
claim that with the reform movements of the 1970s, that which is
actually represented in Congress has changed along with the institu-
tional arrangements which embody that representation. The evidence
has been discussed in detail, but recall: the rise of the entrepre-
neurial member, the increase in staff influence, the decline of
central leadership in the House on the part of either party, the elec-
toral connection, the bureaucratization of the legislature, and
finally the rise of caucus or special interest voting blocs in the
House. These represent centrifugal forces. As elements in the poli-
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tical equation of power within the House itself, they co,npound the
difficulties inherent in arriving at the synthetic judgment that
signifies consensus. Many of these groups, whether they demand
something predicated of interests, like the steel lobby, or something
predicated of principles such as those who oppose abortion, demand
something specific, i.e.. they are seeking to attain goods which can-
not be compromised. In seeking a political rapprochement with such
individuals and groups, the traditional leadership strategies cane to
nothing: it is no longer possible, in bargaining with them, to propose
that they and their opponents alike give up something. What is at
stake is zero-sum. Therefore, alternative leadership and floor stra-
tegies are called for, and these seem to have been forthcoming. What
occurs at present is a new kind of bargaining. "I'll give you what
you want, all of what you want, concerning this little affair of
yours, but in return, when my turn comes, you must give me all of what
I want." Coalitions are built up out of such agreements but note: the
resulting Congressional majorities are aggregations predicated of
bargains rather than compromises about the attainment of particular
goods. They are not the synthetic political of judgments of a koino-
nia .
7.3] As the critics of special-interest legislation and social
spending programs have vehemently attested, compromises of the
logrolling variety have been all too frequent: bargaining and trade-
offs have characterized much legislation since 1974, especially in the
spending and taxing areas. Phlanxes of interest groups mobilize
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clusters of Congress.nen to pass measures which benefit selected por-
tions of the electorate. This is private business. If sufficiently
powerful, such clusters need not compromise in order to raise majori-
ties. The problem is that compromise on public or general questions
is difficult to attain precisely because such issues divide consti-
tuencies, give rise to epistemological heterogeniety
, and are contro-
versial. Controversy, as Fiorina pointed out, threatens the
re-election chances of representatives and is better avoided.
Nor is this all. The process seems to work in reverse The
capacity of the special interests to provide obstructions to the
enactment of broadly-applicable policies has been enhanced by the for-
mation of special caucuses and the emerging independence of individual
members. David Price has pointed out a perfectly clear example of the
kinds of difficulties which beset members of Congress and its commit-
tees alike as they attempt to solve "large" problems which affect dif-
ferent constitutiencies in different ways:
Opposition to President Carter's welfare refomi package came
from Agriculture Committee spokesmen who saw replacing food
stamps with cash payments as detrimental to farm interests,
while many of those working to salvage the bill were mainly
concerned with giving hardpressed state and local governments
financial relief. Safeguarding district water projects or
agricultural commodity programs was often a higher priority
of legislators than identifying with the broader fiscal-
management and consumer viewpoints that the president
adopted. This is not to say that members of Congress are
incapable of taking broad-gauged policy initiatives. Indeed,
as we shall see below, they are increasingly motivated to
gain stature in nationally visible policy areas.
Nevertheless, a general tendency exists in Congress to give
priority to constituency based interests, to aggregate the
demands of groups and contintuencies in such a way as to
minimize tradeoffs and conflict among them, and thus to
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Whether the influence of special interests is positive with
respect to the logroll or negative with respect to obstructionism, the
end result is a kind of institutional paralysis of Congress with
respect to the general welfare, and this paralysis can be discerned
behind the badly-oiled screen of apparent political activity. As
individual congressmen become increasingly independent of the party
structure and increasingly able to build their own organizations and
raise their own money, the sphere of mutual cooperation changes from
the attainment of synthetic judgments in a open central arena to
shifting networks of power that come into being for the sake of
serving specific special interests. The produce of such arrangements
constitutes much of contemporary legislation.
7.4] What is the result of such practices? First, Woodrow
Wilson's critique continues to be fundamenally valid: the public forum
has been replaced by the committee or subcommittee, and all of the
expertise and legislative power embodied by these organs does not
diminish the fact that the broad, general interest--the "common
interest" of the national consti tuency--i s being swept under the car-
pet and forgotten. Robert Paul Wolff pointed out the consequenses for
the national constituency:
. . . there are some social ills in America whose causes do
not lie in a maldistribution of wealth, and which cannot be
cured therefore by the techniques of pluralist politics. For
example, America is growing uglier, more dangerous, and less
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llM K? ^ ? ^''^ in. . . . The reason is that naturalbeauty, public order, the cultivation of the arts, are notthe special interest of any identifiable social qrouoConsequently, evils and inadequacies in those areas cannot be
remedied by shifting the distribution of wealth and power
among existing social groups. To be sure, crime and urban
slums hurt the poor more than the rich, the Negro more than
the white-but fundamentally they are problems of the society
as a whole, not of any particular group. That is to say
they concern the general good, not merely the aggregate of
private goods. To deal with such problems, there must be
some way of constituting the whole society a genuine group
with a group purpose and a conception of the common good.
Pluralism rules this out in theory by portraying society as
an aggregate of human communities rather than as itself a
human community; and it equally rules out a concern for the
general good in practice by encouraging a politics of
interest-group pressures in which there is no mechanism for
the discovery and expression of the common good. 10
7.5] Wolff has the germ of the right idea. What is in order
is not to seek a wholesale condemnation of pluralism. In the absence
of a transcendental argument, the only test we can discover for the
"fairness" of a public policy is that such a policy is fair by defini-
tion if none of the parties subject to it find it intolerable. But
something is missing. The pluralist solution is insufficient, not in
the sense that it is "wrong" but in the sense that it is incomplete.
The overwhelming majority of professional students of Congress,
beginning with the general advocacy of strong Presidential leadership
in the 1960s, but rising to a crescendo of irritation following the
1970s reforms, is that "the broad and general questions are being
ignored in our national legislature, while special interests are well
served." This sentiment, or its equivalent, appears someplace in the
writings of virtually every student of Congress whose work has been
incorporated into this study.
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7.6] The old Whig «ord for what now underlines both the prac-
tical efficacy and the institutional power of Congress is "disunion."
There is good reason to suppose that its underlying basis was
strengthened by the 1970s reforms. Let us recall Young's description
Of the effects of "disunion" upon the Congress during the great
national crisis of 1812:
^^"^''f
"'^ administration saw the fulfillment of evervwor t prophecy of the governmental community's structureattitudes toward politics and power, and its remoteness frmthe citizenry. Jefferson's leadership having alreadycollapsed, the Presidency was restored politicany to theplace defined for it constitutionally and structurally ?n thPcommunity-a position as outsider to' and lac ?ng e ^ h^oauthority over, the establishment on Capitol Hill '^^'isunifying influence removed, all the divisive forces inherentin the social organization and values of the congres onalcommunity were loosed. The party shattered to piece andCongress could not govern, pluging into factional stride atthe very moment of rejecting presidential leadership
Leadership in the nation thus fell to a legislative body
whose organization and values rendered it wholly unequipped
to lead, and obliged it to follow, a distant and divided
citizenry. Policy initiative thus passed to a Congress
unable to mobilize itself, much less the populace for thepursuit of any consistent policy. A nation on the brink of
military disaster was thus embarked upon erratic and mutually
contradictory courses of action dictated by transitory fac-
tional combinations at the seat of government. It was total
victory for the principle of government by "separate and
rival interests." The Presidency slept; effective power
resided nowhere; an anarchy of groups reigned over the
nation. As a wise historian put it, "government, in the
sense hitherto understood, became impossible.il
7.7] What we want to do, then, is not to throw out pluralism,
but to add to it. What we want to do is to try to affect the politi-
cal climate in the United States such that at least a nascent aware-
ness that something like a "common interest" actually exists
here--however incoherent it may appear as a concept. The reason, as
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we noted in (3.6) above and as should be a.ply clear fro™ Young's sta-
te:.ent. is that it is possible for Congress to act in such a way that,
with regard to specific policy areas, it either weakens or strengthen^
the nation as a whole.
7.8] There are both easy ways and hard ways to begin to evoke
a common sense that there is a common interest and that its needs want
attending. The hard way would be to attempt to educate the general
populace of the United States to some common apprehension of the con-
cept. The easy way would be to start with the legislators themselves,
and to search for means to weaken member dependence upon special
interests-particularly in the area of the constant search for finan-
cial resources. Reforms could be made in the electoral process, which
costs too much and which forces representatives to turn to special
interests in order to raise the vast sums for election campaigns as
currently constituted. The television industry, for example, could be
obliged to carry campaign advertising for free, and the duration of
election campaigns shortened as it is in Britain. At the same time,
the salaries of representatives could be raised to the level of upper
middle management--which they equal in responsibility but not in remu-
neration. Let's say about $350,000 per year for a representative and
about $450,000 for a Senator. Given the overhead that the average
member must meet, and the competitive pressure which business is able
to exert for the services of the talented and the diligent, such
increases would be equivalent, I think, to the Greek practice of
paying poor citizens for constant attendance at the assembly. Any
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businessman will attest that "vast" fortunes cannot be built up from
such salaries. Further, with respect to the internal politics of
Congress, the hand of the party leadership simply must be strengthened
both with respect to control over committee appointments and control
over the agenda. The reason for this is that party platforms embody
synthetic, if partisan, apprehensions of a multiplicity of interests.
Perhaps what all this amounts to is a suggestion that a revival of the
notion of virtual representation, if suitably constrained, wouldn't be
all bad.
8.0] It is not too late to make one observation about the
nature of the power of the member of Congress qua citizen. As members
of assemblies which shared in sovereignty, citizens of Florence,
Members of Parliament, and those who sat in the State Legislatures
during the time of the Whig experiment in America shared as indivi-
duals in the power of the institution. While enjoying a privileged
social status, their personal power was in part a function of the
capacity of the institution as a whole to carry out its aims. Now let
us look at the consequences of the rise of the entrepreneurial member,
who has his own organization and center of personal power, and the
emergence of the special interest group as that which is capable of
exerting an exogenous influence on Congress, as it were, and forming
Congressional majorities almost without regard to the will of the
institution. Do these developments enhance the power of the indivi-
dual member? The decentralization of power in the chamber in general
leads, as we have seen, to increasing Congressional paralysis and a
480
long-term loss of power from the legislative to the executive branch
which now not only initiates policy but is an integral part of the
budget and spending process. As a consequence, the locus of govern-
mental agency has moved away from the Congress, even in those areas
where the Constitution most firmly stipulated that it remain.
Furthermore, the complexity of the contemporary U.S. government has
given rise to the "oversight problem"-much discussed in recent
literature--which is one way of measuring the inability of Congress to
make sure that other agencies of government follow up on the policy
initiatives which it lays down or undertakes to finance. When all of
these factors are taken together, what happens to the "power" of the
individual member? If that power is to any extent dependent upon the
capacity of the institution to carry out its collective aims, then
that power is diminished as the power of the institution is dimi-
nished. If Congress is losing power, so is its membership, and so are
i ts members.
8.1] In many historically prior instantiations of the mixed
government form, it was the practice of the Magistracy to propose and
the assembly to dispose. That is, the magistrates proposed what poli-
cies were to be carried out and the assembly either ratified or vetoed
its proposals. The purpose of the Congress, as defined by the
Constitution, was to initiate, define and determine domestic policy.
Its power to do so was guaranteed by its control over the raising and
disbursement of funds. Over the course of its history, however, the
U.S. government has so evolved that these powers have ebbed away, in
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large part as a result of the inability of the Congress to discipline
itself. So once again, as in Greece, Florence, and even the England
of George III, we find that the greatest part of contemporary broad
based policy initiaves originate in the executive branch rather than
in the Congress.
8.2] I have here identifed the "public space" with the
Congress while realizing that the basic notion need not be restricted
to the arena of national politics. Public spaces exist in state
legislatures, at political conventions--though without the lawmaking
capacity—and in the New England Town Meeting. The reason for trying
to equate the public space with the Congress here was to try to main-
tain continuity with the tradition that gave rise to the idea, and to
attempt to define it in such a way as to bind it to the notion of
sovereignty. If there is to be any cogency in the claim that
"politics" is a specific kind of human activity, and that a limited
set of concerns is appropriate to it, then we must be able to support
the claim that the political association per se is greater than and
different from other, lesser associations. If sovereignty can be
attached to the powers of the group meeting in the public space, some
effort is saved with respect to whats needed to make the basic
distinction between the political and other forms of collective life.
9.0] Is it possible to come to a set of definite conclusions
about the nature of Congressional procedures and the powers of the
institution? Not unequivocally. Here are some thoughts which
occurred to me as I concluded my review of that literature.
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9.1] Public space unifies and synthesizes a diversity of
interests and views. So does the Federal Budget. But Congress chops
the budget up into little pieces, and chops itself up into little
pieces, and these pieces decide the public business in public qua
pieces, rather than as representatives of the whole. No. That isn't
quite accurate. The Committees do represent the body politic in some
sense, having been elected to serve in the first place and sent to
their respective duties by other elected representatives of the people
in the second place. Hence they "represent," but the formula of that
representation is different from that of the Congress as a whole.
Given this, what, exactly is behind the insi stence--which I share with
Wilson--that somehow or other, things are qualitatively better when
the Whole Congress, qua representatives of the Whole Country get
together to decide the fundamental questions?
9.2] How fundamental are the thousands of individual
appropriations in the Federal Budget in a given year? Obviously, the
authorizing legislation is important, and exists when passed by the
majority will of Congress. What is to be settled after that are the
amounts to be paid into each account, following an annual review of
the performance of the agencies that administer the particular
programs and disburse the various funds. So what's the problem? The
present procedures of Congress are more or less as Wilson described
them in 1885: the public business of the United States is conducted in
the Committee rooms of the U.S. Congress. Since nobody can see what
they are doing in there, and nobody can understand--unless he happens
483
to be a lawyer or an accountant--what they are doing in there, their
conduct of business and that business itself are not really "public."
This means, however, that the United States is not functioning as a
representative democracy in the classical sense. I think I'm on the
way to making a substantive claim then: the franchise alone is not
sufficient to legitimize the conduct of government. Government must
be conducted in such a manner that the electorate can see what is
going on there.
9.3] What the budget literature shows is that Congress repre-
sents a heterogeneity of interests; that Americans generally accept it
as legitimate that the general body shall take care of particular
interests, because most of the particular interests will be taken care
of. This is pluralism, more or less, based on a distributive theory
of justice and the supposed premise that the government of the United
States is like a gigantic Sears Roebuck Department Store and that
every interest group has a revolving charge account. This reduces our
politics to the form of our domestic economy--a competition between
consumers for the most goods--a Visa Card Politics, if one could bring
forward a new category appropriate to the times. Nobody minds
everyone else having a high line of credit because everyone has a high
line of credit. But this is a delusion: the state is in a fiscal cri-
9.3] The present system works to blur controversy and hide
meaningful choices behind a facade of widely dispensed material goods.
Further, by granting every interested party much of what he asks for.
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if postpones the day of making hard choices between alternatives. As
long as there is enough to go around, the system will be o.k. But now
we are entering a new phase: there is no longer "enough" to go around.
Some people want guns, some people want butter. The electoral
majority does not seem to want the state to grow too large. Difficult
choices loom. What puzzles the political theorist in all this is how
such a large proportion of the population ever came to take it for
granted that the government exists to dispense material goods and
soothe them in their time of trouble. Is government like the "nature"
of some 13th century Romantics, an Ever Bountiful Murse, or is it a
way of organizing and empowering people to make decisions about mat-
ters that concern them severally?
9.4] An elaborate legislative procedure has gradually grown up
over a 200 year period, and this has finally replaced the kind of
public interaction and struggle that always used to take place in
parliaments and assembles. We hear no more of rhetoric in the chamber
and, as I indicated earlier, the last place the professional political
scientist goes to learn about Congress is to the floor of Congress.
Hence, it seems that our institutions are evolving: the United States
government is gradually turning into an elected bureaucracy, or at
least a bureaucracy some of the members of which are elected and some
appointed. The politics that animates it has moved out of the well of
Congress and into hundreds and hundreds of small meeting rooms where
the elected and the unelected convene in an atmosphere of mutual
equality and debate together and compromise about budget figures for
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programs that were instituted at the behest of special interests. In
the long run, this is a dangerous form of government, not because some
people get excluded as the left holds, but because the broad general
questions that vitally affect the United States as a whole are not
addressed under this system.
9.5] If I could prove the foregoing conclusively, I would be
quite happy. I would feel as though I "Knew" something definite about
the nature of the contemporary Congress. Instead, however, as is
usually the case in such matters, the preceding judgment is not abso-
lute. It is, as Aristotle has led us to expect, something of the
nature of more and less. For example. Congress does manage to raise
the broad questions, even though it moves ponderously and may take
years to do so. It is finally moving on toxic waste; it passed a
nuclear freeze resolution; it is debating trade and tariff barriers
with all of the intensity that it did before the Civil War; it has
real free-for-alls on the question of Federal budget deficits and the
balances between defense and social spending; it is moving toward con-
taining Adminstration policy in Central America; it is at work on
legislation to control and regulate immigration; it is deregulating
the banking and other industries.
10.0] Note that Aristptle's concept of a political community
as a koinonia embraced the notion of a kind of communitarian synthesis
of interests, rather than an aggregation of conflicting aims held
together by a circle of power. The koinonia is based upon ethical and
political assumptions shared by the community, and it is clear that if
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the synthetic acts of the assembly are to have meaning for the whole
polis, the notions held in common must go beyond procedure and include
the substance of general questions.
10.1] We find that in American society today, a pattern of
conflicting ideas about justice itself now comes forward in the public
realm. Hence we will encounter logical and political objections to
any claim that the outcome of Congressional debates is or could be the
kind of synthesis that was traditionally equated with a canmon
interest. But perhaps we have drawn the implications and purposes of
the public space somewhat too narrowly: as we have seen, to say that
the public space makes the emergence of the common interest possible
is not the same thing as saying that every decision taken there will
reflect the common interest in substance. Perhaps the common interest
is also reflected in the procedures followed there: in bargaining and
tradeoffs, as well as in unitary decisions. Hence the reluctance to
advocate abandoning pluralism, and the need to add to it.
Altogether, this would make "the common interest" a multipli-
city rather than a unity, and include questions of procedure as well
as of substance under its rubric. Thus it would emerge as an indeter-
minate concept, something that could not be defined a priori before
the actual debates got under way. Taking the "common interest" as an
indeterminate concept which combines substantive as well as procedural
matters in a process prone to influence by the best and worst of human
impulses, and not as a standard to which political actors might be
expected to adhere, leaves the student of politics on firm ground, I
think.
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